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INTRODUCTION 
COLIN FILER 
For Policy that Works 
This book, unl ike many others of its kind, does not contain the proceedings of an 
academic conference, but represents one part of the outcome of a long and rather 
tortuous series of conversations and negotiations between the editor, the 
contributors, the sponsors, and a considerable number of other people who may 
be counted as ' intel lectual stakeholders ' in PNG's  forest pol icy process. This 
introduction wil l  therefore trace the h istory of these conversations and 
negotiations in order to reveal the logic which lies behind the form and content of 
this particular collection of essays, and also the 'miss ing l inks' in this chain of 
reasoning which (we hope) wi l l  soon be fil led by other publ ications. 
In September 1 994, the International Institute for Environment and 
Development (IIED) proposed a comparative study of forest pol icy to be funded 
by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the UK Overseas 
Development Administration. The project was entitled 'Pol icy That Works for 
Forests and People' ,  and its overall goal, as formulated in consultation with the 
funding agencies, was ' to improve understanding and practice of policy 
processes, so that they improve the sustainabi l ity of forest management and 
optimise stakeholder benefits ' (IIED l 995b:2) .  It was understood from the outset 
that this project would involve a number of 'collaborative country case studies ' ,  
but a further process of consultation was required in order to identify the 
countries to be chosen for this purpose . In early November, the IIED made its 
first approaches to research institutions in Papua New Guinea (PNG), including 
the National Research Institute (NRI), in order to assess their wil l ingness and 
abi l ity to be involved in such a study, and received a generally favourable 
response. 
When I joined the NRI in January 1 995 ,  it was sti l l  not clear whether PNG 
would be one of the countries selected for a case study, even though we knew 
that the IIED was keen to make this choice because of its previous involvement 
in the country's  National Forestry and Conservation Action Programme 
(NAFCAP). 1 S ince thi s  programme had absorbed a great deal of intellectual 
effort over the previous five years, as wel l  as a substantial amount of financial 
support from the donor community, the time was ripe for the NRI to make its 
own input to the assessment of that programme in its capacity as the 
government' s  ' th ink tank' on matters of social and economic pol icy. One of my 
1 The I IED had provided one of the consultants who participated in PNG's Tropical Forestry 
Action Plan Review in 1 989 (see Sargent 1 989; World Bank 1 989), and subsequently provided 
counterpart support to the NGO Specialist in the four-person Technical Support Team which 
assisted in the implementation of the Action Programme (see Mayers and Peutalo 1 995). 
2 The Political Economy of Forest Management in Papua New Guinea 
new col leagues, Tahereh Nadarajah ,  had been making her own contribution to 
this assessment in a series of NRI discussion papers (Nadarajah l 993a, l 993b, 
1 994 ), and other NRI staff had also been engaged in the study of specific projects 
or issues in the forestry sector (see Fernando and Nen 1 99 1 ;  Temu, Gumoi and 
Kanari 1 994 ) , but the Institute had not produced a monograph on the subject of 
forestry or forest conservation s ince 1 982, when it had been the moving force 
behind a conference on the contemporary relevance of traditional conservation 
practices (Morauta, Pernetta and Heaney 1 982). We therefore decided to seek 
expressions of interest from potential contributors to a monograph whose 
provisional title was The Sociology and Politics of Forestry in Papua New 
Guinea. 
We discussed this proposal with James Mayers of the IIED when he v isited 
PNG in April 1 995,  and in l ight of these discussions, we decided to amend the 
title to The Political Economy of Forest Management in Papua New Guinea. At 
this stage, it seemed almost certain that PNG would indeed be one of the 
countries selected for a case study of ' Pol icy that Works for Forests and People ' ,  
and we therefore tried to address the contents of  the monograph to  the IIED' s  
own draft guidelines for  the production of  such case studies. We therefore 
planned to divide our monograph into three parts : 
1 .  The National Forest Management Policy Process. 
2. The Negotiation and Impact of Large-Scale Logging Projects. 
3. Local Conservation and Sustainable Development Initiatives . 
The first part was intended to deal with the recent h istory of forest industry and 
forest conservation pol icy at the national level, and thus represent a further 
reflection on the lessons learnt from the NAFCAP.2 The second part was meant 
to supplement the very small volume of existing l iterature deal ing with 
relationships between rural communities and logging contractors,3 while the 
third was meant to reflect on the experiences of staff and consultants engaged in 
the design and implementation of several ' integrated conservation and 
development' (ICAD) projects in PNG.4 
2 The NAFCAP had been reviewed by  a team of  four consultants at the end of  1 994 (Taylor e t  al .  
1 994 ), but their work had been completed in some haste, and had not been officially published by 
the United Nations Development Programme. 
3 At this time the only substantial published accounts of such relationships by social scientists 
were Colin De'Ath 's  study of the Gogol timber project (De'Ath 1 979, 1 980) and Daniela Renner's 
study of the Kumil timber project (Renner 1 990), both of which are located in Madang Province. 
Some additional material was avai lable in shorter publications by Waiko ( 1 977), Mitio ( 1 984), 
Deklin ( 1 992), and Sagir ( 1 994), and these have since been supplemented by those of Kaspou 
( 1 996), Lotu ( 1 996), and Wood ( l 996a, l 996b ). 
4 A meeting of ICAD project personnel took place at the Christensen Research Institute in 
Madang towards the end of April 1 995 (see James 1 996) . 
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By June 1 995 , staff of the IIED's Forestry and Land Use Programme had 
completed the l iterature review which constituted the first phase of their project 
on 'Policy that Works for Forests and People' (IIED 1 995a), and were ready to 
host a workshop to p lan the case studies of forest policy in six countries - Costa 
Rica, Ghana, Z imbabwe, India, Pakistan and PNG. The PNG 'delegation' to this 
workshop comprised myself, Nikhi l  Sekhran and Brian Brunton. Nikhi l  was the 
Resource Economist attached to the Biodiversity Conservation and Resource 
Management Programme in the Department of Environment and Conservation, 
whi le Brian had a long record of involvement in the national forest pol icy 
process, both as a lawyer and an activist in some of PNG's more radical non­
government organisations (NGOs ). 5 In our own contributions to the workshop, 
we painted a rather gloomy picture of past and present attempts to reconcile the 
aspirations of PNG's  people with the conservation of PNG's forests. Despite the 
money, time, and effort which had been poured into the NAFCAP since its 
inception in 1 990, the capacity of _the national government and the international 
community to ach ieve the goal of ' sustainable forest management' was limited, 
both by the dynamics of PNG's pol itical system and by the crucial fact that 99 
percent of all forested land is owned and control led by communities of 
customary landowners, whose attitudes and behaviour are not normally amenable 
to any form of centralised control .  Nor could we reasonably claim that any 
further addition to the smal l mountain of documents which the NAFCAP had 
already deposited in the middle of this forest would have any significant impact 
on its real guardians in a country where very few people read anything except the 
Bible and the daily newspaper. 
These considerations weighed heavi ly on our minds when we came to 
reconsider the organisation of the PNG country study after our return from 
Britain, especially because our sponsors in the IIED were clearly concerned that 
we should try to secure a high level of ' participation' on the part of local pol icy 
makers. We therefore made a number of changes in the form and content of our 
proposed monograph to take account of the relationship between customary land 
tenure, the distribution of academic expertise, and the nature of the national 
policy process. The tripartite d ivision of the study was rearranged as follows: 
1 .  The Negotiation and Impact of Large-Scale Logging Projects . 
2. Conservation and Sustainable Development Initiatives. 
3. The National Forest Management Policy Process. 
This revision was intended to reflect the fact that local project negotiations in 
PNG are generally not the outcome or reflection of decisions taken at the national 
5 Brian had produced a 'Critique of the World Bank's Tropical Forestry Action Plan Review for 
Papua New Guinea' (Brunton 1 990) when he was still Chairman of the PNG Law Reform 
Commission, but had since spent some time in Australia before returning to help found an NGO 
called the Individual Community Rights and Advocacy Forum (ICRAF), which combined legal aid 
with public awareness campaigns. 
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level, but rather that the national pol icy process represents a contradictory (and 
often a seemingly hypocritical) balancing act between the pol itics of the 
Melanesian vi l lage, on the one hand, and the pol itics of the global economy and 
international community of aid donors, on the other. The study would therefore 
proceed by considering: 
• first, the way that different stakeholders have contributed to the negotiation, 
operation, and impact of specific local logging projects in the period since the 
final report of the Barnett lnquiry6 and the Tropical Forestry Action Plan 
(TF AP) rev iew process of 1 989; 
• second, the design and implementation of specific ( local and national) 
'alternatives' to the destructive logging practices which seem to be sustained 
by the balance of interests previously described; and 
• third, the actual and potential re levance and coherence of a distinctively 
'national ' pol icy process which seeks to encompass and transform the general 
relationship between PNG' s  people and their forests. 
At the same time, we were sti l l  wondering how to deal with the aftermath of 
the whole TFAP/NAFCAP process, in which substantial funding from PNG's 
traditional a id donors had so palpably enhanced the weight of expert expatriate 
opinion in the formation of national forest policy, even if, at the end of the day, 
the impact of their fleeting presence was diminish ing quite rapidly. We therefore 
aimed to amend the study format in ways which would expand the number and 
variety of participants beyond the range of those who had the time and 
incl ination to write a chaptP'" for an academic monograph . We could see two 
ways to achieve th is goal: 
• If the first two sections of the monograph were sti l l  to contain a number of 
substantial written contributions by individuals with detailed inside 
knowledge of specific local or national projects, these writings m ight be 
supplemented by shorter criticisms or commentaries by other individuals who 
had an equal ly detai led knowledge of these projects, but viewed them from a 
different perspective, and some whole 'chapters' might even consist of a 
series of short sections written by different authors. 
• The appearance of ' dialogue ' (and unfinished argument) might then be 
ampl ified in the third section, dealing with the national pol icy process, where 
6 In April 1 987, the PNG government appointed an Australian member of the local judiciary, 
Justice Thomas ( 'Tos ' )  Barnett, to conduct a Commission of Inquiry into al legations of impropriety 
against the executives of the Forest Industries Council, and to assess the respective roles of the 
Council, the Minister, and the Department of Forests in the marketing of timber. Over the course of 
the next two years, the Commission produced seven interim reports and one final report, whose 
revelations of malpractice were instrumental in forcing the government to initiate a major process 
of policy reform. Barnett ( 1 992) has provided an excel lent summary of his own findings and 
recommendations. 
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the bulk of the material would consist of transcribed interview sessions with 
those 'key players ' in the pol icy process who were unl ikely to produce written 
contributions of their own . 
This meant, in effect, that four different roles would be made avai lable for 
individuals to participate in the study process: ' contributors' (or primary authors) 
would write substantial p ieces for the monograph; 'commentators' (or secondary 
authors) would write shorter p ieces, including responses to those written by the 
primary authors; ' interviewers ' would be engaged to design and put questions to 
key players in the national pol icy process; and 'respondents' would be those key 
players who agreed to participate in such interviews. 
By this time, we had also come to realise that the proposed monograph and 
the country study required by the IIED would probably not be the same 
document, that the former would be considerably longer than the latter, and that 
these two products would be designed for different audiences. Nevertheless, we 
were stil l  working on the assumption that the country study would most probably 
consist of edited extracts from the monograph or summaries of some of its 
findings. 
At this point, the organisation of the study became the collective 
responsibi l ity of a 'Core Group'  which comprised myself, Nikhi l  Sekhran, Brian 
Brunton, and a fourth member, Basi l  Peutalo, who had previously worked as the 
NGO Special ist in the UNDP-funded NAFCAP Technical Support Team, but 
who was now employed by the World Wildl ife Fund. The main task of the Core 
Group was to establ ish a timetable of activities and a division of labour which 
would lead to the completion of both monograph and country study in the latter 
part of 1 996. Specific provision had to be made for: 
• the design of a 'framework of analysis '  for circulation to the main 
contributors to the first two parts of the monograph; 
• the organisation of a local p lanning workshop, whose participants would 
frame the questions, and identify the potential respondents to be interviewed, 
on matters of forest pol icy; 
• the approval of a budget which the IIED would make avai lable for various 
aspects of this work. 
In practice, I was the only member of the group whose own terms of employment 
created the time required to make a substantial input into the organisation of the 
study, and this state of affairs was recognised in the NRI ' s  assumption of 
responsibi l ity for the overall administration of the project. Nevertheless, a 
process of consultation with other group members was put in place, and this was 
periodically reinforced when James Mayers made one of his occasional visits 
from London . 
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The Framework of Analysis 
Nikhi l  Sekhran and I met to discuss a draft framework of analysis for the first 
two parts of the monograph towards the end of August 1 995,  on the 
understanding that I would take the main burden of responsibility for soliciting 
and coordinating contributions to Part One ( 'The Negotiation and Impact of 
Large-Scale Logging Projects ' ), while he would assume an equivalent 
responsibil ity for Part Two ( 'Conservation and Sustainable Development 
Initiatives') .  This framework of analysis was incorporated into different versions 
of a project document which were circulated to potential contributors and other 
interested parties between October 1 995 and February 1 996. 
The framework of analysis for Part One began with a discussion of the gap 
in the existing body of l iterature which this monograph was partly intended to 
fi l l .  
Despite the physical extent of  logging, the political influence of  the 
timber industry, and its contribution to national exports and revenues, 
much less is known about the political history and social impact of 
individual logging projects than is known about the political history and 
social impact of mining and petroleum projects in PNG. This 
discrepancy is partly due to the difference in the levels of investigation 
required by statute and government regulation, partly to differences in 
the 'public relations' strategies of the major companies involved in 
these industries, and partly to differences in the amount of interest 
which these two types of development have aroused in academic 
circles. As a result, it is difficult to make an assessment of the relative 
significance of the national policy process and a multitude of local 
'pol icy processes' in the forestry sector on anything but an anecdotal 
basis, or by making generalisations from the few case studies which 
have been undertaken, some of which are now seriously outdated. 
The aim was to remedy this deficiency by assembling a number of case studies 
from different parts of the country, each of which would be designed to produce 
data which would be both contemporaneous and mutual ly comparable. 
In order to achieve this kind of comparabil ity, contributors to this part of the 
monograph were asked to consider the fol lowing questions: 
1 .  What have been the main turning points or crucial decisions which have 
affected the 'development' of this project (or set of projects) and thus 
constitute its policy process? 
2. Who are the main stakeholders (both groups and individuals) who have either 
contributed to, or been affected by, these decisions, and what can be said 
about their respective interests, policies, plans, strategies, or motives? 
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3 .  What have the various 'local' stakeholders gained or lost from this process in 
(a) wealth, (b) power, and (c) knowledge ( including their perception of 
' development' itself and of other people ' s  interests and motives)? 
4. To what extent, and in what ways, has the local pol icy process surrounding 
this project (or set of projects) influenced the national pol icy process, and 
vice versc;t? 
Our aim was to secure at least s ix chapters altogether, with at least two projects 
from each of the three coastal regions of PNG. An examination of the eight 
chapters which are now included in Part One of the present volume shows that 
we have accomplished this goal (see Map 1 . 1  ), though we cannot claim that these 
case studies represent the ful l  range of local stakeholder relationships throughout 
the forestry sector. 7 
Our framework of analysis for what was then to be Part Two of the 
monograph originated in some of the 'unfinished business' which remained after 
completion of the Papua New Guinea Country Study on Biological Diversity 
(Sekhran and Miller 1 994 ), which had been prepared by the Department of 
Environment and Conservation for the first Conference of the Parties to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity. Despite the wealth of PNG's  biodiversity 
heritage, and the importance of its contribution to the subsistence base of the 
rural population, this endowment is currently under threat from various 
unsustainable forms of land use, for which a number of separate causes can be 
identified: 
• the dislocation of forest-edge communities from traditional culture, and their 
purposeful or forced absorption into a cash economy in which they are not 
wel l  equipped to participate, which then serves as an incentive to sel l  their 
forest resource to the highest bidder; 
• the 'dependency syndrome' that afflicts many rural communities, which 
partly originates in the 'development determinism ' of both colonial and post­
colonial administrations, and which reduces the capacity for self-reliance; 
• economic factors, such as h igh interest rates and the lack of resource pricing, 
which serve as disincentives for sound resource stewardship; 
• corruption in political circles, both at local and national levels, and the 
existence of patron-client relationships that have to be serviced through 
largesse; 
• the opportunistic behaviour of many developers, fuel led by rent-seeking 
opportunities and the limited effectiveness of state regulation; 
7 Given the fact that West New Britain Province currently accounts for approximately half of all 
the logs exported from PNG, we were very keen to secure an additional case study from this 
province in order to supplement Gary Simpson 's  more general account, but this did not eventuate. 
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• population growth, beyond the ' carrying capacity' of some local 
environments, and a consequent increase in the intensity of resource 
util isation; and 
• the introduction of new technologies, such as firearms, which adversely affect 
natural systems. 
Although the earlier country study investigated some of these pressures, we 
thought that further attention should now be given to some of the practical 
questions which arise in the pursuit of conservation values in PNG. Such 
questions are addressed in five of the chapters now contained in Part Three of the 
present volume. 
It may be noted here that the design of this discussion had already departed 
from our original intention to focus attention on a number of local 'conservation 
and sustainable development initiatives '  within PNG, for only one of the chapters 
in Part Three of the present volume (by Arlyne Johnson) has a local focus (see 
Map 1 . 1 ), while four others are concerned with PNG as a whole, and one (by 
John Leedom) i l lustrates the difference between the practical pursuit of 
conservation values in PNG and its next-door neighbour, Irian Jaya.8 Although 
we sti l l  believe in the desirabi lity of a comparative evaluation of the efforts being 
made by government and non-governmental organisations to establ ish and 
manage ICAD projects in different parts of PNG, it is sti l l  too early to assess the 
success and the sustainabi lity of some of these initiatives, so we hope to revisit 
this subject in a separate monograph to be publ ished at a later date. 
The second part of the present volume does not contain the dialogue on 
national forest policy which we had hoped, in our earl ier scheme, to construct out 
of transcribed interview sessions with ' key players' in the pol icy process. 
Instead, it consists of a number of chapters, written from widely different 
perspectives, on the political economy of the forest industry, which fil l  some of 
the gaps left by our initial distinction between a series of local case studies of 
'forest exploitation' and a series of chapters on various aspects of the national 
'conservation industry ' .  Even in the original framework of analysis for Part One, 
it was recognised that add itional chapters on the logging industry as a whole 
might be included, where these would throw useful l ight on the analysis of 
specific projects . For example, my own collection of statistical information on 
the log export industry (Chapter I 0) was originally canvassed as a method of 
supplying relevant facts and figures to the authors of the local case studies. 
Discussion with Yoichi Kuroda of the Japan Tropical Forest Action Network in 
September 1 995 led us to recognise that some attention should ideally be paid to 
the political economy of tropical timber consumption in the major markets for 
8 The Core Group felt that this chapter would provide an important counterpoint to the rest of the 
study, precisely because the physical and traditional cultural similarities between the two parts of 
New Guinea are offset by such stark differences in property rights and the power of the state to 
determine the use of natural resources. 
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PNG' s  timber exports, and hence to our eventual request for Anja Light 's  
contribution to the present volume .  And another 'chance' meeting with Rod 
Taylor in November 1 995 afforded us the opportunity to solicit a discussion of 
the legal framework of the forest industry from one of the key players in the 
recent process of legal and institutional reform in the forestry sector (see Chapter 
1 1 .). At the same time, it should be noted that this part of the monograph omits 
any detailed discussion of at least three issues on which we had originally hoped 
to include separate chapters - the production of national and provincial forest 
plans, the costs and benefits of 'downstream processing' ,  and the barely visible 
question of gender equity in the forestry sector. 
The final shape of Part Two has thus developed in an incremental, and 
sometimes accidental, fashion, even as we were sometimes tempted to revert to 
our original distinction between studies of 'exploitation ' and 'conservation' -
whether at local, national, or regional levels - or even to use the distinction 
between these three levels of analysis as the basis for an alternative tripartite 
division.9 The division we have chosen must remain, to some extent, an 
arbitrary one .  This is especially true of the l ine which we have drawn between 
the second and third parts of the monograph, where chapters such as those by 
Anja Light, Ron Martin, John Mil lett, Hartmut Holzknecht and Bas Louman can 
obviously be construed as discussions of both the 'forest industry' and the 
practical ach ievement of 'conservation values '  or ' sustainable development' .  
The final division between these two parts has thus been motivated primari ly by 
our conception of the mutual relationship between the chapters which each one 
contains. 
Unfinished Business 
Although the monograph in its present form presents a broad spectrum of 
evidence and opinion on the political economy of forest management in PNG, 
written from a combination of academic and non-academic perspectives, it 
clearly fails to embody that appearance of participation and dialogue which we 
had sought to achieve by conducting interviews with ' key players' in the national 
policy process and appending written commentaries on some or all of the 
chapters which it contains. I should therefore briefly explain how we have tried, 
9 The distinction between forest exploitation and forest conservation would have reflected the 
bureaucratic division between the PNG Forest Authority (formerly Department of Forests) and the 
Department of Environment and Conservation, and between their respective interests and projects 
within the NAFCAP, but would have distorted the conceptions of forest management held by other 
major stakeholders - most notably the customary owners of the forest. A tripartite division 
between local, national, and regional studies would have left us with an unbalanced collection of 
papers, in which the regional context of forest management in PNG would not seem to have 
received the attention which it deserved. Some might argue that this is indeed one of the 
deficiencies in the volume as it stands, but it needs to be remembered that our sponsors in the IIED 
were primarily concerned that we should produce the basis for a 'country study' which focussed on 
the l inkages between local and national dimensions of the pol icy process. 
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and are stil l  trying, to achieve this goal, and the manner in which we now 
propose to complete this task outside the framework of this monograph. 
In January 1 996, a two-day Planning Workshop was held to finalise the 
design of the interview programme which was expected to produce the material 
for what was then to be the third and final part of the monograph. Participants 
were drawn from a range of occupations and institutions, on the understanding 
that this was not an exercise in the formulation of forest policy, but an attempt to 
determine the most cost-effective way of canvassing the full range of local 
knowledge and opinion about the workings of the PNG forest policy process -
both the nature of the decision-making process which affects the use of forest 
resources, and the factors, motives, and values that influence the decisions which 
are made.10 Workshop participants defined six major groups of ' stakeholders ' in 
the policy process - politicians, public servants, industry, NGOs, donors, and 
109al landowners (or resource owners}, and then designed a number of key 
questions to be put to representative members of each category. It was 
recognised that interview techniques would only be appropriate for members of 
the first five stakeholder groups, and that a different approach would have to be 
adopted in order to canvass the diverse range of 'grassroots' community or 
landowner opinion in PNG.  The participants therefore decided that this latter 
task would need to be undertaken indirectly, by designing a survey instrument 
which would be distributed to a stratified sample of social scientists and 
university students who should be able to describe the views held in those rural 
communities with which they are especially famil iar. I I 
For each of the first five stakeholder groups, workshop participants made a 
provisional l isting of approximately one dozen 'key players ' whose perceptions 
and opinions would represent the diversity of experience and influence within 
that group. Some attention was also paid to the problem of recruiting 
interviewers who would have the interest and abil ity to capture these perceptions 
and opinions on tape. S ince then, several attempts have been made to organise 
and implement an effective interview strategy, but progress has been very slow, 
primarily because we decided that the pol iticians would have to be the first group 
I O Apart from James Mayers and members of the Core group, the workshop was attended by some 
of the other contributors to the present volume (Arlyne Johnson, Bas Louman, Fadzilah Majid 
Cooke, John Millett, Michael Wood), and also by : Joe Gabut (private lawyer), John Geno and 
Bruce Jefferies (Department of Environment and Conservation), Ngen Isana (Institute of Publ ic 
Administration), Joe Ka'au (Greenpeace), Dike Kari (National Forest Service), Norlie Miskaram 
and Vincent Warakai (University of PNG), Carol l  Poyep (Conservation Melanesia), and Hans­
Martin Schoel l  (Melanesian Institute). 
I l This approach was previously used in Marilyn Strathern' s  study of local variation in the 
classification and punishment of sexual offences. In 1 973, she circulated a questionnaire on this 
subject to 1 97 social scientists, mostly social anthropologists, who had conducted or were sti l l  
conducting field research in Papua New Guinea. Her ( 1 975) report on the results of this survey 
includes a discussion of the drawbacks and advantages of this method of study, as wel l as the text 
of the survey instrument itself. 
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to be interviewed. This decision was based on our recognition of the l ikelihood 
that pol iticians would become increasingly inaccessible with the approach of the 
next national election (scheduled for June 1 997), and also on the assumption that 
their ' real ' perceptions and opinions might be difficult to disentangle from those 
which are normally offered for public cons.umption on the floor of Parliament or 
through the local media. 
More progress has been made in our efforts to canvass the range of 
' landowner' perceptions and opinions through the design and distribution of a 
'Rural Community Survey Form ' which contains a number of open-ended 
questions on various 'forest management issues' .  This survey instrument �as 
designed in Apri l 1 996, and then despatched to a sample of one hundred social 
scientists (mostly anthropologists) who had spent a substantial period of time in a 
specific rural community, and whose research interests were known to have some 
bearing on questions of forest management. 1 2  Multiple copies were also 
distributed to university teachers offering courses which dealt with questions of 
'environment and development' in general, or with questions of forest 
management in particular, and whose students might therefore be encouraged to 
provide information relating to their own communities. 1 3 Some additional 
copies have been circulated to field staff of the Summer Institute of 
Linguistics. 1 4 Although we have had an encouraging response from all three 
sources, it has long since been apparent that we should not have the time or space 
to include an analysis of this material within the pages of the present monograph, 
and so we now hope to produce a separate publication on this subject at a later 
date. 
It took slightly longer for us to reach the same conclusion in respect of the 
interviews with ' key players' in our other five stakeholder groups. Although we 
were soon obl iged to abandon the prospect of completing the full  set of 
interviews envisaged in the January planning workshop by the end of 1 996, we 
thought at one stage that the present volume might sti l l  incorporate a certain 
amount of the material obtained in this way, within a general historical account 
of the evolution of forest pol icy under the last three national governments - the 
Namaliu government ( 1 988-92), the Wingti government ( 1 992-94), and the Chan 
government (from 1 994). Such an account would certainly have taken up several 
chapters within the framework of the present volume, but it would make more 
sense to complete it after the national election of June 1 997, which wil l  constitute 
1 2 We stratified this sample by attempting to select equal numbers of respondents from each of the 
thirty 'biogeographic districts' distinguished in the Papua New Guinea Conservation Needs 
Assessment (Alcorn and Beehler 1 993). 
13 David Mowbray was kind enough to incorporate the survey exercise into the teaching of the 
Environmental Science programme at the University of PNG. 
1 4 This was done at the suggestion of one of our anthropological 'informants' ,  Pat Townsend, who 
had previously worked for both the Summer Institute of Linguistics and for the NRI. Thanks are 
due to David Troolin for facilitating the distribution of these survey forms. 
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an obvious h iatus i n  the national pol icy process. And by that time, the conduct of 
additional stakeholder interviews wil l  hopeful ly provide the basis for a more 
rounded account of decis ions which have been made, and values which have 
been pursued, under all three regimes. 
Meanwhile, most of the contributors to the present volume have clearly 
made use of information which they have gleaned from interviews with 'key 
players' in specific project areas or pol icy domains, and have l ikewise adapted 
their findings in l ight of the comments made by these other stakeholders. The 
absence of the shorter commentaries which we would have liked to append to 
some or al l  of the chapters, l 5 or to each of the three main parts of th is 
monograph, should not be taken to indicate our reluctance to represent the 
diversity of viewpoints within the forest pol icy process, but rather to reflect the 
time which it has taken to assemble all the material which is presented here, and 
the bel ief that this material should be offered as a contribution to further publ ic 
debate before it loses its contemporary relevance. 
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PART ONE 
THE LOCAL POLITICS 
OF LARGE-SCALE 
LOGGING PROJECTS 

CHAPTER 2 
' GET WHAT YOU CAN WHILE YOU CAN' : 
THE LANDOWNER-GOVERNMENT RELATIONSHIP 
IN WEST NEW BRITAIN 
GARY SIMPSON 
Introduction 
This paper presents a case study of the interaction which took place between 
landowner companies, the government of Papua New Guinea (PNG), and foreign 
logging contractors in West New Britain Province, over the implementation of 
the Forestry Act and the government' s  Revenue Guidel ines in 1 993 and 1 994. 
The role of international aid donors and the ir technical advisers in supporting the 
implementation of the Act is also examined. The conclusion is that the national 
government and landowner companies lost over A$ 1 00 mi l l ion in export 
revenue to foreign logging contractors because they were unable to resolve 
equity issues associated with the distribution of forest revenues. This situation 
arose because the participation and equity imperatives of the Forestry Act were 
unachievable and unenforceable in the West New Britain context, and prevented 
the landowners and the government from reach ing agreement on the distribution 
of logging revenues. 
The Project Area 
In 1 982, West New Britain was estimated to contain about 25 percent of PNG's  
commercial timber reserves, with most of  this being located in  the Kandrian and 
Gloucester districts. There were only two logging companies operating in the 
province at that time - the Japanese-owned Stettin Bay Lumber Company 
(SBLC) and a Korean company, Nam Yang. Both companies held timber 
permits over areas in which the government had acquired the timber rights from 
local landowners through a Timber Rights Purchase (TRP), and then, by way of 
international tender, had sold these rights to a logging contractor in return for a 
resource rent and a package of social, economic, and infrastructural benefits . 
The agreement with SBLC had a profound influence on the landowners and 
provincial pol iticians of West New Britain .  Under the terms of its timber 
permit, SBLC cleared land and established roads, bridges, schools, markets, and 
housing faci l ities in the B ial la and Hoskins districts . This infrastructure 
attracted another foreign investor (Harrison and Crossfield) to establish an oi l  
palm industry in a joint venture with the national government. Th is project 
increased income and employment opportunities for local landowners and 
settlers, contributed to provincial revenues through royalty payments, and 
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provided the national government with a major source of foreign exchange from 
the export of palm o i l .  
The early success of  the B ia l l a  and Hoskins o i l  palm schemes stimu lated 
interest throughout the province in uti l i s ing the local forest resource as the bas is  
for agricu ltural and infrastructural development. 1 Nowhere was there more 
enthusiasm for th is  approach than among the rural popu lation of the Kandrian 
and Gloucester d istricts . These d istricts had few a l l-weather roads, l im ited 
shipping services, poorly maintained ai rstrips, di lapidated school s  and aidposts, 
poor water suppl ies, and few opportun ities to market thei r  produce . Rural 
people suffered from poor heal.th, and had lower educational qual ifications than 
people in other parts of the prov ince. 
In  response to commun ity and pol itical pressure, the West New Britain  
Provincial Government put forward a proposal to  the national government in  
1 988 to  repl icate the B ia l la and Hoskins experience in the Kandrian and 
Gloucester d istricts. The proposal was for a A$44 m i l l ion investment 
programme to develop agricu ltural (main ly cocoa) estates and associated 
infrastructure throughout both d i stricts . Investment funds were to be raised 
through the acqu is it ion and a l location of new TRP areas, thus ensuring that the 
government would  have a significant measure of control over the col lection and 
distribution of the revenues.  
Landowner Companies and Local Forest Agreements 
At the same time as the prov ince was final i s ing its development strategy for the 
Kandrian and G loucester d istricts, the national Min ister for Forests (Karl Stack) 
began to al low groups of landowners to make logging agreements independently 
of the state under the Forestry (Private Dealings) Act. These deal ings between 
landowners and logging contractors were framed with in  Local Forest Area 
(LFA) agreements. The LFA mechan ism al lowed landowners to form a 
landowner company and negotiate a Logging and Marketing Agreement (LMA) 
directly with a logging contractor. The LF A simply required the approval of the 
Min ister.2 
I Since the late 1 980s, the B ialla and Hoskins schemes have become the focus of increasing social 
unrest between local landowners and resettlement block-holders from other provinces. 
2 Under Section 4 of the Forestry (Private Dealings) Act, the Minister's declaration of a Local 
Forest Area al lowed the customary owners to sell or dispose of timber and related rights to any 
person, including non-citizens, but an agreement for the sale of timber was of no force or effect 
until it too had received the Minister's assent. Once it had received this assent, a landowner 
company or its contractor could carry out forestry operations in that area without having to obtain a 
Timber Permit under the Forestry Act. 
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The decis ion by the Min ister to al low logging under LF A agreements 
proved to be exceptiona l ly popular with landowners and logging contractors. It 
al lowed them to expedite logging operations and avoid government scrutiny of 
the ir  LMAs. Landowner groups in the Kandrian and Gloucester d istricts, with 
the active support of logging contractors, were quick to seize the initiative and 
pr.essure the Min ister i nto declaring LFAs (see Map 2 . 1 ). 
The deci s ion by the Minister to declare LF As effectively derai led the 
provincial government ' s  strategy of financing a development programme 
through the use  of TRP revenues. At the po lit ical level  with in the province, 
there was l ittle concern over the Min ister 's  actions. Most provincial pol itic ians  
were also landowners, and were actively involved in setting up their own 
landowner companies and negotiating with the Minister for LFAs. 
Prov incial publ ic servants, on the other hand, were extremely d issatisfied. 
Whereas the TRP mechanism empowered government officers in  the decis ion­
making and resource al location process, the LF A mechan ism marginal i sed them. 
Under an LFA, the landowner companies were given control over forest 
revenues, and hence the power to d irect investment strategies. The enthusiasm 
for landowner company and LF A arrangements on the part of landowners was 
also fuel led- by their  mistrust of, and continual frustration with, the government. 
Dependency on, and control by, successive colonial, national ,  and provinc ial 
governments had stripped rural populations of their identity and traditional 
power base . Landowner companies were seen by many rural people as a 
mechanism for estab l ishing control over local social and economic i ssues and 
promoting a truly self-re l iant commun ity. 
In  sum, the wi l l i ngness of the national Min ister for Forests to faci l itate 
LFAs led to a fundamental sh ift in the balance of power between government 
and commun ity groups in the Kandrian and G loucester d istricts of West New 
Britain .  The LF As empowered landowner compan ies to negotiate directly with 
logging contractors and to develop LMAs which had the potential to del iver 
s ignificant benefits to the landowner company and its members . 
Landowner Company Structures and Contracts 
By 1 989, four landowner companies had been establ ished in the Kandrian and 
Gloucester d istricts. Although landowner companies were emerging as the 
dominant expression of commun ity act iv ity, it soon became apparent that there 
was considerable variation in their structure and representation . The basic  
model used in forming landowner compan ies was an adaptation of the practice 
used by the Department of Forests in framing TRPs. For the proposed timber 
area, customary landowner groups were defined, members recorded, and 
landowner representatives selected . Fol lowing these procedures, landowning 
groups would incorporate with in a company structure . 
In practice, landowner compan ies were formed without adequate attention 
to the recording of landowner groups or to the e lection of landowner 
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representatives. Landowner company d irectors were for the most part self­
appointed, and most had no previous experience in company management or 
procedures. 
The lack of a representative structure, community consultation, and basic 
ski l ls in business management severely l im ited the capacity of landowner 
companies to negotiate favourable LMAs with logging contractors. The LMA 
specified the responsib i l ities of the landowner company and the logging 
contractor. It also determined the nature and extent of logging operations, 
allocated respons ib i l ity for compliance, and establ ished the formulae for the 
distribution of proceeds from the sale of the logs. 
In 1 989, a review was undertaken of the LMAs of the four landowner 
companies which were operating in the Kandrian and G loucester di stricts 
(personal communication, Gordon McNei l ,  1 990).3 Th is review revealed that 
the LMAs, for the most part, s ignificantly disadvantaged landowner companies 
in their share of logging revenues as against forest management and service 
provision responsib i l it ies. 
The figures shown in Table 2 . 1 reflect the typical logging margins 
negotiated by landowner companies under the LMAs during this period . Based 
on an average annual cut of 70,000 cubic metres per LF A, the net return to the 
logging contractor was estimated at A$ l .064 mi l l ion, with the landowner 
company receiving A$3 3 6  OOO. 
Table 2. 1 :  Typical logging margins negotiated by West New Britain landowner 
companies in 1 989 ( in Austral ian dol lars) .  
Item 
Gross Revenue at $100/m3 f.o.b. 
Export tax 
Royalties to landowners 
Provincial government levy 
LOC agricultural fund 
LOC commercial dev 't  fund 
Operating costs 
Total expenses 
Net income 
Landowner 
Company 
28.0 
1 5 .0 
6 .6 
0.6 
1 .0 
23.2 
4.8 
Source: Personal communication, Gordon McNeil ,  1 993.  
Logging 
Contractor 
72.0 
2 .6  
1 .2 
5 3 .0 
56.8 
15.2 
The review also revealed that landowner companies were substantial ly in 
debt to logging contractors for start-up costs involving unspecified payments to 
3 The review was part of a prefeasibility study conducted by the Australian International 
Development Assistance Bureau (AIDAB) which formed the basis for the Kandrian-Gloucester 
Integrated Rural Development Project (KGIDP). 
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indiv iduals and landowner groups. The deduction of these costs considerably 
reduced the overal l v iab i l ity of the landowner company and its  development 
funds. Each of the four landowner companies had s igned agreements in  which 
the landowner company, and not the logging contractor, was responsible for 
meeting the forest management gu ide l ines of the Department of Forests. Hence, 
any breach of regu lations by the logging contractor was legal ly the responsib i l ity 
of the landowner corn pany. 
S im i larly, in the case of infrastructure and service prov is ion, two of the four 
landowner companies had s igned agreements in wh ich basic infrastructure 
development such as roads, bridges, wharves, and education and health services 
were the respons ib i l ity of the landowner company. Subsequent investigation 
revealed that few landowner company d irectors had ever sighted the contents of 
the agreements they had s igned. 
From the review findings, it was c lear that landowner companies were 
unable to negotiate meaningfu l and equ itable LMAs with logging contractors, 
and were unable to superv i se the ir operations. Whi le  landowners were 
benefiting from royalty payments from the sale of their  timber, and some 
landowner compan ies were accumulating funds in their  business and agricu ltural 
trust accounts, the i r  re lative share of logging revenues was m inimal .  
The original intention of landowner company d irectors had been to engage 
the logging contractor under the management structure of the landowner 
company. However, the real ity was that landowner compan ies were being 
d irected by the logging contractor, particu larly in the performance of the LMA, 
and especial ly on financial matters. 
National Government Intervention 
The largesse of the M in i ster for Forests in declaring LF As was not restricted to 
West New Britain . LFAs had become the hal lmark of the forest industry 
throughout PNG in the m id to late 1 980s. However, the inequ ity in the 
agreements, and the loss of substantial revenue to landowners and the state, 
prompted the national government to in itiate an inquiry into the forest industry. 
The report of the Barnett Inquiry (Barnett 1 989c) detai led a 1 itany of corruption, 
malpractice, environmental degradation, and inefficiency. Barnett noted that, if  
these problems were a l lowed to remain unchecked, they would lead to the 
irrevers ib le depletion of PNG' s  forest resources, with consequent environmental 
and social problems and lost economic opportun ity. 
The Barnett Inquiry, and the high profi le  wh ich rainforest management 
issues were accorded among PNG' s  pri ncipal aid donors, prompted the national 
government to seek ass istance with review and development of its forest pol i cy. 
Several donors, notably the World Bank and Austral ia, p ledged support to PNG 
under the National Forestry and Conservation Action Programme.4 Th is  
4 The name was changed from the original National Forestry Action Plan in 1 99 1 .  
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programme sought to provide a framework for the national government and 
donors to formulate an econom ical ly viable and ecological ly sustainable forest 
management programme.  
One of the first outcomes of this programme was the passage of a new 
Forestry Act in 1 99 1 ,  which sought to re-establ ish national government control 
over the forest industry and landowner company operations in the form of 
revised forest agreements. 5 The Act provided for the establ i shment of a PNG 
Forest Authority managed by a National Forest Board with a range of industry, 
landowner, and government representatives (see Taylor, th is  volume). Techn ical 
committees were to be estab l i shed to adv ise the board . The Act effectively 
recentral ised control of the forest industry under a unified National Forest 
Service .  
In  addition to restructuring the forestry adm inistration, the Act sought to 
revise the approach to the issuing of timber perm its . A series of procedures were 
developed which required a study of forest development options, the 
establ ishment of operational guidel ines as the basis for future evaluation of 
forestry activities, the establ i shment of a formal tendering process, the appraisal 
of proposals, and the negotiation and approval of a Forest Management 
Agreement. 
The new Act made the record ing of customary land tenure a key 
prerequ is ite for the issue of a logging permit. As already noted, a major 
weakness in the designation of LF As was that landowner companies frequently 
fai led to document their constituent members and hence their entitlements. The 
legitimacy of the landowner company and its directors was, therefore, constantly 
being contested by d isaffected ind ividuals and c lan groups. Under the new Act, 
before a Forest Management Agreement could be entered into, the title of the 
customary owners to the land had to be vested in one or more registered land 
groups. 
The new Act was hai l ed by the government and its donor supporters as a 
sign ificant improvement. It provided for more rational management of PNG' s  
forest resource, scope for increased community participation and representation 
through incorporated land groups, and greater control over foreign investors . 
Pol itical support for the new Act was further enhanced by a change of 
government in 1 992 and the appointment of a new Forests Min ister (Tim 
Nevi l le) who was a strong supporter of forestry reform . 
Donor Support through Technical Assistance 
The introduction of the new Act, supported by a sympathetic Forests M in i ster, 
had the effect of encouraging donors to support the National Forestry and 
Conservation Action Programme and other forest management in itiatives. 
5 The new Act was introduced by Jack Genia, who had replaced Karl Stack as Minister for 
Forests. 
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Among the projects being cons idered was a proposal by the PNG and Austra l ian 
governments to assist the West New Britain Provincial Government to revi se 
and implement its proposal for a programme of socia l  and economic  
development based around logging operations in  the Kandrian and G loucester 
d istricts . Both governments gave approval for the Kandrian-Gloucester 
Integrated Development Project (KGIDP), and Austra l ian and Papua New 
Guinean technical advi sers were appointed in  Apri l 1 993 . 
The KGIDP found that the s ituation in  the Kandrian and G loucester d istricts 
in 1 993 had changed markedly s ince 1 989.  In 1 989, there were only four 
landowner companies operating in  the two districts; by 1 993 , there were th i rteen, 
and logging was proceeding along the entire north and south coasts. I n  1 993 , log 
exports from West New Britain accounted for 35 percent of PNG' s  total log 
exports, with an estimated value of A$244 m i l l ion. At the time, the bulk of th is  
revenue (72 percent) was be ing appropriated by logging contractors to cover 
their operating costs and return on i nvestments . The national government 
received 1 5  percent from log export taxes .  The remaining 1 3  percent was 
d istributed between l andowner compan ies and customary resource owners 
(Carter 1 995) .  
The KGIDP noted that commercial  forestry operations in the Kandrian and 
Gloucester d istricts were the driving force of soc ial and econom ic change .  
Logging had brought increased income and employment opportun ities, and had 
upgraded rural i nfrastructure in many di spersed areas through the provision of 
roads, shipping serv ices, and airstrips. Th is infrastructure had been bui lt by the 
logging contractors, either as part of their LMAs or to support their own 
operations. Whi le  there were obvious social ,  econom ic, and environmental costs 
associated with logging operations, most landowners were prepared to put up 
with, or e lse ignore, these costs in anticipation of improved l iv ing standards .  
However, the KGIDP advi sers noted that, if the rate and nature of forest 
exploitation was to cont inue, most of West New Britain ' s  commercial  t imber 
resources would  be logged out by the year 2000. 
The KGIDP also observed that v i rtual ly no progress had been made i n  
implementing the new Forestry Act. The problems associated with landowner 
company representation, their i nequitable  relationsh ip with logging contractors, 
and the issues of sustainab le  forest management remained unresolved. 
There was a m ixed response to the KGIDP findings by West New Britain 
Provincial Government members. As already noted, most provincial pol it icians 
had interests in  landowner compan ies, and many held executive positions with in  
these compan ies. General ly speaking, pol itic ians d id  not want any interference 
in the establ i shed structure of landowner compan ies, but were prepared to 
consider proposal s  wh ich wou ld increase landowner company and landowner 
revenues. Forest management i ssues were largely viewed with indifference 
un less they provided scope for improv ing the bargain ing position of l andowner 
compan ies when seeking to increase the ir  revenue share . 
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To further compl icate matters, the KGIDP found that the Department of 
West New Britain, which in 1 989 had sought to p lay a central role in the 
management of forest revenues for rural development purposes, had become 
marginalised and i neffective . Pol iticians  and landowner companies had 
bypassed the provincial publ ic service for advice and techn ical support. This  
situation, coupled with the lack of budgetary support from the provincial 
government and internal bureaucratic management inefficiencies, had 
demoral ised many senior publ ic servants and their fie ld officers . 
Development Strategies and the Policy Imperative 
In formu lating a strategy for the KGIDP, techn ical advi sers had to address a 
range of confl icting interests . At the national level, there was strong resolve 
from the Minister for Forests to pursue the provisions of the Forestry Act. While 
the Act had not been ful ly implemented, progress was being made in securing 
the necessary staff and resources for the National Forest Service. There 
appeared to be sufficient pol itical support from within the Wingti government 
for its eventual implementation . The Minister' s  reso lve was heavi ly backed by 
bi lateral and mu lt i lateral donors and some international non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs). The NGOs were running a strong agenda directed 
towards supporting rational reform of the forest industry within the framework 
of popular participation, equity, and ecologically sustainable development. The 
KGIDP was viewed by al l  concerned as an important project for pi loting the 
provisions of the Forestry Act and the agendas of aid donors and NGOs. 
At the provincial level ,  however, it was business as usual. Logging 
contractors and landowner companies continued to flaunt the Forestry Act, and 
were antagon istic towards any strategy which required restructuring landowner 
companies. 
I n  considering the interests of the various stakeholders, the KGIDP was 
faced with the d i lemma of finding sufficient common ground between the 
stakeholders whi le, at the same time, promoting the Forestry Act and revenue 
guide lines which were unpopular with landowner compan ies, logging 
contractors, and most provincial pol iticians .  
From the consultations with community groups, landowner companies, and 
government officials, it appeared that the common ground between all parties 
lay in  their collective v iew that forest resources shou ld be used to generate 
revenue to improve rural social and economic welfare .  The sticking point, 
however, was d isagreement over whether the state or landowner companies 
should  determine how forest resources should  be managed and the revenues 
distributed. 
On this  issue, the government was standing firm - the forest industry wou ld 
be reorganised around the provisions of the Forestry Act. The government had 
too much to lose. Unless sustainable forest management practices were in itiated, 
and forest revenue agreements revised, PNG' s  forest resources would be rapidly 
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depleted, the government and landowners would lose hundreds of m i l l ions of 
kina in revenue to logging contractors, and the practices of unscrupulous 
landowner company d irectors would continue to div ide rural communities and 
deprive them of an equitable  share of forest. revenue. 
The Political Stalemate 
Landowner company directors and the i r  logging contractors also felt they had 
much to lose. They mounted a major pol itical campaign against the provis ions 
of the Act and, in particular, the proposed revenue guide l ines. Under the Act 
and the revenue guide l ines, the logging and marketing practices of contractors 
wou ld  be more tightly contro l led and their revenue share reduced. Landowner 
companies were to have their revenue entitlements put in trust if they fai led to 
demonstrate that they were representative of the constituencies they c laimed to 
serve. Self- interest fostered a strong al l iance between landowner company 
d irectors and logging contractors. 
In September 1 993 , in an effort to break th is al l iance, the national 
government offered to increase the landowner share of logging revenues from 1 3  
to 44 percent. Based on projected log exports from West New Britain, th is  
wou ld have meant that some A$3 l 0 m i l l ion wou ld have been paid out to 
landowner companies and landowners in the five years from 1 993 to 1 998 
(Carter 1 995) .  However, the West New Britain Forest Resource Owners 
Association (WNBFROA), acting on behalf of landowner companies in the 
provi nce, rejected the offer on the bas is  that it was sti l l  cond itional on 
restructuring landowner compan ies. Other Forest Resource Owner Associations 
throughout PNG fol lowed suit . 
In  March 1 994, in response to the rejection of the forest revenue guidel ines, 
the national government increased exc ise duties on log exports from 1 7  to 30 
percent in order to prevent further loss of logging revenue to the economy. The 
end result was that the revenue base of logging contractors was s ignificantly 
reduced, whi le l andowner compan ies lost a major opportun ity to secure 
additional revenue. 
In  August 1 994, the Wingti government was toppled by the Chan coal ition . 
The new m in istry inc luded a Forests Min ister (Andrew Posai) from the Kandrian 
District in West New Britain who had d irect l inkages with the WNBFROA, 
extensive interests in logging activ ities, and strong connections with overseas 
loggi ng contractors. The WNBFROA lobbied the Min ister to reverse the 
national government ' s  decision on forest revenue arrangements . However, the 
national economy was in deep financ ial cri sis, and needed all the avai lable 
revenue it could get, so the Min ister was unable to ass ist. 
On the issue of landowner company reform, the Min ister shared the 
WNBFROA v iew that the government had no right to intervene in the affairs of 
landowner compan ies. The Min ister 's  v iew, coupled with the fact that the Forest 
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Authority had virtual ly  no resources to implement the Act, meant that the 
operations of landowner compan ies continued as before. 
The Role of the KGIDP 
The economic and pol itical events of 1 993 and 1 994 severely l im ited the 
effectiveness of the KGIDP operations .  In  the absence of National Forest 
Service personnel and resources,6 it was always understood that the KGIDP 
would  play an in itial role  in generating awareness of the provisions of the 
Forestry Act and monitoring and reporting on compl iance. However, the 
intention was that, as the National Forest Service became more organised and 
better resourced, it would  progressively take over KGIDP functions. 
I n  1 993 , KGIDP officers vigorously promoted the provisions of the 
Forestry Act and the revenue guide l ines. Landowner compan ies were alerted to 
their obl igations, and a widespread programme of community awareness was 
initiated . The awareness programme fostered widespread community d iscussion 
and debate over forestry i ssues. A number of landowner spl inter groups were 
formed to chal l enge the authority and practices of some landowner companies. 
However, whi le the KGIDP' s  actions resulted in heightened awareness of the 
forestry i ssues, it had no authority to resolve them . The promised back-up from 
the National Forest Service did not eventuate because of the financial and 
political constrai nts at the national l eve l .  Th is left the techn ical advisers of the 
KGIDP exposed to the criticism, from both the spl inter groups and establ i shed 
landowner company directors, that they had encouraged division with in  the 
community without providing any mean ingful solution to the issues at hand.  
The KGIDP' s  foray into landowner company affairs on behalf of the 
national government effectively al ienated the project from the very people with 
whom it was trying to negotiate . The mistrust c losed off access to most 
landowner company d irectors and company accounts. By the end of 1 994, it 
became apparent that the KGIDP, without substantial support from the National 
Forest Service, would  have no influence over the management or distribution of 
forest revenues by l andowner companies .  Technical support for direct 
intervention in forest revenue and l andowner company affairs was withdrawn 
following a joint review of the KGIDP by the governments of Austral ia and 
PNG in June 1 995 . 7  
6 I n  1 993, there was only one forestry officer serving the Kandrian and Gloucester districts. 
7 The decision to reduce support for landowner company interventions did not herald the end of 
donor support to the people of the Kandrian and Gloucester districts. The joint government review 
resulted in a restructuring of the project which sought to encourage a more productive partnership 
between technical advisers, landowner companies, and the provincial government in the 
development of extension services and the provision of infrastructure support. On the other hand, 
the KGIDP was no longer seeking to play a proactive role in landowner company management and 
investment decisions. 
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The Case of the Kapuluk TRP 
The KGIDP ' s  re lationship with landowner compan ies contrasted sharply with its 
deal i ngs with landowners involved in TRP arrangements. Whi le  the affairs of 
landowner companies under LF A arrangements dominated the efforts of the 
KGlDP, a group of l andowners from the Kapuluk TRP area, wh ich was under 
the management of the Korean company, Nam Yang, sought assistance in re­
negotiating the terms and conditions of the agreement between the state and the 
logging contractor. The Kapu luk landowners were especial ly concerned to 
secure an i ncreased share of t imber revenues through th is  process of 
renegotiat ion. 
Because of the preoccupation of the national government with mob i l i s ing 
the National Forest Serv ice, the representations of the Kapu luk landowners went 
unheeded . Frustrated by government inaction, the landowners sought assistance 
from the KGIDP to develop a strategy to bring the state and Nam Yang to the 
negotiating table .  The KGIDP responded by in itiating a series of landowner 
meetings in order to determ ine if there was general support for the negotiations. 
The KGIDP brokered a role  as techn ical adv iser to the landowners, who then 
entered into a series of lengthy negotiations with the state and Nam Yang. The 
end resu lt was a substantial ly revised agreement, in wh ich landowners increased 
their royalties and levies from A$4.67 per cubic metre to A$ l 3 .67 (personal 
communication, Tom Vigus, 1 995) .  Th is increase translated into an additional 
A$ I m i l l ion per annum for Kapu luk landowners. 
Under the TRP arrangement, the KGIDP was able to play the role of 
techn ical adv iser to both the Kapu luk landowners and the national government 
in its negotiations with Nam Yang. In the case of Kapu luk, th is was made eas ier 
by the fact that the orig inal TRP arrangements had largely excluded landowners 
from any participation in the agreement, and there were no significant vested 
interest groups, such as those associated with landowner companies, who would 
oppose access by the wider commun ity. 
Wh i le  not performing the role of negotiator or med iator in a strictly legal 
sense, the KGIDP was able to fac i l itate these processes by keeping the l ines of 
commun ication open between Kapu luk landowners and the Forest Authority, 
and supplying both parties with critical techn ical information. The end result 
was that the state negotiated a substantial increase in royalties for landowners 
which, in part, satisfied its new forest pol icy requirements . In the Kapuluk 
negotiations, the KGIDP avoided being tagged as the agent of the national 
government. Instead, the KGIDP was seen as the source of independent advice 
which al lowed landowner representatives access to up-to-date information on 
government forest pol icy, the activ ities of the logging contractor, and a range of 
negotiating options. 
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The Question of Compromise 
If the KGIDP had more flexib i l ity to play the ro le of negotiator, wou ld it have 
been able to assi st in brokering a more acceptable outcome between the 
government and the landowner companies? Despite their  publ ic stance through 
the WNBFROA, many landowner company officials made private representation 
to the KGIDP on the scope for restructuri ng their companies, renegotiating their 
agreements, and securing techn ical advice for their investment strategies .  They 
acknowledged the inequities in their LMAs, the internal feuding over the 
distribution of forest revenue, the m ismanagement of trust accounts, and the 
rapid depletion of thei r  forest resources . However, the ir private expressions of 
concern and p leas for assi stance were not for publ ic  consumption. 
Many landowner company officials wanted a way out of the situation in 
which they found themse lves, but were not prepared to lose face and power by 
publi c ly acknowledging the ir  position . Some were tota l ly compromised through 
thei r  own corrupt actions or those of the logging contractor. Although they had 
sought personal gain ,  the ir  power base rested on being able to del iver the goods 
and serv ices which they had promi sed their constituents through their LMAs. 
Any public admiss ion of weakness or uncertainty by landowner company 
directors would have automatical ly opened the door to other aspiring big men, 
and their fame and fortune would have been short- l ived . 
On many occasions, the KGIDP had the opportun ity to negotiate with 
l andowner company directors, but in a private capacity. Wh i le  most directors 
were wary of advice to introduce participatory management practices wh ich 
would empower other landowners to chal lenge their authority, they were keen to 
develop strategies for increasing landowner company revenue, and to col laborate 
with government on the use of landowner company investment funds for 
improving social and economic welfare . I n  development terms, the objectives of 
the landowner company d irectors were s im i lar to those espoused under the 
Forestry Act, the exception being that the d irectors thought they should have the 
right to determine landowner company structure, leadership, and mechan isms for 
distributing forest revenue without government intervention . 
Had the government accepted th is pos ition, the coal ition between the 
landowner companies and the logging contractors wou ld almost certainly have 
been broken . Under its revised (March 1 994) revenue arrangements, the 
government was offering much more than the logging contractors could 
concede. However, entering i nto negotiations with landowner companies on th is  
basis would have requ ired an about-face by the government and its donor 
supporters. It would have meant col laborating with the very people whom the 
Forestry Act was seek ing to weed out. The government position was based on 
two assumptions :  
• that many landowner company directors had secured their pos itions without 
recourse to proper e lections, and had been corrupted by logging contractors 
and their  own greed ; and 
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• that, given the right opportunity and support, the community cou ld  be 
mob i l i sed to replace these d irectors with democratical ly e lected 
representatives of the people. 
I n  the Kandrian and G loucester d istricts, there was sufficient evidence to support 
the first assumption, but not the second. Most chal l enges to establ i shed 
landowner company authority came from spl inter groups, usual ly opposing 
c lans, the l eaders of which s imp ly wanted to replace the existing d irectors with 
their  own people, preferably themselves. In the KGIDP experience, there i s  l ittl e  
evidence to  suggest that spl i nter groups wh ich succeeded in  deposi ng the 
establ i shed landowner company h ierarchy were any more democratic than those 
which they had rep laced . 
Thus, whi le the Forest Authority could c laim the h igh moral ground on the 
actions of some landowner compan ies, it had absol utely no control over social 
organisation and d ispute resolution at the landowner leve l .  Rural communities 
in the Kandrian and G loucester d istricts, as e lsewhere in PNG, were governed by 
a set of social rel ations which do not fit into conventional Western notions of 
popular participation and democracy. In  commenting on social organ isation in 
the two districts, H ide ( 1 990) noted that: 
Kandrian-Gloucester communities are sti l l  largely small-scale, kin 
based and demonstrate strong continuities with the past. Decision 
making occurs at levels associated with smal l-scale settlements such as 
hamlets and groups centred on men ' s  houses. Social organisation at 
this level implies constant political manoeuvring by leaders, aspiring 
leaders and their followers. Factional ism, dispute and division are 
common features. 
Landowner companies represent a new order or scale of organisation 
that has not previously been seen in the region . The areas of forest 
involved, and the numbers of people claiming rights in the resource 
areas, are both large. There is no traditional precedent for lasting, 
decision-making structures with authoritative power over such large 
primary resource areas. S ignificant problems of organisation and 
communication are already apparent. 
In sum, whi le the Forest Authority ' s  first assumption was correct and based on 
empirical evidence, the second was out of character with the pol it ical real ities of 
rural PNG. 
Whi le  the vagaries of popular partic ipation at  the commun ity level i n  PNG 
have been wel l  documented (see F i ler 1 99 1  b ), the lessons were largely ignored 
by the national government, aid donors, and the KGIDP in seeking to implement 
the Forestry Act. The primary reason for th is  was that, at the time of 
formulating the National Forest Pol icy and the KGIDP strategy, al l of these 
parties j udged their  common position to be righteous and enforceable .  
Righteous it may have been, but enforceable  it was not. 
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F inal ly, i n  economic terms, both the national government and landowner 
companies paid a heavy price for the ir  ongo ing debate over participat ion and 
equity. Fai lure to agree on mechan isms for implementing the government ' s  
revised forest revenue guidel ines on log  shipments from West New Britain 
resulted i n  a loss of some A$ 1 06 m i l l ion in export taxes in 1 993 . 8 
The First Lesson for Government 
Policy should be negotiated and incremental if government lacks the resources 
and political will to enforce its provisions. 
At no stage in the formulation of the National Forest Pol icy did the 
government seek to enter into any s ign ificant negotiations with the forest 
industry or l andowner groups. Wh i le briefings were held with these groups, i n  
the period during the formu lation of  the Act, there was no systematic attempt on 
the part of government to assess the position of landowner companies and what 
oppositional strategy they m ight i nvoke. Equal ly important, there was no 
assessment by the government as to its own capabi l ity to enforce the Act, and 
the l ikely outcome if  i t  could not. I n  short, the government was singularly 
focussed on enforcing the content of the Act with in  an unrea l i stic t ime-frame, 
and without due consideration of the processes which could have been used to 
del ineate common ground between the parties. 
The common ground for both parties was the desire to maximise their  
respective share of logging revenues.  Once the revenue base had been secured, 
the government could  have then reintroduced the i ssues of landowner company 
management and equity, and pushed for i ncremental changes to the way 
l andowner companies operated. I ndeed, given the scale of the returns which 
would have accrued to l andowner companies, it would have been relatively easy 
for the government to focus pub l ic attention on management and equity i ssues. 
As it was, the only beneficiaries from the deadlock were the logging contractors, 
who i ncreased the volume of log exports throughout the d ispute, and at a t ime 
when i nternational log prices were at record levels .  
The Second Lesson for Government 
Greater recognition must be given to the problems of achieving popular 
participation and equity in rural P NG. 
As a result of colonial and post- independence pol i cy, rural society in  PNG 
has become i ncreasi ngly div ided by the uneven distribut ion of education, access 
to social services, and economic  opportun ity. Thi s  inequal ity p laces s ign ificant 
pressure on those communities with access to natural resources to develop them 
8 This figure has been derived by subtracting the actual rent paid by logging contractors operating 
in West New Britain from the available rent which the government could have collected if it had 
been able to reach agreement with landowner companies on the implementation of the 1 993 forest 
revenue guidel ines (personal communication, Rod Taylor, 1 995). 
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as quickly as possib le and, in the words of one landowner company director, to 
' get what you can whi l e  you can ' .  
Government pol icy rhetoric cont inual ly seeks to reaffirm the nation ' s  
commitment t o  social democratic  process, and p lays down the real problems 
wliich rural communities have in deal ing with partic ipation and equity i ssues. 
Had the government made publ ic acknowledgement, when formulating the 
National Forest Pol icy, that it was un l ikely to be successful in achieving its 
objectives of fostering equity and part ic ipation in the short term, the Act and 
forest revenue guide l i nes could have been modified to reflect an incremental 
position on these issues. However, such a statement would have been un l ikely 
to endear the national government to the aid donors, who were looking for bold 
pol itical statements to j ustify the ir  expenditure and to placate vocal interest 
groups in their own countries .  
In sum, the i ssues of equity and part ic ipation in  PNG are un l ikely to be 
resolved any more quickly than they are in other developing countries .  In the 
case of forestry agreements, the problems are made more comp lex when 
offshore investors seek to take advantage of a trans itional society in which 
government and rural communities have l im ited experience in  negotiating their  
differences. 
The ferocity with which overseas logging contractors set about exporting 
logs between 1 993 and 1 994 meant that landowner companies and government 
had to reach a rapid agreement if they were to stem the flow of revenue offshore . 
Unfortunate ly, the questions of participation and equ ity on wh ich they sought to 
commence their negotiations proved to be thorough ly intractable in the short 
term . With h indsight, the government wou ld have ach ieved more by adopting a 
strategy which sought to work from the common ground - maxim ising 
landowner company and government revenue shares - and then progressively 
addressed the i ssues of partic ipation and equity. 
The Lessons for Donors and Their Technical Advisers 
Jn the case of the KGIDP, donors and their technical advisers would have been 
better advised to play the role of 'honest broker ' and facilitate the process of 
negotiation between landowner companies and the government. 
In supporting the negotiation and med iation process in the Kapuluk TRP, 
the KGIDP was able  to p lay a more useful and acceptable role than it did as the 
implementing and monitoring agent for unpopular and unenforceable provis ions 
under the Forestry Act. 
Donors gave themselves l itt le opportunity to consider the negotiation 
option. The World Bank, and the Austral ian, New Zealand, and German 
governments, were all enthusiast ic proponents of forestry reform in PNG, and 
committed extensive resources to its deve lopment from the outset. The KGIDP 
was a direct outcome of th is  enthusiasm . Had donors and their technical 
advisers given more cons ideration to the difficulties of implementing the Act, 
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and to the oppositional stance o f  landowner companies, the prospect of 
prov id ing support for faci litating the negotiation process may have been more 
attractive . 
It i s, of course, questionable  whether donors would have opted to support 
the negotiation process, particularly if it meant some short-term acceptance of 
the status quo in landowner company and community power relationships. As 
already noted, donor responses were influenced by the attitudes of international 
and local NGOs, whose philosophical foundations were deeply rooted in 
promoting commun ity participation and social equity. Any turnaround on these 
issues would have been strongly and publicly contested by these groups - a 
situation which a l l  donors were keen to avo id .  
F inally, donor flexibi l ity i s  u lt imately constrained by bi lateral and 
multi lateral aid agreements which dictate that donors give priority to the 
government agenda. In the case of the Forestry Act and revenue guidel ines, the 
government agenda ran counter to the adoption of a more flexible approach to 
negotiating with landowner companies. From the perspective of both protocol 
and approach, aid donors were both locked into, and strongly supportive of, the 
government' s  position . 
The Lessons for Landowners 
Landowners who enter into development agreements with unresolved land and 
resource disputes have little chance of maintaining group solidarity in the face 
of conflict with resource developers. 
Most landowner companies were formed without due consideration for the 
membership of the land groups which they c laimed to represent, or for the actual 
ownership of resources. Had land groups been able to reach agreement between 
themselves over ownership  of the forest resource, and establ ish common 
development objectives, their power to negotiate with logging contractors would 
have been vastly increased. Instead, the relationship between many landowner 
groups was typified by mi strust and conflict, some of which had its origins in 
traditional c lan al legiances and rivalries . Logging contractors, aided wi l l ingly or 
unknowingly by landowner company directors, were able to exploit divisions 
within and between these groups to secure maximum advantage. 
It could be argued that, far from being the flagships of the new social order 
which many rural people had hoped for, landowner companies effectively 
d isempowered their members by making them too dependent on the logging 
contractor. By the time this  was real ised, it was too late for landowners to play 
their trump card - namely the fact that, as traditional landowners, they had the 
undisputed right to determine who should have access to their forest resources, 
and at what price.  
F inally, whi le  it may have been better for the government and landowner 
companies to have focussed on securing a greater share of forest revenue in the 
first instance, the increased revenue generated would have inevitably heightened 
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landowner tens ions over resource ownership and revenue d istr ibut ion . Such 
tensions, as demonstrated i n  Bougainvi l le  (Dorney 1 990), could have a severe 
impact on provincial and national pol itical stabi l ity .  Hence, the government 
could not have afforded to adopt a strategy which s imply sought to maximi se 
revenue and ignored the more fundamental questions of part ic ipation and equity .  
CHAPTER 3 
' PRIVATE DEALINGS' : 
A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE HAW AIN LOCAL FOREST AREA, 
EAST SEPIK PROVINCE 
JOHN M. LEEDOM 
Introduction 
In January 1 993 , a ship under contract to a Malaysian logging company 
appeared off the coast of Wewak, a sma l l  town on the northwest coast of Papua 
New Guinea (PNG). The ship was transporting about K4 m i l l ion worth of new 
bul ldozers, tractors, trucks, and chainsaws to a new logging project that was 
supposed to begin operations that year in the Prince Alexander Mountains .  The 
project location was known as the Hawain  Local Forest Area (LFA), named after 
the largest river w ithi n  its boundaries. 
The arrival of the sh ip  seemingly marked the successful culmination of 
several years of effort, on the part of a group of local pol it icians and clan 
leaders, to i n itiate a large-scale logging project as a means of bringing 
' development' to their  home v i l l ages .  They had formed a local landowner 
company, ' WongWong' Logging, and successful ly lobbied the Min ister for 
Forests, Jack Genia, for a logging permit at a t ime when there was an official 
moratorium on the i ssue of new permits. They had also negotiated a contract 
with a company named Sovereign H i l l ,  a whol ly owned subsid iary of the giant 
Malaysian t imber firm, Rimbunan Hijau .  But as soon as the sh ip unloaded its 
cargo on Worn Beach, conflicts began between customary landowners, 
WongWong Logging, and Sovereign Hi l l .  
In  th is  chapter, I provide a case study of  the troubled h i story of  the Hawain  
logging project. I examine the sh ifting nature of re lationsh ips between 
customary landowners, po l it ic ians, forestry officials, and the management of 
Sovereign H i l l  during the development of the project. My aim, in particular, is 
to examine how Sovereign H i l l  gained and lost access to forest resources, both at 
the national and local level .  In brief, I w i l l  show that, whi l e  pol it icians and 
government officials used their authority to official ly push the project ahead, th is  
did not provide Sovereign Hil l  with unfettered access to the forests of the 
Hawain  LF A. Instead, the advance of bu l ldozers and chainsaws was repeatedly 
blocked by various forms of conflict with in  the local community of customary 
landowners . As we shal l  see, the outcome of these processes has been 
unsatisfactory both for the majority of local people and for Sovereign H i l l .  
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Map 3.1 : The Hawain Local Forest Area and its environs. 
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The Project Area and Its Customary Owners 
When the Min ister for Forests declared the Hawain  LFA in Apri l 1 992, it 
encompassed some 400 square k i lometres of lowland rainforest on the s lopes of 
the Prince A lexander Mountains west of Wewak (see Map 3 . 1  ) .  This  mountain  
range, despite its l i mited extent and re latively low elevations, i s  surpris ingly 
rugged. The range i s  composed of a deeply d issected complex of razor-back 
ridges, steep escarpments, and upland benches.  The range begins near the mouth 
of the Sepik River, fol lows a west-northwest trend that cu lminates in the summit 
of Mount Turu ( 1 ,  1 78 metres), and then abuts the Torrice l l i  Mountains in  the 
west (Reiner and Mabbutt 1 968 :22) .  The northern escarpment i s  drained by a 
series of steep and narrow canyons wh ich empty into a swampy coastal p lain 
east of the Hawain River. The southern escarpment, meanwh i le, drains into a 
series of rivers (the M indj im and Nagam being the most important) wh ich flow 
in a southeasterly, then southerly, d irection to meander through grassy footh i l l s 
and plains before jo in ing up with the m ighty Sepik River. 
The forests of the Prince Alexander Mountains are composed of a wide 
variety of trees, shrubs, ferns, herbs, fan palms, c l imbers, and epiphytes .  At the 
lower e levations, the forest i s  especial ly complex, due to variable soi l  
conditions, human d isturbance, and re latively dry cond itions. There are, for 
example, over s ixty species of trees that have been recorded for the upper 
canopy layer alone (Saunders 1 968 :  1 3 1  ) . At the h igher e levations, where 
rainfal l is general ly greater and human activities more restricted, the forests are 
not as florist ica l ly complex, but are composed of denser concentrations of large 
trees . Final ly, in the coastal plain,  forests are restricted to areas that have 
re latively wel l-drained soi l s, which means that they form isolated stands of 
t imber in the m idst of larger sago and n ipa palm swamps. In all three of these 
types of forest, the most commonly occurring species of econom ic value are 
Taun (Pometia pinnata), Celtis (Celtis phillippensis), Erima (Octomeles 
sumatrana), Kwi la (Instia bijuga), Tat i s  (Terminalia spp. ), and Walnut 
(Dractontomelum spp. ), among others (Robbins 1 968 ;  Saunders 1 968;  ESP 
1 987) .  
By national law, the forests of the Hawain LF A are the property of an 
undocumented number of Boiken-speaking descent groups cal led klan in Tok 
Pis in .  Whi le  I w i l l  trans late this word as ' c lan ' ,  it shou ld nonetheless be noted 
that local usage departs somewhat from standard anthropo logical defin itions. 
The word klan is indeed used in  a normative sense to refer to corporate descent 
groups whose members are be l ieved to be descended from a single ancestor 
through patri l ineal l inks. But in practice, a klan is  more importantly a proper 
name wh ich connects spec ific corporate groups to particu lar ' spaces' or ' s lots ' 
on the landscape. When I asked Boiken men, for example, how to translate klan 
into Boiken, they often responded with perplexity and confusion. Most men 
den ied that klan cou ld  be trans lated i nto the ir vernacular, and asserted instead 
that they always used the proper name of a clan to refer to a spec ific spatial and 
temporal group. These proper names, they to ld me, were functional ly equ ivalent 
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to an address in Engl i sh, such as one wou ld use to locate a person . 1 Th is  shows 
that there is a c lose re lationsh ip between land and social identity in 
contemporary Boiken culture . The local landscape is compartmental ised into 
named subterritories, each of which has its own resident trickster spirits (Tok 
Pis in ,  masalai; Boiken, wari) and h istory. Knowledge of the h i stories of these 
subterritories - in terms of knowing the names of spirits and the ancestors who 
inhabited, used, or fought for the land - forms the fundamental bas is for staking 
claims of landownersh ip .  
The stated rules regard ing the inheritance of land rights are relatively 
straightforward . All Boiken will c la im that rights over land, particularly 
decis ions regard ing its use and d istribution to others, are transferred from father 
to eldest son . Thus, wh i le  he is sti l l  a l ive, the father shows h is e ldest son the 
boundaries of their land and teaches him its h istory . The eldest son then 
acquires the authority to decide how land is to be shared among his fami ly 
members, and how it is to be used when h is father d ies or is incapacitated . In 
practice, however, the land tenure system is  often accommodated to the 
demograph ic fortunes of specific clans .  As is common throughout the Sepik 
cu lture area, the re lationsh ip between mother' s brother (wawo) and s ister 's  son 
(rawa) is  very important, both in customary exchange and in property re lations. 
It is not uncommon, for example, for mother' s brothers to grant s isters ' sons 
rights over land with the intention of eventual ly incorporating them into their 
c lan . 
In 1 990, the Boiken-speaking popu lation l iv ing in close proxim ity to the 
Hawain LFA numbered about 5 ,600 (PNGNSO 1 993 ) .  Th is popu lation was 
residing in th i rty-one h interland v i l lages and three peri-urban settlements on the 
outskirts of Wewak. These v i l lages and settlements are concentrated in three 
locations: 
• along the North Coast Road that travels from Wewak to Dagua; 
• along the southern ridges of the Prince Alexander Mountains near the Sepik 
Highway; and 
• along the ridges adjacent to the Hawain and Rambumba val leys (see Map 
3 . 1  ) . 
Contemporary Boiken settlements are agglomerations of sem i-autonomous 
hamlets separated by gardens and secondary regrowth . Hamlets are mainly 
occupied by the members of a single patri l ineage or joint fraternal group, but 
they sometimes also include married s isters, their husbands, and their  ch i ldren . 
Prior to mission isation, men usual ly s lept apart from their wives and ch i ldren;  
today, however, households are often composed of nuclear fami l ies. The houses 
1 Some men, however, did suggest that klan could be translated by the Boiken word wango, 
which they said literally meant 'family ' .  Interestingly, wango has two other associations. First, it 
is used to refer to holes in the ground or in Ficus trees from which apical ancestors emerged. 
Secondly, it also used to refer to the 'space' or ' room ' that a particular clan occupies. 
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belonging to  the nuclear fami l ies of  a larger descent group are arranged around a 
central courtyard that is cleared of al l vegetation. 
The component c lans  of a larger settlement general ly un ite to defend their 
common territory from the people of neighbouring settlements, but they also 
have complex relationships of a l l iance and enm ity with clans l iv ing el sewhere . 
A regional moiety system or dual organ isation, for example, once encompassed 
the local- level organisation of c lans, and regu lated marriage and male in it iation 
on a regional bas is .  Although it has faded from most aspects of contemporary 
social practice, the moiety system created some flu id ity and instab i l ity in socio­
pol itical relationships with in  and between sett lements . Furthermore, customary 
exchange practices, such as brideprice, ch i ld payments, and mortuary payments, 
establ ish a network of ongoing obl igations between avuncu lar and affinal 
relatives in d ifferent settlements . 
The customary landowners of the Hawain LF A speak at least three dialects 
of Boiken, a non-Austronesian language of the Ndu fam i ly of the Sepik-Ramu 
phylum (Laycock 1 965 ;  Freudenberg 1 976).2 Wh i le  the people who speak these 
dialects are col lectively known as the 'Boiken ' ,  after a coastal v i l lage where 
Cathol ic m iss ionaries first estab l i shed a m ission station near the turn of the 
century, no one I know refers to themselves as such (see Roscoe 1 99 1 ) . Boiken­
speakers do not, in other words, have an overarching conception themselves as 
an ethnic group. Nor, in the pre-colon ial epoch, were they ever un ited into a 
single pol ity .  Instead, social identities are based on people ' s  v i l lage of origin 
and its geograph ical provenance ( 'mountains ' ,  ' coast ' ,  ' Hawain River ' ,  and so 
forth). Dialect d ifferences a lso figure prom inently in the construction of 
regional social identities .  V i l lage and regional affi l iations have played a central 
ro le in landowner pol itics during the development of the logging project. 
The present logging operation is neither the first to have been planned nor 
the first to be carried out in the area. Between 1 962 and 1 982, a significant area 
of the al l uv ium forest immediate ly west of Wewak was commercial ly logged by 
a company cal led Sepik Timbers . The company had expatriate (Austral ian) 
managers but employed local men. The logs were processed in a smal l sawm i l l  
i n  Wewak and sold  on the domestic market. In  1 982, Sepik Timbers closed 
down their Wewak sawmi l l  because the production of timber from a s ister 
sawmi l l  in Madang was already outstripping local demand (Fleetwood 1 983 : 73 ;  
see also Sagir, th is  volume) . 
I n  the m id- 1 980s, the East Sepik Prov incial Government and the provincial 
Divis ion of Forests revived interest in  exploiting the timber resources of the 
Prince Alexander Mountains .  The Div is ion of Forests carried out a survey of the 
2 These dialects formerly corresponded to geographical and ecological subregions in the Boiken­
speaking area. The 'Coastal ' dialect was spoken by residents of the coastal plains and the islands 
of Muscu, Wal is, and Tarawai, to the west of Wewak; the 'Nagam' dialect was spoken by residents 
of vi l lages along the southern escarpment of the Prince Alexander Mountains, near the Nagam 
River valley; and the 'Central ' dialect was spoken by residents of vi l lages in the eastern shadow of 
Mount Turu. 
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timber resource and queried local landowners about their  interest in a future 
logging project. The Divis ion conc luded that, wh i le  not extensive, the forest 
resources could nonetheless support a v iable timber industry. Divis ional staff 
also noted that 'the landowners of the area have differing views about 
deve loping the t imber resources there . . .  [but] to break up the resource in that 
area to suit each ind iv idual group ' s  wishes would not be econom ical ly v iable '  
(ESP 1 987 :4) .  Nonethe less, they concl uded by proposing a 50,000 hectare area 
(cal l ed the ' West Coast Timber Area' )  for further consideration. It was bounded 
by the coastl ine to the north and the peaks of the Prince Alexander Mountains to 
the south . 
Whatever plans the prov incial government was making to develop a timber 
industry in the Prince Alexander Mountains were interrupted in 1 990, when it 
was suspended by the national government for misappropriation of funds and 
pol itical corruption .3  Instead, the impetus for exploit ing the timber resources of 
the West Coast Timber Area was taken over by a coal ition of Boiken-speaking 
m igrants who l ived in peri-urban settlements along the North Coast Road . To 
understand what motivated them to take th is in itiative, it is necessary to describe 
briefly the way in wh ich colonial pol icy and practice fostered an uneven process 
of soc ial and econom ic change in th is region . 
The 'Uneven Development' of the Boiken Landscape, 1884-1990 
The last one hundred years have been a period of dramatic events and rapid 
change in the Wewak area, wh ich have great ly altered its social and natural 
landscape . On the eve of Germany' s annexation of the northern half of New 
Guinea in 1 884, Wewak was simply a smal l ,  Austronesian-speaking v i l lage 
surrounded by genera l ly host i le  Boiken groups (Fleetwood 1 984 :7). S ince 1 884, 
through successive periods of German, Austral ian, Japanese, and then again 
Austral ian ru le, Wewak has emerged as the admini strative and commercial  
centre of the whole Sepik region, and has become the fourth largest town in PNG 
(PNGNSO 1 994). 
The Germans first establ i shed a trad ing station and government post at 
Seleo (near Aitape) in 1 894 . Over the next th irty years, they bu i lt up a smal l 
network of coconut plantations, Catho l ic  missions, and patro l posts, first along 
the coast and on the is lands, and later at Marienberg and Angoram on the Sepik 
River. Wh i le  thus expanding the trade networks that reached into h interland 
v i l lages, the Germans also started to recru it men, sometimes forcibly, to work as 
labourers on plantations in what are now Madang, New Britain, and New Ire land 
prov inces . The infl uence of the Cathol ic church also began to spread gradual ly 
along the coast (see May 1 990 : 1 76). Then, with the outbreak of the First World 
War, the Austral ian army took over the framework of German adm inistration . 
Thereafter, the pace of labour recru itment continued to increase, add itional 
patrol posts were estab l i shed, and the Society of the Divine Word extended its 
missionary activ ities into the h interlands of the Pri nce Alexander Mountains .  
3 The deposed Premier responded by burn ing down the  provincial government offices. 
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I n  the first half of the twentieth century, then, many Boiken converted to 
Cathol ic ism, abandoned practices associated with the haus tambaran (cult 
houses) and male i n it iation, and worked on copra plantations in other parts of the 
Territory of New Guinea. They also learned, and helped to create, a new 
language - ' pidgin Engl ish'  (henceforth referred to as Tok Pis in) .  In 1 93 3 ,  the 
Australian colonial admin istration moved the headquarters of the Sepik  District 
from Aitape to Wewak, thus cementing the substantial sh ift which was already 
under way in the regional pol itical economy. 
In 1 942, 2,000 Japanese soldiers invaded Wewak, driv ing out the Austral ian 
colonial admin istration . In early 1 944, about 30,000 add itional soldiers, 
representing the remnants of the Japanese army on the New Guinea mainland, 
retreated overland from Madang to Wewak. Cut off from their supply l ines, they 
fanned out i nto the mountains  as far west as Maprik, where they hunted and 
foraged for food, raided native gardens and sago stands, and began to c lear forest 
for gardens of the ir own (Long 1 963 ) . They also armed local men with rifles, 
and ·gave them cartridges to hunt game on their behalf. 
The Japanese were eventual ly driven out by Austral ian armed forces in 
1 945,  but not before the war had made a major impact on the ind igenous people. 
Perhaps 1 5  percent of the population died during the three-year occupation .4 In 
addition, large game animals in  the forest were depleted (Gerstner 1 952), 
gardens, coconut groves, and sago stands in coastal areas were destroyed, and 
many v i l l ages were abandoned. 5 
Prior to the Japanese occupation of Wewak, l ittle  econom ic development 
had taken p lace in the Sepik  region . The district generated a smal l amount of 
income from gold m in ing  around Maprik, from trade in crocod i le skins along the 
Sepik River, and from a l im ited volume of copra production in the coastal areas 
and offshore is lands (Curtain  and May 1 979; May 1 990). With the re­
estab li shment of the Austral ian admin i stration after the war, however, th ings 
began to change. The colonial adm in istration made systematic attempts to 
i ntroduce cash crops such as coffee, rice, and peanuts into v i l lage agricu lture .  
Meanwhi le, returning ex-serv icemen, such as  Pita S imogun and Yauwiga 
Wangonalo, chal lenged traditional forms of leadership and mobi l i sed a large 
proportion of the coastal popu lation into what Ron May has cal led ' a  loosely 
coordinated, development oriented, general ly pro-administration movement 
which promoted cash-cropping (especial ly rice and cacao) and other forms of 
business (notably, around Wewak, transport), road bui lding and education ' 
( ibid :  1 77). Their achievements, in organ is ing Rural Progress Societies, 
mob i l is ing labour for the construction of an a l l-weather road between Wewak 
and Dagua, and promoting the planting of cash crops, were considerable .  
4 See 'Wewak Patrol Report No.  4, 1 946/47' (R .G .  Macintyre). 
5 See 'Wewak Patrol Report No. 3, 1 947/48 ' (A. J .  Zweck) and 'Wewak Patrol Report No. 5, 
1 948/49' (L.R. Foster). 
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In the post-war period, the popu lation of Wewak was steadi ly increas ing. 
The expansion of government in the 1 950s increased the size of the expatriate 
commun ity, wh ich created an impetus for the growth of service industries, such 
as smal l -scale construction, transport, and reta i l  stores, most of wh ich were 
owned by ethnic ·Ch inese residents. The growth in the service industry helped to 
provide increas ing opportun ities for local ' nat ive ' employment. Two large-scale 
projects undertaken in the early 1 960s, the construction of Wewak General 
Hospital on Boram pen insula and the army barracks on Moem Pen i nsula, also 
stimulated employment and popu lation growth in Wewak (Curtain and May 
1 979 :56) .  In 1 966, the total popu lation of Wewak town was about 9,000; by 
1 97 1 ,  it had increased to 1 5 ,000 (Lea 1 976 : 356). The construction of the Sepik 
Highway dur ing th is  period a lso made the town more accessible to the h interland 
populations of the Prince A lexander Mountains and the Sepik River. 
Before the war, the swamplands and forests of the coasta l plain west of 
Wewak had been sparse ly inhabited . Once the war was over, however, fam i l ies 
from h interland v i l lages in the Prince Alexander mountains began to migrate to 
the outskirts of Wewak . In 1 95 8, Patro l Officer Mater explained that isolation 
from the burgeoning cash economy of Wewak was one of the main motives for 
migration : 
Lack of commun ication ( i .e .  transport) in the more remote in land 
vil lages has been the major factor in these people ' s  migration to the 
coast to plant cash crops and the local landowners have real ised the 
advantages of allowing them to settle to supplement the sparse 
population for cash cropping, road construction and simi lar efforts. 
The opportunity of acqu iring an income from casual labour around 
Wewak has also contributed to the desire to migrate.6 
In the 1 950s and early 1 960s, the migrants opened up �he swampy and 
forested lands wh ich had formerly served the re lative ly smal l  popu lation of 
customary owners (from Wom, Mingar, Saure, and Yarapos) as reserves for 
sago, hunting, gathering, and fish ing. They converted them to subs istence and 
market gardens, coconut and cocoa groves, and even cattle pastures .  By 1 963 , 
patro l officers reported that there were about eighteen new settlements, with a 
combined popu lation of about 1 ,3 50, along the recent ly completed Wewak­
Dagua road .7  By 1 990, the popu lation had increased to about 3 ,000. 
For our purposes, the most important sett lements that were founded in th is  
period ( in about 1 952) are Tangara, Nunguma, and Yarab i .  These sett lements 
were composed mainly of fam i l ies from v i l lages in the southern footh i l l s of the 
Prince Alexander Mountains, including Handara, Nungori, Kweruro, Puara, 
Huarigen, Musuwagen, and Sassanumbogu . They are also the home of a 
significant number of people from the Rambumba Val ley v i l lages of Penjen, 
6 ' Wewak Patrol Report No. 4, 1 957/58 '  (J .H .  Mater). 
7 ' Wewak Patrol Report No. 1 9, 1 962/63 ' (D .L .Emery and B.A. Hul l ) .  
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Num ienguai, and Jambarampa (see Map 3 . 1 ) . Ind ividuals from these settlements 
have played significant ro les in the development of the logging project. 
As the settlements on the outskirts of Wewak have grown in size, due to 
natural increase and cont inued internal m igration, so too has socio-econom ic 
differentiation increased between peri-urban ' settlers' and the rural ' locals '  sti l l  
l iv ing i n  their traditional homelands. The permanent residents of the peri-urban 
sett lements tend to have completed more years of education, are more l ikely to 
be employed in town or to be self-made entrepreneurs, and are more active in 
provinc ial and national po l it ics, than their counterparts in the h interland .8 
Along the North Coast Road, contemporary Boiken-speakers d ist inguish 
between 'outs iders ' (yanduo, or in Tok Pis in ,  kamman), and ' locals ' (wianduo, 
or man bilong pies) .  The latter group ' s  perception of the increas ing economic 
inequal ity between wianduo and yanduo has also led to increas ing tensions 
between the two. 
By the late 1 980s, however, many ( if  not most) of the Bo iken-speaking 
settlers in Tangara, Nunguma, and Yarabi were want ing to return to their home 
territories to l ive. There are a number of social and material factors that exp lain 
why, for many of them at least, ' going home ' has become both increas ingly 
desirable and necessary. F irst of a l l ,  many sti l l  have insecure tenure over the 
land they occupy and use, s ince it remains under the customary ownership of 
patri l i neages in the neighbouring v i l lages of Mingar, Worn,  Saure, and Yarapos . 
As early as 1 95 8, the colonial adm in istration endeavoured ' to stab i l i se th is  
vexed question of m igrants and the ir land prob lems ' ,  primari ly by negotiat ing 
long-term leases with the customary owners.9 However, these efforts were 
large ly unsuccessful,  as the customary owners preferred to maintain an informal 
host-guest re lationsh ip in which the settlers, to whom they were connected by 
kinsh ip and marriage, would remain perpetual ly in their debt. Yet when 
re lationships between sett lers and locals break down, there is noth ing legal ly 
preventing the latter from demand ing that the former 'get off their land ' ,  as 
happened to the K weruro sett lers resident at Yarabi in 1 990. 
Second ly, the econom ic opportun ities open to settlers are increasingly 
l im ited in scope and number. S ince they do not occupy their own land, 
expanding their hold ings of perenn ial cash crops such as coconut, cocoa, and 
bete lnut carries the risk that they may be repossessed by customary landowners 
who become envious of their tenants ' econom ic ach ievements. Nor has the 
8 This  i s  not surpris ing, s ince most settlers state that the main reason why they migrated closer to 
town was so that thei r  chi ldren would have easier access to schools, whi le they themselves hoped 
to find employment i n  town or start businesses, such as running trade stores or public motor 
vehic les (PMVs). 
9 ' Wewak Patrol Report No.  1 ,  1 958/59'  (J . H .  Mater). 
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urban job market in Wewak grown fast enough to absorb the growing migrant 
propu lation of working age . J O 
Final ly, the amount of arable land avai lable for gardens and the number of 
productive sago stands have both in proportion to the demographic growth of the 
squatter sett lements. A comparison of aerial photographs taken in 1 973 and 
1 994 shows an increase in the proportion of the coastal plain which has 
succeeded to c l imax grass land.  Anecdotal evidence from interviews also 
suggests that the sett lers have shortened their fal low cycles, wh i le yields from 
their  gardens are decreasing.  
Al l  of these factors have inc l i ned the sett lers to bel ieve that they face an 
increasingly uncertain future in the sett lements. They bel ieve that, if they cou ld 
return to the ir homelands, they would have a wider range of economic options. 
But they have been rel uctant to return to their v i l lages because of the l ack of 
roads connecting them to the urban market and the absence of basic health and 
educational services. The logging project, then, was conceived as a means of 
resolving their problematic status. As a WongWong executive once explained to 
me: 
Basically the whole idea behind our starting th is project was to cut 
down on the migration problem . Our people have been migrating 
down to Tangara for some sixty to seventy years. They started to move 
right after World War Two. We bel ieved that, if we remained here, we 
would not have a very bright future . The only reason why we are 
l iv ing here is so that we can be near to town, to enjoy the benefits that 
come from l iving in a town . Otherwise, if we had a good 
infrastructural base back in our homeland, we would go back and come 
to town just when we needed to. We would move . . . .  We sold our 
forests for a road. We felt that we would wait a long time if we waited 
for the government to do it for us. Other provinces have already 
progressed, but we, in the East Sepik Province, are way behind the 
others. We produced the first Prime Min ister of the country. But in 
terms of development, we haven ' t  experienced any. 
Such ideas were commonplace amongst the people of the LF A area. I ndeed, 
when I asked local people why they supported the logging project, the most 
common response I received was : 'Rot tasol! ' ( ' Just for a road ') .  They did not 
bel ieve that the government would ever be able to construct the roads which they 
desired . They hoped, instead, to cu lt ivate a re lationsh ip with an overseas 
company with sufficient capital and mach inery to bu i ld the roads for them . I t  
was for roads, above al I other reasons, that many customary landowners, in the 
m igrant sett lements and h interland v i l lages al ike, were prepared to ' sacrifice' 
the ir forests. 
1 O East Sepik remains a provi nce of net outmigration to other urban areas in PNG (PNG National 
Statist ical Office 1 990).  
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Negotiating the Local Forest Area Permit, 1990-1993 
In the accounts of local people, the idea of sel l ing their timber resources to an 
overseas logging company originated in the Seventh Day Adventist enclave at 
Tangara settlement. A group of e lders in the church, among whom Robert Passu 
was the most important, took the in itiative in organ ising a landowner company, 
petitioning the Min ister for Forests to issue a logging permit, and negotiating a 
contract with an overseas company. 
Robert Passu was a second-generation resident of the settlement, but was 
also a senior member of one of the six landholding c lans in Numienguai, a 
h interland v i l lage located near the headwaters of the Rambumba River, some 
two to three hours' walk from the nearest road . Passu held the position of local 
government counci l lor in Numienguai, had been employed as a ' second 
secretary' in the nat ional Department of Justice, and was also an active member 
of the Melanesian A l l iance Party. In 1 992, he was acting as e lection campaign 
manager for the national Member of Parl iament, Bernard Narokobi,  hav ing put 
aside his own dreams of becoming an MP in order to serve as chairman of the 
new landowner company. 
Between 1 990 and 1 992, Passu and his group of c lose associates held 
numerous meetings with customary landowners in the Wewak Local, Numbo, 
and But-Boiken provincial e lectorates. They urged the landowners to commit 
their forests to a logging project in order to open up the hinterlands, and thus 
resolve the problematic status of the settlers along the North Coast Road . Men 
who were interested in the idea prov ided the names of their c lans and of the 
lands which they control led, s igned 'C lan Land Usage Agreement ' forms, and 
paid K30 to become (as they thought) shareholders in a landowner company. At 
some point in 1 99 1 ,  men representing about sixty clans from sixteen v i l lages met 
at Tangara to organise the company itself. They formal ly appointed Passu to the 
position of executive chairman, seconded the nom ination of a secretary, a 
treasurer, and a project manager, and then e lected twelve men to sit on the 
company' s  board of directors . Passu named the company ' WongWong' 
Loggi ng, after the word in the Central Bo iken dialect for the King Bird-of­
Paradise, Cicinnurus regius. 
According to documents on fi le with the Investment Promotion Authority in 
Port Moresby, Passu first registered WongWong Logging as a proprietary 
company in September 1 99 1 .  Passu and a lawyer based in Port Moresby, Luke 
Nalo, were l i sted as the company' s  two sole directors and shareholders . The 
company' s  Memorandum of Understanding stated that its main objective was ' to 
harvest timber for the purpose of exporting or to be used with in Papua New 
Guinea. ' Its Artic les of Association declared that ' the rights of the members to 
transfer shares in the company is  restricted in that the Board of Directors may at 
any time i n  its absolute d iscretion decl ine to register any transfer of shares. ' 
WongWong, i n  other words, was regi stered as a private company with whom 
customary landowners were registering the ir lands, rather than a corporate 
organisation with broad landowner participation . 
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Whi le  the landowner company was being formed, its executives were also 
busy search ing for an overseas company to invest in the project. The first 
company with whom they began serious negotiations was Groomes Pacific, a 
company based in  New Zealand.  Groomes, they said, performed a careful 
inventory of the forest resources of the Prince Alexander Mountains, and 
u lti.mately expressed an interest in sign ing a Logging and Marketing Agreement 
with WongWong. Negotiations broke down, however, when the executives of 
WongWong d iscovered that Groomes wou ld only pay landowners a flat royalty 
of K4 per cubic metre, and that Groomes also intended to finance the project 
through bank loans .  It was possible,  although it is not documented, that the 
landowner company wou ld have shared the l iabi l ity for these loans .  
When negotiations with Groomes were term inated,  the WongWong 
executives then turned to the national Department of Forests for assistance in 
locating a su itable contractor. Their contact in the Department referred them to 
a ' reputable'  Malaysian company, Niug in i  Lumber Merchants . The WongWong 
executives were suitably impressed by the financial and techn ical capab i l ities of 
th is company, and were espec ial ly reassured by a map d i splaying more than a 
dozen logging projects in PNG in wh ich it was already active ly involved. 
Niugini  Lumber Merchants proposed to estab l i sh a subsidiary company, 
Sovereign H i l l , wh ich wou ld actual ly log the concess ion, wh i le  the parent 
company would  retain the right to market the timber overseas. 
During the last six months of 1 99 1 ,  N iugi n i  Lumber Merchants paid for 
WongWong's  executives, d irectors, and other landowners to make a series of 
trips to Port Moresby. During the ir v is its, these men lobbied the Min ister for 
Forests and other national parl iamentarians to grant WongWong a timber perm it 
under the terms of the Forestry (Private Dealings) Act. 
This  Act, wh ich was original ly enacted in 1 97 1  and amended in 1 979, 
granted the Min ister for Forests the sole authority to dec lare a ' Local Forest 
Area' upon ' appl ication by any interested person and on payment of the 
prescribed fee ' ,  as long as he was sat isfied that such a declaration was ' in the 
interests of the owners by custom of the t imber' , ' the national interests ' ,  and ' the 
prospects for the econom ic exp lo itation of the t imber' . In the 1 980s, th is  Act 
proved extremely popular with overseas logging compan ies and local landowner 
compan ies al ike .  In effect, as the name of the Act impl ied, it empowered the 
customary owners of t imber resources to enter into private, contractual 
re lationsh ips with overseas compan ies outs ide of government scrutiny and 
plann ing. In theory, landowner compan ies were to be formed fol lowing the 
model which the Department of Forests used in the case of Timber Rights 
Purchase agreements. The customary owners were to be identified through 
genealogical investigation, their land boundaries de l im ited, representatives 
selected, and the mechan ism for distributing royalty payments for timber 
extracted from the land defined in advance . In other parts of PNG, however, 
landowner compan ies frequently fai led to adequate ly de l im it customary groups 
and land boundaries. The executives and d i rectors were often not representative 
of the range of customary groups or their interests, and they often lacked the 
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bus iness ski l ls and knowledge necessary to negotiate favourable Logging and 
Marketing Agreements with logging contractors (see S impson, th is  volume). 1 1  
I n  1 989, the Barnett Inquiry had recommended that the Forestry (Private 
Dealings) Act should be repealed because it opened the door to al l sorts of 
unscrupu lous dea li ngs, and because landowner compan ies were often ' mere 
puppets created to enable the foreign timber compan ies to gain access to the 
resource' (Barnett 1 989c, Vol . 1 :  1 20). In 1 990, the Min ister for Forests, Karl 
Stack, announced a two-year moratorium on the issue of new timber permits, 
with the aim of creating an interim period in wh ich new forestry legislation 
could be drafted and institutions capable  of implementing and enforcing the 
regulat ions estab l i shed. However, over the course of the fol lowing year, Stack 
cont inued to i ssue perm its under both the o ld Forestry Act and the Private 
Dealings Act (see F i l er 1 99 1 b) .  
When Jack Genia  took over the Min i stry of  Forests in Apri l 1 99 1 ,  he too 
continued to lobby Cabinet for exemptions to the moratorium wh i le  the 
provisions of the new Forestry Act were being final i sed . 1 2 On 1 2  December, 
whi le Prime Mini ster Namal i u  (who was publ ic ly opposed to any breach of the 
moratorium) was making an 'official v i s it '  to New Zealand, Cabinet granted 
exemptions for five new projects . The Hawain LFA was one of them . In  
justifying h i s  submission to Cab inet, Genia  wrote : ' I  am re luctant to recommend 
these to the NEC [Cab inet] but pressure from landowners, provincial 
governments and members of Parl iament are such that I am compel led to make 
thi s  submission ' (Times of PNG, 2 1  November 1 99 1  ) . 1 3 
Four months later, on 8 Apri l 1 992, Gen ia proceeded to declare the Hawain 
Local Forest Area. He appointed the Acting Assistant Secretary for the East 
Sepik Division of Forests, Al imel  Bel let, to certify Wong Wong as the corporate 
vehicle for a l l  of the customary landowners of the Hawain LFA. According to a 
copy of the Dea l i ngs Agreement between WongWong and the LFA landowners 
that was c irculating in Wewak in 1 995 ,  Bel let certified that sixty-eight men 
acting as the representatives of s ixty-seven c lans from fourteen v i l lages had the 
r ight, by custom, to d i spose of the t imber resources of the 40,000 hectare 
1 1  According to the provisions of the Forestry (Private Dealings) Act, the responsibil ity for 
authenticating the claims of ownership over timber resources lay with a ' prescribed authority' to be 
nominated by the Minister for Forests. At the same time, the Act exempted both the state and the 
prescribed authority from being l iable in civil proceedings for the facticity of the certification. 
Thus, if the parties to a timber sale under this act avoided government scrutiny of their contractual 
relations, the government also washed its hands clean of any responsibil ity for policing this 
relationship. 
1 2 See the reports in the Post-Courier, 8 May 1 99 1 ,  and the Times of PNG, 2 1  November 1 99 1 . 
1 3 It may be noted that the NEC simultaneously voted to extend the moratorium on new timber 
permits until July 1 993 .  
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concession . 1 4 The boundaries of the Hawain LFA, as declared in the 
government gazette, were essential ly the same as those wh ich had been 
del im ited for the ' Wewak-West Coast Timber Area' by the Divis ion of Forests 
in 1 987 (ESP 1 987 :2) .  In its report, the Divis ion of Forests had estimated that 
the popu lation of customary landowning c lans cou ld number some 5,000 
indiv iduals resident in  seventy v i l lages .  WongWong itse lf, in its Envi ronmental 
Plan ,  stated that B lock 1 of the Hawain LF A covered th i rty-one v i l l ages with a 
popu lation of some 4,876 (WongWong Logging 1 992 :34-36) .  Clearly, then, the 
sixty-e ight men who signed the Deal ings Agreement with WongWong 
represented but a smal l fraction of those men who would ,  by either custom.ary 
right or capita l i st self- interest, c laim ownersh ip over forests in the Hawain 
LFA. 1 5  
On 1 May 1 992, WongWong signed a Logging and Marketing Agreement 
with Sovereign H i l l ,  wh ich was now a who l ly  owned subs idiary of Rimbunan 
Hijau. 1 6  The margins which WongWong negotiated with Sovereign Hi l l  for the 
payment of timber from the LFA are shown in Tab le 3 . 1 .  
Table 3. 1 :  Local revenues under the 1 992 Logging and Marketing Agreement 
for the Hawain LF A .  
Description 
Non-prem ium hardwoods 
Prem ium hard woods 
Super premium hardwoods 
Timber for poles and p i les 
Landowner company prem ium 
Reforestation levy 
Agricultural development levy 
Infrastructure levy 
Provinc ial government levy 
Source : WongWong Logging 1 992 . 
Kina/m3 
4 .50  
5 . 50  
7 .00 
2 .00 
5 .00 
1 .00 
1 .00 
1 .00 
0 . 50  
1 4 The v i l l ages which were represented were: Suwambukao (4), Mandigen ( 1 ), Jambarampa (5),  
Penjen ( 4 ) ,  Perringa (9), Rain imbo ( 1 ) ,  Harigen (2), Hurahura (1  ), Sassanumbogu ( 4 ), 
Muscuwagen ( 1 3 ) ,  Puara ( 1 1 )  Kweruro (9), Numienguai (3), and Worn ( 1 ) .  
15 In  1 995, many of the men whose names appeared on the Deal i ngs Agreement were publ icly 
denying that they had ever seen or signed the document. 
l 6 Documents fi led with the I nvestment Promotion Authority show that Sovereign H i l l  was 
original ly registered as a stockbroking company, Rokwana Pty Ltd, by two Port Moresby lawyers 
in 1 986. In 1 989, the name was changed to Sovereign Hi l l ,  new d irectors were appointed, and the 
nominal share capital was increased to K 1 m i l l ion .  In August 1 992, 999,998 shares were a l lotted 
to R imbunan H ijau,  wh i l e  the remain ing 2 shares were al loted to Tiong Ik King of S ingapore. 
Sovereign H i l l  i s  also the vehicle through which Rimbunan Hijau holds its 50 percent stake in 
Niugini  Lumber Merchants (see F i ler, th i s  volume). 
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The day before the Min ister for Forests gazetted the declaration of the 
Hawain LFA, the Acting Min ister for Forests, Michael S ingan, signed 
documents necessary for the gazettal of the new Forestry Act during a campaign 
ral ly which the Prime Min ister, Rabbie Namal iu, was staging in the Duke of 
York I sl ands (Post-Courier, 7 Apri l 1 992) .  The Act was to be formal ly made 
into law on 1 5  Apri l .  Whi l e  Genia had publ icly supported the passage of the 
new Forestry Act, he now combined with the Secretary of the Department of 
Forests to b lock its gazettal unti l 25 June, at the end of the national e lections .  
They c laimed that neither an appropriate institutional structure nor an operating 
budget was in  p lace that wou ld  permit the implementation of the Act. Later, 
Gen ia added that delaying the gazettal of the act was necessary to ensure that ' 1 9 
timber permits and l icences due to expire th is  year are renewed and extended 
prior to the enforcing of the new act ' (Post-Courier, 22 Apri l 1 992). 
Because of his breaches of the moratorium and his delay of the 
implementation of the new act, Genia came under increasing fire from officials 
in the Department of Forests, the opposition, and non-governmental 
organ isations. The Forestry Transitional Management Counci l ,  which was 
overseei ng the amalgamation of the Forest Industries Counci l  and the 
Department of Forests into the PNG Forest Authority, under the provi sions of 
the new Act, was especial ly outraged . In late Apri l ,  its chairman re leased a press 
briefing which c laimed that the majority of logging perm its wh ich Gen ia had 
issued during h i s  tenure as Min ister for Forests had been awarded to Rimbunan 
Hijau or its subsidiaries, giving them contro l over about 66 percent of the total 
area of logging concessions in PNG (Post-Courier, 28 Apri l and 2 1  May 1 992) .  
There were also a l legations that Rimbunan Hijau was lavi sh ly fund ing the 
campaigns of Pangu Party cand idates for the upcoming elections, a charge that 
Gen ia v igorously denied (Post-Courier 1 9  June 1 992) .  Meanwh i le, the 
opposition, led by Paias Wingti and Sir  Jul ius Chan, were cal l i ng for a new 
inquiry into the forestry sector. A l l  th is  meant that the government ' s  hand l ing of 
forestry legi slation and the i ssuance of new timber permits between 1 990 and 
1 992 was turned into an i ssue for the June e lections. 
In  the aftermath of the e lections, Namal iu lost the position of Prime 
Minister to Paias Wingti by one vote in the national parl iament. Wingti then 
appointed Tim Nev i l l e  to replace Gen ia as the Min ister for Forests . Once 
ensconced in office, Nev i l l e  announced h i s  intention to rev iew all of the t imber 
permits which had been issued after the writs of e lection had been fi led, and 
proceeded to step up the speed of reform in the forestry sector. As a resu lt, by 
the beginning of 1 993 , the legal status and future deve lopment of the Hawain 
LFA appeared to be in  question . 
However, the l andowner company executives who had been the 
beneficiaries of permits awarded or extended during during Stack' s  and Genia 's  
terms of office wasted no t ime in organ ising themse lves to protect their 
positions .  Before the e lections were over, they organ ised the PNG Forest 
Resource Owners Association (PNGFROA) and began to campaign against the 
implementation of the 1 99 1  Forestry Act. Robert Passu, the chairman of 
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WongWong Logging, was nominated as the ' representative ' of the Momase 
region. 
The PNGFROA attacked the Act as constitut ing i l legit imate government 
i nterference with the r ights of resource owners to determine how thei r  forests 
wer� to be used . They v igorously opposed Nev i l le ' s  proposal s  to scrut in i se the 
composition of landowner companies and to channel the ' premiums'  wh ich they 
rece ived from log exports d i rectly into government-control led accounts to fund 
infrastructural projects .  Instead, they put the ir  weight beh ind a Private 
Member's  B i l l ,  i ntroduced by Dan ie l  Tu lapi in 1 993 , wh ich would have severely 
weakened the capacity of the government to regu late logging projects by re­
estab l i sh ing some of the provi sions of the now repealed Private Dealings Act. 1 7 
Tulapi ' s  b i l l  was eventual ly defeated in Parl iament, but the backlash from 
the PNGFROA had enough pol itical c lout to delay implementation of the 1 99 1  
Forestry Act whi l e  it went under yet another rev iew (see Post-Courier, 4 March 
1 994) .  The review was not complete in late August 1 994, when the W ingti 
government was toppled and a new government, headed by Sir Ju l ius Chan , 
appointed Andrew Posai as the new Min ister for Forests . Posai hai led from the 
Kandrian-Gloucester D istrict in  West New Britain and had l inks with the 
PNGFROA (see S impson, this volume). The Min i ster shared the PNGFROA's  
view that the government had no  right t o  intervene in  landowner company 
affairs .  The government decided to postpone further scrutiny of the composition 
and financial affairs of local landowner compan ies unt i l  the t imber permits that 
were i ssued during the moratorium came up for review and renewal .  
Whi le the PNGFROA partial ly succeeded in  winning the po l it ical battle 
against the implementat ion of the new Forestry Act i n  Port Moresby, 
WongWong and Sovereign H i l l  were losing support among the customary 
landowners in Wewak. Somewhat incongruously, wh i le the chairman of 
WongWong was making frequent trips to Port Moresby to campaign against the 
Act in the name of the sacrosanct property rights of customary landowners, in 
Wewak he was confronted with a series of profound cri ses among the 
landowners whom he cla imed to represent . F i rst, landowners outside of h i s  own 
immed iate constituency prevented the logging company from gain ing access to 
the i r  land . Then land d i sputes t ied up sign ificant areas of forest, and thus 
prevented them from being logged . F inal ly, the coal ition of settlers who had 
in it ia l ly placed h im in the position of broker broke up into mutual ly hosti le  
groups. The next section describes how th is  infighting among landowners led to 
a halt in logging activit ies in Apri l 1 994, wh ich Sovereign H i l l  temporari ly 
overcame by d irectly intervening in landowner company affairs .  
1 7 See, for example, a letter from the  PNGFROA that was publ ished in the  Post-Courier, I March 
1 994 . 
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Landowner-Contractor Negotiations, 1993-1995 
Because the perm it was granted in  a hurry, many commun ities in the LF A were 
poorly informed about, and i l l -prepared for, the start-up of the logging project in 
1 993 . Whi le some clans in some v i l lages had committed their forests to the 
project, many others had not yet done so . As a resu lt, Sovereign H i l l  resorted to 
negotiating access to specific stands of timber as its men and machinery 
advanced into the forests. 
At first, WongWong acted as a m iddle-man between Sovereign H i l l  and the 
local landowners . On the one hand, the executives were able to draw on local 
kinship connections and exchange obl igations to smooth the advance of the 
project. On the other hand, they tried, at times, to exert some real control over 
Sovereign H i l l  for the benefit of their constituency. Yet u ltimate ly, Wong Wong 
was unable to resolve land disputes, meet compensation demands, or account to 
local landowners for the funds which it was (purportedly) accumulating. As a 
result, WongWong lost cred ib i l ity, not on ly with the landowners, but also with 
Sovereign H i l l .  Sovereign H i l l  therefore began, from late 1 994, to intervene 
directly in  landowner company affairs, and to negotiate agreements directly with 
ind iv idual landowners. In th is  way, WongWong became irre levant as a socio­
pol itical organ isation representing the interests of landowners in the LFA. 
The Plan for Logging and Development 
In August 1 992, WongWong subm itted an env ironmental plan to the PNG 
Department of Environment and Conservation (DEC) for approvaf . 1 8  S ince th is 
is  the most complete and 'official ' five-year plan to which I have had access, it 
is worth summaris ing its contents briefly here. This is  because the way in which 
logging activities actual ly unfolded between 1 993 and 1 995 turned out to deviate 
considerably from the p lan . 
The Environmental P lan (EP) estimated that, out of the 40,000 hectares 
which fel l  with in  the official boundaries of the LFA, only some 28 ,263 hectares 
contained forests of sufficient timber density, on gentle enough terrain, to be 
commercial ly v iable and practical ly operable .  The operable forest area was then 
divided i nto five rough ly equ ivalent areas (or ' coupes ' )  wh ich were to be logged 
successively over the fol lowing five years (see Table 3 .2) .  The first coupe 
encompassed the remaining a l luv ial forests of the coastal plain and the h i l l  
forests b lanketing the western portion of  the northern escarpment between the 
Hawain and Wariman Rivers. The remaining four coupes then revolved 
c lockwise from the forests of the southern escarpment to the ranges south and 
north of the Hawain River (see Map 3 . 1  ) . In de l imiting the boundaries of these 
areas, the EP took into account neither v i l lage nor c lan land boundaries. In  
addition, the forests belonging to the men who were most enthusiastic about the 
project lay for the most part in Coupe 3, which was not schedu led to be logged 
unt i l  the th ird year of the project - 1 995 . 
1 8  The plan was approved by the Minister on 20 September 1 992. 
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Table 3.2 : Five-year harvest p lan for the Hawain LFA. 
Coupe Hectares Timber volumes in cubic metres 
Est. harvest Max. export Sawmi l l  
1 5 , 863 1 52,43 8 1 50,000 n i l  
2 6,080 1 5 8,080 1 47,000 3 ,000 
3 6,070 1 5 7,820 1 45 ,000 5 ,000 
4 5 ,850  1 52,  1 00 1 52, 1 00 1 0,000 
5 4,400 1 1 4,400 1 1 4,800 1 0,000 
TOTAL 28,263 734,83 8 708,900 28,000 
Source:  WongWong Logging 1 992.  
The enthusiasm of the coal ition of sett lers was dependent on their  obtain ing 
what they had long desired - roads that would enable them to go home. Indeed, 
the EP proposed that the first logging camp and transh ipment point for t imber 
extracted from the LFA shou ld be located at a site on Worn Peninsula. 1 9 From 
here, it was proposed that Sovereign H i l l  wou ld rec laim a section of the swamp 
to construct an access road through Tangara into Coupe 1 .  The logging 
company wou ld then bu i ld a l l -weather roads, surfaced with gravel ,  l inking 
Penjen to Perringa, Perr inga to both Num ienguai and Jambarampa, Num ienguai 
to the base log camp along the banks of the Nagam River, and then on to 
Musuwagen . There was also a p lan to construct a road from Surumba to 
Majuom, wh ich brought the total length of the proposed road network up to 1 32 
ki lometres. 'The logging road and network, ' the plan stated, 'would eventual ly 
improve the access ib i l ity and enhance the deve lopment of agricultural areas in  
interior lands and western v i l lages in the LFA . '  For th is reason, and perhaps 
only for th is reason, the plan cou ld then go on to confidently assert that ' the 
timber project i s  perceived by the peop le to be a major breakthrough in 
promoting balanced socia l  development and commun ity prosperity' . Everyone 
wanted a road. 
The EP also l i sted a wide range of soc io-econom ic benefits wh ich the 
v i l lagers would obtain from partic ipating in the project. WongWong and/or 
Sovereign H i l l  would :  
• upgrade the exi sting roads and bridges that l inked certain v i l lages to  the 
coastal h ighway; 
• establ i sh a portable sawmi l l  to supply timber for local use; 
• upgrade the c lassrooms and teachers '  residences in the LFA school s, and 
provide them with furniture and water supply systems; 
• construct a health centre to cater for the needs of LFA commun ities; 
I 9 Worn was the site of the Japanese surrender to A l l ied forces in I 945, home to a small 
community of Austronesian-speakers (with whom the settlers had some t ies of intermarriage), and 
also the site of one PNG 's  few National Parks .  
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• help to maintain and repai r  local churches by providing them with bui ld ing 
materials; 
• help v i l lagers to i nsta l l  water tanks or other water supply systems; 
• establ ish a base camp near the Nagam River, complete with workers ' 
housing, a workshop, an aid post, a pol ice station, a store, and a market place 
for local produce; 
• implement a tra in i ng and local i sation programme to help local workers 
enhance thei r  ski l l s  and expert ise ;  
• take measures to protect special cultural, h i storical , and archaeological s ites 
in the LF A; and 
• encourage env ironmental awareness and participatory planning among the 
local people.  
It was, in  brief, a comprehensive p lan wh ich contained a long l i st of prom ises. 
Conflicts and Confrontations over Logging 
There were problems, however, as soon as Sovereign H i l l  unloaded its fleet of 
new bul ldozers and other heavy mach inery on Wom Beach in January 1 993 . 
Three crises developed and i ntens ified over the course of the fol lowing year, 
which u lt imately led to Robert Passu ' s  downfal l as chairman of WongWong 
Logging, and the temporary suspension of the project. 
The first cris i s  that confronted the project involved the location of the wharf 
and base camp at Worn Point. Whi le one landowner from Wom had s igned an 
agreement with WongWong, many others opposed the construction of a wharf, 
base camp, and road on Worn Pen insula .  The Times of PNG reported that Worn 
landowners had threatened to block the company' s  access because they feared 
'd isruption to thei r  commun ity activ ities, damage to the ir  fish ing grounds and 
pol lution of thei r  envi ronment' .20 They wrote to the DEC, requesting an 
immediate inquiry i nto the poss ib le env i ronmental consequences of the proposed 
development so that they could make an informed dec is ion.  On 4 March, 
another report in the Times featured the testimony and photograph of Cathy 
Tuhak and her grandchi ldren . She was quoted as fol lows : 
These companies are going to destroy my forests, my land and my seas. 
I am old and I am going to die soon. I do not want to see my chi ldren 
and my grandchi ldren suffer as a resu lt of the destruction to my forests, 
my land, and my seas. 
In response to the landowners ' complaints, the DEC suspended the 
development of a base camp and wharf at Wom pend ing the completion of a 
comprehensive envi ronmental impact assessment by WongWong and Sovereign 
20 Times of PNC, 1 8  February 1 993 ; see also Wantok, 1 8  February 1 993 . 
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Hi l l  (personal commun ication, John Douglas, 1 993) .  However, the assessment 
was never carried out because Sovere ign H i l l  decided to abandon the original 
development proposal . 2 1 
The EP also proposed that Cape Kholang could be developed as an 
alternative location for the wharf. Thus, when Wom was ru led out, the 
executives of WongWong turned the ir  attention to the landowners of Kholang. 
At th is  stage, however, the latter had not been informed of the impending 
project. One of these landowners, who later came to sit on Wong Wong' s  board 
of d i rectors, to ld me that :  
when the company arrived in Wewak, I had no idea that they were 
going to come here . . .  (One day] they came in a boat, picked me up, 
and we went over to Muscu I s land. There we all sat down together and 
discussed how we could reach an agreement for the company to come 
and use Kholang. 
Whereas he and h i s  fam i ly had been l iv ing at Kho lang for several years, 
subsist ing off the ir  gardens, the adjacent mangroves, and the sea, he was now 
offered the poss ib i l ity of an increased cash income and permanent house, 
complete with a water supply system . He therefore agreed to al low Sovereign 
Hi l l  to establ ish a log pond and wharf at Kholang. In  exchange, he was to 
receive K400 a month in rent, K3 ,000 as compensat ion for damage to a garden 
wh ich would be uprooted dur i ng construction of the log pond, and a permanent 
house for h imself and h i s  fam i ly .  Once the agreement was s igned, in  March 
1 993 , Sovere ign H i l l  qu ickly establ ished a smal l base camp and wharf.22 
Having secured a foothold on Cape Kho lang, WongWong then turned its 
attention to reso lving two add itional prob lems .  The first involved the choice of 
a location for the temporary, but large, base camp wh ich was requ ired for 
Sovereign H i l l ' s  equ i pment and employees unt i l  such time as they reached the 
Nagam River. Th is  problem was solved when customary landowners from 
Suwambukao read i ly agreed to al low the company to construct a temporary base 
camp on the ir  land .  The second prob lem was that Wongwong had yet to 
negotiate access to the forests that lay beyond Cape Kholang, and th is  proved 
more intractab le .  
Although, on paper, Coupe 1 extended down to the a l luvium forests east of 
the Hawain River, most of the customary landowners from the v i l lages of Parom 
and Rain imbo were in it ial ly inc l i ned to deny access to the ir  land, because they 
regarded the large ly i ntact a l luvium forest as the ir  ' store ' - a place where they 
2 1  The project manager apparently bel ieved that it wou ld be too impract ical and expensive to 
construct a road through the mangrove swamps. V i l l agers reca l l  him say ing (in Tok P is in)  
"Dispela tais bai  ki/im indai olgeta masin bilong mi! '  ( 'This swamp wi l l  swal low up al l of my 
mach inery ! ' ) . 
22 Unfortunately. after the agreement was made, h i s  re lat ives from Muscu Is land d i sputed h i s  
c laim to  exclusive ownersh i p  of Kholang. As a resu lt, the  rental payments have been pa id  i nto a 
trust account pend ing the result of a court decis ion on the i ssue. 
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could freely hunt game, gather forest produce, and catch fish. They feared that 
logging and road-bui lding through the heart of th is forest wou ld foreclose th is 
option . I n  addition, they d istrusted WongWong's  motives because it had been 
formed by people from the h interland v i l lages: '/ no kampani bilong mipela! ' 
( ' It ' s  not our company! ' ), they said . 
I n  late February and early March, executives from WongWong held four 
successive meetings with the leaders of Parom and Rain imbo clans in an attempt 
to negotiate a right of way for the road . They pleaded that the h interland people 
were desperate for a l ink between their  v i l lages and the North Coast Road . The 
leaders of the Parom and Rain imbo clans ultimately found it difficu lt, if not 
impossible, to oppose the desi res of the i r  in land kin .23 They demanded, 
however, that they be duly compensated for any damage caused by the 
construction of the road, and they continued to withhold approval for their their 
forests to be logged. WongWong was thus compel led to s ign a Memorandum of 
Understanding which specified that about K80,000 wou ld  be paid to them, in a 
series of instalments, once log exports began . 
By June 1 993 , Sovereign H i l l  had c leared a track from Cape Kholang up 
i nto the foothi l l s, to the place where they were also completing construction of 
the provis ional base camp, a few ki lometres directly west of Suwambukao. 
However, although the work on the road was largely complete, the customary 
landowners of Parom and Rainimbo had rece ived only a smal l  proportion of the 
promised compensation payment.24 By the end of Ju ly, they grew increasingly 
impatient at the delay, and during the first week of August, a landowner from 
Rain imbo made a publ ic  demand for immediate compensation on Radio East 
Sepik 's  weekly current affairs programme ' What ' s  Happening' (' Wanem 
Samting i Kamap ') . Meanwhi le, other landowners from Rain imbo and Parom 
were p lotting to erect a roadblock on the main logging road unt i l  the ir demands 
for fu l l  and immediate payment of the promised compensation were met. 
WongWong reacted swiftly to these threats. On the morning of 9 August, 
they borrowed large dump trucks from Sovere ign H i l l  and used them to transport 
a gang of youths from the settlements to fight with the dissident landowners. 
One man suffered m inor injuries as a result of the attack. During the next week, 
the Premier of East Sepik Prov ince arranged a meeting between the executives 
of WongWong and the d iss ident landowners from Rainimbo and Parom, and it 
seems that he sided with WongWong, because the logging project went ahead 
without any further compensation being paid to the Rain imbo and Parom clans .  
23 One of the l eaders present at the meet ing recal led :  'I watched how [the chairman of 
WongWong] was cry ing and I felt sorry for h im.  So I said :  "Okay !  We must arrive a t  an 
agreement with you. If you bui ld  th is road through our forest to continue with your work in land, 
then you must pay us for al l the damage that you cause to our land ." '  
24 I nformants vary i n  the ir  c laims about the amount which had been paid - from KS,000 to 
K24,000. 
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About a month later, on 7 September, the East Sepik Div is ion of Forests 
gave Sovere ign H i l l  written approval to begin fe l l ing logs in three smal l  areas of 
Coupe 1 .  B ut no sooner had logging begun in  these areas when c lans from 
Rain imbo and Suwambukao d isputed the ownersh ip of some trees included in  
the three set-ups, thus  caus ing further de lay. 
Land d i sputes constituted the second cri s i s  wh ich threatened the progress of 
the project. By law, un less the parties to a d i spute agree otherwise, logging 
cannot proceed in  forests whose ownership is  under d ispute . I f  the parties to a 
d ispute do agree that logging should go ahead, the royalties payable on t imber 
taken from the di sputed area are paid into a trust account unt i l  the di spute is 
resolved . From the perspective of the d i sputants who choose th is  path, the role 
of the court is  to hear the genealogical and h i storical c la ims of both s ides, and 
then to declare a 'winner' . 
As mentioned prev ious ly, the composition of land groups and the ir  
boundaries had not been formal i sed before the logging project started . I n stead, 
the men who were interested in the project s igned C lan Land Usage Agreement 
forms, wh i le WongWong urged those others who were in  the immed iate path of 
Sovereign Hi l l ' s  bu l ldozers to do the same. Th is  ad hoe procedure led to 
enormous competition over forested land in Coupes 1 and 2 during the first year 
of the project. C lans from Suwambukao and Rain imbo d isputed the ownersh ip 
of forests adjacent to the main logging road . C lans from Yarapos and 
Suwambukao debated the ownersh ip of an area to the west of Suwambukao. 
Kweruro and Suwambukao d isputed the ownership of forests in the v ic in ity of 
the S i l ing Creek. Pambanyeng c lans chal lenged Mand igen ' s  c la ims to 
ownersh ip of the forests around Mount Pambang. In add ition, long-standing 
land di sputes between c lans within some v i l lages, inc luding Rain imbo, 
Suwambukao, and N ionguanja, flared up into bitter confl icts . In many, though 
not a l l ,  cases, the d i sputants were also div ided into supporters and opponents of 
the logging project. 
Provinc ial lands officers were re l uctant to get involved in resolving land 
d isputes once the project had started .  They felt al ienated by WongWong 
because the company had not sought out the ir  assi stance in  the first place. 
Nonetheless, in July 1 993 , the head of the prov incial Divis ion of District Affairs 
wrote a letter to WongWong, stating that he wou ld assign five officers to the 
project if Wong Wong wou ld give them the use of a four-wheel drive veh ic le and 
pay the ir  overtime and camping a l lowances. When WongWong fai led to 
respond, the Divis ion ass igned volunteer land mediators to hear the d i sputes .  
None of the twelve d isputes which were brought to the attention of government 
officials between 1 993 and 1 995,  as a result of the logging project, have been 
resolved. 
The th i rd cr is is  that confronted WongWong and Sovere ign H i l l  was the 
breakdown of the coal ition of landowners wh ich had in it ial ly supported the 
project and the ir  fragmentation into m utual ly host i le factions.  Th i s  cris is was 
provoked, in large part, by the leadersh ip style of WongWong ' s  executive 
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chairman, which was authoritarian, conspiratorial, and h ighly secretive. Just 
three days before the logging operation was opened by three national MPs, 25 a 
core group of landowners who had been instrumental in supporting the project 
convened an i mpromptu meeting in Tangara, where they confronted the 
WongWong executives with a long series of grievances. They wanted to be 
informed about the company' s working plan,  the contents of the contract 
between Sovereign H i l l  and WongWong, the financial status of WongWong, the 
powers of its d i rectors, and its employment procedures. The executives 
responded by largely ignoring the requests for clarification and information 
about the project. I nstead, they ins isted that the real motive for the meeting was 
jealousy between landowners over project employment, and their  impatience to 
receive royalty payments, roads, and ' serv ices ' .  They defended their  selection 
process and threatened to res ign from their positions .  
Needless to  say, the meeting fai led to resolve the brewing confl icts between 
WongWong and the local landowners, who now felt too int im idated to speak up 
for themselves in pub l ic .  I nstead, they began ' talking beh ind the backs '  (tok 
beksait) of the executives and spread ing rumours of embezzlement and special 
treatment by Sovere ign H i l l .  The seriousness of these rumours, and the general 
atmosphere of .d i strust; only increased as the fel l ing of trees proceeded, the first 
log sh ipments went out, and royalty payments were made. By January 1 994, 
Sovereign H i l l  had logged ·out a number of areas adjacent to Perringa, 
Suwambukao, N ionguanja, Mandigen, and Saure. They had sh ipped 1 6,454 
cubic metres of logs, whi l e  WongWong had paid out K65 ,907 .79 in royalties to 
the resource owners. 
After the June meeting, then, a faction of landowners began to withdraw 
their  support from WongWong and to organ i se opposition to its chairman and 
executives in the North Coast settlements. On 1 6  January 1 994, more than one 
h undred men from n ine v i l lages in the Coupe 1 and 2 areas attended a meeting 
in it iated by th i s  opposition group .  The part ic ipants compi led a twenty-one point 
petition demanding that the chairman should respond to questions about the 
working plans, shareholding structure, and financial status of the company, and 
should  state whether Sovere ign H i l l  intended to pay them compensation for 
damage to crops and other resources (see Times of PNG, 24 March 1 994). 
A week later, a second meeting was attended by a lawyer from Port 
Moresby, whom the impromptu opposition comm ittee had h i red to investigate 
the sharehold ing structure and financial deal ings of WongWong. When he 
announced that, ' up unt i l  Friday at 5 o 'c lock p .m . ' ,  WongWong was not 
inc luded on the official  l i st of registered compan ies in Port Moresby, the crowd 
grew tense and anxious.  Fee l ings of betrayal and indignation were wide ly 
expressed . 
25 The entourage included Jack Gen ia, Bernard Narokobi, and Sir  Pita Lus - al l  members of the 
opposition during Wingt i ' s  coal it ion government. 
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Even at th i s  meeting, however, the customary landowners took two s ides. 
One side wanted to take immediate action to stop Sovereign H i l l ' s  operations. 
They proposed sett ing up roadblocks, burning down access bridges, and 
obtain ing a court i nj unction . The other side asked the lawyer to help them work 
out a separate and exc lus ive agreement with Sovere ign H i l l , removing 
WongWong from its intermediary role .  
Dur ing the month wh ich fol lowed, meetings of the opposition continued. 
Two documents from the Regi strar of Compan ies were c i rculated at these 
meetings, and then widely d ispersed among the settlements along the North 
Coast Road . The first document, wh ich bore a stamp dated 1 9  September 1 99 1 ,  
showed that WongWong had been regi stered as a proprietary company with two 
sole d i rectors and shareholders: Robert Passu and Luke Nalo.  Most landowners 
took th is  as legal confi rmation that WongWong was not a landowner company at 
a l l ,  but the private bus iness venture of two men . They had been tricked. The 
second document, which was dated 1 9  September 1 99 1  but stamped by the 
Regi strar of Compan ies on 8 February 1 994, showed that Nalo had resigned as a 
d i rector and transferred h i s  share to Pau l Porei . Other documents, dated 3 1  
January and 2 February 1 994, l i sted an add itional fourteen directors and eleven 
shareholders in WongWong Logging Company, but some of the men whose 
names appeared on th is  l i st den ied that they were either shareholders or d i rectors 
when I asked them . 
On 27 February, Robert Passu convened a meeting at Tangara wh ich was 
attended by the general manager of N iugin i  Lumber Merchants, George Yong, 
and a crowd of several hundred local landowners . The goal of the meeting was 
to overcome the rumours which had been c i rcu lating about WongWong, and 
re ign in the ranks of the opposition so that the project cou ld go ahead . Passu 
reviewed the h i story of the project, ins ist ing that everyth ing was legal and in 
order. Luke Nalo announced that he had res igned from WongWong two years 
prev ious ly, and was neither a d i rector nor a shareho lder. He threatened to sue 
any men who continued to spread rumours about him for defamation of 
character. George Yong pleaded with the crowd to support WongWong and the 
logging project, and to cease the i r  incessant demands for compensation in the 
interests of promoting development in East Sepik Prov ince. He also suggested 
that, if they were unhappy with Passu ' s  leadersh ip as chairman of WongWong, 
they could always elect a new man to take his p lace . Passu, for his part, 
attempted to reassert h i s  control over the landowner company, and to shore up 
support among the landowners of Coupes 2 and 3 .  By the end of the meeting, it 
appeared that landowners from several h interland v i l lages, such as Kweruro and 
Puara, were beh ind h im .  Most, however, were not .  
The meeting did not succeed in giving new l i fe to the logging project. 
Instead, the Times reported that ' the landowners ' were now ' against the 
developers of the Hawain LFA'  and Wantok reported that ' WongWong no 
longer has the support of landowners. ' 2 6  Sovereign H i l l  seems to have agreed 
26 See Times of PNC and Wantok, 3 March 1 994 and 24 March 1 994. 
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with these statements . By the beginning of May, the company transferred most 
of its heavy machinery and expatriate employees to other project areas in PNG, 
and laid off all of its local workforce. The logging project had come to a 
standst i l l .  
A Turning Point 
The events of the first half of 1 994 marked a turn ing point in the re lationship 
between the management of Wong Wong and Sovereign H i l l .  At first, Sovereign 
H i l l  had largely been content to remain in the background as the disputes 
between WongWong and local landowners evolved . Sovereign H i l l  responded 
to conflicts amongst the landowners, when they got out of hand, by simply 
threaten ing to pul l  out of the LF A altogether. 
In the i n itial stages, th is  strategy seemed to work. It mobi l i sed support for 
the WongWong executives in such a way that it became difficu lt for dissident 
landowners to pub l ic ly maintain their opposition . In the first months of 1 994, 
however, rumours about the financial improprieties of WongWong, and 
d isappointment over the s ize of royalty payments and delays in compensation 
payments and prov ision of services, were so severe that the threat of a ' pu l l-out' 
no longer had the i ntended effect. There were now too many landowners who 
wou ld be happy to see the downfall of the landowner company and the 
withdrawal of the contractor. 
From Sovereign H i l l ' s  point of view, WongWong had fai led in its primary 
purpose : to act as a broker between themselves and the local people, and thus to 
ensure that Sovereign H i l l  would continue to have untroubled access to the forest 
resources of the LF A. Thus, in the latter half of 1 994 and the first few months of 
1 995,  Sovereign H i l l  modified its approach to the local landowners. Wh i le the 
operation was temporar i ly suspended, Sovereign H i l l  withdrew its support from 
WongWong' s current chairman and executives, plann ing to replace them with a 
new team . At the same time, the logging company planned to negotiate access 
with small groups of landowners on its own account. 
On 24 August, Robert Passu convened a general meeting of LF A 
landowners, where he presented a verbal report on WongWong's financial 
status, announced his res ignation, and set a date for the elect ion of new directors 
and executives. On 28 August, at a meeting wh ich was main ly attended by the 
old directors and executives, the mantle of chairmanship was passed to Martin 
S imbuk, a landowner from Parom.  Shortly thereafter, two young men, one from 
Kweruro and one from Penjen, succeeded to the positions of deputy chairman 
and secretary. This core group was then charged with the responsibi l ity for 
restarting the project. 
The Revival of the Project in 1 995 
Although it took several months to deve lop, th is move breathed new l ife into the 
stal led logging project. On 4 March 1 995 ,  George Yong flew out to Wewak to 
meet with WongWong 's  new team of directors and executives, and expressed 
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Sovereign H i l l ' s  desire to re-enter the areas of Coupe 1 which had not yet been 
logged - the a l l uv ial  forests belonging to Parom, and the forests in  the footh i l l s 
beh ind Suwambukao and N ionguanja - and resolve the problems wh ich had 
developed in  the Coupe 1 area over the previous year. Unfortunately, however, 
WongWong continued to draw its greatest support from v i l l ages in the 
h interland, such as Puara, Kweruro, and Penjen,  whose forests were in  Coupes 2 
and 3 .  Thus, to ach ieve its a im of 'fin ish ing up'  in Coupe 1 ,  Sovere ign H i l l  sti l l  
had a long road o f  negotiations ahead . 
Sovereign H i l l  first focussed on negotiat ing with the customary landowners 
at Parom . In early March,  its management tried to persuade them to s ign some 
new agreements in  the Wewak courthouse, but the landowners unan imously 
refused to do th is .  An anonymous source, who was present at th is  meeting, to ld 
me that: 
there was a general fear among the people that, if they went up to the 
courthouse and s igned a new agreement, and the courthouse then put 
its stamp on it, then later it wouldn 't  matter how much the forest was 
damaged, they wou ldn ' t  be able to demand compensation or anyth ing 
else .  
Indeed, a long-stand ing grievance of the Parom landowners was that they had 
never received ful l  payment of the compensation wh ich had been promised to 
them by WongWong back in  1 993 . But in February and March, WongWong and 
Sovereign H i l l  tried to persuade them that Sovere ign H i l l  wou ld only be able to 
pay off the ir  compensation demand if they were able to log the ir  forests . 
As a resu lt of th i s  argument, Parom clan leaders began to change the i r  m ind 
about the merits of col laborat ing with Sovere ign H i l l .  They were envious of the 
royalties wh ich the c lans in  Coupe 1 had already received . Their  attitude 
towards the ir  forest was a lso changing.  Whereas, before, they held to the 
conception of their forest as a storehouse of game, they were now start ing to 
view it as an area in which to expand thei r  settlements, gardens, and cash crops .  
As one Parom man explained it to  me :  
I ts not good when we just c lear forest for  starting a garden.  The trees 
just fall down and rot. We want the company to come and take a few 
of our trees [in areas where we wi l l  estab l ish gardens] and then, instead 
of the ir rotting, we wi l l  have a l itt le bit of pocket money too . 
Thus, the antic ipation of receiving compensat ion payments ana royalties, 
combined with a rev i sed conception of land use in  th is  a l luvial area, began to 
sway the m inds of many Parom clan leaders. 
On 1 1  Apri l ,  George Yong once again flew out to Wewak from Port 
Moresby to meet with the Parom landowners . At a meeting in Parom v i l lage, 
Yong offered a K500 bonus to each of the landowners who wou ld come forward 
and s ign an agreement grant ing Sovere ign H i l l  access to the ir  forests. Most of 
the Parom landowners stepped forward, s igned the agreement, and received the i r  
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K500 gift. In this way, Sovereign Hi l l  gained access to the last significant area 
of operable forest in the coastal plain. 
Whi le Sovereign Hi l l  set about logging th is area, it was also engaged in 
serious negotiations with landowners from other parts of Coupe 1 .  The company 
was intent on returning to the forested areas, in the footh i l l s  of th is coupe, which 
had not been logged in 1 993 and 1 994, and also had a practical need to retain 
control of the land on which their logging camp was situated. In early 1 995 ,  
however, the owners of these areas - from Saure, Nionguanja, Suwambukao, 
Mandigen, and Perringa - were, for the most part, thoroughly disi l lusioned with 
both WongWong and Sovereign Hi l l .  They were angry that they had not been 
paid compensation for economical ly valuable crops which had been uprooted 
and destroyed during the logging activities of 1 993 and 1 994 . They were also 
concerned that they had not received any benefit from the agricu ltural and 
infrastructural levies which had been deducted from the export price of their 
timber. In this respect, they were certain that WongWong and/or Sovereign Hi l l  
had abrogated the terms of both the Deal ings Agreement and the Logging and 
Marketing Agreement.27 Thus, in early 1 995 ,  they started organ is ing 
themselves into a coherent group in order to take both compan ies to court for 
breaches of contract. 
Sovereign Hi l l  and the Coupe 1 landowners initially adopted a hard l ine in 
their mutual negotiations in a number of meetings that took place between Apri l 
and July 1 995 . The landowners from the five vi l lages demanded that they be 
paid K5 mi l l ion kina in compensation before they would grant Sovereign Hi l l  
access to the logging camp and their forests . They asserted that they had many 
justifications for making th is demand. Sovereign Hi l l  had cut down many trees 
in their forest which it then left to rot; many roads had been bu i lt without the 
permission of the landowners, foul ing their waterways and ki l l ing off their 
sources of fish, eels, and crustaceans; logging activities had l ikewise scared 
away much of the wi ld l ife in the ir forests ; and the company had uprooted many 
of their cash and food crops, including their cacao, coffee, betel nut, sago, and 
tulip. 
Sovereign Hi l l ' s  project manager regarded the landowners ' demand for K5 
mi l l ion as completely unreasonable, and suggested that he wou ld not entertain 
an amount of more than K3 0,000. Simi larly, he responded to their complaints 
about the agricultural levy by saying that it amounted to a mere K24,000, 'just 
l ike chicken feed' which ' cannot do anyth ing yet ' .  As in the case of the Parom 
landowners, Sovereign Hi l l  thus attempted to persuade the landowners from 
these five v i l lages that their hopes for higher incomes and more infrastructural 
and agricu ltural deve lopment cou ld on ly be realised by providing Sovereign Hi l l  
with further access to their forests. 
27 They were sti l l  unable to secure copies of these agreements, despite the fact that some of them 
had actual ly signed the Deal ings Agreement. 
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Nevertheless, from May to July, the landowners largely stuck to their 
demands. They strongly bel ieved that there had been many ' improper deal ings' 
in the award of the logging permit, and they hoped that their threats of publ icly 
revealing these i l legal ities, in the media and in court, would pressure Sovereign 
Hi l l  into reaching an out-of-court settlement with them . But Sovereign Hi l l ' s  
general manager was u ltimately able to undermine the sol idarity of  the group by 
making opportune financial gifts to a few important indiv iduals who were 
leading the effort, and by privately negotiating smal l compensation payments 
with individual landowners . In September, he also finally paid the landowners 
the K24,000 in cash which represented their share of the agricultural levy. 
Whi le some landowners were satisfied with these amounts, and seemed poised to 
grant Sovere ign Hi l l  access to the remaining forests on their land, others were 
not. Instead, the latter began to file lawsu its (a total of five by November 1 995) 
against WongWong and Sovereign Hi l l ,  seeking compensation for i l legal 
tre�pass and environmental damage. 
Final ly, in the latter half of 1 995 ,  WongWong was faced with a serious 
challenge to its legitimacy as an organ isation which represented the LFA 
landowners . A faction within the group of settlers who had participated in the 
formation of the 'opposition ' in 1 994 were taking steps to register a new 
landowner company under the terms of the 1 99 1  Forestry Act. They named the 
competing landowner company 'Numbosawa' ,  joining the Boiken words for 
'mountains' and 'beach ' .  This was symbolic of what they hoped wou ld be a 
practical and pol itical a l l iance between coastal and mountain Boiken, both to 
wrest the logging permit from the hands of WongWong and to nul l ify the 
Logging and Marketing Agreement with Sovereign Hi l l .  They famil iarised 
themselves with the procedures to be fol lowed under the terms of the new Act to 
register customary land groups, they began some genealogical investigations, 
and they lobbied the Forests Minister for the"' transfer of the perm it. 
Whi le many landowners appeared ready to join th is new group, and thus 
participate in the campaign against WongWong, I found it very difficult to gauge 
the true level of support which existed for either faction . The comment of a man 
from Kweruro, who l ives on the North Coast Road, was typical : 
There are two companies operating amongst us now - WongWong and 
Numbosawa. Those of us who are l iving in th is settlement are just 
going to s it back and wait and see what happens. We go back and forth 
from one to the other as we cons ider: Who is respectable enough to 
perform truly honest work and help us? 
By the end of October 1 995 ,  Sovereign Hi l l  had succeeded in logging out 
Parom 's al luvial forest. The company had not succeeded, however, in winning 
back the support of the Coupe 1 landowners, nor in preventing large-scale 
defections to the side of Numbosawa. I t  appeared that many landowners in the 
LFA would continue to refuse to grant Sovereign Hi l l  access to the ir forests . 
Thus, after a month of attempting to move into new parts of Coupe 1 ,  Sovereign 
Hi l l  once again suspended its operations. 
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Outcomes for Local Stakeholders 
As a result of the ongoing crises in the Hawain LF A, the total area of forest that 
was logged between March 1 993 and December 1 995 was not very large. 
According to provisional estimates, based on data from existing topographic 
maps and maps of logging roads compi led with a global positioning system 
(GPS) device, the logged-over area in Coupe 1 stood at about 2,200 hectares, 
some 3 ,600 hectares short of the total area in which the company had intended to 
operate (see Table 3 .2) .  
In  the forests on the slopes of the Prince Alexander Mountains, the 
combination of land di sputes, local opposition to the logging project, and the 
steep and difficult terrain caused Sovereign Hi l l  to practise 'corridor logging' , in 
which most of the logs were extracted from with in 50- 1 00 metres of the 70 
ki lometres of logging roads. The forests of the al luvial plain were more 
extensively logged because of the flat terrain, accounting for only 1 9  percent of 
the logged-over area but 27 percent of total log exports. 
The log harvest in th is period was also much lower than the projections 
made in the Env ironmental Plan .  Sovereign Hi l l  exported only about 3 8,403 
cubic metres of logs from Coupe 1 ,  which had been estimated to contain 1 52,43 8 
cubic metres of merchantable timber. 
Table 3 .3 summarises the volume and distribution of income from the 
export of logs from the Hawain LF A between March 1 993 and October 1 995 . 
This shows that the landowners received royalties worth just over 4 percent of 
the export price of these logs. In  Suwambukao and Nionguanja, th is royalty 
income was very unevenly distributed : out of fifteen patri l ines, three received 
about 7 5 percent of the total .  
Table 3.3: Export volumes and income from the Hawain LFA, 1 993- 1 995 .  
Period :  
Estimated logged area 
Volume (cubic metres) 
F .0 .B .  sale price 
Landowner royalties 
Landowner company premiums 
Levies 
Government export duty 
Sources : PNG Forest Authority ; 
October 1 995 . 
1 993-1994 
1 , 777 ha. 
23 ,534 .9  
K3 ,830,688 .65 
K 1 28,520. 1 9  
K 1 64,744.34 
K82,372 . 1 8  
K663 ,954.50 
1 995 ( 1 1  months) 
n .a. 
8,867.00 
K l ,049, 1 24 .00 
est. K66,502.50 
est .  K62,  1 00 .00 
K26,60 1 .00 
n .a. 
Tota l 
n . a. 
32,402 .9  
K4,879,8 1 2 .65 
K 1 95,022.69 
K226,844.34 
K 1 08,973 . 1 8  
n . a. 
interv iew with chairman of landowner company, 
Despite the reduced area in wh ich the company operated, there was a great 
deal of ecological disturbance in Coupe 1 .  The network of logging roads mainly 
fol lowed the mountain ridges which form the watershed of three major rivers -
the Yangumba, the Rambumba, and the Jarumba. The clearance of forest along 
the length of these ridges promoted rap id soi l  erosion, and hence the si ltation of 
the creeks and streams below them . As a resu lt, there has been a significant 
dec l ine in the quantities of fish and crustaceans wh ich were formerly consumed 
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by the residents of Nionguanja, Suwambukao, Rainimbo, and Parom. The forest 
fauna was also severely impacted, as vi l lagers report that the noise of bul ldozers 
and chainsaws caused large game an imals, such as wild pigs and cassowaries, to 
flee the area. Bul ldozers destroyed the ground nests of brush turkeys, wh ile 
clearance of the ridge-top forests made it more difficult to trap flying foxes, 
s ince local hunting methods require small clearings in an otherwise intact forest. 
Final ly, expatriate and local employees of the logging company also hunted the 
fauna d isplaced by the fel l ing of trees. 
For the customary landowners whose forests were logged, the financial 
benefits of royalty payments proved to be disappointing and short- l ived . While 
they invested some of their income in used motor veh icles, trade store 
inventories, or savings accounts, most of it was used to meet customary 
exchange obl igations, dealt out to close kin in smal l quantities ranging from K50 
to K250, spent on sponsoring beer parties, or otherwise spent on consumer 
goods, such as mattresses or stereo cassette radios. The fol lowing comment 
from a landowner in Suwambukao typifies the di senchantment of many others : 
Before, when we sti l l  had some royalty money left, we were happy. If 
there was something one of us wanted to buy, we just bought it .  When 
we made trips into town, we could buy lots of th ings. But now that the 
money is gone, it is just l ike it was before . . .  We are finding life hard 
once again . 
Nor did the logging project prov ide much employment for local men and 
women. According to my census materials, during the peak of its operations, 
Sovereign Hi l l  employed between fifty and sixty of them, mostly as assistants to 
expatriate surveyors, as bul ldozer drivers, or as chainsaw operators, and they 
earned between K45 and K60 a fortn ight. Women 's  weekly returns from 
marketing garden produce and betel nut in town often exceed such amounts . 
The landowner company had also promised that they would provide 
services to landowners who participated in the project. Such services included 
roads to home territories, assistance in establ ishing cash crops such as cacao and 
coffee, bui lding materials, and assistance in the prov ision of v i l lage water 
suppl ies. Whi le Sovereign Hi l l  did establ ish roads into the home territories of 
some clans, only the clans in Parom were able to take advantage of them . The 
majority of roads (especially those in the footh i l ls) qu ickly deteriorated under 
the combined effect of erosion and regrowth . Few individuals in the LFA 
possessed sufficiently sturdy four-wheel drive veh icles to navigate these roads. 
In the short term, however, the logging roads did open up new areas for 
garden cultivation. Vil lagers took advantage of the clearings on the roadsides to 
plant bumper crops of sweet potatoes, squash, and bananas. They were also able 
to travel more easi ly by foot to make gardens further from their v i l lages, in areas 
that were formerly densely forested . 
Most of the other services wh ich were promised to participating landowners 
never eventuated . Whi le Sovereign Hi l l  donated funds to the Catholic women ' s  
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group in the Hawain parish, and suppl ied the church with some bui lding 
materials, landowners did not receive any agricultural assistance nor any water 
supply systems. Instead, the logging company uprooted large numbers of their 
cash crops, whi le the qual ity of water in local streams and rivers decl ined. As 
previously explained, it was only after bitter struggles with Sovereign Hi l l  that 
landowners in Coupe I received some compensation for their lost cash crops and 
tlie funds which had been paid to WongWong as agricu ltural levies. 
Lessons Learned by Local Stakeholders 
What, then, did the local landowners learn as a result of their experience? First 
of al l ,  they learned that landowners who col laborated with Sovereign Hi l l  were 
temporari ly empowered in their re lationships with other v i l lagers . Since the 
logging contractor was obl iged to recogn ise their land claims when they were 
granting access to their forests, they acquired a greater capacity to decide how 
land was to be used. They found that it was easier to put land into the logging 
project than it was to withhold it, yet they eventually lost status and wealth as 
their kinsmen contested the legitimacy of their land claims, demanded a share of 
their logging incomes, and spread rumours about them cutting 'private deals '  
with Sovereign Hi l l .  S imi larly, whi le col laboration with Sovereign Hi l l  initially 
empowered the executives and directors of WongWong, they ultimately lost 
authority, and became increasingly alienated from the ir constituents and 
kinsmen, am idst the accusations and rumours that they had been 'bought off' by 
Sovereign Hi l l .  
At the same time, the material interest which many landowners had in  the 
outcome of the logging operation involved many of them in a quest for increased 
l iteracy and knowledge of the law. On the other hand, other powerful actors, 
from WongWong executives to forestry officials, put up many obstacles to their 
quest for an understanding of their legal rights and the various contracts which 
they had purportedly signed . Despite these hand icaps, I bel ieve that knowledge 
about forestry and corporate law, the conduct of business, and the behaviour of 
overseas compan ies has increased as a result of their experience . One can only 
hope that th is gain in knowledge wi l l  put them in a better position, in the future, 
to negotiate more favourable outcomes for themselves and for the health of the 
forest. 
Conclusion: National Policy, Local Practice 
In th is chapter, I have tried to document two aspects of the national and local 
pol icy process in the case of the Hawain LFA. First, I argued that national 
forestry pol icy was itself  in a state of cris is during th is period . Second, in the 
absence of national pol icy and state regu lation, the actual advance of Sovereign 
Hi l l  into the forests of the LFA was shaped by a mu ltitude of local- level 
conflicts between landowners, the landowner company, and the logging 
contractor. Forestry pol icies debated and formulated in Port Moresby were 
ultimately of l ittle re levance to resolv ing the specifical ly local problems of the 
LF A. Instead, logging proceeded as a function of the temporary balance of 
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allegiances between the jumbled ' class ' of customary landowners and Sovereign 
Hi l l .  The former, as we have seen, easi ly divided themselves into factions which 
took up temporary positions in either faci l itating or blocking Sovereign Hi l l ' s  
access to local forests, depending on  their contingent pol itical al l iances. 
Where then, does this leave us, the outside observers who are cal led upon to 
make pol icy recommendations? In my view, the most important arena for future 
action in the practice of forestry management in PNG is not to be found in the 
formu lation of add itional pol ic ies, laws, and institutions at the national leve l .  
Instead, the challenge ahead is to  foster forms of social organisation and pol itical 
culture, at the local level, which can more effectively safeguard the interests of 
local communities, rather than just advancing the agendas of aspiring politicians 
or big men. The point here is that the forces of regionalism and nationalism are 
both weak in PNG.  One of the most important consequences of this weakness is 
that foreigners with capital can (whether intentional ly or not) eas i ly manipulate 
struggles between local factions for their own benefit. These local- level power 
struggles then result in a multitude of negative social, economic, and 
environmental consequences. Meanwhi le, the l ion ' s  share of the benefits 
derived from log exports accrues to the national government and foreign capital, 
whi le local actors merely fight over the patronage offered by overseas logging 
companies in return for their pol itical loyalty. 
The Assistant Secretary of the East Sepik Division of Forests, Al imel 
Bel let, once provided me with the fol lowing thoughtful reflection, wh ich might 
be taken as the theme of this chapter: 'We Sepiks are our own worst enem ies . '  
A starting point for further action is to  raise public awareness of  th is 
predicament, and pose the question of how all Sepiks (and al l Papua New 
Guineans) u ltimately lose as a resu lt. 
Introduction 
CHAPTER 4 
THE INVISIBLE DEVELOPER: 
THE DISSIDENTS' DILEMMA IN THE 
BUHEM-MONGI TRP AREA 
THOMAS NEN 
In the Fourth Interim Report of his  Commission of Inquiry into Papua New 
Guinea' s (PNG' s) forest industry, Judge Barnett ( l  989a) described the logging 
of New Ire land Province in the following terms:  
It would be fair to say, of some of the companies, that they are roaming 
the countryside with the self-assurance of robber barons; bribing 
pol iticians and leaders, creating social disharmony and ignoring laws to 
gain access to, rip out, and export the last remnants of the province ' s  
valuable timber. 
These companies are fooling the landowners and making use of corrupt 
gul lible, and unthinking politicians. It downgrades Papua New 
Guinea' s  sovereign status that such rapacious foreign exploitation has 
been allowed to continue with such devastating effects to the social and 
physical environment, and with so few positive benefits. 
In this chapter, I shal l question the extent to which this situation has changed as 
a result of reforms to forest pol icy and forestry legislation, by examining the 
recent history of the Buhem-Mongi Timber Rights Purchase (TRP) in Morobe 
Province. 
For this purpose, I shal l  describe the interactions between different 
stakeholders involved in the establ ishment of PNG's first helicopter logging 
project, and the legal entanglements which have developed around these 
relationships s ince the 'hel i- logging' venture came to grief in 1 992 . The 
stakeholders have included the landowners and 'their' landowner company, 
provincial and national forestry officers, local, provincial, and national 
politicians, two sets of 'developers ' ,  and several sets of lawyers. In tel l ing the 
story of their mutual relationship, I shal l lay particular emphasis on the 
di lemmas faced by those landowners who wanted to achieve and to participate in 
the kind of sustainable development which was originally prom ised by the 
proponents of hel i- logging, but wh ich seems to have been abandoned by their 
successors, with the apparent connivance of government agencies responsible for 
encouraging this kind of ach ievement and participation . 
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Map 4.1 :  The Buhem-Mongi Timber Rights Purchase . 
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The Buhem-Mongi TRP 
The Buhem-Mongi TRP area is located some 50 k i lometres northeast of the city 
of Lae in Moro be Province. The TRP covers 38, 1 90 hectares of land between 
the Buhem and Mongi rivers, and is in fact an amalgam of two separate 
concessions - the Buhem-Bugeng and Bugeng-Mongi areas (see Map 4. 1 ) . 1 
The area is bounded, on the south, by a thirty-ki lometre stretch of the Huon Gulf 
coastl ine, and on the north, by ridges which l ie some fourteen k i lometres from 
the coast. 
Environmental Conditions 
The area has abundant rainfall .  The wet season normally runs from Apri l to 
October, and the dry season from November to March . 
There are four distinct types of vegetation in the Buhem-Mongi TRP: the 
highland mountain Podocarp forest, the medium lowland h i l l  forest, the lowland 
riverine forest, and the combination of grassland and gardens (Low Impact 
Logging 1 995) .  
The highland mountain zone consists of h i l ls and mountains up to 750 
metres in height, with a m ixture of Podocarp species and some medium lowland 
species. The medium lowland h i l l  forest has the richest forest flora, with a dense 
shrub layer and sparse herb growth . Major species of commercial value in this 
zone are Pometia, Calophyllum, and Terminalia (ibid.) . In the lowland 
riverine zone, the major species of commercial importance are Endospermum 
and Pometia. The last zone contains land currently used by v i l lagers for gardens 
and plantations, and these two forms of land use have been responsible for the 
creation of grasslands in the coastal zone of the TRP. 
Human Settlement 
There are twelve census units located with in the TRP area, with a total 
population of 3,687 in 1 990 (see Table 4 . 1 ). 2 Three of these - Awadi, Mundala, 
and Ukil im - are offshoots of the o lder settlement of Bukaua, and are commonly 
subsumed under the latter' s  name.3 This means that the area contains a total of 
nine vi l lage communities, of which Bukaua (including its satel l ite settlements) is 
by far the largest. Four of these communities - Bukaua, Buengim, Ulugidu, and 
Yambo - are currently in favour of logging, whi le the other five - the 
'd issidents' - are opposed to it. 
1 The Bugeng is  one of three main rivers between the Buhem and the Mongi, the others being the 
Busa and the Bukang. 
2 The official spe l l ing of v i l lage names i s  retained throughout this chapter, even though it is 
sometimes at variance with local pronunciation. 
3 A fourth offshoot of Bukaua has recently appeared as a result  of the impact of the logging 
project. 
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Table 4.1 :  Population of v i l lages in the Buhem-Mongi TRP area, 1 990. 
Census Units Households Females Males Total 
Awadi 1 7  56  7 1  1 27 
Bua 50 1 5 5 1 49 304 
Buengim 76 1 93 236 429 
Bugang 48 1 40 1 37 277 
Bukaua 48 1 37 1 4 1  278 
E'e (Busong) 59  1 64 1 78 342 
Mundala 57  1 80 204 384 
Tamigidu 73 26 1 2 1 0  47 1 
Ukil im 25 78 76 1 54 
U lugidu 34 1 00 1 1 2 2 1 2  
Wideru 65 1 80 1 80 360 
Yambo 6 1  1 63 1 86 349 
TOTAL 6 1 3  1 807 1 880 3687 
Source: PNG National Population Census 1 990. 
All the people of this area, except those of Tamigidu v i l lage, speak the 
Bukaua language, which is an Austronesian language of the S iassi fami ly. 
Following the arrival of German Lutheran missionaries, the people also learnt to 
use the Y ahem language as a l ingua franca. Intermarriage is quite common 
between v i l lage communities, and has served to strengthen traditional social 
relationships throughout the concession area. 
Local Infrastructure 
The TRP area has a relatively low level of infrastructural development. There is 
a road from Lae up to Bukaua, which was bui lt by South Pacific Timbers when 
the company was logging in the Buhem area during the 1 970s. There is no 
airstrip, and no harbours or jetties in  the TRP area. The v i l lage people use small 
dinghies with outboard motors to travel to Lae for shopping, and to conduct 
government and private business. The journey takes an hour or two. 
There are four community schools  in the TRP area: one at Tamigidu which 
serves Tamigidu and U lugidu v i l lages;  one at Bua which serves Bua and Bugang 
vi l lages; one at Busong which serves Busong, Buengim, and Wideru v i l lages; 
and one at Hopoi which serves Yambo and Bukaua vi l lages. 
The Awateng Health Centre, located at Bua vi l lage, provides health serv ices 
to al l the v i l lages in the TRP, and there is also a small aid post at Bukaua v i l lage. 
The health centre treats about 450 patients a month and has a staff of five 
national health workers. F inancial support for the running of the health centre is 
provided by the Morobe Provincial Government (Low Impact Logging 1 99 1  ) .  
The most commonly treated diseases are malaria, upper respiratory tract 
infections, and some cases of tuberculosis. Serious cases are referred to the 
main hospital in Lae. 
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Most o f  the people i n  the are Lutherans. There are two major churches at 
Tamigidu and Bukaua, but nearly al l  the other vi l lages have their own smal l 
churches. 
The Formation of the Landowner Company 
The rights over the two concession areas - Buhem-Bugeng and Bugeng-Mongi -
were respectively acquired by the Australian colonial administration on 7 and 23 
November 1 973, for a period of twenty years. The administration subsequently 
issued a permit to a logging company cal led South Pacific Timbers Pty Ltd, but 
th is company only operated in the area around the Buhem River, and apparently 
ceased all operations in the late 1 970s. 
The local landowner company, Deinzehi l  Investments, was incorporated in 
Lae on 23 August 1 988, with seven original subscribers to the company' s  
Memorandum of  Association : B ingmalo Iga (from Wideru vi l lage), Ania Kaiwa 
(from Busong), Kiong Masang (from Buengim), Paul ltama (from Bugang), 
Kaisom Goy (from Bua), John Aladu (from Tamigidu), and Labo Aladu (from 
Ulugidu). The stated objectives of the company were : 
• to bring together the various people, clans or landowners of each v i l lage 
community for the economic and social development of the area; 
• to be involved in agricultural development activities in the area; 
• to carry on business in logging, harvesting, treating, and exporting of timber 
and timber products, and to carry on business in sawmi l l ing for production of 
sawn timber and other timber products for use in PNG; 
• to establ ish, conduct, and carry on the business of transportation, including 
carriage of passengers and freight by motor and other road veh icles of all 
kinds, ships, and canoes, and to function as wharf owners, stevedores, and 
warehouse operators . 
According to one of the original directors, Paul ltama, who is now the 
interim chairman of the dissident landowner group, representatives of the 
Bukaua community were able to gain control of the company with in a year of its 
establishment. This happened on 8 August 1 989, when a man from Bukaua 
vi l lage, Jonah Tisam, fi led a Form 44 with the Registrar of Companies, l isting a 
new set of seven shareholders . Five of the new shareholders, including Tisam, 
were members of the Bukaua community, one was from Yambo vi l lage, and 
Paul ltama was the only one who had al so been a member of the original board.4 
This sudden change in the ownership and control of the landowner company 
led many local people to question its integrity. Claims have since been made 
that the landowner company has served the interest of the logging companies 
4 It is interesting to note here that Bukaua and Yambo were the two communities which had 
apparently not been represented on the original board. 
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operating in the area rather than that of the landowners . Most landowners are 
unclear about the identities and shareholdings of the individuals who control the 
company' s  affairs, and their suspicions have made them reluctant to participate 
in the ' development' of their resources .  As in other parts of PNG, where 
landowner companies play a vital role in the negotiation of resource 
development, suspicions have been aroused when the directors have not been 
avai lable to answer local people ' s  requests for information, or when they have 
stayed away from the s ite of the development project for a considerable period 
of time. 
The Visible Developer 
The directors of Dienzeh i l  Investments exerted some pressure on the national 
government to secure the development of a new logging project in the Buhem­
Mongi TRP area. In March 1 990, the Department of Forests placed 
advertisements in the local newspapers asking for expressions of interest in the 
development of the TRP. Although Cabinet imposed a moratorium on the issue 
of new log export permits in July 1 99 1 ,  the Buhem-Mongi project was one of 
several which the Forests Minister, Karl Stack, later said would not even need to 
be exempted from this moratorium because they were 'either ready for al location 
or had been al located for some time, are extensions to existing operations or 
defunct projects being revived ' (Post-Courier, 2 January 1 99 1 ;  see Fi ler 1 99 1  b). 
The Buhem-Mongi project was evidently considered as one which fitted one or 
both of these criteria, because the national Department of Forests subsequently 
granted a five-year Timber Perm it (TP 1 3 -3 1 ), commencing on 3 October 1 99 1  
and expiring on 2 October 1 996, to a company cal led Low Impact Logging Pty 
Ltd . 
Records held at the Investment Promotion Authority ' s  office in Port 
Moresby reveal that the ownership of Low Impact Logging Pty Ltd was 
originally divided between Tuckman Holdings Pty Ltd of New Zealand (25 
percent) and a company cal led Malan Investment Pty Ltd (75 percent). Malan 
Investment represented the interests of two expatriates, Mai Smith and Alan 
Shannon, the first of whom was already managing one of the main hel icopter 
companies operating in PNG.  The timber permit was granted specifical ly for the 
purpose of selective logging using hel icopters to transfer logs from the logging 
sites to the log ponds for export. This was in accordance with the expressed 
wishes of the landowners for a sustainable form of development. 
The Development Proposal 
Low Impact Logging engaged a team of forestry experts who carried out both an 
aerial and a ground survey of the area. They divided the gross area of 38,300 
hectares into three parts : 9,800 hectares of 'non-productive forest ' ,  2,900 
hectares of ' inoperable forest' ,  and a 'net productive area' of 25 ,500 hectares, 
from which it was thought that an average annual cut of approximately 320,000 
cubic metres of timber could be harvested over a period of fifteen years. Up­
front capital costs were estimated at K 1 4  mi l l ion, comprising K 1 2  mi l l ion for 
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machinery (which would need to be replaced after eight years), K l .5  m i l l ion for 
mobil isation and establ i shment, and the rest as working capital .  The logging 
operation was expected to generate about K97 mi l l ion in total revenue to the 
country over its projected fifteen-year l ife span, most of which would be divided 
(in order of relative importance) between export duties paid to the national 
government, wages paid to local workers, and royalties and levies paid to the 
provincial government and local landowners. 
The economic benefits to members of the local community were supposed 
to include: 
• the development of local infrastructure through the construction of new 
access road and wharves (see Map 4.2); 
• the employment of up to eighty local people in camp construction and other 
start-up operations; 
• the continuing employment of a smal ler workforce during the course of 
routine logging operations; 
• the monthly distribution of royalty payments immediately after the start of 
the operations; and 
• various ' spin-off benefits ' , such as the development of a sawmi l l ing business, 
the establ ishment of tree nurseries, and contracts for coastal shipping and the 
transportation of workers to and from work. 
Meanwhi le, the national government and the country as a whole would not only 
secure direct financial benefits from the payment of taxes and royalties, but 
would also learn about the benefits of a new method of harvesting logs . 
Helicopter Operations 
The company' s  K 1 4  mi l l ion development proposal emphasised the reduction in 
damage and destruction of residual trees entai led in PNG's  first ' he l i- logging' 
venture. The proposal claimed that the operation would be of a tru ly selective 
nature, since on ly those trees of defin ite commerc ial value would be fel led and 
removed . Th is was because the usual bu l ldozers and skidders would be replaced 
by hel icopters capable of l ifting a five-tonne payload, thus e l iminating the need 
for roads and skid tracks into the forest area. By th is method, there would be no 
benefit in removing lower-value species, which are normally cut by conventional 
logging practices just because they have been rendered accessible by a road or 
track. 
Given the combination of techn ical, econom ic, and environmental factors 
invo lved in hel i- logging, the TRP area was div ided into five zones, each of 
which was to contain a wharf and a sawmi l l  (see Map 4.2). F l ight d istances 
would range from 200 metres to 1 ,500 metres, and the average flying time from 
the coast to the interior of the TRP would be about 2 .05 m inutes . An estimated 
average payload of 2 .5  cubic metres yie lded dai ly production rates between 700 
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and 900 cubic metres for ten hours of flying time, depending on flight paths and 
c limatic conditions (Low Impact Logging 1 99 1  ) .  
Map 4.2 : Proposed infrastructure development for the Buhem-Mongi TRP area 
(after Low Impact Logging 1 99 1 ). 
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The development proposal laid considerable emphasis on the reduction of 
those k inds of environmental damage (such as soi l  compaction or damage to 
residual trees) which result from standard logging practices. In approving the 
company' s  environmental plan, the former Minister for Environment and 
Conservation, Michael S ingan, stated that his department recognised that the 
type of logging to be carried out in the Buhem-Mongi TRP would have less of a 
negative impact on the environment than conventional logging practices. The 
approval was effectively conditional on the logging company' s  capacity to 
demonstrate a combination of economic viab i l ity with a reduced level of 
physical impact (Post Courier, 2 January 1 992). 5 
Operations Curtailed 
Low Impact Logging began logging activities in the area towards the end of 
1 99 1 ,  fol lowing the approval of its env ironmental plan. Although there was sti l l  
some disagreement amongst them, most landowners cooperated with the 
company because it was accepted that this form of logging would cause less 
environmental damage than conventional methods . 
5 In a paper presented to the 20th Waigani Seminar, Tony Power ( 1 996) applauded the heli­
logging techniques as the best way to avoid the damage caused by conventional ' selective' logging 
methods, which, by his estimate, damage between 50 percent and 80 percent of non-harvested 
species. 
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The total volume cut by Low Impact Logging during its first and only year 
of hel i- logging operations was 40, 1 29 cubic metres, of which the total volume 
actual ly exported was 3 5 ,599 cubic metres. Export earnings amounted to 
K2,937,700, from which landowners received a total of K 1 43,597 in royalty 
payments. Under the original proposal, direct landowner benefits had been set at 
K5 .03 per cubic metre, comprising K3 .3 l in royalties and K l .72 in development 
levies. The levies were actual ly used to instal l new water suppl ies in Yambo 
vi l lage and to construct an aid post in Ulugidu v i l lage . 
The operation continued unti l  1 0  September 1 992, when one of the giant 
Russian hel icopters on hire to the logging company crashed (Post-Courier, 1 1  
September 1 992). Seven people d ied in the accident, inc luding four landowners 
from v i l lages in the TRP area. Officials from the Department of Civi l Aviation 
conducted an investigation immediately fol lowing the crash, found that there had 
been gross negl igence on the part of the operator, and imposed al) indefinite 
suspension on the flying l icence for al l  rotor-wing aircraft operating in the area. 
This action natural ly resulted in the cessation of al l hel i- logging operations in 
the TRP area. 
Soon after the crash had occurred, a group of local landowners lobbied the 
newly establ ished PNG Forest Authority not to renew the TRP agreement, which 
was due to expire in November 1 993 , but instead to al low the landowners to 
negotiate a Forest Management Agreement under the terms of the new Forestry 
Act. The landowners also wanted to put an end to logging operations at th is 
stage, and were demanding that the company pay compensation for the death of 
their re latives in the accident.6 Paul I tama, one of the original directors of the 
landowner company, Dienzeh i l  Investments, was elected as the interim chairman 
of a committee representing th is group. He and his fel low committee members 
were hoping to secure the timber perm it themselves, and thus exercise direct 
control over any future logging operations in the area in order to achieve the 
twin goals of sustainable development and downstream processing. 
Enter the Invisible Developer 
Fol lowing the closure of the hel i- logging operation, Malaysian loggers have 
made two separate attempts to resume the export of logs from the Buhem-Mongi 
TRP using standard logging techniques. I t  seems that Messrs Sm ith and 
Shannon sold their interest in Low Impact Logging to one of the compan ies in 
the 'Monarch group ' ,  wh ich is effectively managed by Mr Hii Yi i  Ann, but 
which is also closely associated with Rimbunan Hijau, the largest of the Sino­
Malaysian logging companies operating in PNG (see Fi ler, th is volume) . This 
sale was apparently accomplished before the expiry of the original TRP 
agreement in November 1 993 . However, the dissidents c laim that th is transfer 
of ownership and control took place without their knowledge and consent, and 
6 Local informants claim that no compensation has ever been paid to the relatives of the 
landowners who were ki l led in the crash. 
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have subsequently been engaged in a series of frustrating battles to remove the 
' invisible developer' from their land. 
The First Appearance 
On 1 October 1 993 , the Post-Courier newspaper carried a story by one of its 
staff reporters, Wesley Bunpalau, under the title : 'Prov ince uncovers secret 
logging p lot: Morobe authorities impound shipload of logging equipment' . This 
story was apparently based on an interv iew with the Forest Authority' s  Acting 
Provincial Manager, Mrs Agatha Pokatou. According to Mrs Pokatou, Low 
Impact Logging had been official ly asked on 24 July to show cause, with in a 
period of fourteen days, why its timber permit should not be cancel led, and since 
the company had failed to respond within the stated period, her office was 
operating on the assumption that no new permit would be granted unti l the 
Buhem-Mongi area had been placed under a Forest Management Agreement in 
accordance with the provisions of the 1 99 1  Forestry Act. However, on Monday 
27 September: 
a Malaysian believed to be an agent of the logging company and sent 
by a Mr Hi i  An based in Port Moresby, called at the provincial forestry 
headquarters to meet with Mrs Pokatou and one of her officers . By a 
sl ip of the tongue, the expatriate mentioned that a vessel loaded with 
logging equipment destined for Oligudu [sic] was due to arrive in Lae 
on Tuesday. But as they were meeting, the vessel was being cleared by 
Muruks Customs Agency to sail to Ol igudu the same afternoon. 
When Mrs Pokatou sought to delay the process of clearance, she was told that it 
had already been granted, and the sh ip had set sai l for Ulugidu. She therefore 
went out in person, with two other forestry officials, two pol icemen, and a 
customs officer, and ordered the vessel to take its cargo back to Lae whi le  she 
sought to clarify the status of the timber perm it with Forest Authority 
headquarters in Port Moresby. 
She was also upset that the landowner company of the Buhem/Mongi, 
Deinzahi l l  [s ic] Investment Pty Ltd had not informed her office of any 
dealings it had or had engaged in, let alone complaints of 
environmental damages and benefits that were later channelled to her 
office. 
Four days later, on 5 October, the Post-Courier carried another story by the 
same journal ist, which reported that 
while she and her officers were carrying out their duty to safeguard the 
people ' s  resources and environment, an instruction was faxed to a Mr 
Hi i  Eean [sic] of Magnum Resources Pty Ltd based in Port Moresby, to 
inform his agent in Lae to land the logging equipment outside the TRP 
area. 
The instructions were from Mr Kanawi Poru [sic] , who is the divisional 
manager of operations with the Forest Authority. 
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Mrs Pokatou maintained yesterday that there was no approval granted 
to any new company to move into the TRP, although she said it seemed 
a company had been given approval by ' someone in authority ' .  
She said she would battle o n  to establ ish who gave approval and to 
which company. The equipment had been landed at Oligudu. But she 
would not al low the company to begin logging operations unti l  the 
uncertainties had been removed, adding that she wanted the equipment 
removed . 
On the same day, the Post-Courier publ ished a ful l-page advertisement, 
authorised by the chairman of Deinzeh i l  Investments, which refuted some of the 
points made in the earl ier article by making the fol lowing claims:  
• that Low Impact Logging had received its show cause notice on 1 4  July and 
had given a written response to the Forest Authority on 22 July, so the timber 
permit was sti l l  val id; 
• that Mrs Pokatou had herself been a witness to an agreement between Low 
Impact Logging and Deinzehi l  Investments, executed on 30 July 1 99 1 ,  which 
had faci l itated the subsequent issue of the timber permit; 
• that representatives of the logging company, the landowner company, and the 
Department of Forests had met again in August 1 99 1 ,  and agreed that the 
period of the TRP agreement should be extended to 1 996, so that a five-year 
timber permit could be issued ; 
• that the logging company had submitted a revised Forest Working Plan to the 
Forest Authority in June 1 993 , though it had not received any response; 
• that a meeting of landowners and landowner company directors, in July 1 993, 
had agreed that the logging company should now use conventional logging 
methods, and that the Minister for Environment and Conservation had also 
approved the use of such methods on condition that the logging company 
prepare a new submission on its environmental plan by February 1 994; and 
• that the landowner company was 'total ly satisfied with the way and manner 
in which Low Impact Logging is carrying out its functions and duties and 
obligations in accordance with the Agreement reached with it and in 
accordance with the guidel ines and requirements of the Forestry 
Department' . 
Three days later, on 8 October, Wesley Bunpalau produced another story in 
which it was claimed that landowners in the Buhem area, especially members of 
the Musam Buatu clan under the leadersh ip of one Dobin Dal ly, had 'd i ssociated 
themselves from any deal ings by the landowner company' and ' reaffirmed their 
dec ision not to al low logging operations to restart unti l outstanding payments are 
made for logs now rotting away and compensation to re latives ki l led in accidents 
during the heli- logging operation ' .  Th is decision had apparently been 
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communicated in writing to Nawae MP Amos Yamandi in July 1 993 , and to 
Deinzeh i l ' s  chairman the fol lowing month . 
The Second Appearance 
The press d id not carry any further stories about the Buhem-Mongi TRP unti l 23 
June 1 995, when the Post-Courier reported that local landowners were once 
again complaining about the importation of logging equipment, this time bearing 
the name of Low Impact Logging, but sti l l  under the control of Mr Hii and his 
employees. It appears that local forestry officials were sti l l  in the dark, since a 
'forestry registration officer' ,  Maria Kelva, reportedly denied that Mr Hi i  or h is  
company had been authorised to harvest logs in the area. 
Spokesman for the people of Bukawa area Paul ltana [sic] explained 
that the expiry date of the old Timber Rights Purchase (TRP) had 
lapsed, and the landowners wanted a new investor to be brought in 
under the new forestry guidelines as legislated for in 1 99 1  under 
former Forest Minister Tim Nevil le .  
Mr ltana said the vi l lagers of Bukawa, Buingim, Yambo, Widiry, Eec, 
Bugahang, Boac, Tamigudu and Ul igudu wi l l  only allow logging in 
their are[a] if  the concession comes under the new Forestry Act. . .  . .  
H e  added: ' We wi l l  burn M r  H i i ' s  equipment i f  h e  intends to use the 
divide-and-rule tactic on our people . '  
Despite these reported threats, the Malaysians had begun to construct new 
bui ldings at the Dumadum campsite, near Ol igudu vi l lage, by the end of 
September 1 995,  and had already moved various pieces of equipment onto the 
site in preparation for a further round of logging operations. 
By this time, the d iss ident landowners had been able to establ i sh that Mr 
Hii had previously been responsible for the operations of Putput Logging, a 
company contracted to exploit the timber resources of Umboi I sland, off the 
north coast of Morobe Province, that the Umboi timber permit had been 
cancel led because of the contractor' s  failure to comply with certain cond itions 
set by the government, and Putput Logging had been sold to Rimbunan H ijau 
shortly after the permit had been re-negotiated and re issued. From this 
knowledge they inferred that a s imi lar sequence of dealings must have taken 
place over the Buhem-Mongi timber perm it. 
Extension of the TRP Agreement 
During the course of 1 994, leaders of the dissident landowner group began to 
suspect that the new Malaysian owners of Low Impact Logging were attempting 
to negotiate a new agreement with representatives of the ' landowner company' ,  
Deinzehi l  Investments, but they were unable to  obtain access to  the latter' s  
records of  income and expenditure, or  the current distribution of  its 
shareholdings. These concerns were raised in a number of letters sent to senior 
officers of the Forest Authority in Port Moresby, in which the dissidents sought 
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some assurance that . such negotiations would not proceed without their 
participation. As a result, they claim to have received an assurance from the 
Managing Director, Jean Kekedo, that their own desire to negotiate a new 
agreement with a new developer was perfectly consistent with national 
government pol icy.  
· 
A landowner l iaison officer from the National Forest Service, Muyang 
Basenke, was assigned to consult with local landowners over the question of 
extending the duration of the TRP agreement. He reported that the landowners 
were divided on the issue, and recommended against any continuation of logging 
activities unti l these divisions had been overcome, at which time any new timber 
permit would need to be put out to tender under the terms of the 1 99 1  Forestry 
Act. 
At some point in 1 994, however, the State Sol icitor drafted a form of 
agreement for extension of the Buhem-Mongi TRP for a period of five years 
from November 1 993 to November 1 998 .  The schedule attached to this form of 
agreement l i sted the names of twelve c lan agents from six vi l lages in the TRP 
area - E 'e, Buengim, Bugang, Bua, Tamigidu, and U lugidu. It appears that this 
agreement was signed, on behalf of the state, by the Deputy Prime Minister and 
Minister for Finance and Planning, Chris Haiveta, on 29 July 1 995 .  
The d issident landowners say that the majority of  local people had not been 
consulted over the terms of the agreement, and did not become aware of its 
existence unti l  some time after it had been signed . Nor can they understand how 
the agreement came to be drawn up by the Department of the Attorney-General, 
and signed by the Minister for Finance and Planning, without the involvement of 
the Forest Authority.7 
On 23 September 1 995 ,  the dissident leaders convened a general meeting of 
landowners at Busong (E 'e) v i l lage to discuss the extension of the TRP 
agreement and the timber perm it previously issued to Low Impact Logging. 
This meeting unan imously resolved : 
• to seek the deregistration of the landowner company, Deinzehi l  Investments 
Pty Ltd, on the grounds that it had been used by a m inority of landowners for 
making agreements with the state after unwarranted changes to the 
membersh ip of its board of directors; 
• to support the formation of an interim committee to represent the landowner 
interest in preventing any company from conducting logging operations in 
the TRP area, unless it was under the ownership or control of a representative 
landowner body; 
7 According to a former member of the National Forest Board, the matter did come before the 
Board, and the Board accepted the validity of the extension on the grounds that the state had 
acquired the right to extract a certain volume of timber under the terms of the original TRP 
agreement, and this volume would not have been extracted by the end of 1 993 (personal 
communication, Jim Belford, 1 996). 
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• to ask the courts to declare the purported extension of the TRP agreement 
nul l  and void ;  and 
• to negotiate an entirely new agreement with the Forest Authority, whereby 
landowners would themselves become the permit holders and seek to 
establ ish a sustainable forestry project with a downstream processing 
component, rather than simply harvesting logs for export. 
The interim chairman of the diss ident landowner committee, Paul Itama, 
consequently wrote to the managing director of the Forest Authority, arguing 
that the extens ion of the TRP and the continuation of logging activities under 
Timber Permit 1 3 -3 1 were both i l legal, and pointing out that four of the n ine 
landowning v i l lages in the TRP area had flatly refused to give their consent to 
any extension of the TRP agreement. In his v iew, this meant that there had been 
no process of consultation of the kind required under Sections 1 1 5 and 1 1 6 of 
the newly-gazetted Organic Law on Provincial Government and Local-Level 
Governments. 8 He also argued that conventional logging practices violated the 
conditions of the original permit, because the original Forest Working P lan and 
Environmental Plan had both been based on the assumption that helicopters 
would be used to extract the logs. He therefore appealed to the managing 
director and the Minister for Forests to revoke the extension of the TRP 
agreement and proceed instead with arrangements for a new Forest Management 
Agreement. 
The landowners were informed by Forest Authority officers based in Lae 
and Port Moresby that no new perm it had been issued. Th is meant that the only 
permit which currently existed, despite the expiry of the TRP agreement, was the 
one which had been granted to Low Impact Logging in 1 99 1 ,  and which was due 
to expire in October 1 996 . On the other hand, it was conceded that the 
developers had now voluntarily subm itted a new Environmental Plan for 
consideration by the Minister for Environment and Conservation, which impl ied 
some recognition on the part of the developers and the government that the TRP 
was no longer being ' developed ' in the way that had been foreseen in 1 99 1 .9 
8 Section 1 1 5 requires all three levels of government to ' l iaise fully with the landowners in 
relation to the development of [their] natural resources', while Section 1 1 6 requires the national 
government to make provision for the establishment of 'natural resource development forums' or 
other institutions through which this consultation can take place. 
9 According to the new Environmental Plan (Low Impact Logging 1 995), the development of the 
Buhem-Mongi TRP was to be managed on a sustained yield basis through a combination of 
selective logging and plantation forestry. An official of the Department of Environment and 
Conservation advised the author that his department had not responded to the submission of this 
document because of the confl ict that was known to exist between the Forest Authority, the 
developer and the landowners (personal communication, James Sabi, 1 996). 
Going to Court 
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Since the relevant government authorities were apparently unwil l ing or unable to 
ass ist the dissidents in their efforts to renegotiate the conditions of resource 
development, advice was sought from a national law firm . The lawyers noted 
that Section 1 3 7 of the new Forestry Act had allowed for the continued validity 
of al l  TRP agreements s igned, and timber permits issued, before the passage of 
the Act, but whi le the Act had made some al lowance for the subsequent 
extension of timber permits, no such al lowance had been made for the extension 
of TRP agreements . The lawyers therefore took the v iew that the state had no 
right to grant a t imber permit for a period which outlasted the expiry of the 
original TRP agreement, especial ly considering that the purported extension of 
that agreement had not been authorised unti l  after the original expiry date, and 
wel l  after the gazettal of the new legis lation. The d issident landowners sought a 
local land court injunction in Lae to prevent Low Impact Logging from 
conducting any further logging operations in the TRP area unti l the valid ity of 
the extension made to the TRP agreement could be determined. 
In their originating summons (No. 56 1 of 1 995), the d issidents asked the 
court to declare : 
• that the two TRP agreements between the landowners of the Buhem-Mongi 
area and the State were only val id for a period of twenty years, from 
November 1 973 to November 1 993 ; 
• that, as of November 1 993 , these agreements between the landowners and the 
State had ended; 
• that the award of a timber permit by the State (the second respondent) to Low 
Impact Logging Pty Ltd (the first respondent) in 1 99 1 ,  for a period of five 
years, was i l legal; 
• that the purported extension of the TRP Agreement between the landowners 
and the State in July 1 995 was i l legal ;  
• that the activities of Low Impact Logging Pty Ltd in recommencing logging 
operations were i l legal ; and 
• that Low Impact Logging Pty Ltd and any associates should be restrained 
from pursuing any further logging operations with in the TRP area in 
question . 
On 1 1  January 1 996, the court duly ordered that Low Impact Logging should 
cease al l  logging operations with in the concession area, that any merchantable 
timber which had already been logged was to be se ized and sold by the Forest 
Authority, and that monies received from the sale were to be held in a trust 
account pending completion of the proceedings. 
However, lawyers representing the logging company proceeded to 
challenge these restraining orders in the National Court, and on 8 February 1 996, 
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the landowners' case was dismissed, apparently on the technicality that it had 
been based on an ' originating summons ' rather than a 'writ of summons' . The 
dissident landowners then engaged the services of another law firm - the third 
from which they have so far sought assistance in their costly legal battle with the 
logging company - in order to pursue their case. 1 0 
Whi lst the whole matter is sti l l  before the court, the company continues its 
logging operations in the area. As a result, the level of tension and frustration is 
constantly mounting amongst the dissident landowners, especially the younger 
men who are now threatening to take the law into their own hands . Dissident 
leaders l ike Paul ltama bel ieve that the court system sti l l  provides an avenue 
through which the company' s  activities can be stopped in a peaceful  manner, but 
the failure of previous attempts to achieve this goal, for 'technical ' reasons 
beyond the understanding of local people, is making it harder for them to keep 
their fol lowers under control .  
Conclusion: Whose Sustainability? 
On 2 October 1 996, the Minister for Forests granted a further extension of 
Timber Permit 1 3-3 1 to Low Impact Logging for another period of three years, 
so that it would now expire on 2 October 1 999 - almost one year after the expiry 
of the extended TRP agreement. This extension of the timber permit was 
apparently warranted by the M inister 's  powers under Section 78 of the Forestry 
Act. But, if this is  the case, h is  action would seem to imply that old TRP 
agreements and the timber permits issued over TRP areas can both be extended 
indefinitely, at m ini sterial d iscretion, without being overtaken by the new 
resource al location procedures specified in the 1 99 1  Forestry Act. 1 1  
The recent h istory of the Buhem-Mongi TRP presents a clear example of 
some of the problems which the Barnett Inquiry identified in the mutual 
relationships of landowners, developers, and government in the forestry sector. 
Despite the recent reforms in pol icy and legislation, these problems continue to 
exist. The internal divisions and outward hosti l ity of landowning communities 
both stem from an ongoing failure of communication, which leaves the majority 
of rural v i l lagers in the role of pass ive bystanders who can exercise no control 
over the exploitation of their resources. 
Current development pol icies in the PNG forestry sector sti l l  fall wel l  short 
of achieving the ful l  participation of resource owners in the process of resource 
development (see Holzknecht, th is volume). The result is an escalation of social 
unrest which exacerbates the ' law and order' issue, and which may create more 
l 0 Legal action had already cost the dissident landowners almost K20,000 before the end of 1 996. 
1 1  Jim Belford (personal communication, 1 996) maintains that the National Forest Board advised 
the Minister that this further extension would not be consistent with the provisions of the Forestry 
Act, and the Minister accepted this advice. However, at the time of writing, the dissident 
landowners had not yet heard anything about the Minister's change of heart. 
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employment for lawyers, but also requires the government to spend more of its 
own funds on the business of dispute settlement (Nadarajah l 993a). 
In this particular case, it is  reasonable to ask whose interests are actual ly 
being represented by the national government. This is certainly the question 
which the dissident landowners of the Buhem-Mongi TRP have been asking 
since 1 993 . S ince that year, the members of several landowning vi l lages have 
been trying in vain to persuade the authorities to prevent any conventional 
logging operations from taking place on their land - not because they are 
opposed to logging as such, but because they agree with the government 's  own 
stated pol icies in favour of sustainable development and sound environmental 
management. Having been persuaded to accept a developer who also seemed to 
espouse these pol icies, they now find themselves being forced to accept another 
developer whose understanding of ' sustainable development' does not accord 
with their own . 
CHAPTER S 
THE MAKAP A TIMBER RIGHTS PURCHASE :  
A STUDY I N  PROJECT FAILURE IN THE POST-BARNETT ERA 
MICHAEL WOOD 
Introduction 
The Makapa Timber Rights Purchase (TRP) area, located in the Western 
province of Papua New Guinea (PNG), has been the subject of a lengthy process 
of negotiation in which no party or interest group has been able to exercise 
sufficient power over the other players to successful ly impose their own 
defin ition of the TRP on those other actors. This is a case in which the various 
stakeholders have failed to achieve a level of cooperation which would impose a 
workable order on their d ivergent understand ings of the Makapa TRP itself. 
What has happened instead is that conflicts over the definition of the Makapa 
TRP have so transformed and di luted this 'project' that it has yet to be scaled up 
from the micro-world of proposals, maps, ideas, letters of intent and project 
agreements to the macro-world of actual project development. 
This paper outl ines some of these transformations in the definition of the 
Makapa TRP, and also analyses the reasons for this fai lure to quickly implement 
a logging project. A crucial factor was the questionable validity of the project 's  
' pre-reform' legal basis, wh ich meant that the project' s definition was open to 
chal lenge by rival logging compan ies and by what I wi l l  cal l 'pro-reformist' 
sections of the state forestry bureaucracy. 1 On the other hand, the PNG Forest 
Authority itself has been unable to control the defin ition of the project -
alternative proposals with different boundaries have proliferated, and they have 
sometimes been l inked to quite different procedures for project evaluation (for 
example, . whether a project should be processed by the Forest Authority or by 
Cabinet) . These d isputes are crucial ly about pol icy making, in the sense that 
they are about the legitimate (and i l legitimate) powers and capacities of the 
I The ' reformers' are those people who broadly shared the goal of bringing the PNG logging 
sector under new forms of state regulation wh ich aimed to ensure that PNG 's exploitation of its 
forest was placed on a sustainable basis. The reforms were a direct response to the revelations of 
the Barnett Inquiry and a follow-up report by the World Bank ( 1 989), and are detai led in 
Holzknecht ( 1 994a), Nadarajah ( 1 993b, 1 994), Power ( 1 994), and Holzknecht (ed. 1 995) .  The 
reforms have been subject to continual attack, as exempl ified in 1 993 by the introduction into 
Parliament of the Forestry Act Amendment Bi l l  that sought to weaken the new Forest Authority 
and transfer control of resource decisions to the Minister and the forest industry (Holzknecht 
1 994 :28). This bill lapsed in 1 994, but in early 1 996 attempts were again being made to amend 
the Forestry Act to grant the Minister much greater power to make resource allocation decisions. 
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agents involved to  define events - to  issue a 'permit ' ,  for  example, or  sign a 
letter of ' intent ' to al low logging - in such a way that other actors are obl iged to 
accept those defin itions.2 In the case of Makapa, the Forest Authority' s  
capacities to impose reformist pol icies were weakened by the national political 
el ite ' s  general concern to l imit the reform process so that it did not radical ly 
alter their own capacity to enter into relationsh ips with loggers. Moreover, the 
Authority, 'fragmented' (see Jones 1 994)3 and overloaded by its difficulties 
with the national pol itical e l ite, fai led to sign ificantly transform the nature of 
landowner dependence on the competing logging companies involved in 
Makapa. Under pressure from the pol itical e l ite, from various logging 
companies, and from landowners - all with their own views on the project 's 
definition - the Authority was unable to quickly formulate a single robust 
definition of the project. Consequently, the Authority was unable to effectively 
l ink its own vis ion of project development to those entertained by the 
landowners . The result was that sections of the pol itical e l ite, competing 
logging companies, and the Forest Authority negotiated various defin itions of 
the Makapa TRP with virtual ly no input from landowners. 
Th is is not to say that landowners lacked effective influence on the overal l 
process . I shal l  show that landowners have competed quite intensively to 
support specific logging compan ies which they favoured. Th is competition, 
large ly induced by the logging compan ies themselves, played a role in 
destabil is ing the Forest Authority's  abi l ity to effectively implement the project, 
since it was no longer sure whether the various competing landowners could be 
thought of as ' representative ' of the wider community . From the perspective of 
those landowners able to access the resources of the competing logging 
compan ies, the result was commonly one of temporary empowerment. But from 
the perspective of most landowners, the Makapa TRP represents the failure of 
the post-Barnett reform process to del iver equitable and prompt access to the 
benefits of 'developing' their forest resources. 
Innovision and the State: Trying to Fix a Definition of the Maka pa 
TRP 
In 1 987, the Department of Forests surveyed the forest resources in the Makapa 
timber area, and found that its 3 0 1 ,949 hectares contained 7 .9 mil l ion cubic 
metres gross volume of timber. The TRP area contains no permanent vi l lages . 
The 1 990 National Census showed that the non-Gogodala population with an 
interest in th is area numbered on ly around 2,500, but there were roughly 1 7 ,000 
Gogodala l iving along the Aram ia River system, a large number of whom would 
be profoundly affected by any large-scale logging in the TRP area. The 
Gogodala are heavi ly rel iant on the Aramia for drinking water, fishing, and 
2 This formulation, and my general sense of the Makapa TRP as a site of conflicting 
understand ings, owes quite a lot to Fuj imura ( 1 992), Law ( 1 992, 1 994), and Star and Griesemer 
( 1 989). 
3 I am indebted to Chris Ballard for prov iding a copy of this excel lent thesis. 
86 The Political Economy of Forest Management in Papua New Guinea 
processing sago, and development of the TRP would involve logging much of 
the land around its tributaries and headwaters. A number of Gogodala clans also 
have interests in land in the TRP area.4 Map 5 . 1  provides a simpl ified summary 
of the location of the major language groups in and around the TRP area. 
Around the time of the survey, the state purchased the rights to the timber 
in the Makapa TRP area. Landowners s igned or marked a document that was 
equivalent to a contract to sel l  their timber to the state. On signing, landowners 
were paid two kina each. A very large number of Gogodala s igned the 
document, and it is not clear whether all the signatories had legitimate rights to 
the land at issue. Equal ly, there have been al legations of incomplete coverage of 
al l  right holders, and of h ighly l iterate people apparently sign ing the document 
by making a mark.5 In  1 994, Forest Authority staff attempted to bring this 
process under the ambit of the 1 99 1  Forestry Act by incorporating land groups 
who would then have the power to sign a Forest Management Agreement with 
the state. I have not yet seen the results of this more recent process. 
In  1 989, Wawoi-Guavi Timber Company, developers of the adjacent 
473,000 hectare Wawoi-Guavi  timber area, registered an interest in the Makapa 
forest resource. In m id- 1 989, Rimbunan Hijau, through its subsidiary Niugini  
Lumber, bought the Wawoi-Guavi Timber Company. Niugini Lumber staff then 
set about very actively seeking control of the Makapa TRP. 
In  the early 1 990s, they came to face serious competition from Innoprise 
Corporation Sedirian Berhad (ICSB) of Sabah, Malaysia. On I 0 Apri l 1 99 1 ,  
ICSB incorporated a whol ly owned subsidiary company, Innovision (PNG), 
through which they pursued their interest in acquiring the Makapa timber area. 
In early 1 99 1 ,  Innovision submitted Forest Development Proposals for Makapa 
to both the Fly River Provincial Government and to the national Department of 
Forests. This was despite the fact that the Department's own negotiations with 
landowners were not formally concluded unti l  December 1 99 1 ,  when the TRP 
Agreement was signed between the landowners and the state. Innovision also 
secured endorsement from the provincial government that it be given first right 
of refusal for the Makapa TRP. 
4 A group known as Wawoi-Ridge has tried to represent Gogodala interests in the Makapa TRP. 
It was strongly supported by some educated Gogodala people based in Port Moresby, and 
represented as a potential umbrel la organisation for al l development in the Gogodala region. It 
was also supported by some important figures in the vicinity of Balimo. Since my own research 
has focussed on non-Gogodala groups, my understanding of Wawoi-Ridge is rather l imited and I 
shal l not discuss it any further in this chapter. 
5 My own perusal of the document revealed a certain homogeneity in the marks made by many 
landowners. It is also clear that some people were multiple signatories due to misunderstanding, 
so the clan cal led Kuyala, for example, gets represented in a number of ways, and therefore tends 
to proliferate throughout the document. 
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Map 5.1 :  The Makapa Timber Rights Purchase and related concession areas. 
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A significant barrier to gain ing control of the Makapa resource was the fact 
that the Makapa timber area was subject to a moratorium on the allocation of 
new timber areas imposed by the government in July 1 990. So both would-be 
developers had to ensure that government pol icy was transformed with reference 
to Makapa. This change in pol icy was seemingly relatively easi ly achieved 
s ince, once the TRP agreement was signed by the landowners in December 
1 99 1 ,  the government exempted the Makapa timber area (together with five 
other areas) from the moratorium. At the same time, the government initiated a 
tender process for the Makapa TRP which culminated in May 1 992, when three 
companies - Innovision, N iugini Lumber, and a Korean company cal led Kuk 
Dong Construction - submitted Forest Development Proposals .  On 3 June 1 992, 
the National Executive Committee (NEC) selected Innovis ion . 
On 1 5  June, Innovision pointed out to the government that the new forest 
legislation was coming into force on 25 June 1 992. In their view, it would take 
some time to negotiate a project agreement. In a bri l l iant move, they proposed 
' that a Timber Permit be first issued with negotiation and execution of a project 
agreement as a condition precedent' . They sent a draft permit, containing th is 
condition, to the Department of Forests. 
On 22 June, the State Solicitor' s office commented that 'the draft permit is 
legally in order' , and on 24 June, Timber Permit 1 -9 was issued over the 
Makapa timber area. On the same day that the Makapa permit was issued, the 
then Minister for Forests, Jack Gen ia, issued sixteen other timber permits . The 
mass issue of permits took place one day before the new Forestry Act was due to 
come into effect and supposedly prevent such ministerial abuses (Henderson 
l 996a). This perhaps represented one of the h igh points of Innovision ' s  
influence, in that i t  was able to  get the project defined in the way i t  wanted, even 
where that definition was in direct confl ict with the overt pol icy intentions of the 
government. But the questionable manner by which the permit was issued, and 
the specific terms of the permit, meant that the project was vulnerable to 
disabl ing chal lenges from its very inception . 
The issue of the perm it immediately triggered a violent response from 
landowners who supported Niugini Lumber. On the day when they learnt that 
the agreement was being formalised, some men went to the Department of 
Forests headquarters and, according to the victims, assau lted some landowners 
who were supporters of Innovision. I n  the process, they also attacked the 
Provincial Minister for Forests, Mr Biaguna, who from that day on was widely 
understood to be high ly opposed to any bid by Niugini Lumber to gain control 
of the Makapa TRP or any other concess ions in the Western Province. 
This attack also had important implications for project implementation, in 
that it led the State Solicitor's office to qual ify its support for the issue of the 
permit to I nnovision. Officials from th is office argued that, even though the 
permit was legal, it should not be granted to Innovision unti l  the dispute among 
the landowners was resolved . I n  this sense, the use of violence to influence 
pol icy does seem to have been successful .  
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On 7 July 1 992, in a further move aimed at destabi l ising Innovision ' s  
access to the resource, Niugini Lumber took out an injunction restraining the 
state from issuing the permit, preventing any logging or marketing agreement 
from being approved, and preventing any actual logging. The injunction was 
gninted, but lapsed in late August, and N iugini Lumber' s case was dismissed. 
Nonetheless, it had the effect of creating the impression that something was 
'wrong' with the project general ly, and with the way the permit had been issued. 
A related problem for Innovis ion was that the permit required that 
negotiation of a project agreement be concluded within six months of the permit 
being issued. Th is was a condition 'precedent' to the operation of the permit. 
But, on 3 July 1 992, the then Secretary of the Department of Forests advised 
Innovision that 50 percent local processing would be required. This was quite 
different to Innovis ion ' s in itial proposal to only process about 1 5  percent of 
annual log production into sawn timber - that is, 50,000 cubic metres out of a 
total cut of 320,000 cubic metres (see Innovision 1 992 : 5 ) .  Given these 
divergent positions, the government and Innovision had to engage in quite 
complex negotiations before a project agreement could be signed. 
The injunction, and the obvious disagreement with the Department of 
Forests, gave Innovision grounds to seek an extension of six months for 
negotiations. In late August 1 992, it sought an extension under clauses which 
allowed the permit holder an extension ohime to perform obl igations for reason 
of force majeure (delays by the state) .  S imultaneously, Innovision mobi l ised 
pol itical support for the project. Th is was exemplified by the then Premier of 
the Fly River Provincial Government, Isidore Kaseng, who wrote on 1 1  August 
to Tim Nevi l le, the recently appointed national Minister for Forests, strongly 
backing Innovision . 
Despite such expressions of local support, the negotiations took time. On 
1 7  December 1 992, the government extended the time avai lable for negotiation 
to 24 June 1 993 . But as this date approached, Innovision noted that negotiations 
sti l l  had not taken place, because of the preparations being made for the 
Department of Forests to become the PNG Forest Authority with the gazettal of 
the new Forestry Act. In June 1 993 , Innovision 's lawyers asked for an urgent 
extension and threatened a writ of mandamus against the state. An extension 
was granted on 30 June 1 993 , and Innovis ion then refrained from taking the 
state to court. Innovision submitted a revised proposal, but, in late November, it 
asked for yet another extension until 24 June 1 994 . It appears that the 
government did not respond to this request, and Innov ision then took the state to 
court for breach of contract. 
What this sequence of events reveals is that Innovis ion could not force the 
state to negotiate with it in a way that it saw as appropriate . Indeed, from 
Innovision ' s  point of view, the Department seemed at best indifferent, and at 
times actively hosti le .  Part of the conflict between the Department and 
Innovision derived from the ideas about ' sustainable development' that were 
beginning to circulate within the restructured forestry bureaucracy. By August 
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1 993 , reforms were beginning to focus on the issue of sustainabi l ity, and the 
new Forest Auhority began to redefine the Makapa TRP as a ' sustainable 
project' . The most crucial part of this redefinition involved reducing 
Innovision ' s  preferred annual rate of cut of 320,000 cubic metres down to 
1 50,000 cubic metres (with eventual agreement on 1 70,000 cubic metres). This 
was thought to ensure ' sustainab i l ity' if a forty-year cutting cycle was assumed. 
However, the Makapa permit was to operate only for twenty years. Hence, 
some Authority staff thought Innovision should be offered long-term access to 
the resource. At that time, it was thought that domestic processing should 
involve 85 percent of the allowable cut, and that approval to export logs should 
be based on the company' s  processing performance. Staff also argued that new 
conditions had to be imposed on Innovision. They argued that treating the 
Makapa TRP as legitimately based on commitments made prior to the new 
Forestry Act would send the wrong signal to other loggers who were opposed to 
any review or renegotiation of project agreements made under the old 
legislation . 
Responding to these pressures, Innovis ion submitted revised conceptual 
proposals in October 1 993 , and again in November 1 994. It is clear that, during 
1 994, the negotiations between the Forest Authority and Innovision were 
difficult. Indeed, there are indications that some staff in the Authority started to 
represent Innovision ' s  permit as already being terminated. In records of the 
Batanapi Landowner Company - which at that time was representing many 
landowners associated with the Makapa TRP - there is an account of a meeting 
in Port Moresby (on 5 May 1 994), where forestry officers informed members of 
Batanapi that the permit given to Innovision PNG had been cancel led. Late in 
the next month, Batanapi was told that, due to a fire which burnt down a key 
building at the Forest Authority 's  headquarters, copies of the letter cancel l ing 
the permit were not avai lable. Whatever the status of this apparent, potential ly 
quite destabi l is ing, ' cancel lation ' of the permit, it is clear that, during 1 994, staff 
of the Authority were thinking that they would be able re-tender the Makapa 
concession . 
Aware of these possibi l ities in its November 1 994 revisions, Innovision 
agreed to several new conditions :  
• to reduce the annual cut to only 200,000 cubic metres, if the project' s  ' l ife' 
was extended to thirty-two years; 
• to engage in  domestic processing, over the total l ife of the project, of nearly 
56 percent of total log production volume; 
• to offer the landowners shares in the project, up to a maximum of 20 percent 
(where no such equity had been mentioned in the in itial proposal); and 
• to use ' reduced impact logging' techniques that had been pioneered by its 
parent company in Sabah . 
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However, even th is movement towards the Forest Authority' s  position did 
not meet with automatic approval . By this time, Andrew Posai had replaced 
Tim Nevi l le as national Forests Minister, and Posai was widely understood to be 
a strong supporter of Niugini Lumber. The following letter, written in early 
1 995, indicates that he was strongly opposed to Innovis ion : 
Having had Forestry Authority staff evaluate the revised proposal, I 
consider that the proposal is sti l l  unsatisfactory for the needs of the 
Papua New Guinea forestry industry . . . . . I consider it an insult to Papua 
New Guinea, that the proposal states that your company is committed 
to the objective of sustained yield forest management and that it 
operates on a 60 year rotation in Malaysia, yet the company first 
proposed logging in PNG on a 1 5  year rotation and later, when pushed, 
revised this to a thirty year rotation . Consequently, I intend to re­
advertise the Makapa TRP area for the submission of development 
proposals. 
In add ition to these pol itical attempts to radically redefine the Makapa TRP 
as be longing to no-one, by 1 994 there were legal opin ions circulating in the 
Authority which argued that the Makapa permit had lapsed, and that the perm it 
was, in any case, never a binding or effective contract. These legal opinions 
threatened Innovision ' s  access to the entire resource, and, if accepted, would 
have led to the Makapa TRP being re-tendered under the reformist Forestry Act 
of 1 99 1 .  It would have converted the Makapa TRP to a Forest Management 
Agreement which would have been authorised by the National Forest Board. 
Re-tendering would have led to a Forest Development Options Study, more 
stringent env ironmental and social impact analysis, and detai led evaluation of 
the tendered proposals .  Not only would th is have delayed the project, but there 
was no guarantee that Innovision would be successful if it were to re-tender. 
In August 1 994, staff members of the Authority argued, with forceful 
clarity, that there was actual ly no power to extend the time l imit for 
negotiations, because the clauses that addressed such an issue were only relevant 
after the 'condition precedent' (namely that negotiations were completed with in 
six months) had been satisfied. An extension could be granted only if there was 
an agreement actual ly made between the parties. The perm it could not come 
into operation until that condition was satisfied, and, until that happened, it was 
not a val id contract. 
This kind of argument acknowledged that the old Forestry Act did give the 
Minister discretionary power to issue permits subject to terms and conditions 
agreed by the Min ister. But it was pointed out that the initial Makapa permit did 
not specify detai ls of things essential to the defin ition of a 'permit ' ,  such as 
details concern ing processing and export volumes. Moreover, it was a matter of 
fact that Innovision and the Forest Authority had failed to make any agreement 
on major issues, such as the annual cut and the amount of local processing. 
Since more than s ix months had passed without these matters being settled, it 
was argued that the permit itself had lapsed. If accepted, this advice would have 
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rad ically transformed the Makapa TRP, and Innovision would have lost control 
of assets worth around K850 mi l l ion .6 
The adv ice was endorsed by some senior officials of the Forest Authority. 
In September 1 994, the Managing Director, Jean Kekedo, wrote to the Batanapi 
Corporation and confirmed that 'as a result of their failure to satisfy the 
condition precedent to the permit namely, final ise a project agreement, the 
Innovision permit has lapsed ' .  A letter written to Batanapi on 1 0  Apri l 1 995 
shows that she was then sti l l  of the view that the Makapa TRP would be re­
tendered. 
Innovision responded by repeating and pursuing its earl ier threat to sue the 
state for breach of contract, and apparently sought damages of K250 mi l l ion - at 
a time when the state was suffering an acute fiscal crisis .  The State Solicitor, 
whi le aware of the argument about the potential invalid ity of the Makapa permit, 
advised, in Apri l  1 995,  that the matter should be settled out of court, without any 
adm ission of l iabi l ity, and that no costs be awarded against the state. At the 
same time, it was argued that any project agreement with Innovision should be 
undertaken in terms of the new Forestry Guidel ines (see PNGMOF 1 993b). 
During this period, a further problem for Innovision emerged when Mrs 
Sul iyato Henderson took out an injunction against the project proceeding on the 
grounds that the permit was inval id .  Mrs Henderson had close ties with a 
landowner company, the Makapa Timber Development Company, which was 
supportive of S ir Danny Leahy's  increasing interest in the Makapa area (to 
which I shal l  return) .  However, Mrs Henderson lost the initial round, in that she 
failed to gain any order from the court restraining the state from executing an 
agreement with Innovis ion . 7  
Despite this action by some landowners, final isation of the project was 
under way by mid- 1 995,  even though Innovision had not formal ly withdrawn its 
own action against the state for breach of contract. On 27 July, presumably 
under some pressure from this threat, the National Forest Board gave its 
approval to the project going ahead, pending approval by Cabinet. It took the 
step of seeking the additional endorsement of Cabinet because the permit 
required that any agreement made was to be executed by the Head of State, 
rather than the Board, s ince the latter had not been in existence at the time when 
the permit was issued. By this rather complex route, ultimate control of the 
project was returned to the pol itical el ite . However, the decision to involve 
Cabinet resulted in a very considerable delay to the project, since it did not 
receive NEC approval for almost a year. 
On 1 1  May 1 996, a project agreement between the state and the developers 
was signed. The main benefits to the landowners, under the terms of this 
6 This figure is derived from multiplying the net volume (5 .95  mi l l ion cubic metres) by the 
commonly cited current price of a cubic metre of logged timber (K 1 50). 
7 In November 1 996, it was understood that this action was sti l l  proceeding. 
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agreement, would be a standard royalty of K l  0 per cubic metre, plus a 
'premium ' (based on 7 percent of the f.o .b .  price) which, at current export 
prices, might be worth an additional K 1 0 . There would also be an annual 
payment of K420,000 to fund local development projects .  Vi llages located 
along the Aramia might also receive a further K l  50,000 per year if they agreed 
for logs to be barged on the Aramia - a process which would pose some acute 
risks to the region ' s  environment. There would be a small infrastructure 
programme involving the construction of one medical c l in ic worth K l 00,000 
and a number of school classrooms worth up to K 1 00,000. Innovision would 
also obl iged to spend K20,000 a year on 'marketing studies ' .  Operations were 
expected to start in the first half of 1 997 .  
Sino-PNG: the Makapa TRP as the Western Province Agro-Forestry 
Project 
From 1 993 to 1 995,  whi le Innovision was trying, seemingly unsuccessful ly, to 
enforce its definition of the Makapa project as a val id contract binding the state, 
other companies started to see that there was sti l l  an opportunity for them to 
acquire rights to the Makapa TRP. In the expectation that the state would break 
off negotiations with Innovis ion and re-tender the Makapa concession, these 
compan ies tried to mobi l ise landowner and political support for their specific 
proposals .  These new plans often involved redefining the Makapa TRP so that it 
became something quite d ifferent from what most people understood by the 
term . 
The most audacious attempt to transform the Makapa TRP involved a 
company cal led S ino-PNG Resources. Basical ly, what S ino-PNG tried to do 
was to convert the Maka pa TRP into one among many other 'development' 
projects for the whole of the Western Province . In what seems to reflect an 
increasing trend in logging proposals in PNG, Sino-PNG claimed that the 
Makapa TRP was no longer to be construed as a logging project, but part of an 
' integrated development package ' .  
Sino-PNG was a newcomer to the PNG forestry sector. It was incorporated 
in PNG on 2 1  May 1 993 , and comprised a consortium of two Singaporean 
companies, S ino-PNG Resources Pte Ltd and Lum Chang Holding Ltd, the Hei 
Long Jiang Provincial Government of the People ' s  Republic of China, and 
Innoprise International Incorporated Ltd from Sabah . It appears that Innoprise 
had become less interested in Innovision. Certainly, it is  clear that, in August 
1 994, Innovision (PNG) sold its interest in the Makapa TRP to Construction and 
Supplies House (CASH), a company with considerable l inks to Sabah .8 In 
exchange for securing the approval of the PNG government for the Makapa TRP 
to go ahead, and giving CASH the exc lusive right to the concession, Innovision 
was to receive 5 percent of the net sales of timber from the concession . 
8 See New Straits Times, 25 August 1 994. 
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It is uncertain whether Innoprise had l inks with CASH, but it does appear 
that, for a time, Innoprise was trying to secure access to the Makapa TRP 
through the S ino-PNG consortium . S ince Innoprise is a statutory body of the 
State of Sabah, some people have argued that Sabah did not want to be directly 
involved in taking the State of PNG to court to seek damages for breach of 
contract. Other people have told me that Innoprise ' s  apparent involvement in 
Sino-PNG had not been authorised by Innoprise, and that it was either a 
'mistake' or part of a del iberate m isinformation campaign by supporters of 
S ino-PNG who were seeking to underm ine the credibi l ity of Innovis ion. In 
early 1 996, I was informed by staff from Innovis ion that Innoprise was sti l l  
backing Innovis ion, and a search of documents at the Investment Promotion 
Authority revealed no change in the ownership of Innovis ion. Th is ' return ' to 
Innovision may be related to the stronger expectation that the Makapa project 
would go ahead through the permit i ssued to Innovision. 
It may also be the case that Innoprise thought it should seek alternative 
pol itical backing against Minister Posai, who was, as I have already indicated, a 
strong backer of Niugini Lumber. Sino-PNG was strongly supported by the MP 
for Middle Fly, B itan Kuok, who was also Deputy Minister for Forests . In May 
1 995,  Kuok was actively promoting the project by v isiting landowners 
associated with the Makapa TRP. This  meant that the government was now spl it 
over the question of which logging company would gain its support, and it now 
had to confront the d ifficult task of adjudicating between the competing claims 
of Niugini Lumber, S ino-PNG, and Innovision. 
S ino-PNG staff argued that, because their plans constituted a total 
development package, their interest in Makapa did not amount to a logging 
project, and so the project could be dealt with directly by the NEC instead of the 
Forest Authority. What this  represented was an attempt to bypass those 
decision-making structures of the reform process which threatened the 
developer's  abi l ity to deal on ly with the pol itical el ite. It was an attempt to 
create new procedures, whereby tight el ite control of resource development 
could be maintained. It reproduced e lements of the pre-reform forestry sector, 
where the Minister had wide discretionary powers over resource al location . 
Other logging companies objected to this attempted short-circuiting of reform 
procedures, rather ironical ly arguing that such tactics would distort the ' level 
playing field' establ ished by the new Forestry Act and associated administrative 
regulations (personal communication, Brian Brunton, 1 996). 
Supporting the impression that it was not just a logging company, S ino­
PNG claimed it would invest US$ l .2 b i l l ion in infrastructure and resource 
development in the Western Province. Table 5 . 1  provides a rough guide to the 
company' s  expenditure plans. 
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Table 5. 1 :  The S ino-PNG Resources ' development budget' for Western 
Province, 1 995 . 
Item 
Roads and transport 
Power distribution 
Water supply, treatment, and distribution 
Drainage and prevention of soi I erosion 
Telecommunications 
Port and harbour development 
Agroforestry development 
Industry development 
Social development 
Land development 
TOTAL 
Source : S ino-PNG 1 995 : 35  
US$m 
2 1 0  
1 00 
1 00 
50 
1 0  
1 50 
300 
1 80 
50 
50 
1 ,200 
These expenditures had a v1s 1onary sweep to them - for example, the 
US$2 l 0 mi l l ion investment on roads and transport would involve a h ighway 
l inking Kiunga to Nomad, which would then extend south to Wawoi Fal ls  and 
on to Emeti in the lower Bamu area (see Map 5 . 1  ) .  However, a close reading of 
the various proposals indicates that specific details of these investments would 
only be clarified after appropriate feasibi l ity studies. 
In exchange for a potential - perhaps fanciful - investment of US$ l .2 
bi l l ion, S ino-PNG focussed its attention directly on the Makapa TRP, arguing 
that it required : 
full approval for the development of the Makapa TRP including but 
not l imited to the execution of all necessary agreements, including 
project agreement and Timber Permits, between the relevant 
authorities and S ino-PNG by the NEC. Full approval of the 
development of the Makapa TRP is required as the Makapa 
development is the initial step undertaken by Sino-PNG for the 
concerted development of the Western Province of PNG as outlined in 
th is proposal .  The revenue generated from the Makapa development 
wi l l  also go towards funding the part of the wider and macro­
development of the Western Province PNG (Sino-PNG 1 995,  not 
paginated). 
In this account, the Makapa TRP appears as the source of a surplus capable of 
financing the development of the entire Western Province - something even a 
real gold m ine has been unable to do. Balancing this visionary rendering of 
what the Makapa TRP m ight contain, S ino-PNG, in a far more pragmatic mode, 
demanded that it be exempt from any restrictions on the export of logs (unti l  
2005), and from payment of a l l  taxes, including income tax on expatriate 
salaries, for an equivalent period . It also sought: 
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• Alienation of land required by Sino-PNG Resources for 
development purposes in the Western Province to Sino-PNG 
including the grant of leases and the award of al l mineral rights, for 
up to a period of 99 years. 
• Al l  necessary legislative changes required for the implementation 
and completion of the Development (ibid.) .  
Proposals l ike these show why the 'Makapa TRP' cannot necessari ly be 
understood as a coherent object. Rather, at the time of the Sino-PNG proposal, 
it was a h ighly unstable ensemble of potential forms of resource exploitation. In 
the situation that obtained in the PNG forestry sector in 1 995, the 'Makapa TRP' 
could be transformed into virtually any kind of poorly documented set of 
' developments ' covering a rather i l l-defined area of terrain .  Moreover, the 
S ino-PNG proposal appeared to be unconstrained by any serious consideration 
of the pol icies of the PNG state. S ino-PNG's  assumption appears to have been 
that the PNG state could eas i ly accommodate Sino-PNG by amending its 
existing legis lation and policies. 
This assumption received some support from the actions of the Acting 
Minister for Forests, Titus Phi lemon. In July 1 995,  he gave written approval, in 
principle, for S ino-PNG to develop forest resources in the Western Province in 
what he referred to as the 'Makapa extension area' . The letter also expressed his 
intent to enter into a project agreement with Sino-PNG. The Minister defined 
the project area in utterly vague terms - it stretched 'from Fly River, Strickland, 
Aramia, Tumu, Nomad and Wawoi Fal ls '  (Minister' s letter to S ino-PNG, 1 7  
July 1 995) .  Moreover, ' upon establ ishment of a ful l  inventory of timber supply, 
boundaries may then be altered to correspond to the appropriate supply of 
timber to your commercial industrial complex proposed ' ( ibid.) .  Given this 
h ighly ambiguous definition, the 'extension area' could actual ly have included 
all of the Makapa TRP, but presumably the 'extension ' was understood to 
exclude the area of the Makapa concession held by Innovision. The al lowable 
cut was ' to be specified after establ i shing the boundaries of the project area' ,  
but, at the same time, the Minister gave permission for S ino-PNG to enter ' the 
project areas to undertake and conduct forest surveys . . .  within the areas 
defined ' (ibid.) .  A S ino-PNG staff member told me that the area of the project 
was l ikely to be about 1 .2 m i l l ion hectares. 
What this represented was an attempt by a politician to totally ignore the 
procedures of the Forestry Act and, at the margins of his legal power, lock the 
state into possibly b inding obl igations to give Sino-PNG access to unclearly 
specified forest resources. At the very least, his letter gave Sino-PNG a greater 
degree of control over forest resources than it wou ld have had if it had merely 
submitted its proposal to the Forest Authority through the normal tender 
procedures His actions indicate that some aspects of decision making in PNG's  
forestry sector had either returned to  the pre-Barnett era or  had never left it. 
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Niugini Lumber's 600,000 Hectare Redefinition of the Makapa TRP 
As a further example of instab i l ity in the definition of the Makapa TRP, I now 
want to quickly consider various proposals submitted by Niugini  Lumber 
Merchants. This company is the other main opponent of Innov is ion . Niugini 
Lumber, l ike its parent Rimbunan H ijau, has always been quite effective in 
pursuing its interests in PNG. During the moratorium on additional logging 
projects that was in place from July 1 990 to July 1 992, N iugini Lumber was able 
to gain an extension for its Wawoi-Guavi Timber Permit. In December 1 990, 
Niugini Lumber submitted a proposal to the Department of Forests to 
consol idate the three separate TRP b locks of Wawoi-Guavi into one timber 
permit. On 1 0  April 1 992, despite the 'moratorium ' on the issue of new perm its, 
and without imposing any new conditions on the developer, the Minister for 
Forests, Jack Genia, gave the company what it wanted by issuing the new 
Timber Permit 1 -7 (Wawoi-Guav i  Timber 1 993 :v) .  
As indicated above, this company has competed very intensively with 
Innovis ion for access to the Makapa resource. A good example of its 
competitive approach is found in a dec ision of the Executive Counci l  of the Fly 
River Provincial Government. On 1 8  October 1 99 1 ,  th is body had rescinded its 
previous decis ion for Innovision to be given first right of refusal for the Makapa 
TRP, and agreed that priority be given to Niugini Lumber. It had also requested 
Minister Genia to exempt the Makapa project from the moratorium on forestry 
projects, and had made a further recommendation - without any additional 
conditions or qualifications - that an additional 602,000 hectares be given to 
Niugini Lumber to be added to the Makapa TRP. Had th is resolution been 
implemented, the Makapa TRP would have grown to an area of around 904,000 
hectares, wh ich, when added to the adjacent Wawoi-Guavi concession, would 
have given Niugini Lumber control of 1 ,376,000 hectares. Th is would have 
been one of the largest and most valuable unified sets of concessions anywhere 
in PNG. 
In 1 993 , Niugini Lumber had subm itted a detai led conceptual proposal for 
Makapa. In th is document, Niugini Lumber almost emotional ly argued : 
With the vision of long term development and forever- lasting forest 
resource to be harvested and regenerated to benefit the landowners and 
the country as a whole, we propose a bigger area to be set aside for th is 
Makapa TRP. . . . .  We propose that the area be divided into four (4) 
blocks with total of 904, 1 30 hectares .  (Niugini Lumber 1 993 : 1 )  
It also sought to make the twenty-five year project 'renewable for another 25 
years ' ( ibid :4), arguing that this wou ld al low government and landowner 
revenue to double to an enticing total of K774 mi l l ion . The company also gave 
considerable emphasis to a series of min imal v i l lage ' infrastructure '  
developments. Typical of what it proposed were its plans for Bamustu, a v i l lage 
where a number of its strongest supporters res ided. Niugini Lumber promised, 
during the l ife of a fifty-year project, to do no more than 'upgrade or rebui ld'  the 
church, to bui ld a water tank, to ' study the possibi l ity' of bui lding a community 
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school, and to provide a d inghy for transport (with no mention of providing an 
engine). 
Capturing and Fragmenting Landowners : Landowner Companies 
Along with these k inds of potential ' infrastructure developments' ,  the Makapa 
TRP has opened up the exciting possib i l ity that landowners may be able to 
capture some capital, and bind it permanently on to their land, whi le receiving 
large royalty payments. Before reaching this stage of 'development' ,  
landowners exchange their ' support' for  resources suppl ied by  the investors . 
These resources involve access to prestigious, often paid, positions in investor­
funded landowner companies. Being a 'director on the board ' also entai ls 
frequent trips to Port Moresby and occasional trips overseas. Smart operators 
try to maximise their l inks to investors, with the result that no investors can ever 
be , sure that they have recruited a permanent support base . 
From the perspective of the logging compan ies, it is essential to have 
access to a group that can be portrayed as the ' representatives of the 
landowners ' ,  to be mobi l ised in the process of lobbying government officials to 
endorse company proposals or when signing agreements. Groups of landowner 
supporters can also be mobi l ised to influence pol icy decisions, or to create the 
impression of disun ity amongst 'the landowners ' as a whole, thereby disabl ing 
the claims of another investor 's  landowner company to representative status .  
They can also be mobi l ised to express ' landowner' opposition to any 
government decis ion which threatens the position of the logging company 
backing the ' landowners' . At this  level, the aims of landowners and logging 
companies are often compatible, and can be mutually empowering. Such 
compatibi l ity of interests is also found in cases where logging companies 
transform specific ' representative landowners ' into politicians by funding their 
pol itical campaigns. 
Niugini Lumber's  landowner company, Eksowa, was establ ished in March 
1 990. By July 1 996, supporters of Niugini Lumber claimed that it had spent 
around K6.5  mi l l ion trying to get control of the Makapa TRP, and much of this  
money had been spent on Eksowa and its supporters. The main core supporters 
of Niugini Lumber were Dibiyaso and Bainapi men from the vi l lages of 
Bamustu and Pikiwa (see Map 5 . 1  ), but, through gifts to vi l lages, offers of trips 
to Moresby, and associated flows of funds, Niugini Lumber was always able to 
temporari ly mobi l ise supporters from most other vi l lages associated with the 
Makapa TRP. It also sought to bind its key supporters by getting them to swear 
their total al legiance to the company on the Bible. In an area of strong mission 
influence, this was an especially potent attempt to permanently enrol landowner 
support. 
Eksowa members spent a great deal of time of lobbying against Innovision . 
In opposition to Eksowa, lnnovision establ ished its own landowner company -
the Makapa TRP Development Corporation (MDC). The main supporters of 
MDC came from Makapa vi l lage, whose inhabitants were mostly Tulumsa and 
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Kamula people (see Map 5 . 1  ) . Support for Innovision in other v i l lages was not 
particularly strong, since Innovision did not spend as much money as Niugini 
Lumber on landowner support, and tenqed to fly only landowner company 
executives and directors into Port Moresby, ignoring 'ordinary' landowners . 
Innovision staff told me that it was exp l icit company pol icy, and was designed 
to avoid the development of a ' handout mental ity' amongst landowners . But 
prud�nt financial management also played a part in Innovision ' s  relationship 
with landowners . For example, when the Makapa permit was signed, Innovision 
gave the MDC K20,000 on the condition that, if Innovision did get the project, 
the money would be repaid from royalties during the first year of the project ' s  
operation.9 It may have also been the case that, after Innoprise downgraded its 
interest in Innovision, Innovision was strapped for cash, and was consequently 
unable to finance ' its ' landowners to the same extent as Niugini Lumber. 
Innovision support was also weakened by the active participation of a New 
Zealand expatriate, Mr Henderson, who had married Sul iyato Madie from 
Makapa vi l lage . In the early days of Innovision, Mr Henderson strongly 
supported the landowner company, and MDC supporters reciprocated by 
transforming h im into a ' landowner' . He was l i sted as such in one report on a 
meeting between the landowners and Innovision, and was al located to his wife's  
purported clan, 'Dopto Kamula' . 1 0 But many people were critical of  his past 
business practices and expressed reservations about his involvement in MDC. 
Many of these doubts focussed on his wife's  Dopto Kamula Business Group, 
which was, for a time, receiving K l ,000 a month in 'consultancy fees' from 
Innovis ion. 1 1  Niugini Lumber supporters used these associations to den igrate 
the Innovision bid as nothing more than a device to make the expatriate rich . 
By early 1 994, in the context where Innovision was seem ingly unable to 
conclude its negotiations with the state, and where the TRP appeared l ikely to be 
put to tender, the division between the landowners was widely seen as an 
obstacle to the development of the project. A 'unified' landowner company was 
establ ished, known as Batanapi ,  and it immediately set about gaining 
recognition as the legitimate representative landowner company. It seems that 
this move was partly a response to national forestry officials who wanted to deal 
with a unified group of landowners which was somewhat more independent of 
the logging companies than were the previous landowner companies, Eksowa 
and MDC. 
Nevertheless, many of the meetings designed to generate a unified 
company were organised by a provincial government representative who was a 
strong supporter of Niugini Lumber. Despite selecting a man who had 
previously been the MDC chairman as the Batanapi chairman, and despite a 
9 From 'Affidavit of Sul iyato Madie Henderson, sworn 216195 ', p.4. 
1 O My own Kamula informants argue that the Dopto clan is now extinct, and its land has been 
taken over by other clans. 
1 1 From 'Affidavit of Sul iyato Madie Henderson, sworn 2/6/95 ' ,  p.4. 
1 00 The Political Economy of Forest Management in Papua New Guinea 
preponderance of previous Innovision supporters on the board, Batanapi 
endorsed Niugini Lumber as the preferred developer of the Makapa TRP. On 1 
May 1 994, the new board wrote of Niugini Lumber that 'we have seen you to be 
a true brother' , and agreed that Batanapi ,  and not MDC or Eksowa, would be the 
official spokesperson for matters related to the TRP. Innovis ion had temporari ly 
lost its landowners to its main opponent. As a token of these shifting all iances, 
the new Batanapi chairman was flown to Malaysia and the Phi l ippines by 
Niugini Lumber. But this  new all iance was more apparent than real, s ince many 
of the landowners on the new Batanapi board sti l l  maintained close relationships 
with Innovision. 
This  tendency to back more than one contender at the same time was due to 
a growing perception that the national government would not award the project 
to Niugini Lumber, even if it was re-tendered. Such complexities were reflected 
in Batanapi ' s  own account of its options at that time: 
RESOLUTIONS:  
Leave N/Lumber or  find others so that they can apply for the project 
because the project wi l l  be on Tender. A l l  companies are l ine [sic] up 
but they want to deal with the landowners and they do not know who 
are the landowners (Batanapi records of meeting, 27 June 1 994). 
Around this time, the Batanapi chairman was being actively solicited by other 
interested parties. In July 1 994, he s igned a letter of intent, on behalf of 
Batanapi, with F i l let Capital Corporation of San Diego, endorsing this  
organisation as the ·potential developer of Makapa. Around the same time, he 
also started to form l inks with Golden Springs International, who, on 14 
September 1 994, formed their own landowner company, known as Kamula­
Doso Timber. They were interested in the area around the Makapa TRP, and 
were in direct conflict with Niugin i Lumber's  plans to extend the Makapa TRP 
into the same area. Despite these new all iances, the chairman sti l l  maintained 
his l inks with Innovis ion, at one point indicating to me that Innovis ion officials 
had expressed some interest in l inking the Makapa development to the plans of 
Golden Springs . 
This strategy could not be maintained for long, and in January 1 995, the 
chairman attempted to subvert Niugini Lumber' s  claims by recruiting all 
Batanapi supporters who had interests in land associated with the expansion of 
the Makapa TRP. He argued that members of the Kamula and Doso groups had 
no land within the Makapa TRP, and that consequently they should withdraw 
from any involvement with Batanapi .  This was quite an extraordinary move, in 
that many board members of MDC (Innovision ' s  landowner company), 
including the chairman, were in fact members of these groups, and for a long 
time had been claiming an interest in the Makapa TRP. They had maintained 
this interest in the face of very strong criticism by Niugini Lumber supporters, 
who had argued that the Kamula and Doso members of MDC really had nothing 
to do with land in the Makapa TRP. The chairman explained to me that he only 
The Makapa Timber Rights Purchase 1 0 1  
found out that this  was 'true ' after talking to elders during a Christmas trip to 
Maka pa. 
He also argued that the Makapa TRP would take a long time to be 
developed because the various parties were l ikely to continue their legal 
contests, so it would be better for Kamula and Doso people to al ign themselves 
with Golden Springs, which was unencumbered by such disputes. In trying to 
align specific language groups with specific logging projects, the chairman was 
not just acting on Golden Springs ' behalf. What happened can also be 
understood as an innovative attempt by some landowners, including the 
chairman, to establ ish a stronger, less 'ethnically' divided basis  for l inks 
between landowners, projects, and potential developers . So, in early 1 995, he 
engineered a seemingly complete withdrawal of all Kamula and Doso from 
Batanapi .  He was apparently abandoning Batanapi to Niugin i  Lumber' s core 
supporters, who, as mentioned earl ier, were primari ly members of the Dibiyaso 
and Bainapi language groups .  
Golden Springs International initiated a legal istic procedure to fix and 
specify Kamula and Doso support through a Memorandum of Understanding 
between itself and the Kamula-Doso landowner company. This agreement 
required the landowners to prevent any disputes from disrupting Golden 
Springs ' operations, and in the event of such disruptions, the landowner 
company was to indemnify Golden Springs for any losses it might suffer. In 
exchange for securing such obl igations from the landowners, the developer took 
on responsibil ity for organis ing ' al l  developments and logging operations' in the 
permit area, and undertook to pay compensation for damage to gardens and 
sacred places. The developer also agreed to give the landowner company cash 
advances of K20,000 to help build an airstrip at Somokopa (a vi l lage in the 
proposed concession area), and a further K 1 00,000 for construction of an office 
in the timber perm it area and the purchase of a dinghy, engine, and radios. 
These advances were to be repaid by deductions from royalty payments. 
In practice, the memorandum had l ittle effect. By September 1 995, the 
s ignatories had started to drift away and join other companies, such as S ino­
PNG and Niugini Lumber. Apparently, Golden Springs was th inking of taking 
action against some of them, but could not do so, simply because the landowners 
had no resources to compensate Golden Springs for its putative losses. In any 
case, by the end of 1 995,  Golden Springs was no longer interested in the 
Makapa extension area, and the chairman of Kamula-Doso then started to have 
prel im inary discussions with a Korean company, Hal la, and simultaneously 
intensified his l inks with Innovis ion . 
The 'Greening' of the Maka pa TRP? 
While these complex shifts in the allegiance of landowners to specific logging 
compan ies were occurring, further divis ions amongst the landowners were being 
amplified by the activities of the New Zealand expatriate, his affines, and other 
supporters. Having split off from the Makapa Development Corporation in 
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1 994, and then being excluded from the Batanapi corporation, they reformed 
themselves into another 'Makapa Deve lopment Corporation ' and sought their 
own developer. They effectively used the MDC name to make high-profile 
assertions of their exclusive and privi leged relationship to the Makapa TRP. 
They did this  by placing an advertisement in The National ( 1 0  October 1 994) 
which claimed that they were the only true representatives of the landowners . 
The advertisement read as fol lows : 
MAKAPA TIMBER AREA 
Makapa TRP Development Co. P/L hereby advises the public and the 
National Forest Authority that it is the true landowner company 
representing all groups from the Makapa area. 
We further advise that any person, group or company pretending to 
represent the people or attempting to influence the granting of a timber 
operation or l icence in the area wi l l  be resisted with the full process of 
Law etc . 
We currently have an operating company which involves large PNG 
interests which is submitting a marketing and logging agreement for 
the area. 
This  new MDC eventual ly secured the backing of Col l ins and Leahy, a company 
closely associated with S ir Danny Leahy. A new company, known as Pisa, was 
establ ished to develop the Makapa TRP. Coll ins and Leahy held 50 percent 
equity, the landowners held 40 percent through the Makapa Timber 
Development Company, and a group known as Piskul ik held 1 0  percent. Pisa 
has gained some support from people at Makapa, Wasapeya, and Pikiwa 
vi l lages, but landowners often refer to it as 'the expatriate' s  company' - and this  
association is  sufficient reason for some people to express their opposition to it. 
Of all the players in the Makapa TRP, S ir Danny Leahy was perhaps the 
most serious in seeking to ensure sustainable development, landowner equity, 
and possibly even meaningful landowner partic ipation in the project ' s  design 
and implementation . Indicative of this ideology was the attempt to involve the 
Pacific Heritage Foundation in the preparation of its plans. Th is is a group with 
an excel lent reputation for trying to implement sustainable use of rainforest 
resources in parts of New Britain (see Henderson l 994b:20). 1 2  
As mentioned earl ier, Mrs Henderson took out an injunction against the 
state finalis ing an agreement with Innovision . Th is legal challenge was seen by 
many landowners, especially those backing Innovision, as interference that 
would only further delay the start of the project. As a part of the court battle, 
Pisa was subject to a campaign wh ich sought to undercut its legitimacy as a 
representative body. In th is process, its support has probably diminished 
further. In late June 1 995,  the chairman and vice-chairman of the Makapa 
12 Max Henderson, founder of the Pacific Heritage Foundation, is not related to the Hendersons 
of Makapa. 
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Development Corporation (which had supported Pisa) wrote to the Forest 
Authority, stating that 'our landowner company namely Makapa Development 
Corporation (MDC) has agreed to join forces with Batanapi Holding Pty 
Limited because we feel this is the only way to el iminate confl icts and 
unnecessary delays on the projecf . On 1 1  July 1 995, Batanapi took out a full­
page advertisement in The National (a newspaper control led by Rimbunan 
Hijau), announcing this  unification and cal l ing for early approval of Makapa by 
the National Forest Board and the acting Forests Minister. The advertisement 
also dealt with ' green issues'  in its final paragraph : 
We are also aware that some foreign experts are concerned about 
environment and protection of rare insects. We welcome their 
expertise and invite them to write to us with the ir proposals and expert 
p lans and programs so that our landowners can incorporate these into 
our forest development plan. The forest are [sic] with us in Makapa 
area so please send your ideas to us and don 't keep them in Waigani 
alone. 
Despite this somewhat self-confident tone, Niugini Lumber's  own power in 
respect of Makapa decl ined quite dramatical ly in the second half of 1 995 . 
According to landowners, around the time that the Forest Authority endorsed the 
permit originally i ssued to Innovis ion, Niugini Lumber was told not to interfere 
further in the Makapa project. Certain ly, towards the end of 1 995,  Niugini 
Lumber had started to wind down its overt support of Batanapi, and very few 
supporters were being flown to Port Moresby. In the same year, Niugini 
Lumber temporari ly lost control of its supporters when Lan Huwat, a Malaysian 
company interested in the Makapa concession, was able to fly the Batanapi 
board and other landowners to Malaysia, and almost managed to gain their 
endorsement as the preferred developer. Soon after these events, two key senior 
staff, who were coordinating Niugini Lumber' s bid for Makapa, resigned from 
their positions. Moreover, once the project agreement was signed in May 1 996, 
Niugini Lumber immediately ceased to fund Batanapi .  Given these events, a 
number of previously strong supporters of Niugini Lumber moved over to 
Innovision, though some of Batanap i ' s  board members were sti l l  lobbying 
against Innovis ion in October 1 996 (see Post-Courier, 7 October 1 996). 1 3  
Transformations in Local Powers and Understandings 
From the landowners ' perspective, the Makapa TRP and its long delayed start­
up represent the fai lure of government to provide the highly marginal i sed and 
impoverished groups of the Makapa TRP with access to opportunities for 
immediate ' development' . Landowners, particularly in the southern vi l lages, 
I 3 Despite such setbacks, Niugini Lumber has continued to try secure access to logging areas to 
the north of the Makapa TRP. It now hopes to achieve this by 'extending' its Wawoi-Guavi 
concession. To achieve this extension it is using another landowner company (Wawoi-Tomu), 
which is primarily supported by Kamula, Doso, and Kalamo people l iving at Somokopa and 
Kesigi. 
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have watched their region undergo a process of stagnation over the last fifteen to 
twenty years. Health and educational serv ices remain much as they were, no 
innovations have been made in the local system of production, and there has 
been no fundamental change in the way of l ife in the v i l lages. At the same time, 
there is an enormous interest in the possibi l ities of epochal change. There i s  a 
widespread concern with the meaning of the year 2000, which is thought to be 
associated with apocalyptic events, including the end of all current property 
relationships and the return of Christ. The logging project is seen as one veh icle 
that wi l l  quickly shift people into modernity and its associated wealth before the 
year 2000 has its effect. 1 4 
An equally significant basis of local support for logging was the 
prol iferation of ' landowner' companies which provided large numbers of men 
with access to unprecedented wealth, prestige, and influence, by bringing these 
men into regular contact with developers and the often unstable networks of 
e lite and bureaucratic power. They have also become fami l iar with forestry 
consultants, lawyers, and, to a more l imited extent, the ideas of non­
governmental organisations and the power of international agencies such as the 
World Bank. 
Yet, despite this expansion of practical knowledge of modernity, Port 
Moresby, and PNG's  forestry sector, the landowners have so far been unable to 
create any organisation that represents their unified interests. Given the pre­
existing divisions amongst the landowners, and the intense competition among 
men for senior positions in landowner companies, such an organisation was 
perhaps unl ikely to have been successful ,  but the landowners have been further 
div ided and destab i l ised by competing logging companies who do not 
necessarily require strongly unified and independent landowners. Rather, each 
potential investor is interested in maintaining patron-cl ient ties with a small 
group of 'representative ' landowners who are fundamentally dependent on the 
investor for further funds and resources .  
Landowner company board members and directors who find themselves in 
this position are unl ikely to always represent the views and interests of the wider 
community. This  point is not lost on other landowners, who often bitterly 
criticise directors for tricking the 'ground people'  by doing deals in Port 
Moresby without tel l ing them . At the same time, board members and directors 
are accused of 'eating' or ' steal ing ' future royalty monies, since it is thought 
that the investor wi l l  recoup all expenses in running the landowner company 
1 4 There is also a strong view that the younger generation, who tend to occupy most positions on 
landowner companies, owe their seniors at least some access to the benefits of development, and 
that these benefits should materialise before the elders die. Here a notion of inter-generational 
equity is reworked into the more culturally specific theme that the younger generation are indebted 
to the senior generation for the ' suffering' and 'pain '  which the latter suffered when rearing the 
former. This emphasis on the previous generation tends to undercut a concern with 'sustainable 
development' ,  either in the sense of long-term sustainabil ity or in the sense of this generation 's 
responsibil ity to the next generation. 
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from royalties, should the investor be successful .  Some directors are said to be 
' l ike prostitutes '  who just ' look for money' and 'jump' from one company to 
another. The result is that the 'ground people ' ,  even when overtly supporting a 
particular logging company, are h ighly suspicious of the directors of its 
associated landowner company. Partly because of such criticisms, some men 
holding senior positions in  a landowner company rarely leave Port Moresby, and 
consequently have l ittle direct contact with people at the v i l lage level .  Such 
divis ions with in factions further contribute to the sense that, in the v i llage, no­
one really knows what is going on, apart from the often h idden pursuit of self­
interest. The government d id not intervene or in any way regulate this  process. 
It simply refused to recognise the legitimacy of any of the feuding landowner 
companies, but by fail ing to intervene, it faci l itated, by default, the landowners' 
transformation into competing and h ighly unstable factions which were 
organised and funded by potential investors . 
Moreover, neither the state nor the investors were real ly interested in 
landowner participation in the negotiations over the Makapa project. Most 
negotiations have taken place in Port Moresby, with l ittle input from 
landowners, and indeed most landowners have l ittle knowledge of the details of 
these negotiations .  Many landowners sti l l  have no real understanding of the 
transaction which they were entering into when they signed the initial TRP 
agreement. Many people find it difficult to understand that the state now owns 
their timber and has given it to Innovis ion . They bel ieve that, s ince they own 
the land, all their possessory rights in the trees are sti l l  active. People also think 
that they wi l l  be able to 'try out' any logging company that comes on to their 
land, and that, if they are not happy with its operation, they wi l l  be able to send 
it away. Embedded in this  view is the bel ief that they sti l l  control access to the 
resource, and that they have the capacity to negotiate terms and conditions as the 
project develops. 
Such ideas are ev ident in assertions, by some landowners, that adequate 
recognition of their sovereign powers over ' land and resources ' ,  by the state and 
other parties, wi l l  result in a more successful development. Such ideas are also 
indicated in a 'Petition to get the Makapa Timber Project Operational ' ,  wh ich 
was sent to the then Deputy Forests Minister, Bitan Kuok, by supporters of the 
Makapa Development Corporation : 
The l iv ing style of the people are just l ike in colonial day times where 
people are l iv ing l ike primitives who just came from the bush, while 
others are much wel l  off than our people, where no proper health care, 
education, no proper social development, no good water during long 
drought, no proper econom ic and infrastructure development. . . . . .  we 
are again so concerned that we are l iving l ike during colon ial days. 
We are independent, PNG is an independent country and we as native 
of this country have every right to have any say over our property l ike 
land issues and the resources. Why is it that our area is sti l l  the least 
developed area in the county? (Makapa Development Corporation, 27 
January 1 994) 
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The problems identified in the petition do not just refer to poverty, but to the 
failure of the landowners' ' independent' or sovereign status to be recognised. 
The state, in  both its bureaucratic and pol itical arms, is able to make arbitrary 
decisions about landowners' resources without sufficiently acknowledging the 
landowners' rights over their property. The petition provides an important 
insight into the level of frustration amongst landowners about the way in which 
the state operates :  
W e  now believe that n o  body i s  tel l ing us, the landowners, the truth 
w ith our Makapa Timber Project when exactly the project is 
commencing. We believe that officers are cheating . . .  the 
landowners . . . . . .  We always stood for ourselves not for any contractor, 
we were always been w ith the state 's  decision but yet we seem 
(landowners) to be kept in the dark (ibid.) 
What this reflects is the very s ignificant failure of the government to formulate 
an al l iance with the landowners, and the landowners' resulting sense of isolation 
(rather proudly ex·pressed in the phrase 'we always stood for ourselves ' ), 
balanced by indications of their potential support for state decision making ( if 
only they knew what those decisions were). What these quotes also reflect is 
landowner awareness that the state, represented by its ' officers' ,  i s  possibly 
engaged in a 'dark ' process of pol itical and economic domination over the 
previously ' independent' landowners, pushing them back into 'colonial times ' .  
Insofar as many of the negotiations concerning Makapa have involved only 
members of the pol itical el ite, staff of the Forest Authority, and the various 
logging companies, then this  landowner perception of disengagement accurately 
reflects their s ituation. Landowners did not participate in the negotiations that 
led to the Makapa project agreement in May 1 996. They were not parties to the 
agreement and did not s ign it. By July 1 996, they sti l l  had not been given a 
copy of the full  agreement, which was being treated as confidential to the 
signatories. As one man put it (in July 1 996), they were now being treated l ike a 
pig that has been bound: 
We have chains around our neck and legs. We are l ike a pig that 's  tied 
up. That p ig can' t  move where it wants. I t  goes where you make it go. 
It can' t  move, when it does it hurts. It cries. No-one l istens. It cries 
and cries and then it falls asleep in pain. It can' t  move. We 
landowners are l ike that now. 
Conclusions 
The material presented here has outl ined some of the complexity in the 
definition of the Makapa TRP, as understood by various actors attempting to 
influence policy concerning the project. These various, often changing, 
definitions of the Makapa TRP have emerged in a national context where 
reformist policies were being defined and strongly contested by the Joggers and 
sections of the pol itical e l ite. Due to th is pol icy confl ict, the state was unable to 
quickly implement the Makapa TRP, despite having identified it as a key project 
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in PNG's  forestry sector. The Makapa TRP was not only potential ly a major 
source of revenue for the government - it was, for a time, seen by the reformers 
as being l ikely to exempl ify many of the benefits of the reform process. But the 
failure to implement the Makapa TRP became an icon, to their opponents, of the 
reformers ' more general inabi l ity to effectively implement their policies. 
Yet the material on the Makapa TRP suggests that the reforms did not go 
far enough in deal ing with obstacles to effective implementation . Whi le the 
reforms weakened the discretionary powers of the Minister for Forests, there 
was no real attempt to destroy or transform the al l iances between the wider 
pol itical e l ite and the loggers . If anyth ing, the reformers succeeded .in 
temporari ly transforming a 'governing al l iance' between the loggers and the 
el ite which had previously run the forestry sector (see Barnett 1 989) into a 
'defensive al l iance ' which aimed at constrain ing, and winding back, the reform 
process. What this  case study reveals is that the reformers have been unable to 
effect a ful l  structural transformation of forest resource al location decisions. 
The reform process has not been robust enough to completely transform the 
perm it given to Innovision under the old Forestry Act into an arrangement that 
ful ly conforms to the procedures of the new Act. Moreover, the reformers have 
been unable to prevent al l iances between pol iticians and loggers from 
generating other definitions of Makapa which also seem to chal lenge procedures 
establ ished by the Forest Authority. As th is case study has shown, logging 
companies are sti l l  able to strongly influence elements of the state decision­
making process by recruiting influential pol iticians. The competing loggers in 
the Makapa TRP have been reasonably successful in continuing to operate with 
a model that al locates power to the pol itical el ite in the form of the Minister for 
Forests, other ministers, and the National Executive Counci J . 1 5 Understood in 
these terms, the Makapa TRP represents the fai lure of the Forest Authority to 
effectively impose its reformist policies on the pol itical el ite. 
On the other hand, the national reform process and the associated policy 
shifts have delayed the Makapa TRP, and in this way s lowed the rate of 
exploitation of PNG's  forests to someth ing less than what it might have been, 
had the project started in 1 992 or 1 993 . The uncertainty associated with the 
negotiations over Makapa has created a space, albeit one which is increasingly 
implausible, where a national logging company, possibly with a real concern for 
socially appropriate and sustainable logging, may sti l l  emerge to be considered 
as an appropriate developer of the Makapa TRP. Secondly, sections of the 
bureaucracy were, for a time, able to take ·control of the negotiations with 
Innovision and, up to a point, effectively use their control of Innovision ' s  
uncertain access to  resources as  a point of  leverage in  their negotiations .  
l 5 The restriction of  funding for the Forest Authoerity, the recent ( 1 995) sacking of  Jean Kekedo 
as its Managing Director, and the more recent ( 1 996) attempts to amend the Forestry Act in ways 
that would have given the Forests Minister the power to appoint members of the National Forest 
Board, also exemplify this trend to weaken or subvert the independence and capacity of the 
Authority. 
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Threatening to revoke the permit meant that the state was able to use some real 
power in negotiations, at least up unt i l  the point when Innovision threatened to 
claim damages. What thi s  suggests is that the reformists have had an important 
role in shifting the possible definition of the Makapa TRP away from that 
outl ined in the initial proposals lodged by Innovision and N iugini Lumber in 
1 992. Whi le the newer defin itions have yet to be actualised, the options now 
being cons idered for Makapa represent a considerable, albeit stil l  contingent, 
ach ievement of the reform process. 
Despite these positive outcomes and possibi l ities, the material above shows 
that, fundamental ly, many of the specific decisions associated with the Makapa 
TRP involved a weakening of national pol icy as formulated by the Forest 
Authority. The new forestry bureaucracy was unable to assure landowners of 
Makapa TRP that it was acting effectively in their interests, and it was unable to 
radically transform al l iances between the el ite and the loggers . What the 
Makapa case suggests is that any further attempt to reformulate the state' s  
relationship with landowners (see Taylor, th is  volume) must b e  augmented by 
more effective state regulation of the e l ite ' s  relationship with the loggers . 
CHAPTER 6 
WHERE DO THE RAW LOGS GO? 
CONTRACTORS, TRADERS, AND LANDOWNERS IN LAK 
F ADZILAH MAJID COOKE 
Introduction 
The bulk of timber harvesting in Papua New Guinea (PNG) is carried out by 
Malaysian-based multinational companies. These logging companies generate 
extreme emotions in PNG. The Chan government has seen them as development 
pioneers whose presence needs to be promoted by pol itical elites in power. 1 
Non-government organisations (NGOs) regard them as environmental vandals at 
best, or ' robber barons' at worst, whose activities are normally i l legal and ought 
to be instantly stopped.2 At one time or another, different groups of local 
landowners have also seen Malaysian logging contractors as the perpetrators of 
large-scale environmental destruction, but have sti l l thought they ought to be 
mi lked at every available opportunity. Yet the occasion for m i lking rarely 
presents itself, because the companies are too cunning to al low them such 
opportunities. More often than not the reverse is true. Wi l l ingly or unwi l l ingly, 
landowners have often been used as mouthpieces for timber companies, most 
notably when they resist any change to what they perceive to be the 'cosy' deals 
which they have maintained with 'their' developers (National, 1 6  July 1 996). 
The Malaysian companies themselves regard their role in PNG as that of an 
' investor' whose primary aim is to accumulate profit, even if the profit motive 
receives l ittle emphasis  in their own rhetoric when compared to the provision of 
'development' goods (health, education, infrastructure) to remote rural regions 
(Post-Courier, 23 June 1 993 ; National, 1 3  March, 7 July, 1 6  July 1 996). 
According to the Malaysian Prime M inister, Dr Mahathir, the emotion 
associated with the activities of Malaysian logging contractors has something to 
In March 1 996, during the visit of a Malaysian trade delegation headed by the country 's  
Minister for Primary Industries, Lim Kheng Yaik, Prime Minister Chan issued an open invitation 
to Malaysian business interests to explore PNG's potential in various sectors, including agro­
forestry, finance and tourism. Wisely or otherwise, the Association of Southeast Asian (ASEAN) 
countries in general, and Malaysia in particular, are often held up as models of ' development' by 
political el ites in power in PNG (see Post-Courier, 1 0  April 1 996; Independent, 1 9  July 1 996; 2 
August 1 996). 
2 See, for example, Henderson ( l 996a) . The Independent newspaper ( 4 October 1 996) recently 
publ ished a summary of the findings of a report by the Environmental Investigation Agency, 
entitled 'Corporate Power, Corruption and the Destruction of the World's Forests' ,  which 
compared timber companies to 'robber barons' that create social disharmony, threaten rare animals, 
and seriously damage the environment. 
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do with ' resentment among some regional powers' (read Australia) at the 
success of Malaysian investments in the South Pacific region (New Straits 
Times, Malaysia, 26 August 1 994). In this conception, Malaysian logging 
contractors have become a pol itical football within the changing (if not 
deteriorating) context of regional power relationships in the area, as evident in 
PNG's  increasing unease with the nature of its l inks to Australia.3 
It i s  not the intention of this  chapter to establ ish the 'true ' role of Malaysian 
loggers in PNG. The aim is  to examine the part played by one Malaysian 
logging company, Niugini Lumber (NGL), itself a subsidiary of the Rimbunan 
Hijau conglomerate of Kuching (East Malaysia), in influencing the nature of 
social change in the Lak e lectorate of New Ireland Province. The objective is to 
frame NGL' s  commercial intervention in Lak within the larger context of the 
world tropical t imber trade into which PNG has been drawn. The first argument 
is that forest degradation in PNG constitutes one aspect of a larger production 
and consumption system which depends for its survival on the maintenance of 
low prices and large turnovers in the consuming countries - especially Japan . 
The second argument is that logging is voracious in PNG because of the 
uncertainties and risks attendant on timber harvesting general ly - but especially 
in PNG. 
The Tropical Timber Trade, Logging Companies and Timber 
Production in PNG 
The image of Malaysian logging compan ies in PNG is  one of a pol itical ly 
influential, and even all -powerful ,  mach ine (Post-Courier, 9 April 1 996) .  Most 
of the Malaysian timber companies which operate in PNG are from Sarawak in 
East Malaysia. In Sarawak, the timber industry is dominated by one segment of 
the ethnic Chinese population, the Fouchow (Maj id Cooke 1 997). They may 
have partners who are not Fouchow, including Sarawak native groups and 
Malays from Sarawak itself and from Peninsular Malaysia, but in such 
partnerships they remain the control l ing party. 
However, in the context of global trade, these contractors are noth ing more 
than intermediaries in a raw log production chain which is dominated by 
3 Australia dominates the flow of both budgetary and programme aid to PNG, and the current 
shift from budgetary to programme aid is evidence of a struggle for control over the aid component 
of the PNG economy. The point at issue is the extent to which efficient and equitable spending of 
the aid budget is an internal matter, and how far donor concerns can be accommodated without 
infringing on the sovereignty of the recipient country. Austral ia's shared position with the World 
Bank in pushing for reform of PNG 's forestry sector as a fundamental condition of the current 
structural adjustment programme, and its public discomfort over the use of Australian helicopters 
in the Bougainvi l le crisis, both exasperate PNG pol iticians. In public, PNG political el ites have 
occasionally ' rapped Autral ia on the knuckles ' ,  but economic reality (and dependency) often 
dictate the need for compromise (Independent, 2 August, 23 August, 6 September, 1 996; Post­
Courier, 4 October 1 996), even while PNG seeks to broaden its vision by ' looking north' to 
ASEAN, especially Malaysia (Independent, 2 August 1 996), and by strengthening its relationship 
with other countries of the Pacific. 
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compan ies in consumer countries such as Japan and Korea. In the tropical 
timber industry, the Japanese sago shosha ( 'general trading companies ' )  
dominate the raw log trade, whi le their control of  the tropical plywood trade has 
been weakened somewhat, in recent years, . by the planned entry of Indonesian 
products into the Japanese market (see Dauvergne 1 996). The sago shosha l ink 
firms involved in the raw log trade, control distribution chains, and finance 
producers, wholesalers, and d istributors, as wel l  as final consumers - al l for a 
smal l fee. According to Dauvergne ( 1 996), wasteful consumption is a necessary 
outcome of their function and corporate structure. Moreover, they are able to 
control the market by the sheer volume of their purchases .  When raw logs are 
perceived to be in short supply, the sago shosha commence a buying spree, 
sending prices up, creating instabi l ity and, ultimately, price collapse as excess 
logs are sold back into the market (Krause and Sekiguchi, cited in Nectoux and 
Kuroda 1 989). Operating on a two-to-three month reserve stock, sago shosha 
are able to use these reserves to flood the Japanese market and lower log prices 
(Dauvergne 1 996). 
In sum, producer companies in PNG, even the seem ingly all-powerful 
Rimbunan Hijau, enjoy noth ing more than a subordinate position in a world raw 
log trade that i s  dom inated by the appetites of consumers .  Malaysian loggers in 
PNG function to cater to consumer appetites for timber which are largely 
Japanese. Having exhausted sources in the Ph il ippines and Sabah in the 1 960s 
and 1 970s, these consumers found new supplies in Sarawak and PNG (World 
Bank 1 995 :76) .  Malaysian logging companies, as longstanding suppl iers to the 
Japanese market, are now also logging in Africa, South America, and other 
South Pacific is land countries apart from PNG - especially the Solomon Islands, 
Vanuatu and Samoa (ibid.) .  However, for these logging contractors, remaining 
in a subordinate position does not imply complete subjugation, and often 
produces some real advantages - a point which wi l l  be dealt with in more detai l  
later. 
Operational Risks 
In general, timber harvesting can be a very lucrative business .  According to 
Vincent and B inkley ( 1 992: 1 0 1  ), it is lucrative because of low royalties and 
premiums. S ince concessions are awarded, withdrawn, or reissued under criteria 
which are often unclear, and certain ly not based on economic efficiency, low 
premiums and royalties actual ly provide valuable perquisites for those in power 
(Barnett 1 992; Taylor 1 992). On the other hand, markets are uncertain, demand 
is control led by consumer countries, sunk costs are high, and in the case of PNG, 
production itself may be risky because of uncertain operational conditions. 
Timber harvesting cal l s  for heavy front-end expenses which usually include 
outlays on infrastructure, purchase or rent of heavy mach inery, and fees payable 
to landowners who may or may not turn out to be representative of communities 
in the project areas . The more remote the logging site, the higher these 
operational costs are l ikely to be. Because of uncertainties about the richness of 
forest, about obtaining ful l  landowner support and, even if such support i s  
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forthcom ing, of being able to proceed smoothly, large-scale logging is not for 
the faint-hearted nor the small, under-capital ised companies. 
Provincial and national governments see logging companies as potential 
providers of infrastructure and services to remote rural areas. In most l icensing 
agreements, there have been clauses stipulating the responsibi l ity of landowner 
companies for the construction of transport faci l ities, especially roads and 
bridges. This responsibi l ity has commonly been transferred to the logging 
contractors by the Logging and Marketing Agreements which they have 
negotiated with the landowner companies, although the burden has occasionally 
been shared. Road and bridge construction may cost anything up to K l 00,000 
per k i lometre, depending on the nature of the terrain and local soi l  conditions.4 
For convenience, road construction is normally sub-contracted, often to other 
Malaysian companies .  
Despite the relatively h igh labour costs in PNG, wages do not account for 
more than 1 5  percent of total operational costs . Apart from roads, the sunk costs 
on machinery constitute the other major component of front-end expenses. The 
requirements of each logging s ite are different, and the number of machines 
obviously depends on the s ize of the operation . In 1 99 1 ,  when logging in the 
Lak TRP began, a cluster of four different types of mach inery cost over K2 
mi l l ion. A single cluster includes mach inery for the sawmil l ,  a forklift, two 
types of bul ldozer for logging, and additional machinery for road maintenance, 
including a shovel, a grader, an excavator, and a dump truck. More than one 
cluster of machines is sometimes required at a particular site at any one time. 
Some machines may be shared, that is flown or shipped from other existing 
logging sites, but this  does not solve the problem of spare parts. Because parts 
are not readily avai lable in PNG, they are often brought in directly from 
S ingapore or Japan . In v iew of the distance, together with the h igh cost of 
transport within PNG itself, importing mach inery and parts is a costly exercise. 
Calculations made by Kumar ( 1 986 :99), based on logging operations in 
Malaysia, where avai labi l ity and distance may be less problematic, show that 
machinery and equipment account for anything up to 90 percent of fixed costs . 
There is no reason why such costs should be any lower in PNG. Moreover, there 
are other uncertainties specific to PNG operations. 
S ix years after the adoption of the new National Forest Policy, no national 
forest inventory has yet been undertaken, and national forestry plann ing is based 
on maps which are described as ' inaccurate, confusing and misleading' (Brian 
Brunton, cited in the Independent Business Weekly, New Zealand, 2 August 
1 996). Consequently, official calculations of annual allowable cut may or may 
not be rel iable (Taylor 1 992 : 1 3 8) .  Admittedly, th is in itself is not a problem 
pecul iar to PNG. Because of uncertainties inherent in the biological qual ities of 
the forest, and the difficulty of measuring the mean annual increment of 
particular species over a long enough period of time and a large enough 
4 Much of the information presented here on operational costs is based on a personal interview 
with NGL 's Lak Operations Manager, conducted on 1 3  July 1 996. 
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geograph ical area, most calculations of annual allowable cut tend to be fairly 
fluid (Maj id Cooke 1 995) .  A national forest inventory may help, but only up to 
a point. At ground level, m iscalculation of the potential timber volume from a 
given patch of forest can affect the attitude that loggers present to landowners as 
these are translated into the sums of money which the former are prepared to 
part -with in their negotiations with the latter. More importantly, m iscalculation 
of timber volumes affects operational decisions over the question of how many 
clusters of machinery need to be used, or whether the outlays on infrastructure 
can be recuperated from the logging operations. 
The fees paid to landowners (some of whom are pol iticians) form part of 
the front-end expenses that logging companies have to bear (Nectoux and 
Kuroda 1 989). 5 However, the purchase of landowners ' good wil l  is a protracted 
and unstable process which does not always yield predictable results, as wil l  be 
explained in more detai l  in the next section. 
Counting the cost of machinery and equipment, the construction and 
maintenance of infrastructure, and upholding landowners' good wil l ,  logging is, 
in fact, a high-risk business. Moreover, regardless of all iances made with 
landowners, politicians and others, good networking alone does not convert trees 
into profits . Knowledge of the forest is important. Unless logging companies 
are prepared to undertake vigi lant surveys themselves, they may have very l ittle 
idea of what ' their' patch of forest may yield . It is frontier territory, where one 
may strike gold or oi l ,  but luck has a lot to do with it as wel l .  In Malaysia, 
losses from logging operations are represented in the expression untung tidak 
tahan rugi - ' profit that cannot withstand losses' (Maj id Cooke 1 994 :428). The 
survival of logging companies is therefore driven by the urgent need to recover 
front-end expenses or sunk costs . It is this  imperative that drives the logging 
frenzy in large-scale commercial operations, regardless of where it is done or by 
whom, Malaysians or others.6 
In 1 996, in an attempt to restructure the PNG timber industry, the World 
Bank has persuaded the PNG government to effect a greater redistribution of 
forestry profits . Th is redistribution has been based on the perception that the 
landowners were receiving inadequate returns from their forest resources. In 
response, the Forest Industries Association (FIA) has told an incredulous public 
that the timber industry could not afford any further reduction to an already 
5 In Malaysia, the fees are usually paid by Chinese logging contractors to their Bumiputra 
partners in a system referred to colloquially as Ali Baba - the Bumiputra Ali and the Chinese Baba 
(Majid Cooke I 994; I 997). The Bumiputras are the licence-holders, but may or may not engage in 
actual harvesting for various reasons. The right to harvest any l icensed area is sold for a fee to a 
contractor, usually Chinese. The fee paid to the l icence-holder can be substantial, and is not taxed 
because the exchange is unofficial, and is actually i l legal in the Peninsula under Section 23 of the 
National Forest Act. In Sarawak, on the other hand, with the very significant ethnic Chinese 
presence in the economic and pol itical l ife of the state, Fouchow logging contractors may 
sometimes be awarded timber l icences on their own account. 
6 See Footnote 2 above. 
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small profit margin (Post-Courier, 9 April 1 996; National, 1 6  July 1 996; 
Independent, 2 August 1 996). What the industry might have been referring to i s  
overall margins. Because of uncertainties over market conditions, inadequate 
resource surveys, and differences in the richness of each individual patch of 
forest, there are bound to be some operations that are much more (or less) 
profitable than others . It i s  one reason why many logging companies have such 
large and d ispersed logging concessions .  Such holdings enable them to balance 
the less v iable timber l icences against the ones that are more profitable. After 
all, maintaining supply to meet market demand is the priority; which forest patch 
the raw logs are produced from is of l ittle or no consequence. Nevertheless, 
what the FIA understated was the fact that when markets (especially prices), 
timber yields, and machinery have been wel l  synchronised, logging has been a 
h ighly profitable business indeed, as it was in 1 993 . 7  Estimates of profit 
margins are undoubtedly contested territory because of arguments about what 
may be cons idered as acceptable risks (especial ly production costs) and 
reafonable profit levels .  Moreover, since 1 993 , the log price has fallen, though 
it has not yet fallen below the levels of 1 989.  And regardless of the price levels, 
the reality of day-to-day existence for the logging companies remains with the 
problem of control l ing production costs, especially sunk costs. 
While the cost structure of machinery, parts, and maintenance may be 
relatively inflexible because it represents the cost of ' dead labour' , infrastructure 
costs and landowner fees may be more amenable to manipulation. The 
flexib i l ity can be seen in the frequently sub-standard qual ity of logging roads 
and the various means and degrees by which landowner companies are 
manipulated or exploited in order to save costs . But another condition that 
drives the logging frenzy is found beyond the shores of PNG shores: th is is the 
need to keep prices low in the international (especially northeast Asian) market 
and to keep sales volume (or turnover) correspondingly h igh . These two points 
are explored later, using examples from the Lak TRP in New Ireland. 
How to Maximise Profits or Recover Losses 
To ensure maximum profits, logging companies use many different strategies. 
These include cultivating smart business all iances international ly and with in 
PNG. 
International ly, smart business all iances can be made by cultivating 
favoured trading and marketing arrangements with consumers . S ince 64 percent 
of PNG log exports are destined for Japan (Independent, 1 9  August 1 995 ; see 
also F iler, this  volume), and the market for raw logs in Japan is control led by a 
few conglomerates or sogo shosha (Dauvergne 1 996), it makes sense for logging 
companies to have good working relationships with these conglomerates .  NGL 
at Lak, in conjunction with its parent company Rimbunan Hijau, maintains a 
long-term business relationsh ip with a few sogo shosha, including Sumitomo 
7 In I 993 , the price for PNG raw logs soared to US$ I 67 per cubic metre. One reason for the rise 
in price was the decl ine of supplies from Sabah (Dauvergne I 996). 
Contractors, Traders, and Landowners in Lak 1 1 5 
and Nissho lwai, as wel l  as with Stettin Bay Lumber Company in Rabaul, which 
is the subsidiary of a sago sasha (personal communication, NGL Lak Operations 
Manager, 1 3  July 1 996). These long-term relationships have several advantages. 
Some of these include guaranteed and stable access to the Japanese market, as 
wel l  as access to the range of services that sago shosha provide to timber 
suppl iers, such as loans at relatively cheap rates of interest. Another key service 
is the l inks which sago shosha provide with other firms involved in the log trade, 
such as shipping companies and agents (Dauvergne 1 996). 
More importantly, such relationships cush ion raw log producers against 
price fluctuation . When the price is low, for example, Rimbunan Hijau ' s  (and 
NGL's) logs are given priority; more logs are purchased from them in order to 
keep their volume and turnover at a steady level .  On the other hand, when prices 
are h igh, their logs are not phased out of the market (personal communication, 
NGL Lak Operations Manager, 1 3  July 1 996). Undoubtedly, this business 
arrangement helps to explain much of the momentum behind the company' s  
production levels .  
Whi le sago shosha may provide essential services for logging companies 
such as Rimbunan Hijau, their business style i s  detrimental to the sustainabi l ity 
of PNG forests. They are not discrim inating in their sources; they do not 
distinguish between legal and i l legal suppl iers or between those logging 
concessions which are sustainably managed and those which are not. In fact, 
although some major sago shosha, including Maruben i, have agreed in principle 
to confine their log purchases to suppl iers who follow sound environmental 
practices, most Japanese tropical log imports have originated from concessions 
that are not managed in a sustainable way (Dauvergne 1 996; see also Light, th is 
volume). 
Most logging contractors are driven by a form of competition which 
requires them to keep the price of raw logs low in order to maintain the large 
turnovers on which their profits are based. Several strategies are used in the 
process, including transfer pricing and the misdeclaration (or underdeclaration) 
of species. For lack of space, only the former is dealt with here . 
Transfer pricing, which may be effected by undervaluing purchases or 
overvaluing services, means lower (official) profit margins, leading to payment 
of lower corporate taxes, which in turn means lower costs and lower export 
prices. This reduction in export prices may not mean a corresponding reduction 
in import or consumer prices, but the undervaluation of exports does mean a loss 
of revenue to producer countries such as PNG. Survei l lance, of the kind 
undertaken by the Swiss company Societe Generale de Survei l lance, for 
example, may be able to control transactions involving material products such as 
raw logs, plywood, or even machinery, but it is doubtful whether control can be 
effectively exercised over fees and charges for services such as marketing or 
management consultancy. For obvious reasons, therefore, revenue loss from 
transfer pricing may be difficult to document. One attempt at estimating such 
losses, based partly on gains estimated in favour of logging contractors, arrived 
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at a figure of around K 1 93 mi l l ion in 1 993 , when prices boomed (Duncan 
1 994) .8 
In their capacity as financiers, sago shosha can further be rel ied upon for 
business expansion or d iversification . Indeed, they have supported much of the 
downstreaming or value-added manufacturing undertaken by Sarawak timber 
companies (Perkasa, various i ssues) .9 At the same time, the sago shosha are 
not so powerful that they have been able to prevent competition from Indonesia. 
In the 1 980s, 90 percent of Japanese plywood consumption was produced 
locally, but by 1 994, with plywood from Indonesia flooding into the Japanese 
market, only 50 percent of plywood was produced local ly (Dauvergne 1 996). 
However, such competition, while certainly making an impact on their control of 
the plywood market, does not cause much of a dent in their domination of the 
raw log trade. Their position is  backed by h igh tariffs on value-added imports 
into Japan. In 1 995,  the tariff for plywood imports into Japan was 1 5  percent for 
plywood less than 6 mi l l imetres thick, and a 1 0  percent for plywood more than 6 
mi l l imetres thick - twice as h igh as those imposed by the United States (ibid.) .  
Moreover, the Indonesian competition came at a price . It was a del iberate 
attempt at targetting the sago shosha but, because of difficult market conditions, 
the strategy used by Indonesia was to sell plywood at below world market prices, 
thereby increasing demand whi le artificial ly depressing al l plywood prices 
(ibid.) .  This  practice had detrimental effects on Indonesian forests because 
plywood production requires raw logs and it is not certain that these raw logs are 
produced from projects which operate under acceptable logging standards .  
There are other ways by which logging contractors operating in PNG could 
maximise their profits . They may make smart all iances with politicians, both 
provincial and national, and with landowners who are power-brokers in their 
own right. However, landowners do not speak with a unified voice. 
Even when all iances have been establ ished, smooth and continuous 
operations are no certainty. Landowners continually change their m inds and 
positions. The same landowners who have been tempted by the prospect of a 
once-in-a-l ifetime taste of 'development' goods, and who therefore want logging 
in the first instance, may later turn against the contractors when forest 
degradation follows logging operations .  Alternatively, landowners may turn 
8 It is worth noting here that Nissho lwai, one of the sogo shosha with which Rimbunan Hijau has 
l inks, was named in the Barnett Inquiry as a company engaging in chronic transfer pricing which 
enabled it to make substantial 'h idden profits' (Marshal l 1 990: I 76; Times of PNG, 27 July I 99 I ) . 
9 Perkasa is the quarterly magazine of the Sarawak Timber Industries Development Corporation 
(STIDC). In February I 996, Nissho Iwai signed a joint venture agreement with Samling for the 
production of a range of value-added products (Perkasa, April I 996: I I ). The Daiken and Itochu 
Corporations of Japan are involved in a joint venture arrangement involving Proexcel (a subsidiary 
of Rimbunan Hijau), the Sarawak Timber Industry Development Corporation, and Limbang 
Trading to produce medium density fibreboard, largely for the Japanese market (Perkasa, June 
1 994 :4), and production began in March I 996 from their plant at the Kidurong Industrial Estate in 
Bintulu, Sarawak (Perkasa, June I 996 :2). 
Contractors, Traders, and Landowners in Lak 1 1 7 
against logging contractors because the undervaluation of raw logs leads to 
dissatisfaction with the amount of royalty payments . Depending on the degree 
of frustration, landowners may resort to various strategies, including violence, 
designed to increase their share of the returns from logging. 
On the other hand, windfall s  may occur. After years of negotiation and 
uncertainty, res istant or deeply divided landowners may, because of a 
combination of timing and circumstance, suddenly decide to smooth over their 
differences and invite the loggers in (see Leedom, this  volume). In m id- 1 996, 
landowners of the Weittin Valley segment of the Lak Timber Rights Purchase 
(TRP), whose land had been set aside for biodiversity conservation, decided 
have their land logged instead . l o  
The clear message to  contractors i n  the field is that nothing is certain, 
neither the market, the timber volume, nor the landowners . As and when 
opportunities for logging present themselves, they must be seized swiftly. 
Moreover, time is not on the contractor' s side. Experience must inform many 
logging contractors that tomorrow' s  landowners wi l l  not necessari ly honour 
deals struck today. Th is uncertainty accounts for the unsustainable nature of 
logging in PNG. The logical logging strategy is to harvest as large an area as is 
allowable and do so as fast as possible (World Bank 1 995 : 77-78). Logging is  
unsustainable when it does not take into consideration the general health of the 
ecosystem and, more narrowly, the regeneration potential of specific forest 
patches (see Louman, this volume). Unsustainabil ity is partly fuel led by 
inadequate tools in the field, such as lack of good maps or a national forest 
inventory, as wel l  as by the overal l  production and consumption system, already 
discussed, which is geared towards keeping the cost of production low and the 
level of consumption high . 
Uncertainty drives logging contractors to devise strategies to minimise risk 
at many different levels .  There may be attempts to directly influence public 
pol icy, either through the Forest Industries Association (FIA) or by cultivating 
direct access to key members of the pol itical el ite. The FIA is a natural platform 
for influencing pol icy because it has been constantly consulted in the national 
pol icy process and is formally represented on the National Forestry Board. In 
1 996, the chief executive of Rimbunan Hijau, Tiong Hiew King, was President 
of the FIA, and his views therefore received a good deal of publicity, al l  the 
more so because Rimbunan Hijau owned the English language dai ly newspaper, 
The National. The FIA's  responses to pol icy issues have often reflected Tiong's  
views. For example, the FIA claimed, in August 1 996, that the industry would 
suffer an attrition rate of 30 percent if the government implemented the World 
Bank's  proposal to mcrease landowners ' share of forestry revenues 
1 O This information was obtained from interview (dated I I July I 996) with a landowner 
spokesperson who was also a director of the landowner company, Metlak Development 
Corporation. The Weittin Valley was set aside partly because the terrain was considered too 
difficult and inaccessible, thus uneconomical, for logging purposes, but once the surrounding areas 
had been logged, it may have become a commercially viable proposition. 
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(Independent, 23 August 1 996). Tiong had publ icised a s imi lar claim a few 
months earlier, when he was a member of the visiting Malaysian trade 
delegation headed by the Primary Industries Minister, Lim Kheng Yaik, and his  
speech was publ ished in ful l  in h is  own newspaper (National, 13 March 1 996). 
In an attempt to influence policy, logging contractors also cultivate direct 
access to members of pol itical e l ites in power. During Prime Minister Chan ' s  
official v isit to  Malaysia in  Apri l 1 996, he and his  Deputy were both honoured 
guests of Rimbunan Hijau in S ibu, Sarawak (Post-Courier, 9 Apri l 1 996). 
During this vis it, the Prime Minister reportedly agreed - at least ' in principle ' -
to review the new forest revenue system supported by the World Bank. 
Indirect strategies may also be used. One such strategy is for logging 
contractors to persuade landowners to speak on their behalf in the public arena. 
Often they are successful .  The controversy surrounding the World Bank' s  
efforts to change the forest revenue system in 1 996 provides additional evidence 
that some landowners identify their own wel l-being with that of logging 
companies operating in their areas, and are prepared to declare their affiliations 
quite openly. Landowner representatives are also inspired, to some extent, by a 
general unwil l ingness to al low governments to make decisions about land use 
that seem to infringe the constitutional ly guaranteed rights of landowners 
themselves. In July 1 996, the Vice-President of the PNG Forest Resource 
Owners' Association (PNGFROA) was quoted as follows : 
We appreciate the fact that the additional royalty announced recently 
by the government is a step in the right direction - but where wil l  it 
come from if the operators (forest rtsource developers) can ' t  pay it? . . .  
Our people know that any benefit we  get essential ly comes from our 
operators and we want to protect our interests. What alternative can the 
government offer? We have nothing so far and can' t  believe that is 
going to change if our operators leave . . .  (National, 1 6  July 1 996, my 
italics) 
Rimbunan Hijau could not have phrased these sentiments better. In this 
instance, they were able to persuade landowners to speak because these 
landowners may be directors or shareholders of landowner companies that are 
merely fronts for the contractors. In return, these shareholding landowners are 
supported in many ways, especially material ly, by 'their' logging contractors, 
whether or not they represent the interests of many landowning clans from a 
given area (Taylor 1 992 : 1 4 1 ) . However, as is often the case in PNG, 
landowners do not speak with a unified voice (Fi ler 1 996b; Holzknecht 1 996a). 
At the precise moment when the PNGFROA was critic ising the World Bank, 
another ' representative body' of landowners was defending it (National, 1 6  July 
1 996; Independent, 4 October, 1 1  October 1 996). 
Logging in the Lak TRP 
Lak is one of those areas that romantics would l ike to preserve. When 
discussing Lak with some New Irelanders in Kavieng and Rabaul, notions of Lak 
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as the last bastion of culture and custom, of people relatively untouched by 
'development' ,  were regularly mentioned. One New Irelander in Rabaul, 
conscious of changes in Lak, commented : ' If I were in Lak, I would fight to 
keep the custom ' .  It i s  as if Lak not only represents 'custom ' ,  but as if 'custom ' 
in Lak is seen as a static entity which has remained relatively untouched. 
Nevertheless, ideas about ' development' through large-scale logging and 
through more ' sustainable' forms of resource uti l i sation and conservation have 
been introduced into the area in rapid succession in the span of less than ten 
years. 
The h istory of the Lak TRP may contain features which are pecul iar to New 
Ireland Province, but it would not be surprising if the pattern of power, its 
negotiation and abuse, had relevance to many other parts of PNG, where 
questions of profit maximisation and risk m inimisation, the manipulation of 
landowner compan ies, local forms resistance, and local negotiations with the 
power of the logging company are no less pertinent. 
What may be distinctive about the Lak case, however, is the presence of a 
competing interest, namely that of an integrated conservation and development 
(ICAD) project funded by the Global Environment Facil ity and administered by 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the PNG Department 
of Environment and Conservation (DEC). What may be doubly distinctive is 
that the ICAD project establ ished its presence in Lak in 1 993 , approximately two 
years after large-scale logging had begun, and withdrew, for various pol itical 
and administrative reasons, in September 1 996. 1 1 On the other hand, Lak is 
only one of several priority conservation areas in PNG which have been 
identified as part of the ICAD 'process' (see Hedemark and Sekhran 1 994). 
An understanding of recent events in Lak must take account of the fact that 
ideas about large-scale logging, sustainable development, and forest 
conservation have been introduced into the area in rapid succession with in a 
timespan of less than ten years. Material ly, logging has produced roads and 
royalties in a way which has affected Lak society on an unprecedented scale and 
at an unprecedented rate. Logging roads l ink previously isolated vi l lages. 
Company vehicles travel l ing to and from logging sites have been the main 
means of transport for both goods and people, apparently without cost. 
ICAD project staff argued that NGL' s  style of logging did incur costs to the 
environment and to future generations. Under their mandate, the conservation of 
biodiversity in Lak meant nothing less than a complete halt to large-scale, 
unsustainable logging, and hence the removal of NGL from the area. Although 
the ICAD project itself was removed in September 1 966, it was certainly a thorn 
in NGL's  side for some time, and thus formed another element of the operational 
risk with which the company had to deal .  
1 1 There is not enough space to  discuss the the reasons for this withdrawal in any detail here. 
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Map 6.1 :  The Lak Timber Rights Purchase . 
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The Lak TRP covers an area of approximately 80,000 hectares (see Map 
6 . 1 ), and the timber permit al lows for the removal of up to 1 00,000 cubic metres 
of timber each year under a selective logging regime (Hedemark and Sekhran 
1 994 ). Nevertheless, export volumes have been relatively low (see Table 6 . 1 ). 
Table 6. 1 :  Estimated timber export volumes from the Lak TRP, 1 99 1 -95 . 
Year 1 99 1  1 992 1 993 1 994 1 995 
Volume (m3) 1 2, 1 00 47,500 35 ,300 8,700 24,700 
Source : personal communication, Nikhi l  Sekhran, 1 996. 
These figures are mere estimates, there are other sets available. Moreover, 
export volumes do not correspond with harvest volumes since they do not take 
full  account of the damage caused during fell ing. Likewise, declared production 
levels do not take account of the temptation and tendency for loggers to 
underdeclare harvest volumes because royalties are assessed on them. With 
tighter survei l lance now in place through the Forest Authority' s  contract with 
Societe Generale de Surveil lance, the potential for underdeclaring export or 
harvest volumes may have been greatly reduced, but this operation is a fairly 
recent introduction . 1 2 Consequently, the convention of calculating harvest 
volumes at a level 1 5  percent higher than export volumes may produce an 
underestimate. Nevertheless, even if the harvest volumes were inflated to a level 
30 percent higher than export volumes, the former would sti l l  remain below the 
annual allowable cut in the Lak timber permit. 
At the same time, operational costs may have been unusually high. NGL 
maintains the coastal road all the way from Weittin to Mimias, a distance of 
approximately 40 ki lometres, having constructed a 27-ki lometre section of that 
road at an average cost of K 1 00,000 per ki lometre (personal communication, 
NGL Operations Manager, 1 3  July 1 996). Maintenance costs have been very 
high because the road was set too close to the coast and has been affected by 
shifting river mouths . 1 3 It is common knowledge in Lak that the road may not 
last too long when logging is finished and NGL leaves. The road is substandard 
because of the company' s  effort to minimise sunk costs, but also, to some extent, 
because the history of the Lak TRP, l ike that of other logging concessions in 
PNG, is replete with factional i sm .  There had been disagreements among local 
clans before NGL secured the logging contract, because some clans had been 
supporting a New Zealand logging contractor, Leytrac (personal communication, 
Metlak Development Corporation Vice-Chairman, 1 1  July 1 996). During these 
years, between 1 989 and 1 99 1 ,  NGL had to make financial outlays in order to 
maintain its presence in the area by cultivating exchange relations with local 
12 SGS began its survei l lance work in PNG in 1 995 with financial backing from the European 
Union (Times of PNG, 6 April 1 995). By July 1 996, SGS surveillance of the Lak project was sti ll 
in its infancy (personal communication, SGS Operations Manager, 16 July 1 996). 
1 3 Road design was the responsibi l ity of the provincial government, which was mainly concerned 
to link the vi l lages strung along the coast of southern New Ireland. 
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clans and key landowning groups which supported its own bid for the logging 
contract. 1 4 When logging did finally begin, many rules were broken because of 
the pressure to recover the previous cost of maintaining a presence. 
The p ivotal personal ity behind the introduction of NGL (and later the ICAD 
project as wel l) was Ezekiel Weisale . In 1 990, Weisale represented the Lak 
electorate and was also F inance Minister in the New Ire land Provincial 
Government. Provincial e lections were imminent, and Weisale may have 
believed that h i s  pol itical future depended on the evidence that he could bring 
' development' to his e lectorate. Arproval of the timber permit had certainly 
been the promise on which he had been elected the last time around (Filer 
1 99 1 a) .  Elections in PNG are a costly business. 
In 1 989, forty-seven Lak clan members had signed the TRP agreement, but 
government approval of the timber permit had become entangled in the 
moratorium that was imposed on the issue of new l icences as part of PNG' s  
commitment t o  the Tropical Forestry Action Plan i n  1 990, and on subsequent 
attempts by a government Task Force on Environmental Planning in Priority 
Forest Areas to assign a different kind of priority to the Lak area (see Fi ler 
1 99 1  b ) .  When the timber permit was finally i ssued, NGL could not afford to 
waste any more time. The M im ias to Weittin road was constructed in a hurry so 
that logging could begin, and front-end expenses could be recuperated, with 
minimum delay. 
NGL has been found in breach of government logging standards on a 
number of occasions s ince the start of its operations in Lak. Operations were 
suspended for six months in 1 993 for non-compliance with permit conditions 
and for severe environmental degradation . Operations were again suspended in 
February 1 995,  and this  time the l i st of transgressions included irregularities in 
the construction of a log pond, the poor qual ity of snig tracks causing 
unnecessary damage, the poor standards of road construction and drainage, and 
excessive damage to residual tree stands. 1 5 These irregularities seem to indicate 
poor engineering standards, but a key factor would have been the speed at which 
logging was done. Because of the delays and risks which have already been 
discussed, logging occurred at a frantic pace whenever it could be undertaken at 
al l .  The resulting problems have been aggravated by the poor qual ity of 
technical staff available to supervise field workers. 
The Malaysian field supervisors were largely technical (bul ldozer or 
chainsaw) operators who had been promoted. The poor qual ity of field 
supervision has been a wel l-known problem for some time in Sarawak, where 
most of the Fouchow companies are based, but it has only recently been 
recognised as such by the Sarawak Timber Association (Perkasa, June 1 995) .  
1 4 In 1 99 1 ,  the group supporting the New Zealand logging contractor was persuaded to change its 
mind and support NGL instead (personal communication, Metlak Development Corporation Vice­
Chairman, 1 1  July 1 996). 
1 5 These are itemised in a letter frorr, the DEC dated 26 September 1 995 .  
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On the whole, logging crews in Sarawak are in itial ly untrained; they learn 
through trial and error on the job. Trial and error in dense forest undoubtedly 
carries untold costs. The question is whether members of such logging crews, 
once promoted, have the capacity or the .ski l l  to identify their own and their 
workers' shortcomings, and to conduct on-the-job training in PNG forests. More 
importantly, even if they can train or supervise, do they have the incl ination to 
do so, especially considering that most of the local workers whom I interviewed 
found it very difficult to communicate with their supervisors in either English or 
Tok Pisin? According to local Forest Authority staff (personal communication, 
4 July 1 996), Malaysian supervisors spend most of their time driving along the 
roads. It is true that the company has hired its own environmental officer, but 
his job has been to find ways of remedying, rather than anticipating and 
avoiding, the damage caused by logging (personal communication, NGL 
Operations Manager, 1 3  July 1 996). Incompetent supervision has cost money 
because logging has occasionally been suspended. Together with relatively low 
production levels and h igh infrastructure costs, th is means that the Lak project 
may not be Rimbunan Hijau ' s  most prized operation in PNG. 
The question i s :  if logging in Lak is not as profitable as it could be, perhaps 
hardly profitable at al l ,  why does the company stay? 
Rimbunan Hijau is a giant in PNG's  logging industry, for it is reputed to 
control more than 50 percent of PNG' s  log harvest (Gumoi and Sekhran 
1 995 : 52 ;  see also Fi ler, th is volume) . Profits can be transferred between 
different projects, and the company can afford to withstand losses in some of its 
ventures, so long as these can be recovered from others. Rimbunan Hijau 
(through NGL) maintains its presence in Lak as part of a long-term strategy 
which is possibly designed to secure sources of timber for a downstream 
processing plant at Alotau, in Milne Bay Province, which is planned to begin 
operations around the year 2000 (personal communication, NGL Operations 
Manager, 1 3  July 1 996). 
Furthermore, the potential for profit has been enhanced by the framing of 
the Logging and Marketing Agreement (LMA) between NGL and the local 
landowner company, Metlak Development Corporation (MDC), which was 
originally signed in 1 99 1 ,  then renewed and revised in 1 994 . 1 6  Briefly, MDC 
was apportioned 30 percent of gross timber revenues, whi le NGL retained the 
balance. On the surface, this  was a generous arrangement, when compared to 
the normal practice of assigning 7 to I 0 percent of revenues to landowner 
companies elsewhere. However, out of its 30 percent share, MDC was to pay al l 
export taxes, plus infrastructural, agricultural, reforestation and other levies. In 
1 994, the government increased export taxes by approximately 20 percent, with 
the result that MDC's  debt to NGL has subsequently increased with each 
l 6 NGL's  exploitation of the landowner company is well documented in the 'MacKenzie Report' 
(MacKenzie 1 995), and SGS staff also consider the Lak LMA to be 'a bad one' .  
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shipment of logs. 1 7 MDC' s  interests were not enhanced by the revisions made 
to the LMA in the same year, because these only had the effect of increasing 
premiums (rather than overall returns) by a few percentage points. Further 
changes to the LMA cannot be made before 1 998, and it is a moot point whether 
MDC' s  board of d irectors has learnt, or wants to learn, from the mistakes made 
in 1 994. 
The face of Rimbunan Hijau in the field is presented by its Malaysian field 
staff. Field staff are mostly technicians - surveyors, accountants and foremen . 
There are no foresters among the staff at Lak. The field staff are expected to 
cope with very complex work and social situations in a country with which they 
have l ittle famil iarity, but they have been given little preparation in human 
resource management. It was only in 1 996, five years after the start of its 
operations, that NGL employed someone to undertake personnel work at Lak. 
This individual had no formal training in personnel work, but was formerly a 
storekeeper with some experience in office work (personal communication, NGL 
Personnel Officer, 29 June 1 997). It was clear, therefore, that NGL staff 
members were very much left on their own to deal with local conditions as best 
they could. 
Wage labour is evidently a new phenomenon in the Lak TRP area, even 
though local people were engaged in the production cash crops (especially cocoa 
and copra) for several decades before the arrival of logging (Albert 1 986). The 
sparse population, the mountainous terrain, and the smal l production base often 
meant that boats from Rabaul bypassed the area, so local engagement in the cash 
economy was tenuous. Malaysian field staff were thus expected to deal as best 
they could with a local labour force whose members might not have any 
previous experience of regular wage labour, yet their authority was l imited. The 
company' s  head office in Port Moresby took al l major decisions regarding the 
application of inducements (whether carrots or sticks) to local workers, 
landowners, and decision makers at provincial and national levels .  
Although local men were very keen to secure employment with NGL 
because of the fortnightly pay packet, they were in no hurry to accept the 
discipline of wage labour, whose negotiation therefore became a serious 
business .  Workers have often spent the better part of the day, between the times 
of checking in and checking out, engaging in activities unrelated to their work, 
l ike gossiping. There has also been a high level of absenteeism . Both 
phenomena could be described as part of a strategy of avoidance - a cultural ly 
accepted way of withdrawing from an unpleasant relationship (Kingston 1 996). 
1 7 The Lak LMA (Clause 1 3 .4) also sets no l imit to the charges which MDC is to bear as 
commission for marketing agents, travelling and overseas expenses directly related to 'the 
marketing function ' ,  or ' demurrage expenses and specification claims' - whatever these may be. 
This is an example of the way that landowner companies can be squeezed by making the definition 
and the cost of services as vague as possible. A high marketing fee and travel charges incurred 
while marketing products overseas would mean higher sunk costs and less revenue avai lable for 
overall distribution. 
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Such resistance to the discipl ine of wage labour was clearly connected to the 
confidence which workers derived from their status as landowners. Despite the 
high value associated with work for 'the company' ,  nineteen of the twenty 
workers whom I interviewed had no intention of moving away from Lak once 
for they knew that their gardens would provide them with 'free food ' .  NGL 
demonstrated some flexibi lity in deal ing with the h igh levels of absenteeism 
amongst local workers with different levels of ski l l  - from log scalers up to 
mechanics. Company policy was to employ more workers than were actually 
needed in order to ensure that, on any given day, enough would turn up to keep 
the operations going (personal communication, NGL Operations Manager, NGL, 
1 3  July 1 996). 
Under conditions of chronic uncertainty, company staff must constantly 
reinforce their relationships with timber workers who may also be landowners, 
but their capacities and their techniques for doing so vary with their 
personalities. Some field staff are 'top' ,  while others get beaten up. Camp or 
site managers are 'top' when they show some compassion towards their workers, 
usually through the provision of material assistance in times of need, but also in 
their will ingness to drink together (Kingston 1 996). On the other hand, camp 
managers and field staff get beaten up for al l  sorts of reasons - refusing to allow 
the use of company vehicles for social purposes, fail ing to take sufficient note of 
workers' personal needs, or fail ing to represent their case for better working 
conditions to h igher levels of management. 1 8  One of the Malaysian field staff at 
Lak told me that ' timber workers look upon the logging company l ike god' ,  but 
they do not make sacrifices to the deity. A former operations manager was said 
to have adopted a pol icy of 'bending with the wind ' - providing financial or 
other assistance as and when requested.  According to the current operations 
manager, ' he thought he was Jesus Christ ' ,  but he was soon recalled by head 
office and now languishes in happy anonymity back in Sarawak. Another 
manager fell victim to attacks of anxiety after being subjected to physical 
violence by timber workers on a couple of occasions, and he was also flown 
home . 
Under conditions of chronic uncertainty, the company has establ ished 
exchange relations with specific groups. Some clan leaders have used strong­
arm tactics, such as roadblocks, to prise what they want out of NGL -
compensation for trees used in road or bridge construction, for example, or 
vehicles to carry their children to and from boarding schools in town. NGL's 
strategy in such cases has been to placate them with money or gifts. For 
example, one clan in Kamilal v i l lage had the use of an electricity generator 
which was apparently stolen from NGL and also the use of a car which was 
officially reserved for a local landowner employed as a supervisor at NGL's 
northern camp. This individual had a brother who had previously been 
employed by the company, who had a reputation for strong-arm tactics, and was 
1 8  For example, members of forest survey teams pay a lot of attention to the quantity and quality 
of their food rations during the periods when they live and work in the forest. 
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negotiating a hefty payout on h is  ' retirement' in July 1 996 - partly in 
recognition of the key role which had previously played in NGL's  campaign 
against the ICAD project. 
In their deal ings with the Metlak board members and other key players in 
the local political scene, NGL staff were entering into the sort of exchange 
relationships which made it possible to make inroads into Lak social . By these 
means, the company reified exchange relationships in order to achieve 
commercial ends (Kingston 1 996). 
The ICAD Project in Lak 
By contrast, the ICAD approach was guided by popular ideas about grassroots 
participation in environmental planning (Sekhran 1 996). These ideas were 
commendable enough, but it was not clear how they should be translated into 
Lak terms.  Moreover, in practice, the structures avai lable for channel l ing these 
ideas were h ierarchical and bureaucratic. 
In their pursuit of grassroots participation in environmental planning, ICAD 
project staff actual ly refrained from establ ishing exchange relationships with the 
local community. It appeared that the ICAD project was concerned with the sale 
of ideas about conservation and its long-term benefits for future generations. 
For their part, most people in Lak were interested in material s igns or proof that 
these ideas would work in their favour in the short term. 1 9 After all ,  their 
d iscontent with logging had more to do with their desire to get a fairer share of 
the material rewards from this activity than with any clash of principle between 
the values of forest exploitation and nature conservation. On the other hand, the 
show of support for the ICAD project at various public forums suggests that 
local people were not opposed or c losed to alternative ideas . Material benefits 
may be important in winning support, but even more important is the way they 
are distributed. NGL did not pave the road with gold; it merely put up a few 
water tanks at Lamborn, substandard community hal ls in various vi l lages, 
teachers ' houses at W eittin  and Morukon, and one aid post at Bakok. Of course 
there were the private deals with some members of the Metlak board of 
directors, but generally speaking, material benefits to the community were 
carefully rationed. For its part, the ICAD project also spent money in the area -
1 9  Much of the data in this section derives from an informal meeting held with the local ICAD 
committee on 7 July 1 996, followed a few days later by personal interviews with some of the 
members. The ICAD committee comprised the nominated representatives of several Lak vil lages. 
Committee members actively participated in planning and publicising various components of the 
ICAD project. They were treated as 'volunteers' by ICAD project staff, but did not accept this 
designation, and made several attempts to get the project to pay them for services rendered. In 
many societies of the 'Third World '  the idea of 'volunteer' work is not necessarily a new one, but 
may not be understood in the same way as it is in the West. In Siar vi l lage, it was noted that local 
women formerd groups in which they donated labour to meet the needs of various members, e.g. 
for clearing c learing of bushes or planting garden crops. However, local people may not have seen 
the value of volunteer work on a long-term and unpaid basis because participants would normally 
need to be rewarded in order to live. 
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on repairs to the hospital at S i lur, for example, and on a motor bike for the local 
kiap - not to mention the ' invisible' funds spent on surveys and research in the 
area. Likewise, the relative popularity of the ICAD project with some of its 
supporters in Siar v i l lage was probably due to the fact that some project staff had 
entered into personal exchange relations with the vi l lagers . On the other hand, 
the project also offered some incentives which were visible and tangible, yet 
proved to be relatively inaccessible - l ike the dinghy and the truck which were 
used as bait to galvanise the community into getting rid of the logging company, 
and which later came to be seen and resented, by some local people, as rewards 
which were being withheld in the sort of treatment which is meted out to 
naughty chi ldren.20 
As noted earl ier, the ICAD project' s mandate for conserving biodiversity 
required a complete halt to large-scale logging. This  was a big ask when the 
local clans were not united, and the best that some clans could do was simply to 
show their support. The approach that ICAD project staff adopted in the field 
was encapsulated in the overarching question : What should Lak as a community 
do to get NGL out? In v iew of the complexity of the relationships between and 
with in clans, the appropriate place to start would be the constitution of the clans 
themselves, since they appear to be the pivot of all collective action. In which 
case, it would have made sense to ask which particular clans were involved in 
making particular decis ions about the use of land or forest resources, and to 
recogn ise the identities of one ' s  friends and enemies at the outset. The aim here 
would not have been to promote some sort of clan h ierarchy through differential 
treatment, but rather to gain a knowledge of local power relationships as a guide 
to project implementation. In retrospect, what may have been lacking in the 
ICAD project approach was the abi l ity to adopt effective strategies to deal with 
local power relationships. This  faHing was partly due to the pol itical ly naive 
assumption that Lak was a single community which could mobi l ise its members 
for the task of getting rid ofNGL. 
At the same time, we must recognise that the institutional structures within 
which the ICAD project operated were not conducive to pol itical sophistication, 
precisely because of their hierarchical nature. In order to uphold the values of 
accountabi l ity and transparency in decis ion making, the project staff in Lak were 
at the end of a l ine, or the bottom of a pyramid, which included the Conservation 
Resource Centre (part of the DEC) in Port Moresby and the UNDP offices in 
Port Moresby and New York. 
Admittedly, the choice of Lak as a project site was del iberate and pol itical, 
in the sense that this  was an experimental or pi lot project intended to pit the 
20 Apart from meetings with the ICAD committee members, my account of local perceptions of 
the ICAD project is also based on discussions with clan leaders at Siar vil lage and with 
government officials like the kiap and the forester. In June and July 1 996, there was a widespread 
feel ing that ICAD project vehicles were inaccessible to the people, despite the fact that one of them 
had just recently been used to transport some v i llage people from Siar and Pukolmal to Kamparam, 
approximately ten ki lometres away, for a singsing (vil lage festival). 
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values of conservation squarely against those of 'development' . Furthermore, 
the project had to be establ ished rapidly in the face of a logging project which 
was already operational . As a result, there was no time for prior social analysis .  
However, the belief of the national government and its overseas aid donors in the 
feasibi l ity of this ICAD is revealing in itself, because it reflects a kind of naivety 
regarding the complexities of social l ife. Lessons from around the world suggest 
that the business of conservation has more to do with managing people and 
human relationships than with conserv ing flora and fauna (Utting 1 993). Social 
relations are the key to decisions about the exploitation of the biological and 
physical world. The question why societies conserve or destroy forests is  
l ikewise a social question. 
However, although there is certainly an awareness of the social dimensions 
of forest abuse in the conservation community, the model prescribed for 
predicting change often assumes that a more accurate understanding of the 
physical and biological mechanisms of abuse is the primary task. The irony, in 
the present case, is  that NGL had an instant grasp of what was going on in Lak, 
partly because it had spent some years establ ish ing a presence before it moved in 
at the opportune moment to promote its own self- interest through the actual 
business of logging. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter has suggested that the form and scale of logging in PNG are both 
tied to the global features of tropical timber production and consumption. 
Consuming countries, especially Japan and South Korea, dominate the world 
trade in tropical timber, especially raw logs, whi le intermediate countries such as 
Malaysia occupy a special n iche as production agents. The roles are h ierarchical 
and cannot be easi ly changed, although Indonesia has managed to modify the 
h ierarchy to the point where it has gained s ignificant control over the plywood 
trade by cutting prices and c ircumventing the sago shosha. On the other hand, 
the Indonesian experiment has had substantial economic and environmental 
costs, and PNG should not seek to repl icate it, even if this were a feasible option . 
But PNG cannot compete directly either with Indonesia or with Malaysia, where 
attempts have been made to attract Japanese investment to Sarawak with 
incentive packages which include a mixture of planned infrastructure and other 
serv ices (Perkasa, March 1 994, August/September 1 996, September/October 
1 996). 
The additional problem for PNG is  that the consuming countries try their 
best to exclude any new entrants who threaten their own control over the tropical 
timber trade, as they do by imposing h igh tariffs on value-added products such 
as plywood, yet they have no desire to exercise any direct control over the 
production and importation of raw logs. This explains why countries such as 
PNG find it more convenient to continue producing raw logs . With changing 
patterns of production in consumer countries, the consumption of tropical raw 
logs has decl ined, and the trade may change direction with the substitution of 
other materials. There is no bright economic future in the production and export 
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of more raw logs, because prices wil l  need to be kept low to meet the needs of 
plywood manufacturers in consumer countries, such as Japan, who already face 
competition from Indonesia. This means that PNG may have to produce more 
for less, with obviously detrimental effects on its economy and its forest 
resources. Hence the current need to explore the alternatives to large-scale 
logging. 
The case of Lak suggests that local communities are interested in the 
alternatives, but these must operate within specific economic, political and 
socio-cultural conditions. Ironically, NGL was able to grasp the complexities of 
these conditions and used them to its own advantage. It expected and exploited 
divisions within the community, targetting useful power-brokers and 
manoeuvring to enter into exchange relationships with them, whi le 
disempowering those who were excluded from these relationships. This is not 
an approach which aspires to any semblance of social justice or popular 
participation, and it ought to be treated with extreme disdain .  However, if there 
is a lesson to be learned here, it consists in the need to make sense of power and 
culture wel l  before one tries to make sense of biology and ecology. 
CHAPTER 7 
LIVING WITH LOGGING AND BROKEN PROMISES :  
MADANG TIMBERS IN THE MADANG NORTH COAST TRP 
BILL F. SAGIR 
Introduction 
The Madang North Coast Timber Rights Purchase (TRP) was negotiated in the 
pre-Independence era, and became an integral part of the Gogol timber project 
(see Montagu, thi s  volume). It covers an area of about 1 4,990 hectares. A 
timber permit was issued over the area on 27 October 1 97 1 ,  and should have 
expired on 27 October 1 995,  but a one-year extension was granted by the PNG 
Forest Authority at the request of the current l icence-holder and operator, 
Madang Timbers Pty Ltd .  
Although the North Coast TRP covers a large area, much of the information 
presented here has been gathered from the smaller operational area known as 
Wasab-Yab-Y o id ik, where I conducted fieldwork in 1 99 1 ,  1 994, and 1 996. 
Some reference will also be made to the Ari area, which I vis ited briefly in April 
1 996, and for which I have gathered other information from reports kept in  the 
provincial forestry office in Madang. 
Local Policy Processes 
Madang Timbers has engaged in a number of practices which can be regarded as 
the foundations of the ' local policy process ' which governs its logging 
operation. These include : 
• a strategy of ' appeasement' ,  by which the company has consciously adapted 
its practices to meet the demands which local vi l lagers have made on its 
resources; 
• a policy of avoiding the threat of confl ict with local v i l lagers through the 
practice of 'patchwork logging' ;  and 
• attempts to secure the support of landowners through false promises of future 
material benefits . 
Appeasement and Accommodation 
Since 1 990, when the campaigns of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
caused an upsurge in landowner mi l itancy, the logging company has embarked 
on a pol icy of keeping the landowners happy enough to prevent them from 
d isrupting logging operations. In the Wasab-Yab area, the company agreed to 
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let vi l lagers use its machinery to fell  and haul logs from areas outside the TRP 
boundary into their v i l lages. Vil lagers then used chainsaws and wokabaut somils 
to cut up the logs for sale both with in and outside the v i l lage . People in Yab had 
a contract with the Catholic church in Alexishafen to provide sawn logs of 
various sizes. In this case, the use of company machinery seems to have been 
fuel led by the need to meet the church ' s  demands for sawn logs. 
The company knew that this practice was i l legal, but the company and the 
v i l lagers al ike saw the need to accommodate each other' s interests, just so long 
as the authorities did not get to know about it. In September 1 995,  however, 
forest inspectors who went to the area to check on the activities of Madang 
Timbers found out about this practice. Although they told the v i l lagers that this 
was against the law, and should therefore cease, the vi l lagers took no heed of 
their advice, but kept on using company machinery for their own logging 
operations. Madang Timbers was also warned that it should stop letting the 
vi l lagers use its machinery in this way, and in October 1 995, the company 
decided to act on this warning. This  caused some unrest in the vi l lages of Yab 
and Gabaksal ,  which resulted in some v i l lagers being locked up in police cel ls .  
In the wake of these events, Madang Timbers reversed its previous decision and 
al lowed the practice to continue, albeit on a l im ited scale. This was possibly due 
to its desire to finish cutting the commercial timber sti l l  standing within this part 
of the TRP. In January 1 996, forestry officials issued a stronger warning to the 
company, which again decided to stop the practice altogether, provoking a 
second round of unrest. This  time, the reason which vi l lagers gave for their 
protest was the company ' s  failure to build the classrooms which it had promised 
to build at Komindor community school, but the real reason may sti l l  have been 
their desire to keep using company machinery to fel l  and haul logs for 
themselves. By th is time, however, Madang Timbers had already begun moving 
its equipment out of the Wasab-Yab area and into the Ari area, e ither because 
the first area had been logged out or e lse because this was another way to avoid 
further confl ict. 
Another plank in this  pol icy of appeasement was company' s  wi l l ingness to 
fel l  of smal l logs by roadsides at the local people ' s  request, thus increasing the 
volume of timber on which royalties could be calculated. The company itself 
had no market for these undersized logs, which therefore ended up in Jant ' s  
woodchip m i l l .  When provincial forestry officers enquired ctbout this practice, 
Madang Timbers responded with a letter which said that :  
Landowners insisted that small logs must be extracted also from the 
roadsides and to maintain good relationship with the landowners, we 
accepted their request to take some small logs for royalty payment 
calculation. 
The wi l l ingness of the logging company to keep landowners happy by doing 
such th ings, and the abi l ity of landowners to manipulate this weakness, meant 
that both parties were col laborating in a form of environmental mismanagement 
by further depletion of local forest resources .  
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The need for this  pol icy of appeasement is evident from those instances of 
conflict in which certain influential individuals in the local v i l lages have fal len 
out of favour with the company, and then mobi l ised their followers to disrupt 
logging operations. One example from the Wasab-Yab area wil l  i l lustrate this  
point. During its operations in the Yab area, Madang Timbers employed a man 
from a neighbouring v i l lage (Garup) as a mechanic. During the course of his 
employment, this  man made use of company tool s  for his own ends. When the 
company found out, and the man was sacked, he persuaded his fellow vi l lagers 
to d isrupt the logging operation, complaining that the company was infringing 
into part of Garup territory which was not part of the North Coast TRP. The 
company had, in fact, been gui lty of thi s  infringement, and the mechanic knew 
about it, but he did not do anything about it so long as he was employed by the 
company and could use company tools for his own benefit. 
This man was acting in much the same way as one of the local ringleaders 
in the protests against the company' s  decision to curtai l  the use of its machinery 
for fel l ing and hau l ing logs to supply vi l lage sawmil ls .  Both men were able to 
incite their followers to a level of violence which meant that pol ice had to be 
cal led in to quel l  the disturbances. 
Conflict Avoidance through Patchwork Logging 
The patchwork pattern of logging is a forest management practice whereby the 
logging company operates simultaneously in several different areas. This can be 
justified on technical grounds, because it faci l itates the continuity of operations 
when bad weather hampers work in particular parts of the TRP, but it also serves 
as a device for avoiding conflict with specific groups of landowners, and even 
enables the company to avoid its commitments to provide social serv ices and 
infrastructure to local communities. 
By logging several areas at once, the company has been able to maintain its 
operations, when there was landowner unrest in one area, by concentrating its 
equipment and personnel in the other areas. This  strategy was evident when 
there was an outbreak of landowner unrest among the Yoidik people, neighbours 
of the Wasab and Yab people, in 1 989. Madang Timbers was operating in parts 
of the Far North Coast TRP (under Timber Permit 1 2-6) at the same time as it 
was operating in the Y oidik area. When the Y oidik people disrupted logging 
operations because their royalty payments were long overdue, Madang Timbers 
was eas i ly able to move its equipment to the Far North Coast TRP. As we have 
seen, the same strategy was evident in the case of the unrest which occurred 
among Yab and Gabaksal v i l lagers in 1 995,  when the logging equipment was 
moved to the Ari operation area. And when landowners in the Ari area caused 
trouble with compensation demands for a v i l lager k i l led by a company vehicle, 
the company again concetrated its operations in the Far North Coast TRP. 
This pol icy was one which not on ly enabled the company to avoid open 
conflict with landowners, but also enabled it to escape from undertakings to 
provide social serv ices to landowners . The lack of services was often cited 
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amongst the reasons for landowner unrest in the North Coast TRP. As 
previously noted, a contributing factor to landowner unrest in the Wasab-Yab 
area was the company' s  failure to build the three double classrooms which it had 
promised to bui ld at Komindor community school . This  was a promise the 
company made when it wanted the landowners to support its appl ication for a 
orie-year extension to the North Coast Timber Permit. When company officials 
were later asked why the classrooms had not been bui lt, the response was that 
they would have been built if there had not been an outbreak of unrest which 
forced the company to leave the area. It appeared, in this case, that landowner 
unrest was being used as an excuse for the company to break its promises to 
provide essential services. 
Promises, Promises 
Madang Timbers has a pol icy to employ unskil led and semi-ski l led manual 
workers (mostly men) from within its current areas of operation. Unski l led 
workers are those employed as road builders and those who tie logs to chains for 
haul ing. Semi-skil led workers include drivers, heavy equipment operators, and 
log scalers . When it moves from one area to another, these workers are laid off 
and left behind so that new ones can be employed in the next area. 
During the Wasab-Yab operations, in the decade from 1 985 to 1 995 ,  sixty 
to eighty local men were employed at one time or another. In 1 99 1 ,  Wasab men 
complained during interviews about the long hours and weekends which they 
spent working on roads and bridges, motivated by promises of generous 
overtime payments which were never forthcoming. In Apri l 1 996, these very 
same complaints were raised again in Yab and Gabaksal . In October 1 995,  
workers from Y ab, Gabaksal, W asab, and W asab-amal stopped work because 
their wages had not been paid for such a long period of time. They joined forces 
with other landowners in causing disruption to logging activities, only to be 
chased off by pol ice, and some of them ended up in pol ice cel l s .  
I t  is by no means clear that Madang Timbers or its predecessor, Wewak 
Timbers, ever real ly had a pol icy of providing infrastructure and social services 
to the people l iving within the North Coast TRP. In effect, the two decades of 
logging in the area have only seen the people living with broken promises. 
Promises of social services, such as educational and health care faci l ities, were 
made in the very beginning as a means of enticing the people to agree to logging 
in the area. More recently, when its permit was about to expire, representatives 
of Madang Timbers ran around the area, making frantic prom ises to provide 
infrastructure and social services if the company had its permit renewed or 
extended by at least one year. Landowners from both the Ari and Wasab-Yab 
areas agreed to an extension on this basis .  In the Wasab-Yab area, the company 
prom ised to build three double classrooms at Komindor community school, 
bui ld a house for a community health worker, upgrade roads in the area, and help 
th� vi l lages fell and haul logs to their v i l lages. In the Ari area, the company 
promised to 'fulfil  infrastructural requirements ' ,  bui ld school faci l ities and an 
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aid post, and upgrade roads in the area. The failure to keep these promises has 
caused a lot of the recent d isturbances among landowners . 
Whatever roads and bridges have been built by the logging company were 
not meant for the long-term benefit of local people, but only for the specific 
purpose of extracting logs, and they have soon become unusable once logging is 
completed. Barnett ( 1 992 :97) described the situation as fol lows : 
The dazed and disi l lusioned forest owners stood watching in disbelief 
as foreign operators removed their trees before moving on to the next 
area, leaving environmentally disastrous logged-over hi l lsides, 
temporary gravel/mud roads and rotting log bridges to erode and cave 
in to clog the watercourses [my ital ics] . 
This  description certainly fits the case of the North Coast TRP. 
The Actors and Their Interests 
The Pre-Reform Period 
In the period which ended with the major reforms of the national forestry sector 
in 1 990, the main actors in the negotiation of the Madang North Coast TRP, in 
order of appearance, included the landowners, the colonial state, Fletcher 
Holdings (Wewak Timbers), the Japan New Guinea Timber Company 
(common ly known as ' Jant' ), Gasmata Resources (Madang Timbers), and the 
Madang Provincial Government .  
The Landowners 
Austral ian patrol officer G.L. Szarka, after conducting a patrol through the 
Wasab-Yoidik area in 1 952, noted the existence of a good stand of timber in the 
area, reaching as far as the in land vi l lage of Bunu. Tropical hardwoods l ike 
Taun (Pometia spp. ), Kwi la (lnstia spp. ), Tal is (Terminalia brassii), and Cedar 
were said to be present in this  area. Szarka also noted the possibi l ity of bringing 
timber to the beach without too much difficulty, by making use of the 
Surumerang River, and thought that development of th is forest area would 
provide a 'good opportunity for future native enterprise ' (Madang District Patrol 
Reports). 
In the 1 960s, when resource inventories were carried out, the Australian 
administration told local people of the many benefits which would follow from 
logging. These included infrastructural development, in the form of roads and 
bridges, access to social services, and agricultural development once the forests 
had been cleared . Local pol itical leaders made prom ises of substantial and 
regular royalty payments (De' Ath 1 980 :36) .  The people themselves, not only in 
the Wasab-Yoidik area, but also in other parts of the TRP, did then see logging 
as a 'good opportun ity' for development. Logging presented an opportunity for 
them to become 'developed ' and to 'catch up' with coastal v i l lages which were 
seen to be more 'developed ' than the in land vi l lages . Landowners in the North 
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Coast TRP, l ike those . in the Gum TRP, were not interested in reforestation as a 
post- logging land use option . They were interested in commercial agricultural 
development (Lamb 1 990 : 75) .  In parts of the TRP area, this was seen as a way 
of stopping young men from m igrating to work on coastal plantations. 1 On the 
whole, the proposed project seemed to el icit a sense of pride amongst people in 
the in land v i l lages, and, for this  reason, it was welcomed wholeheartedly by 
most of them, even if some may have welcomed it out of fear of the kiap and the 
colonial administration. In either case, at this  point in time, they can sti l l  be seen 
as mere recipients of ' development' - people who accepted things without 
question. 
The Colonial State 
For the colonial state, in the period of transition to self-government, the logging 
project presented a good opportunity for economic progress to be made, not just 
on behalf of the local people, but also for the nation at large. As Ross ( 1 983) 
notes, the colonial administration expected the exploitation and development of 
PNG' s  forest resources to support its own policies for social and economic 
development during this period of trans ition . However, his analysis  also shows 
that the timing, scale, and financing of major forestry projects have normal ly 
been determined as much, if not more, by decisions and events occurring outside 
PNG as by the publ ic pol icies laid down by the colonial and post-colonial state. 
This argument certain ly appl ies to the case of the North Coast TRP. 
Having completed its survey of the North Coast TRP, the colonial state 
made a down payment of A$ l 3,955 to the various groups of landowners within 
the TRP area as the purchase price of rights to extract timber from their land. 
The rights to harvest timber on four TRPs in Madang Province - North Coast, 
Gogol, Nam, and Gum - were unsuccessful ly offered for publ ic tender in 1 964 
and 1 966 (see Map 7 . 1  ). When they were offered again, in 1 968, the consortium 
of Japanese firms now known as Jant submitted an appl ication and began 
feasibi l ity studies to see if the variety of species present in the Madang forests 
could supply a pulping operation .2 Their application was unsuccessful because 
the Japanese could not agree to Austral ian demands for Austral ian or PNG 
interests to hold a majority equity share in the pulpwood logging project. In 
1 969, however, Austral ia changed the equity requirement and asked the Japanese 
to apply again (see Montagu, this  volume). 
1 In 1 99 1 ,  an old man in Wasab vi l lage told me that, when a kiap (patrol officer) and some local 
government counci l lors came and told his people about the project in the late 1 960s, the people felt 
happy that this would release them from their role as wokbois (contract labourers) on mission and 
other privately owned plantations on the coast. 
2 Jant included a prominent Japanese financial institution, Nomura Securities, and a giant paper 
company, Honshu Paper Corporation. It was initially interested in developing an operation to 
produce cardboard from tropical hardwoods. 
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Map 7.1 : The North Coast, Gogel, Naru, and Gum TRPs, Madang Province 
(courtesy of S imon Montagu). 
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Jant. Wewak Timbers. and Madang Timbers 
Jant' s  second appl ication was almost turned down when the company refused to 
forge a partnersh ip with Wewak Timbers, which was already carrying out a 
selective sawlog operation in  the Gogol area. It was eventual ly agreed that Jant 
would subcontract Wewak Timbers to continue its sawlog operation in the North 
Coast TRP, whi le Jant itself would concentrate its woodchip project in the 
Gogol ,  Naru, and Gum TRPs. On this basis, Jant was finally granted the permit 
(Timber Permit 1 2-3) for all four TRPs in August 1 97 1 .  Jant ' s  own logging 
operations have since been conducted on a scale far greater than the sawlog 
operation in the North Coast TRP, with a much more intensive training regime 
for local workers, and a far more substantial pattern of infrastructural 
development (see Lamb 1 990; Montagu, this volume). 
Wewak Timbers continued to operate on a much smal ler scale, despite the 
fact that a control l ing interest in the company had been acquired by the New 
Zealand company, F letcher Holdings. The new owners built a sawmi l l  in 
Madang town, not far from Jant' s  own woodchip m i l l ,  to produce sawn logs for 
domestic consumption as wel l  as for export. Jant and Wewak Timbers agreed to 
exchange logs suitable for each other' s  purposes at mutual ly agreeable prices. 
The logging roads built by Wewak Timbers in the North Coast TRP were 
far less sophisticated than those built by Jant in the other areas, and its 
sawmi l l ing operation soon ran into difficulties when equipment imported from 
New Zealand proved to be unsuitable for sawing tropical hardwoods.3 In 1 985,  
the high cost of processing timber in PNG, and the low international prices of 
processed timber, persuaded Fletcher Holdings to sel l  its interests to a Malaysian 
logging company, Gasmata Resources. At the same time, the Madang Provincial 
Government, then under the leadership of Premier Andrew Ariako, also 
purchased an 8 percent equity share in the business, which partly explains the 
change of name from Wewak to Madang Timbers. The new owners insisted that 
they could only make a profit by exporting raw logs, rather by than processing 
timber for both export and domestic consumption . The government finally 
agreed to a compromise, whereby most of the logs could be exported in raw 
form, but some would sti l l  have to be processed for domestic consumption. 
Donor-Funded Reforestation 
In 1 985, the New Zealand government approved a grant of NZ$ l 0.2 mi l l ion, 
over a period of six years, for the implementation of a 'demonstration 
reforestation project' in PNG. The area around Wasab vi l lage was one of four 
locations selected for the implementation of th is project. However, the New 
Zealand government, the PNG government, and the local vi l lagers have never 
shared a common understanding of the purpose of th is project. 
3 The company had to fly in specialist technicians from New Zealand to handle major problems in 
servicing this equipment, and finally decided to replace it altogether. 
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The New Zealand government saw it as a pilot project to investigate the 
feasibi l ity of government-sponsored reforestation on customary land by 
collecting cost and growth data which could later be presented to aid donors as 
part of a commercial plantation forestry programme. But the PNG government 
regarded it as part of an existing programme which embraced a range of other 
activities in each of the four provinces where the project was being 
implemented. Activities in  the Wasab area were thus seen to have s ix specific 
objectives: 
• to provide a commercial ly viable and sustainable alternative to harvesting 
natural forests, which were seen to be a rapidly diminish ing resource base for 
establ ished forest industries in Madang Province; 
• to demonstrate the potential of commercial sawlog production for both export 
and local markets; 
• to demonstrate efficient medium-scale plantation forestry as a v iable form of 
land use, and as a means of restoring the productivity of logged-over forests 
in an area close to the provincial capital ; 
• to complement the existing reforestation projects in the Gogol Val ley 
(designed to maintain the supply of pulpwood) through the development of 
plantations containing high-value crops, thus diversifying the range of local 
forest products; 
• to build on the s i lvicultural and management experience of the Gogol project 
in order to : (a) determine the optimum range of species for the local cl imate 
and soi l  conditions of the project s ite, given specific end-use objectives; (b) 
introduce agroforestry systems combining wood crops with agricultural 
crops; and ( c) compare the benefits of open and l ine planting of the major 
species selected for the project; and 
• to establ ish a suitable framework of cooperation between national and 
provincial forestry staff, local landowners, and the forest industry (PNGDOF 
1 984). 
For the people of Wasab and other local communities, the reforestation 
project presented itself as the latest means of achieving the benefits of 
' development' and ' catching up' with their coastal neighbours . They ' gave '  
their land to the project in  the hope that this 'gift '  would be  reciprocated by the 
PNG and New Zealand governments (Fi ler 1 989). The PNG government was 
supposed to survey the land and then lease it from the customary owners . The 
landowners thought that they would receive substantial rental incomes once this 
process was complete, but it has never been completed. New Zealand ' s  bi lateral 
assistance for the project has come to an end, and no-one is now caring for the 
trees (mostly eucalyptus) which the landowners planted when they were 
employed on project funds. S ince the lease arrangements were never completed, 
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the trees presumably belong to the local landowners, yet they may not even be 
aware of th is.4 
The Period of Reform 
There have been some important changes in the identities, activities, and 
interests of actors engaged in the negotiation of the North Coast TRP during the 
present decade. The post-colonial state, with the support of overseas aid donors, 
has been seeking to impose a major reform of forest pol icy and forestry 
legislation in the wake of the Barnett Inquiry; NGOs have been much more 
active in their conduct of campaigns against large-scale logging operations; the 
Madang Provincial Government was suspended in 1 992, then subjected to a · 
nationwide reform of local and provincial government in 1 995 ; and early in the 
same year, Gasmata Resources sold its stake in Madang Timbers to another 
Malaysian company, WTK Realty. 
NGOs and Landowners 
In 1 990 and 1 99 1 ,  environmental NGOs were very active in their campaign 
against logging operations in Madang Province. Members of various groups, 
such as Wau Ecological Institute and Asples Madang for a Better Environment, 
walked the length and breadth of logging areas in the province on a campaign to 
'critically raise the consciousness of the people' (personal communication, Otto 
Avorosi) . Much of the campaign was aimed at Jant' s  long history of clear-fell 
logging in the Gogol and Naru TRPs, but the North Coast TRP was also 
included . 
Th is campaign resulted in strong anti- logging and anti-Asian sentiments 
among the vi l lage people, as I was able to observe during my fieldwork in 
Wasab vi l lage in 1 99 1 .  Wasab people now bel ieved that they could cut down 
their own trees, process the timber with wokabaut somils, and then sel l  it to local 
consumers. So they felt, at this time, that large-scale logging was unnecessary 
and destructive. The men who worked for Madang Timbers, during its 
operations in the Wasab area, talked a good deal about the harsh treatment they 
received at the hands of Asian supervisors and the long hours which they worked 
without overtime payments. From these experiences, they had come to regard 
al l Asians as greedy and d ishonest. 
By 1 994, these feelings seemed to have mellowed, and there was less 
vociferous opposition to large-scale logging. The number of wokabaut somils in  
the area had certainly increased, but rather than tel l ing the logging company to 
leave, the people felt that they could use the company to pursue their own 
interests. By this  time, as previously noted, they had started using company 
machinery to fell and haul logs from outside the TRP boundary to the vi l lages, 
4 Section 8(t) of the National Forest Pol icy states that: 'Customary land owners wi l l  receive al l 
proceeds from the sale of timber and other forest produce that are harvested from their plantations 
and wood lots. ' 
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where the wokabaut somils could be used to cut them up. On the other hand, the 
logging company sti l l  got some of the blame when this activity was prohibited 
by regional forestry officials in 1 995 . 
The Post-Colonial State 
Following the introduction of the new National Forest Pol icy in 1 99 1 ,  and 
gazettal of the new Forestry Act in 1 992, regional and provincial forest 
inspectors, who were now employees of a unified National Forest Service, began 
to carry out more frequent and intensive checks on the conduct of logging 
operations in Madang Province . In thi s  way, the state was seen to be more 
energetic in its imposition of the rule of law, but this, in turn, d isrupted some of 
the existing forms of col lusion between the logging companies and local 
landowners, thus making life more difficult for both of them, and provoking the 
landowners to take action against the companies. 
Meanwhi le, the Madang Provincial Government remained in a state of 
suspension from 1 992 to 1 994, so provincial pol iticians lost much of their 
previous power to interfere in relationships between logging companies, 
government officials, and local landowners . When new provincial elections 
were held at the end of 1 994, two of the new members elected to the Provincial 
Assembly were men who had been very active in the campaign against logging 
companies in the 1 990-9 1 period. It was widely- expected that these two men 
would join forces with other members to form a government which would bring 
new pressures to bear on the logging companies. However, the two men joined 
opposing factions in the Assembly, and al l provincial members soon disappeared 
into obl ivion when the old system of provincial government was abol ished by 
the passage of the new Organic Law on Provincial and Local-Level 
Governments in 1 995 . 5  The newly constituted provincial authorities have been 
too preoccupied with the process of inst itutional reform to take any significant 
action in the forestry sector. No cons ideration has been given, for example, to 
the possibi l ity of sel l ing the provincial government's  8 percent equity in Madang 
Timbers . 
The Logging Companies 
In early 1 995,  Gasmata Resources sold its interest in Madang Timbers to WTK 
Realty, despite the fact that the North Coast timber permit was due to expire in 
October 1 995 . Prior to the expiry date, company officials held a number of 
meetings in different v i l lages in the North Coast TRP in order to convince the 
residents that the Forest Authority should grant Madang Timbers a one-year 
extension or a renewal of its permit so that it could complete its operations those 
parts of the TRP which sti l l  contained commercial volumes of timber. As 
previously noted, the v i l lagers agreed to this proposal because of the 
5 The new Organic Law abolished provincial assemblies made up of elected representatives from 
a set of provincial electorates, and replaced them with authorities which included the national 
members of parliament and the presidents of local government councils from each province. 
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undertakings which the company made to provide additional infrastructure and 
other material benefits . 
Meanwhi le, Madang Timbers had come into conflict with another logging 
company, cal led Taway Timbers, which one forestry official referred to as a 
'ghost company' ,  probably because he knew very l ittle about it. This company 
was said to have been started by an Asian man who was married to a local 
woman, and who had entered into an agreement with his in-laws to fell trees on 
their land and sell the timber to unknown Asian companies. In 1 995,  Madang 
Timbers accused Taway Timbers of trespassing into its own area of operations at 
Ari . In a letter written to the Provincial Forest Officer in Madang, the Madang 
Timbers management alleged that, on 26 September 1 995, when Madang 
Timbers had stopped the movements of its own logging trucks after heavy rains, 
a Taway Timbers truck carrying ' short length baby small undersized logs' had 
caused a lot of damage to the logging road in the . Ari operation area. The letter 
went on to complain that these ' supersmal l ,  undersized logs ' had been left to rot 
away, and to demand K20,000 in compensation from Taway Timbers to repair 
the damage to the road. This demand brought no response from Taway Timbers, 
which now appears to be defunct. 
At the time of my fieldwork in Apri l 1 996, Madang Timbers was already 
winding down its own operations in the Madang North Coast TRP. Operations 
in the Wasab-Yab area had ceased altogether, and those in the Ari area were 
about to follow suit. Substantial amounts of equipment had been moved to the 
Far North Coast TRP, whose permit is not due to expire until 1 998, and Madang 
Timbers had also secured the contract to log the Sogeram TRP, whose current 
permit expires in the year 2000. 
The Costs and Benefits of Logging 
What have the landowners of the North Coast TRP, especially those of the 
Wasab-Yab and Ari areas, gained or lost, in wealth, power, and knowledge, from 
their experience of two decades of logging? 
Wealth 
In economic terms, it could be argued that the losses outweigh the gains. As we 
have seen, the colonial state bought the right to extract logs from the North 
Coast TRP for A$ 1 3 ,955 ,  but when this money was divided up amongst the 
landowners, individuals final ly received less than A$5 each . Landowners were 
promised that royalties would be paid every six months, but payments were 
in itial ly made on an annual bas is, and seem to have ceased altogether after 1 980. 
In 1 99 1 ,  the cessation of royalty payments was a major pol itical issue, and one 
on which I was repeatedly questioned by my informants in Wasab v i l lage.6 
6 The Wasab vi l lagers received a royalty payment almost as soon as I had left the field, and I was 
apparently given some credit for this, probably because I was known to have taken the matter up 
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Up until 1 996, landowners have been entitled to 25 percent of the royalties 
which the government has col lected from logging companies on the volumes of 
timber harvested each month (see F iler, this volume). Table 7 . 1 shows the 
volumes of timber harvested from the North Coast TRP, the total royalties paid 
to the government in respect of th is harvest, and the 25 percent share which 
should have been passed on to landowners, during the period from 1 978 to 1 990. 
Table 7 . 1 :  Annual t imber production and royalty payments for the Madang 
North Coast TRP, 1 978-June 1 990. 
Year Timber harvest (m3) Total royalties (K) Landowner share 
1 978 28,347 .3 80 28,967.9 1 7,24 1 .98 
1 979 33 ,048.29 1 3 8,622.47 9,655 .62 
1 980 4 1 , 1 89 .685 4 1 ,073 . 1 7  1 0,268.29 
1 98 1  32 ,698.480 37,585 .67 9,396.42 
1 982 22,446.549 23,738 .33 5 ,934 .58  
1 983 2 1 ,244.43 5 32,070. 1 2  8,0 1 7 .53 
1 984 26,0 1 0 .659 43 ,058 .05 1 0,77 1 .26 
1 985 1 7,707.672 36, 1 45 .69 9,036 .42 
1 986 1 2,553 .043 37,747 .38  9,436 .85  
1 987 4, 1 0 1 .034 1 3 ,520. 1 7  3,3 80.04 
1 988 22,479.4 1 1  67,983 .07 1 6,988 .27 
1 989 1 2,368 .000 52,424 . 1 4  1 3 , 1 06.04 
1 990 1 0,896.000 33 ,480. 1 1  8,370.03 
TOTAL 285 ,090.693 486,4 1 3 .28 1 2 1 ,603 .33 
Source: Department of Forests records held at Hohola. 
Note: 1 990 figures are for the first six months only. 
The statistics in Table 7 . 1  indicate that individual landowners would not have 
received more than KS per annum in royalty payments, even if the payments had 
been made on time. 
Apart from their problems with royalty payments, people in both the 
Wasab-Yab and Ari areas have complained about the lack of compensation for 
the damage which logging has done to their gardens and economic trees. 
Madang Timbers has consistently failed to pay such compensation, despite its 
promises to do so. 
Employment of local people, especially men, has certainly contributed to 
their economic gains, although the logging company has rarely employed more 
than fifty at any one time, and most of them have occupied jobs with low levels 
of ski l l  and correspondingly low levels of pay. In Wasab v i l lage, I found that 
men who were employed by Madang Timbers used most their wage incomes to 
with provincial forestry officials, although it seems l ikely that the consciousness-raising efforts of 
local NGOs were also partly responsible. The more important' point, however, is to ask why 
people had been denied their entitlement for such a long time. 
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purchase consumer and household goods, and my own household survey showed 
that households whose heads had worked on the logging project had more 
durable household goods than those of other households (Sagir 1 992). In Yab 
and Gabaksal, most of the logging company' s  employees started their own trade 
stores, but most of these c losed down after a few months of operation. A very 
smal l proportion of such wage incomes was invested in other income-earning 
activities such as cash cropping. 
Economic losses are d ifficult to measure, but could be inferred from the 
statements made by people in both the Wasab-Yab and Ari areas, that game had 
been much easier to catch, and · fruits and nuts had been much more plentiful, 
before the advent of logging. In the Wasab-Yab area, people complained about 
the disappearance of flying foxes, which are considered as some kind of del icacy 
in the local d iet. Logging has removed the big trees which used to attract large 
numbers of flying foxes at certain times of the year, and local people are left to 
grieve over the recol lection. The logging company' s  practice of leaving many 
trees to rot when they have been fel led is  also perceived by local people as a 
symbol of their economic loss. 
The loss of wealth was conceived in cultural, as wel l  as economic, terms.  
The spiritual significance of the forests was seen to be lost as logging destroyed 
many of the sacred s ites (pies masalai) where ancestral spirits dwelt, and no 
compensation was paid for this destruction. Whenever s ickness or m isfortune 
has afflicted an individual or fami ly, it has sometimes been attributed to the 
destruction of a particular pies masalai associated with the clan to which they 
belong. For example, when I was in Wasab in 1 99 1 ,  a chi ld had to spend some 
weeks in the the general hospital in Madang, and the sickness was attributed to 
the father' s decision to let the logging company fell  trees in a pies masalai 
belonging to his c lan. 7 
Power 
In 1 99 1 ,  Wasab v i l lagers were clearly suffering from what Fi ler ( l  996a) 
describes as the 'demoral isation effect' of large-scale development. The 
feel ings of powerlessness and al ienation were obvious, but obviously hard to 
quantify. Local people had welcomed the logging operation as a means to 
achieve 'development' ,  but their expectations had not been fulfil led, and they 
could no longer identify with the forests which they had lost. The feeling of loss 
of power and identity i s  ' posthumous' ,  in  the sense that people grieve after their 
loss of control over an environment which they have sacrificed to the goal or 
thing they cal l 'development' (Fi ler l 996b). 
The situation in the v i l lages of Y ab and Gabaksal appeared to be somewhat 
different. In these cases, they tried to maintain a sense of their own power, of 
maintaining some control of their own l ives, by negotiating and col laborating 
7 The child in question eventually dropped out of school, and this was also seen as a loss due to 
logging. 
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with the logging company in the depletion of their forest resources. To some 
extent, they were successful in using the company to pursue their own interests 
and achieve their own goals .  However, this was really a false sense of control 
which was l ikely to disappear once the company had left the area, and the local 
people were left with the real ity of a depleted resource. 
Knowledge 
Gains in local knowledge might be said to include changes in people ' s  
perception, and the accompanying practice, of  'development' .  Initial ly, local 
people thought of development largely in terms of tangible benefits such as 
roads, bridges, schools, health centres, opportun ities for cash cropping, and, 
most importantly, the acquisition of money. It was the promise of such things 
during the 1 960s which had made them consent to logging in the first place.  
And there was no difference in the way that men and women had approached the 
question of development in these terms (see Sagir 1 992, 1 994). 
By 1 99 1 ,  this perception of development had begun to change after the 
campaigns which NGOs had mounted against logging in the province. At that 
stage, I found that it was not only common for vil lagers to express anti- logging, 
anti-Asian sentiments, but they had also begun to talk about sustainable 
development, by which they basical ly meant the need to save some of their 
resources for future generations. Unfortunately, for the people of Wasab at least, 
most of their forest resource had already disappeared by this time. People in 
Y ab and Gabaksal sti l l  had some of their resource left, and saw the wokabaut 
somil as a means to pursue the goal of sustainable development, yet this 
aspiration was threatened by the impatience of some individuals to make quick 
money by using the logging company' s  machines as an adjunct to their own 
practice of small-scale forestry. 
Through the work of NGOs, vi l lagers within the TRP have also become 
more knowledgeable about the interests of other parties, such as government 
agencies and logging companies. The general feeling in this area was that the 
state does not represent the interests of ordinary landowners, or Papua New 
Guineans in general, but those of rich people and foreigners, especial ly Asians. 
Villagers in Yab and Gabaksal accused forestry officials in Madang of siding 
with the logging company, and arranging for the pol ice to harrass, arrest, and 
detain those vi l lagers who caused any disturbance, when they should have been 
taking care of landowners' grievances. 
Local vi llagers have also acquired some knowledge of institutions l ike the 
World Bank, which now figures prominently in their discourse on 
'development' ,  although the accuracy of this knowledge is questionable. 
Villagers mistakenly bel ieve that the World Bank has been responsible for the 
influx of Asian logging companies into the country because it wants the PNG 
government to repay its loans quickly. The Bank is also seen as a vil lain 
because of the part which it played in promoting the government' s  proposed 
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Land Reform Bi l l ,  which is thought to have been intended to take land out of 
customary ownership for sale to rich Papua New Guineans and foreigners .8 
In 1 996, I also found that certain forms of environmental rhetoric, which 
had not been present in 1 99 1  and 1 994, had become quite common in the Yab­
Gabaksal area. For example, one could hear vi l lage people talking about land 
being 'our l ife' and the earth being 'our mother' . One elderly man who showed 
me around some of the areas which had been logged kept repeating the 
vernacular phrase og ka in i ginen ( ' this earth is our mother') .  Such statements 
bear no relationship to any local myths of origin, but are evidently derived from 
the teachings of environmental NGOs. 
Such gains in knowledge are offset by some significant losses. The most 
significant of these, according to people in the Wasab-Yab area, is the loss of 
magical knowledge associated with flying foxes. In the past, when large 
numbers of these animals had settled in a particular tree, anyone wishing to cut 
down the tree would perform this magic in order to make them remain on the 
tree when it fel l .  The older men say that it now seems pointless to teach young 
men this magic when there is no way they can practise it. 
Another significant loss is the knowledge of how to make and use a 
particular type of cane fish trap, which resembles a basket with one end open . 
Although local women sti l l  know how to use these traps, and could pass these 
ski l ls to their daughters, the young men are no longer wi l l ing to learn the art of 
making them, for the older men complain that they are more interested in going 
to dances and beer parties than in gaining such traditional knowledge. 
Conclusion 
How should we characterise the relationship between the local 'pol icy process' 
in the North Coast TRP and the recent reforms of national forest pol icy? The 
first point to be made in response to this question is that this particular logging 
operation began in the period before Independence, at a time when the colonial 
state was attempting to strengthen and diversify the country's  economic base . 
From this point of view, recent pol icy reforms in the forestry sector have only 
had a marginal impact on the history of the North Coast TRP, because most of it 
had already been logged before these reforms were introduced. It is true that the 
state has recently done more to ensure that Madang Timbers compl ies with the 
laws and regulations which govern the forestry sector, but there are sti l l  some 
aspects of the National Forest Pol icy which seem to have made virtual ly no 
impact on the behaviour of the logging company. Despite a notional 
commitment to reforestation, for example, and the government's collection of a 
'reforestation levy' from the logging companies, the only evidence of 
reforestation in the North Coast TRP is the result of a New Zealand-funded aid 
project. 
8 These ideas seem to have been disseminated in 1 995, at a public forum convened by university 
students in Madang town to campaign against the land reform bi l l .  
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On the other hand, it could be argued that the earlier activities of Madang 
Timbers and its predecessor, Wewak Timbers, were part of the national pattern 
of logging operations which prompted the establ ishment of the Barnett Inquiry, 
and thus contributed to the redirection of forestry pol icy during the 1 990s. Some 
of the practices in which Madang Timbers has engaged are indeed very simi lar 
to those which were described and condemned in the various reports of the 
Barnett Inquiry. For example, the company has continual ly ignored the 
regulation which requires loggers to leave twenty-metre buffer zones on both 
banks of any permanent waterway; it has felled trees right across the course of 
the Surumerang River, dragged logs across streams, and blocked streams with 
the branches and leaves of felled trees. Likewise, many of the trees which have 
been felled have been left to rot in the bush (see Sagir 1 992 :56-57). Such 
practices could stil l  be observed in the Yab-Gabaksal area in April 1 996. 
At the same time, there i s  no reason to suggest that the local ' pol icies' of 
Madang Timbers have had any specific influence on the national pol icy process. 
Its policies of appeasement and conflict avoidance, as described at the beginning 
of this chapter, have merely been intended to ensure the logging company' s  
economic survival through the continued exploitation of  the local timber 
resource. As stated earl ier, some of these 'po l icies' have actually clashed with 
aspects of the new National Forest Pol icy, and in these instances, Madang 
Timbers has been obl iged to change some of its own practices. 
CHAPTER S 
PROCESS AND OUTCOME IN THE GOGOL : 
ISSUES IN FOREST PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT 
SIMON MONTAGU 
Introduction 
The Gogol Val ley lies approximately 30 ki lometres southwest of Madang, on the 
north coast of Papua New Guinea (PNG). The val ley has been the scene of 
large-scale, clear-fell ing timber operations for the past twenty-three years. 
Timber extracted from the val ley is used in the production of woodchips for 
export and sawn timber for domestic supply. The Gogol project has the 
distinction of being the first operation in the world to util ise m ixed tropical 
rainforest species as a source of woodchips for the international pulp and paper 
industry. 
This chapter examines the historical development of the Gogol Woodchip 
Project and reviews the resultant outcomes. The review focusses on the resource 
planning and management activities undertaken by key participants involved in 
the development process. This  focus reveals the ad hoe nature of the entire 
planning process, and the type of outcomes which this  process produces. In so 
doing, it h ighl ights the s ignificance of h istorical circumstance as the driving 
force which has control led the development of the Gogol project. 
The chapter proceeds as follows: 
• Firstly, I define the key participants involved in the development of the 
Gogol project, and describe the role which each of them had in the planning 
and subsequent management of timber extraction in the val ley. 
• Secondly, I review the general planning environment in which the project 
evolved, discussing the key regulatory and administrative instruments 
employed in the plann ing process. 
• Final ly, I review the outcomes of the planning process, and assess the 
relationship between the in itial objectives of the project and the resultant 
outcomes. 
Background 
The historical significance of the Gogol Woodchip Project for the emergence of 
industrial-scale resource development in PNG has been reviewed extensively by 
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various authors (see, for example, Cavanaugh 1 97 1 ;  De' Ath 1 980; Davidson 
1 983 ; Lamb 1 990). Consequently, only a general overview need be given here .  I 
The Physical Environment 
The topography of the Gogol Valley is a mixture of steep low hi l ls, broad 
floodplains, river terraces and swamps. The floodplains and swamps are low­
lying (generally below 50 metres above sea- level) and subject to seasonal 
inundation. Hil ls are more dominant in the southern and northwestern portions 
of the valley. Elevations of more than 300 metres are rare (Haantjens et al . 
1 976:46; Lamb 1 990:46). The rivers running through the valley2 are unstable 
and change course regularly, creating a hydrological dynamic of perpetual 
erosion and deposition. 
Landscape dynamics are accentuated by natural disasters. Geological 
evidence suggests that nearby offshore volcanoes periodical ly blanket the area 
with volcanic ash . A fault l ine runs through the Gogol Val ley, roughly parallel 
to the Gogol River. Earthquakes and other seismic events are a regular 
component of the natural dynamics of the area, resulting in folding, faulting, 
land slumpage and slippage, and tsunamis. Over a longer period of time, 
seismic activity has also resulted in several changes in sea level .  Within a 
shorter time frame, forest fires are a common occurrence during extreme dry 
seasons, and floods are a regular feature of the wet season . 
The soils of the area are general ly si lty clays or clay loams, with deep, 
undifferentiated profiles and only moderate fertility (Saulei 1 984:3 52). C lose to 
the Gogol River, structureless loams or silts predominate . Textures become 
heavier, and silty clays predominate, away from the river. Surface drainage is 
slow because of the flat topography, and internal drainage is hampered by the 
heavy soil textures (Lamb 1 990:52-53) .  Even on sites not regularly flooded, 
water tables are commonly at or near the surface during the wet season 
(Davidson 1 983 : 57) .  
The cl imate of the region is tropical, featuring distinct wet and dry seasons. 
Rainfall is in the order of 3 ,000 mm per year, with most fal l ing in the months of 
December to May.3 Rain falls on an average of twenty-four days per month 
during these months. Temperatures remain stable throughout the year, with 
maximum temperatures around 29° C in the wet season, and 33° C in the dry. 
Vegetation roughly parallels the region 's  topography, with drainage acting 
as a major determinant. Vegetated areas can be divided into three main types: 
lowland hi l l  forests, al luvial forests, and a mosaic of vegetation found near the 
1 Unless otherwise noted, the material presented was taken from De' Ath ( l  980). 
2 The main rivers are the Gogol and the Nam. 
3 Rainfall data for the Gogol Val ley has only been collected since the early 1 970s. Most 
estimates of rainfal l throughout the region are based on data from Madang town. 
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coast. The floristic composition of these forests is extremely rich, characteristic 
of closed-canopy tropical forest in general .  
The lowland hil l  forests are found on the steeper slopes, away from the 
valley floor. Structurally, these forests consist of three tree layers above a 
ground layer of shrubs, ferns, and forest seedl ings. The upper canopy trees 
average 36m in height, with occasional emergents up to 45m. The al luvial 
forests cover the low- lying plains that flank the rivers of the region, and are thus 
subject to seasonal inundation. Whi le th is influences floristic composition, these 
forest are structurally s imi lar to the h i l l  forests. The range of girth s izes of the 
canopy trees are more variable, however, and the sub-canopy layer is generally 
more dispersed. Species composition remains d iverse. 
Both of these forest types contain areas of anthropogenic d isturbance, 
mainly in the form of regrowth over old subsistence garden sites. While this has 
general ly resulted in secondary forest regrowth interspersed with fruit trees, 
some areas have converted to grassland. 
The area closer to the coast i s  a more complex mosaic of vegetation. 
Higher population densities have ensured that garden regrowth and grassland 
areas are more prevalent. Furthermore, the lower rel ief of this  area results in 
greater and more enduring inundation, creating a series of swamps and swamp 
forests (Robbins et al . 1 976 : 1 06). 
The Social Environment 
Living within the val ley are a number of 'clans ' which maintain traditional 
rights of ownership and control over the land and its resources.4 These groups 
traditionally supported themselves through subsistence gardening practices 
combined with hunting and gathering in val ley's  forests. As in other parts of 
PNG, food production was not especially difficult, but health surveys undertaken 
before the start of logging indicated that their existence was not entirely idyl l ic 
(Lamb 1 990:67). 
While traditional subsistence activities continue throughout the val ley, the 
advent of a cash economy has introduced a market-oriented dimension to these 
activities, with revenues from crop surpluses used to purchase foodstuffs and 
other merchandise from trade stores. Furthermore, clear-fell ing has significantly 
reduced the amount of forest available for traditional hunting and gathering 
practices, thus reducing the supply of bush materials and foods. The cash 
economy has also spawned a market for wildl ife. Ownership of firearms has 
increased, and with it the capacity of landowners to take advantage of this  new 
market for wildl ife (Lamb 1 990:63) .  
Estimates of the human population of the Gogol Val ley vary. Missionary 
reports from the 1 880s indicate that the area was densely populated when 
4 The groups commonly identified as 'clans' ,  both by government officials and by members of 
local communities, may not fit the definitions adopted by anthropologists. 
1 50 The Political Economy of Forest Management in Papua New Guinea 
m ission stations were establ i shed west and south of the Gogol River. A dramatic 
decline in population, primarily the result of smal lpox introduced by New 
Guinea Company personnel, occurred some time after the establ ishment of these 
stations, while malaria forced the withdrawal of all miss ion personnel from the 
valley by 1 9 1 2 . The decl ine bottomed out in the early 1 920s, and the population 
was growing by the 1 940s (Cavanaugh 1 976 :  1 76). 
The general consensus on population figures in the years prior to logging 
operations falls around 2-3 ,000 (see Table 8 . 1 ) .  However, De' Ath ( 1 980:77) 
arrived at a figure closer to 4, 1 00 by taking into account the impacts of 
migration and absenteeism .  The 1 980 census counted 4,872 residents (see Mitio 
1 984), suggesting some increase after logging had started .  The 1 990 census 
figures document a continuation of this trend, for they counted approximately 
5 ,300 people l iving inside the Gogol, Naru, and Barum TRPs.5 
Table 8. 1 :  Population statistics for the Gogol and Naru TRPs, 1 969. 
Population 
Number of v i llages 
Number of clans 
Area (hectares) 
Crude population density (persons per 1 00 ha) 
Average area (ha) per clan 
Source: Lamb 1 990 :56 
Gogol 
1 1 83 
1 1  
1 68 
52,270 
2.3 
3 1 1 
Naro 
1 1 4 1  
7 
93 
1 5 ,800 
7.2 
1 70 
Genealogies compi led during the early years of the Gogol project identified 
over 250 distinct landowning groups across the val ley, speaking eight separate 
languages (Colton 1 976 :  1 93) .6 Under traditional settlement patterns, these 
groups were scattered across the val ley, l iving predominantly on their own clan 
lands and divided along l inguistic l ines . While some large v i l lages now exist,7 
v i l lagers tend to frequent these only on major ceremonial occasions, residing 
instead in clan hamlets or in bush houses constructed near their gardens. Access 
to most areas has grown with the construction of logging roads, which have 
increased the mobi l ity of the local people to areas across and outside the val ley -
including the Madang town. The increased use of Tok Pisin throughout the area 
has also lessened the impact of l inguistic boundaries. 
5 Local forestry officers have identified the relevant vi l lages within the South Ambenob, Gal Utu 
and Trans-Gogol rural census divisions. 
6 Over twenty-one languages are reportedly spoken in the region surrounding the Gogol Val ley 
(Z'graggen 1 975, cited in Lamb 1 990:56). 
7 This situation is largely an artifact of colonial efforts to bring people together in vi l lages which 
were easier to administer, although roadways have also faci litated this centralisation. 
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S imple averages suggest that each clan owns between 1 70 and 3 1 1  hectares 
of land (see Table 8 . 1 ). In reality, the differences between landholdings are 
much greater. The overall effect is that some clans are relatively wel l  off, whi le 
others are facing a land shortage. Most of the land is held in small blocks 
interspersed with the lands of other clans. As a result, disputes over boundaries 
have been, and continue to be, a source of great social tension (Lamb 1 990 : 58) .  
The History of Forestry 
Government interest in the forest resources of the Gogol Val ley dates back to the 
early 1 950s. Colonial forest ·pol icy of the time sought to establ ish a large 
number of smal l mi l l ing operations across PNG in order to supply local timber 
demand. The timber resources of the Gogol were evaluated in this l ight, in the 
hope of establ ish ing a timber supply accessible to the township of Madang. 
The initial assessment took place in 1 959, at a broad reconnaissance level, 
to ascertain whether state acquisition of rights to timber was justified, and to 
gauge local attitudes towards such a proposal . This first report recommended 
further investigation of the area, with a v iew to developing it as an immediate 
source of timber for the local urban market and for export (Davidson 1 983 :48). 
Fol lowing th is recommendation, a second survey was conducted in 1 962, 
lasting approximately five months. This survey undertook a more thorough 
sampl ing of forest types in the val ley, with statistical analysis indicating a bias in 
favour of Intsia (kwila) species. As a result of these findings, a third and sti l l  
more intensive survey was carried out in  late 1 963 . On this occasion, the survey 
team was serviced by hel icopter, and more than 600 quarter-acre survey plots 
were analysed (ibid.) .  
The findings of the third survey prompted the Administration to purchase 
timber rights over an area of 52,000 hectares for a term of forty years 
(Cavanaugh 1 976 : 1 78). The purchase agreement offered a once-off payment of 
K50,000 for rights to all timber above 1 . 52 metres dbh. 
The Administration unsuccessfully put harvest rights over this area up for 
publ ic tender in 1 964 and 1 966. When the rights were offered for a third time in 
1 968, one bid was received from a consortium of Japanese interests. This bid 
served as the starting point for a long and, at times, rancorous series of 
negotiations between the consortium and the Australian government. These 
negotiations ended in August 1 97 1 ,  when the Gogol Timber Agreement was 
signed by the Administration and the Japanese consortium trading as 'Japan 
New Guinea Timber' - commonly known as Jant. 
Fol lowing the inception and prel iminary planning of the Gogol Woodchip 
Project, a fourth and more detai led assessment of the Gogol area was conducted 
in 1 970. Unlike previous surveys, which assessed the area' s  potential as a 
source of selectively harvested sawlogs, this survey also evaluated tree sizes 
(greater than 25 cm girth) which were suitable for woodchip production (De' Ath 
1 980 :33 ; Davidson 1 983 :48). 
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Motivations for Development 
The development of the Gogol project did not take place in a vacuum. The 
economic, social and pol itical events of the late 1 960s, when the project was 
conceived, was to shape its ultimate d irection. Locating the project in the 
broader context of the era therefore sheds l ight on the motivations which 
underscored its conception and development. 
The colonial administration and the national government have both 
championed the Gogol project s ince its inception. Official enthusiasm for the 
initial concept appears to have flowed from its status as a 'world first. ' There 
appears to have been a great deal of pol itical optimism that the project would 
inspire other forms of development in the area. It was viewed as the anchor of a 
large-scale industrial complex based in Madang, centred around the manufacture 
of paper and paper-based products. The project was also seen as a model for the 
development of other resource-based industrial complexes elsewhere across the 
Territory.8 
The inception of the project coincided with a period of s ignificant policy 
change in the Territory. From the mid- 1 960s, economic development policy was 
refocussed to encourage the rapid uti l isation of natural resources as a means to 
achieve greater economic and social development. Instrumental in this policy 
change was a report by the World Bank (IBRD 1 965), which advocated a more 
rapid programme of development, centred in part around the greater uti l isation 
of the Territory' s  forest resources . It saw considerable potential for expansion in 
the forestry sector (ibid :34  ), and recommended that the Administration faci l itate 
this expansion as much as possible ( ibid: 1 5 8). The report also assessed the 
world market potential of the Territory' s  timber reserves, and argued that the 
Territory was wel l  placed (both geograph ical ly and in terms of reserves) to 
capital ise on the expanding Japanese market for sawlogs and timber projects 
(ibid: 1 5 7). 
The recommendations of the World Bank report were given further 
momentum when the Administration produced its second five-year development 
plan in 1 968 .  The forestry component of the plan sought an even greater 
expansion in output, and aimed to establ ish a forest industry based on large, 
integrated timber complexes, centred around 'big l ick' concession areas. The 
initial Gogol proposal obviously fitted this bi l l  when it was put forward in 1 968 .  
The timing of the Gogol proposal also coincided with an international push 
for the independence of the colonial territories of the South Pacific. Australia 
played its own part in th is movement, and was preparing for its eventual 
withdrawal from PNG at that point, in the early 1 970s, when the Gogol project 
reached a serious conceptual isation phase . De' Ath ( 1 980) argues that the 
8 Particularly in l ight of the developments occurring in the mineral sector. Proposals for the 
Bougainville copper mine were circulating around the same time, and exploration around the site 
of the future Ok Tedi mine had just begun. 
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Administration, in its eagerness to ensure a strong economic base for an 
independent PNG, welcomed the proposal and became a strong advocate for its 
implementation. 
Davidson ( 1 983) suggests that support for the project was reinforced by the 
economic status and potential of the Gogol Valley itself. Without the 
development of a woodchip operation in the area, the val ley had l ittle else to 
attract other forms of development or to gain much priority from the state in the 
provision of publ ic infrastructure and services. The area' s  forest resources were 
never considered to be very substantial, and further analysis actually 
downgraded the qual ity of the stock. Agricultural potential was always low as a 
result the area' s  low-lying topography, seasonal inundation, and naturally poor 
soi ls .  Population density was low, and there is evidence to suggest that the 
various social systems of the val ley were disintegrating at an increasing rate 
(Colton 1 976 : 1 92) .  Frustration with the poor economic conditions in the area 
had prompted the formation of cargo cults and a h igh level of outmigration 
(Davidson 1 983 : 62).9 
The poor economic and social conditions of the area were apparently 
recognised by the local population . Cotton 's  ( 1 976) work, which was based on 
extensive patrols in the area, showed that the residents could see their chances 
for development were sl ight, and that health and education opportunities for 
their chi ldren were l imited. Davidson ( 1 983) adds that, despite numerous 
reservations about the project (particularly the l ikel ihood of squatters moving 
into the area), the people agreed to dispose of their timber rights largely because 
of their feel ing of economic backwardness and the lack of other development 
options. 
The Gogol Woodchip Project 
The Gogol Woodchip Project formally commenced operations after the Gogol 
Timber Agreement had been signed on 1 1  August 1 97 1 .  The agreement gave 
Jant the rights to al l  pulpwood in the project area, whi le the rights to the sawlogs 
were granted to a smal l PNG logging company, Wewak Timbers. 
Jant' s  permit to harvest timber for pulp was issued in July 1 972 . The 
company spent much of 1 972 and 1 973 tool ing up and developing the necessary 
infrastructure - the woodchip mi l l  and harbour faci l ities in Madang, and logging 
roads in the project concession areas. The first shipload of woodchips was sent 
to Japan in June 1 974. 
The operation of the Jant mi l l  is dependent on a concession of 
approximately 68,000 hectares, made up of four separate Timber Rights 
Purchase (TRP) areas : the Gogol (52,265 ha), the Gum River (5 ,063 ha), the 
Nam ( 1 5 ,8 1 1 ha), and North Coast ( 1 5 ,00 1 ha) (see Map 7 . 1  ). Timber extraction 
9 Colton ( 1 976) suggests that the majority of the able-bodied men of the Gogol area were absent 
from the area when the project started. 
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was originally p lanned to proceed at the rate of 3-4,000 hectares per annum, with 
a 20-25 year l ifespan placed on the resource. Although annual logging rates 
have remained around the proposed level, the predicted life of the resource has 
since been downgraded, following revisions of the quality of the timber resource 
in these areas. l o  Jant' s  own estimations now suggest that the resource wi l l  last 
until late 1 997, at a reduced harvest rate of around 1 ,000 hectares per annum. 
From that point on, operations wil l  be dependent on plantations and local tree 
farms (personal communication, Joe Loreakena, 1 1  1 995). 
Actual logging operations involve crews of loggers moving into designated 
logging coupes and clear-fel l ing all trees above 20 cm in diameter. Fel led trees 
are snigged by bul ldozers to loading ramps, where they are sorted on the basis of 
size into sawlogs and pulplogs. These are separately loaded and trucked to 
Madang, then washed and weighed in the presence of a government inspector, 
and either cut into sawn timber at the mi l l  belonging to Madang Timbers (the 
successor to Wewak Timbers) or reduced to woodchips in Jant' s  chipper. 1 2 The 
chips are stockpi led before being conveyer-fed onto Jant' s  transport vessel for 
shipment to Honshu' s  paper mil ls  in Japan . 
Principal Actors 
From an analytical perspective, three primary groups of actors have been 
involved in the planning and management of the Gogol project: the government, 
the developer, and the landowners of the Gogol Valley. Each group has had a 
different input into the p lanning and management of the Gogol project, and the 
impact of each has varied over time. This section reviews the inputs and impacts 
of each group in turn. 
Government Agencies 
The impact of the Gogol project on the surrounding physical and social 
environment mirrors the comprehensive scale of the project. Clear-fell ing 
results in the total destruction of the forest ecosystem (at least temporari ly), with 
an associated impact on other ecological, social, and physical systems. These 
impacts cut across the administrative turf of many government agencies at both 
the national and provincial level, and thus draws them into the planning process. 
Furthermore, the phased nature of the development of the project, and the 
differential impacts experienced through the different phases, has meant that the 
10 The resource has proven to be more diverse in qual ity (for woodchips) than was originally 
estimated. 
1 1  Jant Public Relations Officer. 
1 2  l was told that sawlogs are now sold to a company cal led Tiway (or Taway) Timbers (see 
Sagir, this volume). The Madang office of the National Forest Service was using this company 's 
fax machine in March 1 995, after its own telephone l ines had been disconnected for non-payment 
of bi l ls. 
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input of different government agencies has varied in both form and extent over 
the l ife of the project. 
In this process, it is possible to identify four national agencies with a long­
term involvement in the planning process, whose principal planning and 
management functions are discussed in this section . 
Madang Timber Working Group 
The government' s  early involvement in the Gogol project was control led by an 
interdepartmental body establ ished specifical ly for the coordination and 
management of state activities in the area. This body was know as the Madang 
Timber Working Group (MTWG). The colonial administration establ ished the 
MTWG in 1 972, drawing representatives from the four departments directly 
involved in the Gogol project: those of Forests, Agriculture, Lands, and the 
Chief Minister (subsequently Prime Minister). The primary tasks of the l ine 
agencies involved in the MTWG are summarised in Table 8 .2 .  These points are 
expanded upon in the sections below. 
Table 8.2 : Functions of the l ine agencies involved in the Madang Timber 
Working Group. 
Agency 
Forestry 
Agriculture 
Lands 
Primary Function 
Forest species and volume assessments 
Forest typing and land use classification 
S ilvicultural research 
Regulation of environmental impacts of logging 
Advocate for agricultural development initiatives m the 
area 
Provide extension services to agricultural projects 
establ ished in the area 
Delineation of clan land boundaries for royalty purposes 
Del ineation of clan land boundaries for the drawing up of 
land leases (for reforestation lands) 
Note: Due to the phased nature of the Gogol project, the primacy of these functions has 
varied over time to coincide with the different nature of operations through the different 
phases. 
The departmental officers of the MTWG attempted to incorporate local 
perspectives on the planning and development of the Gogol project by making 
allowance for local representation on the committee. By 1 976, the group 
included seven vi l lage leaders elected by the people of the Gogol area (Gegeyo 
1 976: 1 85) .  
The MTWG served two major functions. Firstly, it attempted to coordinate 
the activities of the government departments which had a role in the plann ing 
and management of the Gogol project. Secondly, it attempted to perform a 
l iaison function between the government, the local residents, and Jant. 
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In its l iaison capacity, the first task of the MTWG was to patrol the areas to 
be affected by the project. Over a two-week period, the patrol team held vi l lage 
meetings throughout the Gogol TRP area, in which they tried to inform residents 
of the current state, and probable future impact, of the project. Group members 
also used these sessions as an opportunity to sol icit local residents' opinions on 
the project, and their future aspirations for the area, and they introduced the 
departmental representatives on the MTWG in such a way that local residents 
would be aware that they had someone to help them in their dealings with the 
company and with different levels of government (Gegeyo 1 976 :  1 86 ;  Davidson 
1 983 :65) .  
The hands-on, local ised approach of the MTWG quickly made i t  the main 
agency of the Administration in planning and managing the development of the 
Gogol project. It was later to faci l itate the compi lation of genealogies and the 
survey of clan boundaries throughout the project area, and to coordinate the 
distribution of royalty payments, as wel l  as serving as the mediator between the 
landowner and the developer (Lamb 1 990 : 80) .  
Papua New Guinea Forest Authority 
The PNG Forest Authority and its predecessor, the Department, of Forests, has 
been the principal government agency in the Gogol Val ley for the past thirty 
years. The nature of the Gogol project has ensured a close association between 
forestry officers, local residents, and the resource developer since the inception 
of the project. 
Before the project proposal was formulated, government activities in 
relation to the area's  forests were exploratory and transitory. The Department of 
Forests established a permanent presence in the Gogol area in 1 969, when it 
constructed the Baku Forestry Station near the vil lage of Mawan. The Baku 
station initially served as a research laboratory, nursery and administrative 
office, though it is now in a state of disrepair. 1 3 The local forestry officer sti l l  
maintains an office there, 1 4 but the research laboratory no longer exists, and the 
nursery is no longer ful ly operationaJ . 1 5 
1 3 On one of my trips to the Gogol area ( in March 1 995), I visited the centre with Bob 
Thistlethwaite, a former forestry officer based at Baku Station. My assessment of the faci l ity ' s  
decline is based on h i s  comments and reactions. 
1 4 Much of his time has been spent in producing and updating the only competent map of the 
progress of the logging project to date, but there is no evidence to suggest that his superiors have 
taken an interest in the results of this work. 
1 5 I noticed that the nursery did have young seedling trees in it whenever I visited Baku station. 
It appears that they belonged to Gogol Reforestation Company, which has an agreement with the 
Forest Authority to use what remains of the physical plant (mainly the nursery ' standout beds' )  for 
the propagation of its own seedl ings. In return, the Authority receives a percentage of the tree crop 
turned out from the nursery. 
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The permanent presence of the Forest Authority in the Gogol area, coupled 
with the phased nature of the Gogol project, means that it has played a diverse 
and, at times, controversial role in the planning and management of the area's 
forest resources. For example, during the inception phase of the project, from 
1 968 to 1 97 1 ,  the Department of Forests occupied a dual role, for it represented 
the interest of residents of the Gogol and Naru TRP areas in negotiations over 
the harvest rights for these areas, whi le also actively promoting the development 
of timber reserves in these and other locations across the Territory. It can be 
argued that this entai led a conflict of interest, and that, in theory at least, the 
abi l ity of this agency to perform either task with authority was compromised as a 
result. 
Some of the other key activities of the agency are summarised in Table 8 . 3 .  
Table 8.3 : Key activities of  the l ine agencies responsible for the Gogol forestry 
project. 
Phase 
Exploration and 
resource assessment 
Project inception 
Pre-logging 
Operational 
Operational 
(reforestation) 
Activities 
Survey timber resources of Gogol area 
Assess potential of Gogol timber reserves 
Negotiate acquisition of timber rights from traditional owners 
Advertise harvest rights for Gogol Val ley 
Select potential developer 
Negotiate agreement between developer and state for harvest 
rights 
Liaise with local residents regarding timber agreement 
negotiations and seek their input 
Oversee pre-logging operations (road construction, etc.) 
Liaise between residents and Jant over pre-logging operations 
Monitor logging operations 
Enforce legislative and administrative measures controll ing 
logging operations 
Liaise between government, Jant, and Gogol residents over 
issues arising from project operations 
Arbitrate in disputes between residents and Jant 
Arbitrate at local level in disputes between residents and 
government 
Advocate benefits of land leases for reforestation amongst 
Gogol landowners 
Negotiate land leases between government and landowners 
Provide local-level extension services for local tree farmers 
Department of Agriculture and Livestock 
The colonial administration and the individual proponents of the Gogol project 
always env is ioned agricu ltural development as an integral part of their regional 
development strategy (Serjeantson 1 976 :20 1 ) . The proponents advocated 
various schemes that would follow behind logging operations, capitalising on the 
value of the land cleared in the logging process. The chal lenge of implementing 
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these schemes has been the responsibil ity of the Department of Agriculture and 
L ivestock (DAL) and the relevant divisions of its predecessor, the Department of 
Primary Industry (DPI). 
The principal p lanning and management functions of DAL have comprised 
the promotion of various forms of agricultural development in the area, and to 
the provision of local-level extension services to any agricultural projects 
estab li shed there. DAL' s  advocacy role is revealed in the Gogel Land Use Plan, 
which reflects the perceived importance of agriculture as a post-logging land 
use. Although the main emphasis of the plan lay on the provision of land for 
future reforestation and the continued supply of pulpwood to the Jant chip m il l , 
sign ificant exclusions were made for the subsistence farming needs of present 
and future generations of Gogol res idents, smal lholder agricultural and cattle 
pr9jects, and large-scale agricultural development. The final land use plan 
(discussed below) set aside approximately 1 5 ,300 hectares (about 23 percent) of 
land in the Gogol area for these purposes . 
Despite these planning efforts, very l ittle land in the Gogol has actually 
been converted to any form of permanent agriculture. This is  probably the result 
of the natural l imitations of the Gogol Val ley, although low population densities 
have played a part. The low-lying topography and natural ly poor soi ls  of the 
valley l imit agricultural potential, whi le low population densities l im it the 
amount of labour available to any large agricultural projects . 
DAL's  extension serv ices in the Gogol area have also diminished. This is  
largely due to the lack of agricultural activity in the area, but also to the general 
collapse of extension services which followed their decentralisation to the 
provinces, and to severe operating constraints placed on all government agencies 
by PNG's  current budgetary and fiscal problems.  
Department of Lands and Physical Planning 
The role of the Department of Lands and Physical Planning (DLPP) and its 
predecessors, whi le complex and important, has been sporadic in comparison to 
those of the other government agencies involved in the project. The primary 
responsibi l ity of DLPP has been the survey and mapping of clan boundaries, on 
which the distribution of timber royalties is based. While boundary adjustments 
have been required from time to time, as clans have questioned the veracity of 
earlier land claims, the nature of the work has not required DLPP to maintain a 
constant presence in the project area. 
The demarcation of clan boundaries has been based on meetings held with 
members of adjoin ing clans in order to reach agreement over ownership and 
boundary position. The adjoining clans then elected guides to accompany a 
survey party while it used field survey techn iques to delineate the boundaries 
and codify them into a mappable form (Leet 1 976:205) .  
More recently, DLPP has also been responsible for the negotiation and 
administration of land lease arrangements between the landowners and the 
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government. These have been designed to secure sufficient areas of land for 
reforestation efforts in the val ley. DLPP has often been required to conduct 
additional boundary surveys identifying lease boundaries, and to create and 
administer the lease agreements. 
Jant 
The planning and management act1v1t1es of Jant have been conducted at a 
different level from those of the government. Jant ' s primary resource 
management concern has centred on the continuous supply of pulpwood to its 
chip mi l l  in Madang. All  other ' project-related activities in the area have been 
anci llary to the key task of extracting timber. 1 6  
I t  i s  difficult to describe the specific details of Jant' s logging programme, 
since these detai ls are not generally available, even though they can be inferred 
from the impression left on the landscape in the wake of logging activities. 
However, several observations can be made in an effort to characterise the 
nature of the resource planning and management activities undertaken by Jant. 
Jant' s logging operations, whi le very directional in their aim of securing a 
continuous supply of pulpwood to the chip mil l ,  have nonetheless been flexible 
in their application . The environmental, pol itical, and cultural environment of 
the project has had a considerable impact on the operational direction of Jant' s  
planning processes. 
Throughout the l ife of the Gogol project, Jant has had to incorporate a great 
degree of flexibi l ity in its operational planning framework, as a result of 
numerous uncertainties in its operational environment. Many technical and 
operational dimensions of the project were developed through trial and error. 
Neither Jant nor anyone else at the time had a lot of technical or operational 
expertise in conducting large-scale clear-fell ing operations under the chal lenging 
physical conditions found in the Gogol area. Learning by trial and error has 
necessari ly demanded a degree of flexib i l ity in the decision-making process. 
A great deal of the uncertainty surrounding the management of the natural 
resources of the Gogol area has also stemmed from the lack of specific 
regulatory guidel ines. The colonial administration placed only loose controls 
over production schedul ing and broader problems of environmental 
management, presumably on the assumption that existing regulations were 
sufficient for a project of this  nature . As the project progressed, however, and it 
became apparent that this assumption was i l l-founded, the government has made 
several attempts to introduce additional controls over various aspects of the 
project. Jant has general ly attempted to incorporate such changes into its 
l 6 These include the construction and maintenance of logging roads, the associated extraction of 
gravel from river beds, the operation of the Jant chip mil l ,  and the management of company 
reforestation programmes. 
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operating procedures, and its abi l ity to do so has been both a component and a 
product of the flexibil ity inherent in its operational planning framework. 
In a similar vein, Jant has also had to maintain a considerable degree of 
flexibi l ity in its operations in order to accommodate the ad hoe demands of 
landowners. 
Landowners 
Of the three groups with some stake in forestry operations in the Gogel area, 
local landowners have the largest stake. They 'bet the farm' on the project, 
hoping for the benefits which they thought, or were led to bel ieve, would result 
from it. They have endured the fundamental changes in lifestyle which clear-fell 
logging brought about, and they continue to bear the brunt of the impacts of 
logging operations on a daily basis. 
Despite the size of their stake, they have had the least input into the 
planning and decision-making process . Few avenues exist at the local level for 
any sustained and meaningful input into this process. Although landowner 
consent was required for the state ' s  acquisition of timber rights, and although 
numerous attempts have been made to sol icit landowner input over the l ife of the 
project, the system of timber rights transfer - the TRP Agreement - has 
marginal ised the landowners within the planning and management process. 
Once the government had assumed control over the resource under the TRP 
agreement, and then transferred the harvest rights to Jant under the Gogel 
Timber Agreement, decision-making powers were transferred out of the val ley, 
in both a figurative and a l iteral sense, and the residents themselves have become 
peripheral to the decisions which were made. 
The lack of effective mechanisms for landowners to voice their concerns 
and express their desires has prompted landowners to resort to confrontational 
strategies in order to get a hearing. On occasions dating back into the early 
years of the project, disgruntled Gogol residents have blockaded roads, disrupted 
logging crews, and sabotaged Jant equipment in order to draw attention to their 
grievances (see Post-Courier, 5 July 1 994). While these strategies have been 
successful in gaining the attention of Jant and the government, the frequency of 
their repetition indicates that they have led to few substantive changes. 
Instruments of Forest Management 
Resource planning activities relating to forest management in PNG take place 
within a framework defined by a range of legislative and administrative 
instruments developed to promote particular planning and management goals. 
The Gogel project has evolved within the planning and administrative 
framework defined by four main instruments :-
• The statutory regime governing forest use and management; 
• The Gogol Timber Agreement; 
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• The various timber permits i ssued to Jant; and 
• The Gogol Land Use Plan . 
Statutory Regime 
The implementation of national forest pol icy and the administration of a timber 
industry has been the responsib i l ity of a separate, national-level l ine agency 
s ince the development of a formal forest management regime in the late 1 930s 
(see Mantu 1 985) .  At the time of the inception of the Gogol project, forestry 
operations were administered under the provisions of legislation dating back to 
this era, primari ly the Forestry Ordinance 193613 7 of the Territory of New 
Guinea (as amended to 1 97 1  ). This ordinance and its supplementary regulations 
defined the procedure for the al location of rights to harvest timber, and described 
the general context of government control over forest resource development. 
The primary objective of the Forestry Ordinance was to provide the 
administrative and regulatory environment for a national forest industry based 
on smal l-scale, selective harvesting techniques. The emphasis of the regime was 
placed on broad, national-level goals, such as the acquisition and management of 
a national forest estate. Consequently, it provided l ittle in the way of specific 
planning guidel ines or resource management criteria operable at the project 
level .  Instead, operating conditions were negotiated and administered on a 
project-by-project basis .  The negotiated terms and conditions of each project 
were then formalised in either a Timber Permit or a Timber Agreement. 
Whi le this negotiated procedure was sufficient to handle ' typical ' forestry 
projects in PNG, it became problematic in the Gogol case, simply because so 
many dimensions of the project were new and unknown. The unique nature of 
the proposal meant that very l ittle technical expertise existed within Jant, the 
Administration, or the wider forest industry, which could comprehend the 
impact and ramifications of large-scale clear-felling in this tropical environment. 
Few specific guidel ines could be drawn from the pool of institutional expertise 
and experience within the colonial forestry service. As a result, few specific 
terms and conditions were formally documented in the initial Timber 
Agreement. 
Once the project became operational, and the impacts became clearer, 
efforts were made to develop project- level guidelines, but these general ly lacked 
any specific or binding obl igation. Their  implementation by Jant was dependent 
on government persuasion and the developer's good wi l l .  
The uncertainty and ignorance which characterised these initial negotiations 
over the Gogol project do not account for the apparent lack of impact of more 
recent changes in the statutory regime. The longevity of the Gogol project has 
seen it survive, relatively unchanged, through numerous changes in the statutory 
and administrative regime pertaining to the natural environment in general, and 
forestry in particular. Statutory controls over forestry have undergone several 
changes, the most recent being the reforms ushered in by the findings of the 
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Barnett Inquiry. Other broader environment management initiatives have been 
formalised in the Environmental Planning Act and the Environmental 
Contaminants Act of 1 978, and, to a lesser degree, in statutes l ike the 
Conservation Areas Act of 1 978 and the Water Resources Act of 1 982 (see 
Whimp, this volume). 
Once again, however, the fundamental problem with these changes has been 
the s ingu lar lack of initiatives capable of providing a bridge between the high­
level ideals of the statutory framework and specific, operational guidelines 
which can be implemented at the project level .  Recent efforts have been made 
to close this gap, within the forestry sector, with the publication in April 1 996 of 
a Logging Code of Practice by the PNG Forest Authority. However, it is too 
early to say whether these guidelines are having any impact on operations in the 
Gogol or in any other logging areas. 
The impact of legislative changes has also been lessened by the lack of 
retrospective appl ication of many new laws. In some cases, such as the 
Environmental Planning Act ( 1 978), the option to apply new rules to existing 
projects is expressly ruled out. 1 7 More often, however, a lack of institutional 
resources, capacity, and flexibility has made it almost impossible to implement 
substantive changes to the management of the environment. 
The Gogol Timber Agreement 
Beneath the national governance framework, the operations of the Go go I project 
are control led through a negotiated Timber Agreement. The original Gogol 
Timber Agreement was signed in August 1 97 1 ,  and a renegotiated version 
(without any significant changes) was s igned towards the end of 1 995 . 
The content of the agreement is project-specific and very functional in 
nature. It lays out the various obligations of the government and Jant (mostly 
Jant) in relation to particular operational aspects of the project. Matters covered 
in the original ( 1 97 1 )  agreement include: 
• the utilisation of the timber resource; 
• the state ' s  option to acquire equity in the project; 
• the woodchip pricing structure; 
• the company' s  responsibility for road construction, and the 
obligations of both parties to undertake road maintenance; 
• the Administration ' s  right to view company contracts; 
• the supply of electricity to the company; 
• the company' s  obligation to construct a wharf and the state ' s  
prerogative to use the wharf; 
1 7 According to Section 3 (2): 'This Act does not apply to any project to which appl ies the - (a) 
Min ing (Bougainvi l le Copper Agreement) Act 1 967; or (b) Mining (Ok Tedi Agreement) Act 
1 976; or (c) Petroleum (Gulf of Papua Agreement) Act 1 976. ' 
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• the company's  obligation to train and recruit PNG nationals; 
• the procedure for the leasing of land; 
• the company's  obligation to submit plans for waste disposal, noise 
and pol lution control ;  
• the Administration 's  undertaking to provide for public peace and 
welfare; 
• the Administration' s  undertaking to obtain land for reforestation; 
• the procedure for the entry and stay of foreign personnel; 
• the agreement of both parties on the capital structure and mode of 
financing of the project prior to the grant of a timber permit; 
• the formation of an operational and incorporated company; and 
• general legal applicabi l ity of the agreement 
The commitments made in the agreement are couched in general terms, and 
there are no specific m i lestones or deadl ines to mark their achievement. Most 
deal with particular facets of the business and operations of Jant. The agreement 
offers l ittle in the way of specific directives for action in the planning and 
management of the Gogol forest resource. The two clauses that directly mention 
the forest resource (Clause 2 on 'Resource Uti l isation ' and Clause 1 3  on 
'Reforestation ' )  do so in only general terms :  
2 .  Utilisation . 
The company undertakes to establ ish an industry in accordance with its 
proposal and to the satisfaction of the Administration, in particular the 
company undertakes -
(a) to arrange for the conversion of the saw log component of the forest 
resource; 
(b) to ensure that arrangements made are such that a substantial viable 
sawmil l ing operation will result; and 
(c) to use its best endeavours to reach a suitable agreement with a local 
sawmil l ing company for the conversion of a saw log component; or 
(d) if unable to reach an agreement w ith a local sawmill ing company to 
provide evidence of the offer made, and to establish a sawmill ing 
complex to util ise the sawmil l  component of the resource. The 
minimum annual intake to be 1 0,000,000 super feet log volume per 
year, to be achieved as soon as practicable . . . . . .  
1 3 .  Reforestation. 
The Administration will endeavour to obtain an adequate area for 
reforestation to maintain the industry at a viable level .  The 
Administration may make arrangements with the company for 
Company participation in the reforestation on such terms and 
conditions as mutually agreeable. The terms and conditions may 
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include, inter al ia, the utilisation of the harvest from the future 
plantations and the possible extension of the permit period. 
Gogol Timber Permits 
The regulatory schemes establ ished under the Forestry Ordinance (and 
continued to the current day under successive Forestry Acts) have al l required 
that logging operations only proceed following the issuance of, and in 
compl iance with, a Timber Permit. Timber permits provide a binding 
commitment between the logging operator and the government. Generally 
speaking, they detai l  the particular rights and responsib i l ities incumbent upon 
the logging operator following the receipt of harvest rights from the government. 
The formal and legally binding obl igations establ ished within a timber 
permit ensure that they are not readi ly avai lable for publ ic scrutiny. It is 
therefore difficult to comment on the resource planning and management 
obligations set out in the original Gogol Timber Permit (TP 1 2- 1  ) .  However, 
discussions with forestry officers did provide the opportunity to examine the 
contents of the renewed version of the Timber Permit (TP 1 2-2 1 ,  dated 24 June 
24 1 992). Some brief comments can therefore be offered, assuming that this 
permit is  fairly typical of those appl ied, at various times, to the whole of the 
Gogol project area. 1 8  
In  l ine with its specific administrative and regulatory function, the Timber 
Permit addresses the twin issues of resource planning and environment 
management. Clause 6 cal ls for Jant' s  logging activities to proceed in 
accordance with a five-year forest working plan, formal ly vetted and approved 
by the proper forestry authorities. The permit provides specific detai ls (Clause 
6 .2) of the information to be included in th is plan. It also outl ines a procedure 
for the periodic review and updating of the working plans (Clause 6 .4), as wel l  
as requirements for  the submission of  completion reports for  logged-over areas 
(Clause 6 .5) .  
Nothing within the permit defines the express purpose of such plans, nor of 
the process of hav ing them vetted and approved. Given their production 
planning orientation, the presumed purpose is to provide the forestry authorities 
with an overview of the project 's  ongoing operations and the future sequencing 
of resource uti l i sation . 
Stipulations for the environmental ly sensitive management of operations in 
the project area are set out in Clause 7 .  The provisions of this c lause address 
both general environmental management conditions and the particular 
l 8 Following the significant increase in awareness of the environmental implications of large­
scale logging, and in the wake of the findings of the Barnett Inquiry, it is probably safe to assume 
that this new permit is more specific and detailed than the original . The amount of detail given 
over to environmental matters, particularly in comparison to the original 1 97 1  Timber Agreement, 
and the addition of clauses specifically addressing issues raised by the Barnett Inquiry (i .e .  transfer 
pricing and arms-length pricing) offer credence to this assumption. 
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environmental impacts of logging operations, such as water pol lution and soil 
erosion. Clause 7 .2 provides an example of the more general management 
obl igations prescribed in the permit: 
Clause 7.2 : Environmental Precautions 
The Permit Holder shall use its best endeavours to overcome and 
minimise the deleterious effects caused by its operations on the 
physical environment and the inhabitants of the Permit Area and in 
particular shall comply with all environmental control conditions 
included in the approved Forest Working Plan and with the following 
provisions: 
(a) Logging will be selective l 9  and will take place only on slopes up to 
thirty (30) degrees; 
(b) there wil l  be no logging on slopes greater than thirty (30) degrees; 
(c) there wil l  be no logging within fifty (50) metres of rivers, streams 
or watercourses. 
( d) there will be no logging in proximity to vi llages, gardens, burial 
grounds or areas of cultural importance; and the Permit Holder shall 
identify such areas in consultation with the local people, taking into 
consideration existing and projected land-use patterns, and the nature 
and abundance of forest produce required by vil lagers; and 
( e) as a m in imum requirement, there wil l  be no logging: 
(i) with in one hundred ( 1 00) metres of any garden in use, burial 
ground, or area of cultural importance, or 
(ii) within five hundred (500) metres of any inhabited vil lage.20 
References to specific impacts of logging activities are made in twelve sub­
clauses. These range from the control of soil erosion (Clause 7.6) and 
compaction (Clause 7 . 1 6), to fire prevention measures (Clause 7 . 1 4) and 
measures to promote forest regeneration (C lause 7 . 1 7) .  The following is 
indicative of the content of these clauses: 
Clause 7 . 1 0 : River Bank Damage 
The Permit Holder shall take all precautions consistent with sound 
forest management practices to ensure that the banks of any river or 
stream are not damaged, and that the course of any river or stream is 
not altered as a result of the operations of the Permit Holder. 
As with the Timber Agreement, the commitments set out in Clause 7 are notable 
for their general ity and largely devoid of any specific criteria or standards that 
19 It is not known why this specification was included in TP 1 2-2 1 .  
20 My observations of logging activities in the project area indicate that al l of these provisions 
have been violated at one time or another, some (such as logging within 50m of watercourses) 
more frequently than others. 
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would faci litate the monitoring of operational compliance. Vague commitments 
to take 'al l  reasonable steps' and to abide to unspecified ' sound forest 
management practices' are al l  that this clause offer. 
Gogol Land Use Plan 
Beyond the statutory and regulatory controls governing the Gogol project, a 
detailed land use p lan was also prepared for the area. In 1 97 1 ,  the Department 
of Forests conducted an assessment of post- logging land use, which focussed on 
the need to identify sufficient land for the development of large-scale timber 
plantations. The government' s  planners recognised the need to ensure a 
continuous supply of resource to the Jant mi l l  following the depletion of the 
natural forest. 
The land use plan followed fairly standard procedures for land classification 
and assessment of suitabi l ity. The Gogol landscape was classified using a 
h ierarchical model of ' land systems' .2 1  An existing land systems classification 
for the Gogol-Madang area (CSIRO 1 976) was subdivided on the basis of 
terrain, with areas of similar terrain grouped into discrete ' land units ' .  Land 
units were further sub-divided into ' land components' on the basis of vegetation . 
Twenty resultant ' land-types' were defined, representing areas of unique 
vegetation ( land components) and topography ( land units). These are 
summarised in Table 8 .4 .  
2 I  This approach was in widespread use across Austral ia and PNG, and was a standard resource 
assessment procedure for the Australian Commonwealth Government at the time. Large areas 
could be classified and assessed in relatively short periods of time using aerial photography. The 
procedure follows a hierarchical conceptualisation of the landscape as a spatial complex of various 
environmental parameters. Different parameters are used to distinguish different complexes down 
through the hierarchy. 
Process and Outcome in the Gogol 1 67 
Table 8.4 : Land types of the Gogol Val ley. 
Terrain Vegetation Land Area 
(land units) (land components) type (hectares) 
Flat Secondary forest 1 5 ,250 
Kunai grassland 2 460 
Pit-pit 3 860 
Floodplain forest 4 4,300 
Wel l  drained terrace forest 5 4,570 
Poorly drained terrace forest 6 6,270 
Swamp forest 7 580 
Hil l  forest 8 780 
Gentle Secondary forest 9 1 ,840 
Kunai grassland 1 0  600 
Wel l  drained terrace forest 1 1  740 
Poorly drained terrace forest 1 2  960 
Hill forest 1 3  7,530 
Moderate Secondary forest 1 4  2,060 
Kunai grassland 1 5  5 1 0  
Hil l  forest 1 6  1 2,830 
Broken Hi l l  forest 1 7  4,440 
Rugged Secondary forest 1 8  1 ,3 1 0  
Kunai grassland 1 9  470 
Hill forest 20 1 0,400 
Source : Adapted from Lamb ( 1 990). 
Each land type was rated on a five point scale for its suitabil ity for 
commercial forestry and reforestation purposes . In the process, other non­
forestry land uses were also assessed, although this was done primari ly by 
reference to general physical characteristics (based on the land unit 
descriptions), and did not consider the effect of factors relating to managerial 
dimensions of these alternate land uses (distance to market, ski l l  levels of 
operators or staff, market prices, etc . )  (Davidson 1 983 : 78). The resultant 
suitabi l ity rankings are shown in Table 8 . 5 .  
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Table 8.5 : Land suitabi lity rankings for the Gogol project area. 
Land 
type 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
1 0  
1 1  
1 2  
1 3  
1 4  
1 5  
1 6  
1 7  
1 8  
1 9  
20 
Roading Logging 
1 3 
1 5 
4 5 
I 
2 
3 1 
2 2 
2 
2 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
4 
2 
3 
3 
3 
5 
1 
I 
2 
3 
5 
2 
4 
4 
5 
3 
Erosion Reforest 
-ation 
4 1 
4 2 
5 
4 1 
4 1 
4 3d 
4 4d 
3 2 
3 
3 
4 
4 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
3d  
2 
3t 
3t 
3t 
4t 
4t 
4t 
4t 
Agri­
culture 
2 
4 
I 
2 
4 
2 
2 
2 
1 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Cattle 
ranches 
4 
4 
I 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
4 
3 
3 
3 
Subsist. 
gardens 
2 
3 
4 
2 
I 
4 
5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 
2 
3 
1 
3 
2 
3 
2 
Notes: 1 = most suitable; 5 = least suitable; d = soil drainage is a major constraint; 
t = terrain is a major constraint. 
Source: Adapted from Lamb ( 1 990) 
Based on this assessment, eight land use scenarios were developed, 
allocating land in different proportions to different land use priorities across the 
valley. Each scenario set aside at least 20,000 hectares for reforestation 
purposes, which was considered to be the minimum area required to sustain 
commercial forestry in the area. 22 They also documented the location of areas 
suitable for partial or total conservation, land for agricultural development, and 
areas (such as swamps or steep hi l ls) unable to support commercial forestry. 
Details of the land uses for these eight scenarios are presented in Table 8 .6 .  
2 2  Experience with plantations e lsewhere in PNG suggested that at least 20,000 ha  grown on  a 
l 0- 1 2  year rotation would be sufficient to maintain continuous supply to the Jant mil l  once the 
natural forest had been logged (Lamb 1 990:83) .  
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Table 8.6: Post- logging land use scenarios for the Gogol Valley (area in 
hectares). 
Land use 
Small holder agriculture, no reforestation 
Benchmark reserves 
Reforestation plus smallholder agriculture 
(Land for reforestation) 
Large scale agriculture 
Cattle 
Selective logging and enrichment planting 
Swamps and river edges 
Table 8.6 (continued). 
Land use 
Small holder agriculture, no reforestation 
Benchmark reserves 
Reforestation plus smallholder agriculture 
(Land for reforestation) 
Large scale agriculture 
Cattle 
Selective logging and enrichment planting 
Swamps and river edges 
Source: Adapted from Lamb ( 1 990) 
Scenario 
1 2 3 4 
3 ,900 3 ,900 3 ,900 3 ,900 
1 ,300 1 ,300 1 ,300 1 ,300 
25 , 1 00 26,900 25 ,600 27,800 
( 1 8,800) ( 1 7,700) ( 1 9,200) ( 1 8,300) 
34,400 
3 ,000 
5 
3 ,900 
1 ,300 
25 ,900 
( 1 9,400) 
4,900 
29,000 
3 ,000 
32,600 
3 ,000 
4,800 
29,200 
3 ,000 
Scenario 
6 
3 ,900 
1 ,300 
28 ,400 
( 1 9,000) 
4,900 
26,300 
3 ,000 
7 
3 ,900 
1 ,300 
26,300 
( 1 9,700) 
4,900 
4,600 
23,800 
3 ,000 
4,700 
27, 1 00 
3 ,000 
8 
3 ,900 
1 ,300 
28,500 
( 1 9, 1 00) 
4,900 
4,700 
2 1 ,500 
3 ,000 
The eight scenarios were evaluated by the MTWG, and Scenario 3 was 
preferred . Two further modifications - 3A and 3B - were prepared, reflecting 
MTWG's  assessment of landowner aspirations on the basis of its vi l lage patrols .  
Scenario 3B (detai led in Table 8 .7) was eventual ly accepted by the MTWG and 
forwarded to Cabinet for its consent. It was adopted as the basic planning 
document for the area in 1 974 (Lamb 1 990: 84). 
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Table 8.7: Post-logging land use in the Gogol Valley under Scenario 3B. 
Land use 
Clear-felled 
Selectively logged 
Not logged 
TOTAL 
Large-scale agriculture 
Cattle projects 
Plantation forestry 
Subsistence gardening, smal l-scale 
agriculture, agroforestry 
Enrichment planting, 
natural regeneration 
Benchmark reserves 
Vi llage reserves 
Vi llage smal lholder projects* 
Swamps, rivers, etc. 
Hi l l  forest on rugged terrain 
Hectares (%) 
1 ,  1 60 (2) 
3 , 1 40 (5)  
20,000 (29) 
6,000 (9) 
1 4,840 (22) 
1 ,280 (2) 
900 ( 1 )  
3 ,980 (6) 
2,000 (3) 
1 4,840 (22) 
68, 1 40 ( 1 00) 
* This category reflects Davidson' s  ( 1 983) assessment of Scenario 3B. Lamb ( 1 990) 
p laces this area in the c lear-felled, small-scale agriculture category. Landowners of the 
area in question were initially not interested in logging, and thus their land was not 
expected to be logged in the post-logging scenarios. They did eventually agree to 
logging, however, which may explain why Lamb ( 1 990) places them in the clear-felled 
category. 
Source: Adapted from Davidson ( 1 983) and Lamb ( 1 990) 
Outcomes 
Collectively, these instruments create a l imiting framework within which the 
plann ing and management decisions of the Gogol project are made. Their terms 
and conditions formally define the specific rights and obligations bestowed on 
the parties involved in the planning process. They inform and direct the 
activities of these actors. 
There is considerable variation in the strength and specificity of the 
commitments produced by these instrnments . This in turn affects the degree to 
which they are translated into meaningful or purposeful action . Analysing the 
current state of the Gogol project in l ight of these commitments offers one 
means of evaluating the outcomes of the planning process. 
Impact on Post-Logging Land Use 
What has been the impact of this l imiting framework on the planning and 
management of land use in the Gogol Val ley in the wake of logging operations? 
The short answer to th is question is: very l ittle. The Gogol Land Use Plan 
offers the strongest statements on follow-up land use, but few of the land uses 
which it envisages have material ised as planned. The key land use - plantation 
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forestry - accounted· for only 6,225 hectares by the end of 1 994. Although 
planting targets of around 1 ,000 hectares per annum have been achieved over the 
past five years, total plantation area falls wel l  short of the 20,000 hectares 
envisaged in the plan. 
It is now seems unlikely that anything near the 20,000 hectares proposed in 
the land use plan wi l l  be given over to plantation forestry. Under Jant's latest 
plann ing schedule, only 1 0,000 hectares of plantation is required to supply the 
chip mi l l .  This is largely due to a change in the species being planted. Initial 
planning estimates were based on plantations of Eucalyptus deglupta, and 
many of the early plantations were based on this species. However, further trials 
within the Gogol confirmed that Acacia mangium was a more suitable 
pulpwood source because of its shorter rotations, higher yields, and greater 
tolerance to a range of s ite conditions, especial ly surface water ponding 
(Thistlethwaite 1 995 :6). Jant anticipates an eight-year rotation from A. 
mangium, down from ten for E. deglupta.23 
None of the various agricultural schemes envisioned in the land-use plan 
have ever been ful ly real ised. Several schemes were in itiated, but few have 
either survived over the long term or produced significant alternative means of 
l ivel ihood for large numbers of people. A smal l number of cocoa blocks were 
establ ished by DAL, more as demonstration blocks than as operational ventures. 
Most of these were not maintained and have now been cut. Local residents have 
shown l ittle interest in establ ishing blocks of their own, due largely to the 
l im ited marketing opportun ities for such crops in the local area. Coconut and 
coffee plantings were also establ ished, but most have since been abandoned . 
Cattle ranch inr, once thought of as the best smal lholder activity for the 
people of the Gogol area, also fai led to take off. In 1 978, there were thirteen 
separate projects, with 3 06 head of cattle altogether (Lamb 1 990:  1 70) .  Now 
there are three cattle projects operating in the val ley, but with on ly a few head of 
cattle (ten to twenty) in each one, and they are l im ited to the supply of strictly 
local needs (Thistlethwaite 1 995 : 1 0- 1 1 ). Officers from the DAL branch in 
Madang are promoting local cattle production once again, but as smal l 
enterprises for the supply of fattened cattle to the local abattoir. 
The unwi l l ingness of landowners to make land avai lable for the projects 
proposed in the plan appears to have been the largest impediment to its 
implementation . The large-scale agricultural project certainly foundered for this 
reason (Lamb 1 990:9 1 ) .  Local people's negative experiences with logging, the 
government, and Jant made them wary of renewing any future commitments. 
23 With 3 .5 by 3 . 5  metre spacing, the anticipated harvest volume of A. mangiu m at year eight is 
l 60m3 /ha, while yields from E. deglupta at year ten are around 1 20- 1 30 m3 /ha (Thistlethwaite 
1 995 :7). 
1 72 The Political Economy of Forest Management in Papua New Guinea 
Their dissatisfaction with revenues received from logging operations, and with 
the level of returns from lease agreements, has compounded this problem.24 
In cases where landowners have been will ing to lease land for plantations, 
the spatial ly dispersed nature of customary land ownership limits the viabil ity of 
such ventures. Much of the land offered has been in small and dispersed blocks. 
The marginal cost of establ ishing and maintaining plantations on such blocks is 
high, it is expensive to construct road access, and difficult to arrange fire 
prevention and control measures. 
The difficulty of coordinating Jant' s logging operations with the conversion 
of land to uses outlined in the plan also caused the plan to founder. Land 
allocated for cattle ranching, for example, was in areas which were not 
designated for logging until wel l  into the life of the project, and which were sti l l  
unlogged in March 1 995 . Profits, prestige, and hence local interest in  cattle have 
decl ined since the plan was adopted, and other smal ler cattle enterprises have 
come and gone over the intervening years without a great deal of success. 
Impact on Infrastructure Provision 
One of the great desires of local residents was that the project should provide 
roads into and across the Gogol Valley (Colton 1 976: 1 92). The construction and 
maintenance of roads has since become one of the most contentious aspects of 
the project. 
Much of the disagreement has revolved around differences in the allocation 
of responsibility for this work. Jant has tried to stick to the formal obligations to 
which it is committed under the terms and conditions of the Gogol Timber 
Agreement and the various timber permits. The costs of road construction have 
always been a substantial component of Jant's operating budget, and the 
company has been reluctant to spend more on road construction than is essential 
for the continuation of its operations. 
Jant' s  formal interpretation of its responsibi l ities has sometimes brought it 
into conflict with local residents and with national and provincial government 
officials. The majority of landowners were not privy to the conditions 
negotiated under the various agreements, and therefore had no knowledge of 
Jant' s  obligations relating to road construction . The matter only became an issue 
once Jant withdrew from logged areas and discontinued the maintenance of 
roads in these areas. The design of the roads and the environmental conditions 
in the area ensured that these roads deteriorated quickly without maintenance. 
Local resentment towards Jant grew as the roads crumbled and bridges were 
washed away. Many interpreted Jant 's  behaviour as a sign of i l l-wi l l ,  unaware 
of the economic motivations behind the company' s  actions. 
24 Leases normally run for thirty years or more, with a rent of 50 toea per hectare paid in five­
year increments. A 2 . 5  percent royalty has been paid to the landowners for timber subsequently 
harvested from the leased land. Landowners have generally been unwil ling to lease land under 
these terms. 
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This is not to say that Jant has not tried to accommodate local requests for 
road construction. In the early days of the project, considerable community 
pressure was brought to bear on the company to construct roads ahead of its 
logging schedule . Jant acceded to these requests, and has cautiously continued 
to do so ever s ince . Jant' s  field supervisors wi l l  redirect heavy equipment from 
logging areas to assist in c learing or maintaining nearby roads, provided the 
request does not interfere with logging operations (personal communication, Joe 
Loreakena, March 1 995) .  
Relations between Jant and the government have also been strained over the 
issue of road maintenance. Jant contributes approximately 3 5 percent of the cost 
of maintaining the paved roads between the Gogol area and Madang town . Both 
parties have voiced concern over the other' s commitment to road maintenance 
over the years. 
Jant has also been criticised for the haphazard development of its road 
network. Little strategic forethought has gone into the p lanning of roadways 
across the val ley. Roads have been bui lt without proper regard for 
environmental and ecological conditions, let alone the requirements of local 
landowners. 
In Jant' s  defence, some of these problems can be ascribed to the uncertainty 
of company operations in the Gogol area. The combination of many different 
factors make it d ifficult to develop long-range operational plans. Individual 
landowners can object to logging activities and force the company off their land 
at any time, seasonal factors can force operations to be suspended, and the 
variabil ity of forest qual ity can force changes to logging schedules. Jant has had 
to incorporate a considerable degree of flexibil ity into its planning horizons in 
order to accommodate these unanticipated operational changes . 
The project does not appear to have boosted the development of other key 
forms of publ ic infrastructure. Improvements in school and health care faci l ities 
have not kept pace with the population increase in the Gogol .  De ' Ath ( 1 980) 
reported eight aid posts and two health centres (one at Utu mission and one at 
the Jant base camp) in the Gogol Val ley. Two additional aid posts had been 
established by early 1 995,  bringing the total complement of health care faci l ities 
to twelve.25 All but two of these faci l ities are constructed out of bush materials .  
Current faci l ities are not equitably located throughout the val ley, requiring some 
vi l lagers to walk for up to two hours each way to receive medical attention 
(personal communication, Dick Bart,26 March 1 995) .  
School faci l ities have not improved. Current enrolment in community 
schools across the val ley is roughly 1 , 800 students. Many of the school 
bui ldings were constructed prior to, or early in the l ife of, the Gogol project, and 
have received decl in ing levels of maintenance over the past twenty-five years. 
25 These figures were supplied by the Health Office, Department of Madang, March 1 995.  
26 Health Officer, Department of Madang. 
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Some are now in a considerable state of disrepair. Other schools lack adequate 
housing for teaching staff (personal communication, Robert Solon,27 March 
1 995) .  
Impact on Employment 
Another antic ipated benefit of the Gogol project was the employment 
opportunities which it was expected to create - both within the val ley and 
throughout the Madang region. Initial estimates suggested the project would 
create around 1 ,500 jobs (Department of Forests Annual Report 1 97 1 /72, quoted 
in Lamb 1 990: 1 67) .  Employment seems to have peaked in the 1 980s, when the 
project employed roughly 1 ,  1 00 people. More recent statistics are difficult to 
locate, but current estimates are around 800-900.28 
In l ine with the wishes of the landowners (and subsequently the conditions 
of the Gogol Timber Agreement), Jant initial ly followed a hiring policy which 
gave preference to people from the Gogol Val ley. However, most of the jobs are 
seasonal labouring positions which require low levels of ski l l  and attract 
correspondingly low wages. Many local people found that there were few 
benefits in working for Jant, particularly given the fact that most of the seasonal 
work coincides with the period of greatest gardening and social activity. As a 
result, they only tend to join the Jant workforce on a casual basis when they have 
an immediate need for cash. Jant has consequently relaxed its employment 
pol icy, and obtains the majority of its workforce from Madang town . 
As with al l projects of this nature, the overall impact of the Gogol project 
on employment has been uneven . Jant has maintained a commitment to employ 
ski l led Papua New Guineans, and has treated these employees wel l  enough to 
cultivate a sense of commitment to the company. 
Aside from wage employment, the project has opened up two other avenues 
for Gogol landowners to obtain a cash income. The first is  the opportunity for 
contract labour in the business of tending Jant 's  plantations. The company sub­
contracts some of the establ ishment work and most of the routine maintenance 
tasks to local clans or, alternatively, district church and youth groups. 
Conditions in the Gogol Timber Agreement and timber permits stipulate that 
local v i l lagers get the first chance to bid for these contracts, although the small 
population in the valley often means that local contractors are unavai lable, and 
others must be found elsewhere . Contract rates vary depending on the task, but 
estimates suppl ied by forestry officials indicate that they normal ly work out at 
around K4-5 per person per day. 
27 Education Offficer, Department of Madang. 
28 My investigations revealed that Jant has not fi led an Annual Return with the Investment 
Promotion Authority since 1 987. Current estimates are based on conversations with managerial 
staff of Jant itself and with officers of the Madang office of the Forest Authority. Current field 
operations uti l ise three logging teams, down from the four or five teams at the peak of operations. 
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The second avenue is the establ ishment of tree farms. There are now 
bel ieved to be around 1 20 tree farmers in the Gogol Val ley, with an estimated 
2,000 hectares under private plantings. Most of the establ ished farms are smal l, 
with only two or three farms in the order of 1 5  hectares .  The majority are less 
than 1 0  hectares, with the average around 2-3 hectares .  
Tree farms are a largely unanticipated and unplanned spin-off from the 
Gogol project. They emerged early in the l ife of the project, after a few 
landowners working with Jant' s  reforestation teams began planting trees on their 
own land. These landowners establ ished smal l areas of Eucalyptus deglupta 
(Kamarere ), and Jant started logging these areas between 1 986 and 1 990. The 
farmers were surprised at how much they earned from the trees, particularly in 
comparison to their income from royalties, lease fees and stumpage rates on 
leased land. The perceived benefits of tree farming have spread rapidly, and 
demand for seedl ings has grown significantly. 
In the past, the government and Jant both suppl ied seedl ings to interested 
landowners, and provided techn ical assistance free of charge, but budgetary 
constraints have reduced the role of the National Forest Service in recent years. 
Jant has taken over the operation of the nursery at Baku station, providing the 
Forest Service with seedl ings in return for use of the faci l ity. The Forest Service 
sel ls these seedl ings for I 0 toea each, whi le Jant gives the seedl ings away. Table 
8 .8  shows the increase in Jant ' s  d istribution of seedl ings between 1 990 and 
1 994 . 
Table 8.8: Jant 's  distribution of seedl ings, 1 990- 1 994 . 
Year 
1 990 
1 99 1  
1 992 
1 993 
1 994 
TOTAL 
Number of Seedlings 
23,650 
6 1 ,430 
65,56 1  
95,950 
1 30,000 
376,59 1 
Estimated Area (ha)* 
38  
98 
1 05 
1 54 
208 
603 
* Area based on a nominal spacing of 4 x 4 metres ( 625 trees per hectare). 
Source: Information provided by Jant, March 1 995 .  
More recently, Jant has established a loan programme which provides 
interested tree farmers with smal l amounts of money to assist in the 
establ ishment of plots. Jant has also provided support for the establ ishment of 
several privately run nurseries to meet both its own needs and the local demand 
generated by tree farming. 
Although interest remains high, the long-term viabi l ity of tree farming in its 
current form is questionable. Neither Jant nor the Forest Authority has done 
much to coordinate the establ ishment of farms. As a result, farms are scattered 
across the val ley, few are contiguous, and many are either too smal l or too far 
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away from existing roads to make harvesting viable. Estimations of the cost of 
establ ishing and maintaining a five-hectare tree farm indicate that the venture is 
now marginal at best (Thistlethwaite 1 995) .29 The combination of these facts 
led Thistlethwaite ( 1 995) to conclude that Jant gives a 'very low second priority' 
to tree farming, and that current efforts are more a gesture of goodwill than a 
serious attempt to supplement commercial plantations through guided tree 
farming initiatives. 
Broader Considerations 
This sketch of some of the outcomes of the Gogol planning process serves to 
i l lustrate one critical point about this process: its impact has been very 
haphazard. This fact by itself seems to indicate some failure on the part of an 
organised and purposefully directed planning process . Yet this conclusion 
understates the influence of a number of historical ly and political ly contingent 
factors over the planning process, as wel l  as overstating the abi l ity of the process 
to accommodate and counteract the influence of these factors. 
The key point to emerge from the preceding discussion is that the overal l 
planning framework - the statutory, regulatory, and administrative instruments 
used for forest management - provides only general guidance for the 
management of forests at the project leve l .  In the Gogol case, the details of this 
task are left almost entirely to Jant, which understandably manages the resource 
with one purpose in m ind - to ensure a continuous supply of pulpwood to its 
chip mi l l  in Madang. 
The management controls that do exist for the Gogol project derive from a 
broader set of controls intended to manage forestry on a national basis .  No 
regulatory controls have ever been developed to deal specifical ly with the unique 
aspects of forestry operations in the Gogol area, most notably the clear-fell ing of 
natural forests for pulp wood. Resource control has derived from existing 
regulatory devices designed for the management of selective logging operations . 
This lack of specificity is more a victim of circumstance than a product of 
design. This framework was shaped by various events which coincided with the 
start of operations in the Gogol area, and it therefore needs to be considered in a 
historical context. 
F irstly, the uncertainties and unknown dimensions of the Gogol project 
were largely responsible for the lack of specific guidel ines controll ing the 
project 's  operations. The entire concept of clear-fell logging was unknown, 
from a regulatory point of view, at the time of the project' s  inception . 
29 Earlier estimates had suggested a return of around K 1 ,000 per hectare (see Lamb 1 990: 1 72). 
Thistlethwaite' s  estimates are based on a yield of 1 25m3 from an eight-year rotation of Acacia 
mangium (on which the majority of all plantations and tree farms in the Gogol are now based), 
while Lamb's figures are based on a yield of 200m3 from a ten to thirteen-year rotation of 
Kamarere. 
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Commercial forestry in PNG prior to the Gogol project was on a much smal ler 
scale and was based on selective harvesting techniques. In the absence of any 
projects of a simi lar nature and size, local knowledge about the issues and 
impacts associated with large-scale clear-fel l ing of lowland tropical forest was 
minimal . Government personnel also had to contend with the fact that many 
aspects of the project 's  operations could only be roughly estimated when it 
commenced. 
Wider events also had a bearing on this situation . Fol lowing its pol icy 
direction of the m id- 1 960s, the Administration was keen to establ ish large-scale 
industrial projects as the basis for economic development in the impending post­
colonial era, and the Jant proposal fit the bi l l  n icely in this regard. Whi le a lot of 
effort was directed at ensuring that the benefits of development accrued to local 
landowners, considerable effort was also directed at accommodating the 
requirements of Jant. The Administration wanted to establ ish an environment 
conducive to large-scale resource development, foreign investment, and 
(hopeful ly) economic growth. Some of its deal ings with other forestry projects 
had resulted in the erosion of its own credibi l ity, prompting several timber 
producers to shift their attention to other parts of Southeast Asia. The 
Administration became wary of scaring off the Jant project - with its 'world­
first' status - and hoped that the successful negotiation of an agreement with 
Jant would raise the visibi l ity of a flagging timber industry. 
The development of the Gogol project also took place in a period of great 
pol itical uncertainty and complexity in PNG, as the country moved rapidly 
towards self-government and eventual indepeRdence. As late as 1 968, the 
Australian Minister for Territories had been unwil l ing to set a target for even 
l im ited self-rule in PNG. By the end of the decade, however, pol itical events in 
both PNG and Australia forced the Australian government to recognise that 
colonial rule was com ing to end much faster than had been anticipated only a 
few of years earl ier .(Lamb 1 990: 1 2) .  The Administration found itself in an 
ambiguous position, and, as a resu lt, opted not to engage the trickier problems of 
the day, such as the uneven impacts of resource development and the resultant 
social unrest, or difficulties of promoting development under PNG' s  customary 
land tenure system . Instead, it left these problems to an imminently independent 
government. 
Negotiations over the Gogol project took place in th is uncertain pol itical 
and economic cl imate . The attentions of the Administration were drawn in 
several different directions as it prepared for its own withdrawal and attempted 
to balance competing national and local- level goals in an effort to maintain some 
semblance of national un ity. Not surprisingly, the Administration was never in a 
particularly strong bargaining position with Jant. After the protracted 
negotiations, and the erosion of its credibil ity in the eyes of the international 
timber industry, the Administration was looking to save face and restore lost 
credibi l ity by successful ly concluding its negotiations with Jant. 
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The ultimate consequence of thi s  s ituation was that, at the end of the 
negotiations, only vague commitments had been given on a number of critical 
aspects of the project, particularly reforestation and development controls, 
leav ing all parties with a great deal of uncertainty. The Administration had only 
a vague notion of the operational d imensions of the Jant proposal, and therefore 
did nothing to control or regulate them in any specific manner. Jant had only 
vague prescriptions for its operating environment, and was left to interpret these 
largely on its own terms.  Final ly, the landowners knew l ittle about what had 
been negotiated and what it would mean for their future way of l ife. 
Conclusion 
It is  d ifficult to know what conclusions to draw from the Gogol experience. The 
project continues to hold a unique and prototypical status amongst forestry 
operations in PNG. No other project shares the technical specifications of the 
Gogol project, nor its place in the evolution of the modern state of PNG. 
This is  not to say that specific lessons have not been learnt from the Gogol 
experiment. Jant and the forest industry have developed the technical ski l ls  to 
extract wood chips from m ixed tropical forests on a profitable basis .30 Jant and 
the government have also accumulated a pool of expertise on the task of 
managing Western-style, industrial-scale development in a non-Western 
environment. The government has been given a lesson on the administrative and 
regulatory demands of industrial-scale resource extraction, whi le vi l lagers in the 
Gogol have crashed head long into the calculating rationality of the 
internationally defined marketplace. 
From a natural resource planning perspective however, the conclusions are 
a l ittle more indeterminate . It is difficult to know whether the problems of the 
Gogol project are a result of a complete breakdown in the planning process, or 
simply the result of historical and pol itical circumstance. In real ity, the truth 
probably l ies somewhere in between. 
On the one hand, the planning framework, consisting of the various 
statutory and administrative instruments that set the context for resource use and 
management, did not appear to provide the necessary guidance for the del iberate 
and intentional management of the Gogol ' s  natural environment. No clear 
process existed to gently ease the project into the Gogol Valley, and none seems 
to have evolved since. The initiative for resource management has been left to 
the one group whose objectives are the most clear-cut - Jant. 
Unfortunately, the objectives of Jant are also the most singular in focus. It 
has always viewed the Gogol as l ittle more than a source of feedstock for its 
mi l l ing operations, and has managed the resource accordingly. As a result, 
broader management considerations and an integrated perspective on all the 
30 The continued operation of the Gogol project is perhaps the best indicator of its productivity -
better than the history recorded in its balance sheets. 
Process and Outcome in the Gago! I 79 
resources of the Gogol Val ley have always been lacking. Some efforts have 
been made to take purposeful steps to implement an envis ioned future for the 
val ley, but these have been largely ad hoe and, for the most part, have missed 
their mark. 
The invisible hand of history cannot ·be understated either. The historical 
sequence through which this project has unfolded has been shrouded in 
techn ical, administrative, and pol itical uncertainties. The consequence of this is 
that the project has not real ly developed as planned, but has simply evolved. 
Events have unfolded in a contingent manner, with important decisions taken as 
and when required by the historical and pol itical events of the moment. 
In the final analysis, therefore, the Gogol experience makes most sense ·if it 
is evaluated in l ight of both the specific character of the governance framework, 
and against the backdrop of a pol itical ly and economical ly uncertain epoch, in 
PNG's  recent h istory. The governance framework gave only a loose definition 
of the planning process, so resource planning and decision making has always 
taken place in an opportun istic environment. Under these conditions, it is not 
surprising that events of the moment can quickly overwhelm even the best laid 
plans. The history of the Gogol project suggests that they often do. 
CHAPTER 9 
CUTTING THE WOOD OF WOODLARK: 
RETROSPECTS AND PROSPECTS FOR LOGGING ON MUYUW, 
MILNE BAY PROVINCE* 
FREDERICK H. DAMON 
Introduction 
Elders from Woodlark Island in Milne Bay Province used to begin their origin 
myths by saying 'The Creator cursed us ' .  Insofar as logging is concerned, the 
island's recent experience suggests that the Creator did indeed curse the place . 
Although coconut plantations and expanding v i l lages are beginning to transform 
the i s land 's  appearance, from a distance it seems to be dominated by dense 
rainforests. But the inference that m ight be drawn from this view - an untapped 
wealth of rainforest resources for contemporary logging - is i l lusionary. The 
island does have old forests . Yet truly impressive-sized Eucalyptopsis found in 
the volcanic region are often hol low and rotting. The island 's  prized ebony 
barely makes the grade, and many of the trees meeting the 50 cm dbh I l im it 
often have l ittle of the h igh-demand black heartwood. Furthermore, the ebony is 
often found in such treacherous terrain that machinery becomes stranded or 
* Data for this chapter was gathered in the process of conducting ethnobotanical research across 
the northern islands of Milne Bay Province. This research was faci l itated by a University of 
Virginia Sesquintennial Associateship, for which thanks are given to the University 's Centre for 
Advanced Studies. The project involves col laboration with Dr Linus Digim 'rina of the 
Department of Anthropology and Socio logy at the University of Papua New Guinea, to whom 
thanks are given for stimulating discussion of some of the issues which this paper engages. 
Voucher specimens for flora collected on the island have been deposited at the Lae and Harvard 
herbaria, and tentative identifications have been received from Mr Max Kuduk (Lae) and Dr Peter 
Stevens (Harvard): thanks go to both men and their institutions for much kind advice and help. A 
portion of the research entai led organising a study of tree growth on 'Woodlark' ,  and I thank Dr 
Herman Shugart of the Department of Environmental Sciences at the University of Virginia for 
stimulating and partly funding that work, and officials of the National Forest Service in Lae, the 
Milne Bay Provincial Forest Management Committee, the Muma Local Government Counci l  
(especially its clerk, John Alison), and elders and helpers across the island for  their contributions to 
the survey process. Rolly Christiansen also strongly supported the forest growth survey and held 
many conversations with me about the status of Jogging on the island: if it is not evident from what 
follows, I should say that I have the highest regard for Mr Christiansen and for what he is trying to 
accomplish. This paper also draws on innumerable Muyuw friends, acquaintances, and 
relationships which are now some twenty years old, as well as on conversations with forestry 
officials in Alotau and the island 's two forestry project supervisors, Noel Di be la ( 1 995) and 
Samuel Alosious. 
1 Diameter at breast height. 
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wrecked in the process of extracting it. Many other trees tend to be smal l .  The 
is land 's  logger reports that 80 percent of all but one s ignificant genus -
Calophyllum - are unders ize . And even those trees that meet legal size limits 
often shrink below the minimum between the time they are cut and the time 
forestry officials take their measurements. S ince the industry is now more 
tightly regulated (especial ly for those operators who cannot afford to pay 
bribes), significant logging on the island may now be a thing of the past. 
Yet the Creator' s  curse may be a blessing in disguise. The problematic 
nature of the is land 's  trees, the island ' s  small s ize from the point of view of 
large-scale logging, and its remoteness, may make Woodlark unworthy for 
today's industrial logging standards . But these very factors might make timber 
activity on a different, smal ler scale one of a number of attractive options for the 
indigenous population ' s  future development. 
In this chapter I shall review Woodlark Is land 's  relevant ecological and 
social context, its logging history since the Second World War, as wel l  as the 
current logging situation, and I shal l then offer some guidel ines for the future 
based on current indigenous land use patterns .  In so doing, I attempt to deal 
with three of the four issues discussed by other contributors to th is part of the 
monograph. These are : 
• the main turning points in the island ' s  logging history; 
• a description of the main stakeholders, their interests, plans, motives, etc; and 
• what these people have gained and lost from the experience. 
I exclude from serious consideration here the effects of the Woodlark experience 
in the provincial and national pol icy arenas because of the l imitations of my own 
knowledge. As my description develops, I try to go from relevant ecological and 
ethnographic facts to real or potential pol icies as I have experienced them on the 
is land . By 'pol icy' here I do not just mean the formal del iberations of 
governmental or pol itical institutions; rather I include what I take to be the 
developmental presumptions of the European order that has increasingly come to 
dominate th is is land from some time in the first half of the nineteenth century. I 
offer th is material as an anthropologist with some th irty-six months on the 
is land, stretching from July 1 973 to July 1 996 . My most recent research 
concerned the culture ' s  ethnobotany, and thus I am able to draw on local 
knowledge directly relevant to the question of logging in contemporary Papua 
New Guinea (PNG), insofar as logging impinges on what is left of contemporary 
cultures. Prior to th is, I have been concerned to describe Woodlark' s  place in 
the Mi lne Bay Prov ince-wide regional system known to the anthropological 
world as the Kula Ring (see Map 9. 1 ) .2 In this regional system, which remains a 
dominant force in many people 's  l ives, social un its continual ly pass two major 
2 This region of Mi lne Bay Province is one of the classic areas in anthropology. Consequently, 
there is a massive anthropological l iterature devoted to the area. Much of the significant l iterature 
written before 1 990 is referenced in Damon ( 1 990). 
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wealth items clockwise and counter-clockwise around a circle of inter-related 
islands. As wil l  soon become apparent, a consideration of the island' s  logging 
resources and potential should take account of the local culture ' s  place in this 
larger social setting. 
Map 9.1 :  The Kula Ring. 
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The Ecological and Social Contexts of 'Woodlark' Island 
The island' s  common European name, Woodlark, dates from the late 1 830s, 
while its current official (government) name, Muma, follows from a Trobriand 
pronunciation, and its real, indigenous name is Muyuw. In this paper I employ 
the indigenous name. The oldest European centre, now the centre for logging 
and mining activities, remains near Kulumadau Mountain in the centre of the 
island. The present administrative centre, together with an airstrip dating from 
the Second World War, is at Guasopa in the southeastern corner (see Map 9.2).3 
3 I thank Auridiam Consol idated NL for permission to reproduce Map 9.2, which is taken from 
the Inception Report on the Woodlark Gold Project Environmental Plan, prepared by 
Environmental Management and Monitoring Ltd in August 1 996. 
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Located in the far northeast corner of Milne Bay Province, Muyuw is a 
mixed classic coral atoll ,  one of a number of islands on what geologists cal l the 
Woodlark Rise, a geological formation perhaps stretching from below the New 
Georgia Group in the Solomon Islands to the Huon Gulf. Gawa, K weywata, 
Iwa, Kitava, and the Trobriand Islands are the other major inhabited islands on 
this formation. Although they may all be the result of volcanism, Muyuw is the 
highest of the group and the only one with evident igneous and basaltic 
foundations. It has a mountainous core with two named ranges, perhaps formed 
by a single eroded caldera, running on a northeast to southwest angle in the 
island 's  centre .4 The h ighest peak, Tabakuiy, is some 300 metres high . Several 
individual mountains - Kabat, Kulumadau and Ginaua - appear to be volcanic 
cones, although that may not be l iterally true. 
The island rests asymmetrical ly around its volcanic base. There are several 
coral platforms which apparently rise to the north while they sink to the south, 
creating a landmass rectangular in shape, some sixty-five kilometres long and 
thirty ki lometres wide at its centre . Relatively steep rises or sheer cliffs 
dominate the northern side of the island whi le much of the southern side is 
swampy. The outer edge of the coral platform extends for a kilometre (at the 
eastern end) or much further (at the western end) from the southern shoreline, 
providing lagoons with sign ificant marine resources for the local population, and 
of indeterminate value for a national or international market. 
The island's flora varies in accordance with geological and ecological 
conditions. One set of trees is found on the l imestone platforms that dominate 
the eastern, northern and western portions of the is land. A different set is found 
on the volcanic south-central part. Th is difference probably has more to do with 
soil variation than elevation . The 'mountainous' areas also tend to be swampier 
and far more difficult to traverse than the limestone dominated areas which 
readi ly soak up the rains (up to 4000 mm per annum). The island is a difficult 
environment - for Western life forms at least. 
Nasikwabw (or Alcester Is land), which l ies some fo.1y-five ki lometres 
south of Muyuw' s volcanic centre, is a raised portion of the southern reef 
system, most of which is under water. In the traditional economic system, 
Nasikwabw provides a base for a sail ing community which facil itates 
communication between Muyuw and the island cultures to the south . Because of 
its sai l ing obl igations, Nasikwabw's  population depends on Muyuw for much of 
its food, and with the exception of some nut- and fruit-bearing trees, there is 
l ittle exploitation of this island' s  landscape. In consequence, the island supports 
many ebony trees, a genus which seems to need undisturbed environments in 
order to thrive. 
4 Recent geological exploration work by mining companies has created sufficient new data to 
rework ' Woodlark's '  geology. However, the most useful physical descriptions of the island 
remain those of Oil ier ( 1 975) and Oi l ier and Pain ( 1 978). 
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The flora of al l islands resting on the Woodlark Rise is clearly the result of 
a complex interaction between each is land' s  geological setting and the social 
systems created through human occupation of the region, which began at least 
2,000 years ago, and the patterns here remain part of people ' s  impl icit or expl icit 
knowledge of their environment - in other words part of their culture.5 The 
design from Gawa, just west of Muyuw, to the Trobriands is obvious and easy to 
define. Comparatively h igh forest growth rings each island, especially on the 
steeper sides. On Gawa, Kweywata, Iwa and Kitava, several tiers lead to an 
oval-shaped concav ity entirely dominated by gardens and early successional 
forest growth monitored and significantly determined by the local inhabitants. 
The tiers are al l gardened or planted with fruit- or nut-bearing trees, whereas the 
shorel ines or steeper rises have higher forests monopol ised by l ight-demanding 
trees which are also sign ificant for local populations. Many species are also of 
commercial significance. Included are Pometia pinnata, Intsia bijuga, several 
Calophyllum species, including the common beach Calophyl lum (C. 
inophyllum L.), and at least in some areas, Endospermum medulosum and 
Palaquium. 
There is multifaceted evidence suggesting that these floral environments are 
intentionally (or unintentional ly) determ ined by the wel l-formed regional social 
system . First, most islanders bel ieve their garden soi ls are reproduced by one 
commonly found tree - Rhus taitensis - which has simi lar names (gweda/gwed) 
in the local languages.6 Th is tree is not found in natural forest gaps, on ly in 
regions sign ificantly transformed by roads or gardens.7 Whi le some is lands and 
vi l lages allow it to sprout at wil l ,  others transplant seedl ings next to root crops or 
alongside young nut or fruit trees. 
Second, different islands or regions were planted with, or known for, trees 
of regional sign ificance. lwa grows a species of Terminalia (T. catappa, 
known locally as saido) which is thought to be unique in the whole province, and 
whose soft-shel led nuts are traded for the products of other is lands. Gawa and 
Kweywata are known for producing the largest class of outrigger canoe, a craft 
5 Aspects of this system have been described in the work by Hide et al . ( 1 994). I particularly 
thank Dr Michael Bourke for numerous exchanges concerning aspects of the systems partly 
described in this work. I 
6 Other trees also play this role for people in more localised areas, e.g. several Dysoxylum 
species in southeastern Muyuw. 
7 'Woodlark Island' is famou_s- international ly, and denoted as an environment worth protecting 
for biodiversity purposes, because of a unique species of cuscus (Phalanger lul lulae). By the mid­
I 980s, timber cutting and gold exploration activities had developed to the point of appearing to 
threaten this animal 's natural environment. Partly as a consequence, biologists from Oxford 
University ( 1 987) organised two research trips to investigate the species. Although it had been 
presumed that this animal would tend to be found in the island's  least inhabited zone, the south­
central mountainous region, it appears to be more common around vil lages. The genus Phalanger 
is known to be an indiscriminate forager, but Muyuw people say one of its main foods is the nectar 
from the Rh us taitensis and a vine frequently seen in the first five to ten years of garden fallows. I 
thank one of the Oxford researchers, Dr Chris Norris, for discussing some of the relevant issues. 
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that p l ies the whole eastern half of the province, from a species of Calophyl lum 
abundant on both islands (and also on the smal ler and no longer inhabited 
Dugumenu). This tree is also one of the two real ly s ignificant commercial 
Calophyl lum species on Muyuw, and I shal l discuss it again later in thi s  chapter. 
Two other Calophyl lum species found most commonly in Muyuw' s volcanic 
region furnish the best masts for this same type of canoe, whi le several hectares 
of north-central Muyuw are known as the only rel iable source of a leguminous 
tree used to fashion its outriggers . 8 A species of pandanus found just east of the 
volcanic centre is (or rather has been unti l recently) a major source of leaves for 
the traditional sai l .  Budibud (or the Laughlan Islands), south east of Muyuw, was 
and remains almost entirely planted with coconuts, and thus serves as a sort of 
coconut bank for Muyuw and other nearby is lands. Although both maturing and 
sapling ebony trees can be found in many inaccessible Muyuw locations, I 
suspect that the ebony trees of Nasikwabw were del iberately placed on that 
island as an economic resource when ebony sapl ings were employed for making 
traditional weapons (such as spears for hunting larger sea animals such as 
turtles) and some tools .  In any case, such examples could be multiplied. 
F inally, most islands or island sectors are identified with a particular 
species of tree which is used locally as a source of firewood in ' ritual ' and l ife­
cycle contexts, and thus incorporated into the network of vital labour obligations 
between inter-married groups. Much of eastern Muyuw, for example, identifies 
with a tree which is only found in young fallow gardens, whi le north-central 
Muyuw identities with a Syzygium species found in middle-aged fal lows, and 
western Muyuw is l inked to an old-fallow species. These trees symbolise the 
age of the garden fallows which these groups typically cut - young, m iddle, and 
old respectively. At the same time, south-central Muyuw is identified with a tree 
which is very hard and difficult to cut, symbolising the traditional indifference to 
gardening which accompanied that area' s  special isation in stone-tool 
manufacture. Boagis, a sai l ing vi l lage at the southwestern extremity of the 
landmass, uses another tree that only grows near the sea, the wood from which is 
used as a critical component in the technology that ties masts to the keels of the 
largest class of outrigger canoe. Muyuw (and Gawa) people identify Gawa's 
tree as one that grows only along the beach - a hard and heavy species, whose 
cutting, splitting, and carrying for firewood represent the difficulties posed for, 
and transformations required of, a sea-based society perched on top of a column 
jutting 1 50 metres above the sea, since the bundled firewood has to be carried up 
the island 's  two sets of steep cl iffs to the inhabited areas .9 lwa is identified with 
a nut tree planted by its inhabitants, which is emblematic of its anthropogenic 
landscape. Dawson Is land, one of the islands to the south of Muyuw, is 
8 People from other islands sail to the vi l lage of Kaulay, which l ies closest to this area, in order to 
refit their craft. 
9 Although she was unaware of the use of this tree, Munn 's  ( 1 977) analysis of the symbolism of 
fabrication entailed in the production of Gawa's  famous canoes - canoes designed to ply the whole 
eastern half of Mi lne Bay Province - shows how this specific practice is part of a system of 
transformations. 
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identified with Intsia bij uga. Knowledge of these tree usages thus constitutes a 
kind of 'totemic'  communication system (see Levi-Strauss 1 966). In reference 
to these trees and their d istinctive usages, people locate themselves and others in 
a set of complementary roles and places in what i s  virtually a province-wide 
regional system . 
Two conc lusions may be drawn from the material presented up to th is point. 
First, the data suggests that th is region is s imi lar to the environments which 
recent ecologically sensitive observers (for example, . Posey 1 985;  Balee 1 989) 
have begun to describe in  the Amazonian region of South America. Such 
env ironments are parts of constructed social systems, not natural entities to 
wh ich people adapt on the basi s  of what Westerners might regard as their 
' l imited ' level of technological development. 1 0  Second, it follows that these 
areas are, from the indigenous point of view, 'developed ' .  So, when outsiders 
enter this area presum ing that someth ing is lacking or that development is  
needed, they are creating an impl icit or expl icit misunderstanding between their 
own views and those of the inhabitants educated in th is region. 1 1  
Muyuw may therefore look l ike an island dominated by dense rainforests, 
but it is really part of a larger ecological and social region which is the subject of 
local knowledge, classification and use, and which is probably made to be the 
way it is. Th is point, however, raises a particular problem in the case of Muyuw 
because it looks so different from other islands to the west. Those islands are al l  
densely populated, just fringed by ' rainforest ' .  Except for the areas immediately 
surrounding the current distribution of v i l lages, 12 the interior of Muyuw, unl ike 
the centres of the v\/estern i s lands, is not now a vast plane of garden land, but is  
covered by such rainforests . Why? Th is is  not just an interesting academic 
question which may be answered by archaeological research; it also has some 
practical sign ificance because of the distribution of many of the most 
commercially significant trees found on the is land.  I shal l try to explain .  
When compared to the popu lation of some 20,000 in the Trobriand Is lands, 
and the equal ly dense if not denser popu lation distributions on the small is lands 
from Kitava to Gawa, Muyuw' s  current population of under 3 ,000 is an enigma. 
It is known that the i sland suffered a major demographic collapse after the 
earl iest colonial encounters of the 1 840s, reaching a low point of some 800-900 
around 1 9 1 5 .  But the population estimates at the beginning of this decl ine are 
equally puzzl ing - several thousand certain ly, but not as many as 1 0,000 or 
20,000. Be that as it may, scattered artifacts found throughout much of the 
J O The Woodlark Cuscus (Phalanger lul lu lae), which feeds off the tree Rhus taitensis, may be 
part of the island 's  human-created environment. According to Chris Norris (personal 
communication, October 1 995), ' the current evidence suggests that cuscuses in general, and 
Phalanger orientalis in particular, tend to get moved around by human agency in this region ' .  
1 1 ' Educated i n  this region' is, o f  course, a qual ification which requires further discussion, since 
educational contexts are changing. 
1 2  Along the eastern, southeastern, and southwestern shorelines, the north-central part of  the 
island, and several vi l lage locations on its western appendage, known as Mwadau Island. 
1 88 The Political Economy of Forest Management in Papua New Guinea 
uninhabited part of the i sland do suggest a different population distribution or 
size in the past, and this  may serve to explain the incidence of two of the more 
s ignificant commercial trees growing on the island, which are two out of some 
six Calophyl lum species . The identification of these trees is not certain . One 
appears to be simi lar or identical to Calophyllum peekelii L. , the other s imilar 
or identical to Calophyllum leleanii P.F.  Stevens. 1 3 Across the island they are 
known as apul and kausilay/kosilay respectively. The latter, kausilay, is the 
most s ignificant because it is the main tree used to fashion outrigger keels .  Both 
trees are gregarious; they normal ly occur in groves, and isolated trees are rarely 
encountered. The former species, apul, tends to be found on wetter ground that 
fringes swamps, especially in the southeastern third of the island. 1 4 By contrast, 
kausilay is found on drier ground defined by upl ifted l imestone platforms.  A 
most important fact about both trees is that in the high (30-40 metre) forest, 
where mature trees are found, one may see thousands of seeds and hundreds of 
sprouted seedl ings but no sapl ings or middle-sized trees. I have only found 
smal l to midd le-sized apul on the fringes of meadows in the lowland expanses 
dotting the is land ' s  volcanic upl ifts. These meadows are named and apparently 
quite stable. If in some sense natural, they are also regularly burned after major 
dry periods as people traipse through them hunting wild pigs. Away from these 
meadows, to the east of the i sland ' s  mountain ranges, mature apul are common, 
l 3 These tentative identifications are courtesy of Dr Peter F. Stevens, who is a Malesian 
systematist, Curator of the Harvard University Herbaria, and the expert on Calophyl lum in Papua 
New Guinea. For Mr Rolly Christiansen, the owner of the island's logging company, Milne Bay 
Logging, there is a 'true' Calophyl lum, plus the 'beach ' Calophyl lum and some others. His 'true ' 
species is the one which Stevens suggests is Calop hyllu m peekelii L.,  and he does not distinguish 
it from Calophyl lum leleani i .  Although the former tends to grow somewhat larger than the latter, 
they are the only two trees consistently found and cut at about the 50 cm dbh minimum size for 
export logs. Not all Muyuw peop le clearly distinguish the various types of Calophyl lum; only 
those who are engaged in their various and complex uses for the manufacture of outrigger craft. 
Kausilay (Calophyl lum leleanii)  is the one used for outrigger canoes, and less knowledgeable 
people regard it as the prototype for the whole group (which is not named as such, but is clearly 
recognised as a group). Although my generalisations draw on empirical support from across the 
island, my understanding of Calophyl lum derives from extensive interviews and observations with 
people in southeastern Muyuw. Their experience with the genus can only be described as 
'studied' .  It is impossible to deal with al l of the complexity in the local understanding or ecology 
of the trees here. Nevertheless, these are vital issues for organising any commercial logging on the 
island. I am less certain of the facts with other commercial trees, yet many are found in 
environments similar to these two Calophyl lum species. This is true of Endospermum 
medulosum, Pometia pinnata (undoubtedly a tree of a later successional stage than 
Calophyl lum), perhaps several of the commercially significant Stercu lia, Dysoxylum, and one 
Aglaia species. The Sterculia and Dysoxylum are cut, but are not as significant commercially as 
the others. When found inland, Intsia bij uga grows near young Calophyllu m leleani i  P.F. 
Stevens. 
1 4 Another Calophyl lum species is found in the swamps. Although it has also been cut for 
timber, it does not reach the sizes of the other two and, unl ike all the others, it is a major food 
source for another of the island 's  resources, wild p igs. For the sake of future maintenance of the 
Muyuw culture and resource base, this tree (probably Calophyl lum vexans) should not be 
exploited commercially. 
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but they are also beginning to rot, die, and fal l .  Once a guide casual ly mentioned 
to me that new ones would grow up in the gaps created by fallen older ones, but 
I saw no evidence of this, and I therefore wonder what conditions al lowed them 
to grow in the first place - presumably a significant deforestation. 
Like the apul, smal ler kausilay trees are not found in the high forest, though 
the kausilay represents a somewhat different case because large trees are not just 
found in drier areas, but quite often on land which is unusually rocky. But more 
than this, sapl ings and middle-s ized trees are only located on the edges of garden 
areas that have not been cut because the ground is so fi l led with coral l imestone 
that it cannot be worked. Muyuw people know this, of course, and have a 
special name for this kind of ' land' - sasek. The avoidance of such land creates 
patchy garden regions, ' is lands' 1 5 of higher trees surrounded by gardens, or a 
much lower and distinctively different early-succession forest. In eastern 
Muyuw these patches tend to be smal l ,  with gardens forming around them. In 
north-central and western Muyuw, they tend to be long, as if the islands were 
ridge tops, with the gardens in val leys. In any case, people know that their 
intentional use of the landscape creates the conditions which this tree needs in 
order to reproduce in significant numbers . 
My use of the term 'patch ' to translate the concept of ' is land ' is intentional . 
I draw from Winterhalder' s ( 1 994) attempt to make the ecological notion of a 
'patch ' - mean ing a spatially and temporally heterogeneous area - useful for 
anthropological analysis .  Although they are not part of his purpose, 
Winterhalder cannot avoid the pol icy impl ications of this notion : 
. . .  it would be better to manage for the recurrence of desirable states 
than constantly try to force an ecosystem to maintain a particular 
state . . .  [As for policy recommendations,] it is enough to note here that 
current approaches to policy almost universally adopt an equil ibrium 
view:  thus much environmental and developmental pol icy attempts to 
suppress temporal variation (e.g. fire control), homogenize spatial 
heterogeneity (monocrop tree planting), and introduce connectedness 
(industrial-scale timber harvesting), all of which promote constancy 
and stability at the expense of variability and resil ience . . .  
(Winterhalder 1 994 :39-40). 
Milne Bay Logging has created three monocrop tree plantations in its pursuit of 
systematic forestry. 1 6 My own argument would be that Winterhalder' s 
1 5 The vernacular word is tasim, which is derived from the word for 'cut' or ' chop ' and the word 
for ' island ' .  The concept is clearly motivated, and part of a convoluted indigenous system whose 
outlines may be suggested by noting that gardens are designed to represent all of the major social 
categories in the culture. Gardens are also understood to be boats, in part weaving their ways 
among the ' islands' .  Aspects of the relevant system are discussed in Chapter 5 of Damon ( 1 990). 
1 6 Two of these are planted with species of Planchonella and Calophyllum,  and may make 
reasonable progress because both trees seem to be require large amounts of l ight and usually only 
grow on the edges of higher forest. Although gregarious, they cannot be observed (on Muyuw at 
least) in the natural state in anything l ike the high concentration of the plantations. The third 
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' patchiness ' is an intentional feature of Muyuw society, thought, and 
environment - as wel l  as the larger system in which they are ensconced. This  
social system creates and organises itself around heterogeneity. 
For the indigenous system of knowledge, the patches of older growth 
amidst early succession regrowth, created by the selective use of land, are 
important because the way in which the kausilay trees bend from shade to l ight 
creates the necessary curvature of an outrigger keel, and local people study th is 
development over the years . These facts point to the conclusion that human 
action created the conditions for at least two, and perhaps more, of the island' s  
most important commercial timbers . It therefore seems very l ikely that 
commercial logging has been exploiting a resource prev iously created by 
humans. Among other things, this means that random surveys of the island ' s  
'commercial timber potential ' may be  very misleading. One survey l ine 
designed to gauge this potential in southeast Muyuw fol lowed along a virtual 
corridor of kausilay, which I would guess to be the l im it of gardening when the 
island' s  population was larger at some time in the nineteenth century, and was 
then used to project species numbers over almost 1 5  percent of the is land . As a 
result, the southeastern third of the is land is supposed to contain, as various 
people told me, a mi l l ion cubic metres of timber. Th is may be a radical 
overstatement, because kausilay are rare or non-existent away from the route of 
the survey l ine. This  s ituation does not appear to be unique to Muyuw. 1 7 
The History of Logging 
'European' whal ing ships probably ignored the island in the 1 820s, when they 
first entered its waters. However, from an unsuccessful episode of Christian 
miss ionisation in the late 1 840s down to the present day, the European order has 
looked at 'Woodlark' only to think that there must be souls or sales into which it 
can convert the i sland ' s  perceived 'raw materials ' .  In the 1 880s, copra from the 
Budibud coconut stands was the first botan ical product to be commoditised . 
Thereafter, Europeans and some Muyuw people gradual ly started coconut 
plantations along the south eastern, south western, and western sides of the i sland. 
With one or two exceptions, most of these plantations have now reverted to 
forest. But copra production, even fol lowing the Coconut Ordinances effected 
in the 1 920s and the re-emergence of indigenous planting after 1 950, has always 
taken a back seat to the development of the island ' s  mineral resources .  Gold 
plantation contains the island 's  species of ebony - a tree that appears to need mature forest cover to 
reach maturity itself. 
1 7  Jean Kennedy (personal communication; Kennedy et al. 1 99 1 : 1 1 6) reports a similar situation 
in Manus. Nearly 'pure stands ' of mature Calophyllum euryphyllum are found, often over old 
vil lage sites. During treks through the eastern, southeastern, and far western sectors of Muyuw, I 
got to the point where, if I came across kausilay, I would start looking for, and then quickly find, 
either evidence of dense coral outcroppings unsuitable for gardening, or potsherd or shel l fish 
evidence of human occupation. My discussion of these findings with Ral ly Christiansen prompted 
him to recollect his own experience of cutting the trees and concluding that these were ' regrowth' 
trees. Expanding garden areas in southeastern Muyuw are now downing dozens of large kausilay. 
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was discovered on the island i n  1 895 ,  creating an instant gold rush, several 
mining operations, a European centre located near Kulumadau Mountain (see 
Nelson 1 976), and a legacy which is now prompting a fresh attempt to mine the 
island 's  certain but probably smal l deposits. Europeans left when the Pacific 
War began, but 'Woodlark' and the Trobriands were the first islands which 
MacArthur invaded in 1 943 on h is  way to the Phi l ippines, though there had been 
no Japanese occupation of e ither place. Some 1 0,000 Americans camped on 
Muyuw for a few months - an episode which accounts for the island' s  only 
airstrip (originally used by fighter aircraft supporting the attacks on Rabaul) and 
the roads in the southeastern corner. 
After the war, as the colon ial frontier moved to new parts of the Territory, 
only one European fami ly returned with any sustained interest and success. This 
was the fami ly of Mr R.C. Neate, h is wife, and their one son, Don Neate. It was 
Don who, with h is  own wife and six chi ldren, eventual ly cast off his father' s  
fantasies of  m ineral wealth and establ ished a company cal led Kulumadau 
Enterprises. The Neates and their company presented a model of European 
activity for Muyuw people, whose evaluations have shifted over the years. 1 8  In 
a general sense, the Neates created the l inks that moved 'Woodlark' from its 
n ineteenth century moorings to whatever the twenty-first century wi l l  bring. 
More concretely, Don Neate and his wife gathered island resources - marine 
resources, crocod i le skins, copra - in a manner typical of other smal l European 
outposts of the era; created three trade stores; provided transportation, materials, 
and business support for companies engaged in the never-ending search for 
minerals (mostly copper and gold); organised local carving of ebony craft 
objects for an expanding national and international market; 1 9 started cutting and 
exporting the ebony trees themselves; establ ished a modest but increasingly 
efficient lumber mi l l  which, in  its best years ( 1 975-77), cut some 500,000 
superfeet of lumber annual ly; and last, but by no means least, when they left the 
island in 1 978, they created an indigenous corporation cal led Woodlark Island 
Development Corporation (WIDC0).20 I shal l  return to the Neates' social 
legacy later. 
1 8 Muyuw people are intense and critical observers of what they see and imagine, and the Neates 
and Rol ly Christiansen are very different people. Muyuw who were bitterly critical of the Neates 
in 1 982 were using their activities as models of correct behaviour in 1 996, at the expense of MBL, 
for which many people said they would no longer work. There is no space to discuss this issue 
here. However, as may be typical of situations l ike that of Muyuw, the Europeans who have 
marked the island have been so few, and their engagement so intense, that their 'personalities' and 
styles of business operation have become active forces in indigenous models of appropriate or 
inappropriate action. 
1 9 Among all but the island's  traditional carvers, who used to reside along an uplifted ridge in the 
southeastern sector of the island. 
20 WIDCO is currently engaged in an attempt to sort out landownership disputes, and remains at 
the centre of all non-traditional activities except those of the churches, whose influence is growing 
at a rapid rate. 
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The Neates '  home, sawmi l l ,  and lumbering activities were al l  located in or 
around Kulumadau, the 'volcanic cone' and old European residential and mining 
centre . In the early 1 970s, they had a truck, a smal l bul ldozer, several smal l 
d iesel-powered boats, and a barge for moving the bulldozer. Some of the trees 
they cut down were dragged to their m i l l  or to nearby ' roads' by teams of 
vi l lagers, usually from Dikwayas (or ' Dicoyas' )  and Kaulay (or 'Kauray' )  
v i l lages. As a result, the people of these two vi l lages, and now the entire 
population resident on the north-central and south-central coasts, presume that 
they can partly or completely sustain themselves by periodic or regular 
employment in a European extraction sector.2 1 The Neates mostly cut 
Calophyllum, an undetermined species of Syzygium ( 'watergum' ),22 Pometia 
pinnata ( ' taun ' ), Manilikara, and Endospermum medulosum ( ' basswood') .  
The boats that suppl ied their needs and carried away their exports were coastal 
trawlers that could rarely go further than Lae, or perhaps Rabaul .  
Communication with the outside world was by  short-wave radio and, from some 
time in the 1 960s, a fortnightly government charter which landed unpredictably 
on the airstrip at Guasopa, at a distance which sometimes required one or two 
days to be spent in further transportation on one of the Neates' diesel boats . By 
these means, and on a very smal l scale, the is land ' s  ebony gradual ly became 
known to the rest of the world.  But for their t ime, which came at the end of 
Australia' s overt control of PNG, the Neates had a relatively large operation. 
This  was dwarfed by the next real chapter in the island ' s  logging h istory. 
After a couple of fitful years of trying to keep the Neates' operation going, 
WIDCO made arrangements with Mi lne Bay Logging Company (MBL) to cut 
the i sland 's  t imber. MBL was created by another Australian, Rol ly Christiansen, 
who had worked in the country - mostly in New Britain - as a logger since the 
late 1 960s. MBL came to the i sland in 1 980 and started cutting in 1 982. Within 
its first s ix months of operation it cut 1 0,000 trees and sustained an annual cut of . 3 about 50,000 m through to 1 99 1 .  
MBL changed the i sland ' s  infrastructure and many islanders ' expectations. 
When the Neates left the island in 1 978, there were probably less than 20 
k i lometres of passable roads, of which a significant proportion in the 
southeastern corner were a legacy of the Second World War. By 1 983, a road 
was cut from Kulumadau to Guasopa, wh ile another circled the western half of 
the i sland (see Map 9 .2). By 1 988, there were some 200 k i lometres of roads, 
and there was a growing expectation that vi l lages situated along these roads 
should have several of their own vehicles, usually purchased from royalties 
rather than wages .23 By the m id- l 990s, in the central part of the i sland, people 
2 1 Perhaps not paradoxical ly, plans and actions for indigenous engagement in the European sector 
are, in 1 996, better established elsewhere on the island. 
22 I know of five species on the island. 
23 These roads have been a source of continual conflict between MBL, the local population, and 
the provincial and national governments. As part of the conditions attached to its presence on the 
island, MBL has been obl iged to construct various roads at its own expense. The road that 
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expected to ride on these veh icles and on MBL trucks from one vi l lage to 
another for sporting contests, especial ly soccer matches, held every Saturday. 
By 1 988, MBL had as many as ten bul ldozers, four logging skids, five fork l ifts, 
two large dump trucks, road graders, and so forth . This was a scale of activity 
previously unseen by any of the i sland ' s  younger generation, and otherwise only 
reminiscent of the Second World War. 
The Neates '  docking and loading area had been located at the mouth of a 
creek in the northeast corner of what i s  known as Kalopwan (or 'Kwaipain ' )  
Bay. For the new scale of  activities a much deeper wharf, loading area, 
machinery repair area, and a v i l lage (and graveyard) for the workers' (some 
imported from Rabaul) were created close to Boiboi, at the mouth of the bay. 
The arrival of two or three freighters per month was not unusual up to 1 99 1 ,  
though these vessels  were not all fi l led with is land timbers . MBL commonly 
had an arrangement to cut and del iver some I ,OOO m3 of Endospermum 
medulosum ( ' basswood ' )  each month. Most of the raw logs were sent to East 
Asian markets. By the m id- 1 990s, MBL had a sate l l ite phone, a fax machine, 
and had created a global interest in the i sland' s  ebony. In 1 995 and 1 996, up to 
1 00 m3 of ebony was being shipped to Japan to make ceremonial posts ins ide 
Japanese houses. MBL's  owner spoke with Austral ian, German, Papua New 
Guinean, and United States businessmen about the wood. In 1 996, it was no 
surprise that a planeload of Saudi Arabians swooped down to examine the ebony 
stands. 
MBL's near decade of cutting were the first boom years for industrial 
logging in PNG. I have the impression that the company did what it wanted in 
the early years. But by the late 1 980s and early 1 990s, new rules were beginning 
to create difficulties. In m id- 1 990, the is land was examined by members of a 
governmental Task Force on Environmental Planning in Priority Forest Areas, 
whose brief was to look for possible s ites for the combination of nature 
conservation and sustainable development (see F i ler 1 99 1  b, Young 1 99 1  ) .24 In 
1 995 and 1 996, local forestry officials told me of the enormous waste which they 
encircles the western half of the island also faci l itated a good deal of lumbering activity, but the 
required road to Guasopa, completed by 1 983, did not have the same effect, and now remains a 
major expense for the company, especially with logging revenues next to non-existent. Eastern 
Muyuw people anxiously await another road, which is supposed to traverse the northeastern 
shoreline to the eastern side of the island, and complain about Christiansen favouring people in the 
centre who take their roads for granted. Christiansen now believes that he is performing duties that 
are more properly those of the government, and counts the various taxes and royalties that he and 
WIDCO pay against the services the island does not receive. Furthermore, there is no doubt that 
the roads which run through the island's mountainous terrain have transcended MBL's  engineering 
capacities. 
24 From my own point of view, it is unfortunate that the island was not selected for further 
intervention along these l ines, though the visit of the Task Force may sti ll have prompted 
Christiansen to re-evaluate his own conception of sustainable development. 
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now had under control .25 The company lost its permit to cut after 1 99 1 ,  just 
when tropical timber prices rose to unusual heights, and it was only renewed for 
a year from about May 1 995 to May 1 996, and this on land which had already 
been cut once. In the past, roads could be cut in any direction that seemed 
convenient, and any tree that could be sold could be cut down, so many trees had 
to be sold with the designation of ' smal l '  or ' super-smal l ' .  But now roads had to 
be carefully monitored, and all trees marked before cutting and carefully 
measured to ensure sufficient size .  Sample hectares, laid out ahead of time, 
were to be evaluated for damage after they were cut. MBL' s  owner saw al l this 
as being too restrictive for an operation of his size, yet his operation was too 
small to afford the cost of paying bribes. The two young forestry officials, 
whom I got to know in 1 995 and 1 996, felt that they were introducing a badly 
needed system of control, yet they became bored because there was so l ittle to 
do. Rol ly Christiansen refused to cut any new wood in the area for which he was 
granted a permit, partly because there was so l ittle wood to be cut, but partly also 
because of his ebony work and engagement in support activities for Auridiam 
Consolidated NL, the Australian gold mining company prospecting on the 
island. Christiansen had hired his own planner who, l ike the two forestry 
officials, was a young man from Milne Bay Province who had been educated in 
Lae, and whose own surveys led him to conclude that there was very l ittle left 
which could sustain a profitable timber operation. Many hectares were 
producing less than 1 5  m3, less than 50  percent of norms elsewhere in the 
country,26 and far less than in other tropical regions . 
In 1 982, MBL officials told me they had estimated there were twenty years' 
worth of timber left on the island. By 1 99 1 ,  after he had been cutting nearly 
50,000 m3 a year, Christiansen told me that this rate could no longer be 
sustained. Al l  the cutting to that time had been on the western half of the island. 
The company hoped to gain permission to cut the eastern half, but that was not 
forthcoming. Even if it had been, Christiansen now estimated that the island 
could only sustain a maximum cut of 28,000 m3 a year. Remarkably up to date 
on the state of the market and political dialogues swirl ing around tropical 
forests, Christiansen assumed that shortly nobody would be able to sel l any 
tropical products unless they could prove they were ' green ' .  And he wanted to 
become that. He hoped 6-8,000 m3 out of the annual cut of 28,000 m3 would be 
earmarked for lumber production by a small mi l l  which he had purchased, and 
by others which he hoped to persuade the local vi l lagers to purchase on their 
own account. At the same time, he figured ebony cutting would have to decl ine 
to 20 m3 a year, rather than the rate of up to 1 00 m3 in 1 995-96, and the only 
way to make this profitable would be to have the ebony turned into some kind of 
25 This is what I was told, but I do not have the abi l ity to judge the qual ity of MBL ' s  operations 
myself. In 1 996, I surveyed two hectares which had been cut in the 1 980s, and found that they 
were fi l led with young to middle-sized commercial ly significant trees, not unl ike those that had 
been harvested. The regrowth was 'natural ' and had not been organised by MBL. 
26 Harvest rates in West New Britain, which currently accounts for roughly half of PNG's  total 
log exports, average 25-30 m3 (personal communication, Michael Bourke). 
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finished product on the i sland.  Although, at the time of writing, it seems that 
governmental concerns with environmental controls over logging have 
foreclosed any future action on his part, Christiansen ' s  creative and ambitious 
view of the future addresses the i sland ' s  current situation rather than its history. 
The Current Situation 
MBL's owner, Ral ly Christiansen, has also become the manager of WIDCO, the 
indigenous development corporation which the Neates establ ished in 1 978.  
Being married to a Muyuw woman, i t  also turns out that he is a brother- in- law to 
many of its officers .27 Deeply embedded in the vagaries of local culture, in a 
way that almost inverts the distanced colonial manner of the Neates, he actively 
participates in many social processes. Closely tied to, and now a long-term 
observer of, the local social scene, he told me that he th inks the biggest threat to 
the future of logging on the i sland now is the way in which the islanders are 
cutting down the forests for gardening purposes. 
He may be correct, for a number of interrelated reasons. New patterns are 
developing which wil l  have serious long-term consequences for the island ' s  
environment and whatever social system the current trajectories generate. 
Clearly one factor is a rapidly increasing population, whose impact has several 
dimensions. F irst, although Muyuw' s  own population is a long way from 
chal lenging the island ' s  resource base, it has exceeded 2,000 and is now pushing 
towards 3 ,000.28 By contrast, the islands to the west are genuinely crowded. 
There is a continuing exodus of people from the Trobriands, Kitava, and lwa, 
and although government officials do not bel ieve their excess population can just 
shift across to Muyuw, as they did in the early 1 980s, there is sti l l  a smal l but 
steady stream of people moving from west to east. 
27 WIDCO has a number of officers, a board of directors drawn from across the island, and a 
mass of shareholders comprising all those people resident in the Murua Local Government Council 
(LGC) area who have bought shares for a kina each. Although WIDCO's  officers think things are 
going very well, few if any of the directors agree with them, and there is a near-total breakdown in 
communication between the manager and the officers, on the one side, and the board and most 
islanders on the other. Christiansen is an effective operator in his own way, but is playing too 
many roles not to become trapped by their contradictory effects. He bankrolled his father-in-law's  
partic ipation in the inter-island exchange system without knowing i t ;  he  has helped many other 
people and keeps 'open house' to an extent which shocks government officials (both national and 
expatriate); and he has doled out money to help pay school fees in a manner not untypical of a 
traditional Muyuw big man. All of which has only prompted some Muyuw people to hold up his 
actions as examples of irresponsible financial deal ings: 'A European would not act that way ' .  
28 The population of  the Murua LGC area, which includes al l the islands from lwa to Budibud, 
has just risen above 5,000. At least 2,000 people l ive on the outer islands. The main land mass of 
Muyuw has nearly 3 ,000 residents, including outsiders employed by MBL and the mining 
interests, plus a number of government officers and the school population located at Guasopa, and 
various Trobriand, Kitavan, and other people from nearby islands who may or may not be 
permanent residents. 
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Alongside population growth, a second major issue is the way that people 
are cutting the forests for their gardens. Everyone thinks it best to cut the older 
types of forest, and they do so with rel ish. Consequently, scores of 
commercially valuable trees are being cut, and most are left to rot. There is also 
a different aesthetic sense and knowledge base among the new generations of 
people now practising the 'traditional ' system, which brings us back to my 
earlier qualification concerning the locus of education . Most people have now 
been to schools, and increasing numbers have been educated in other parts of the 
country. A 'modern' landscape for them is one with no trees. Furthermore, the 
main message which many people have picked up in school is that their e lders 
did not know anything. So they see no reason to avoid cutting down trees in 
places l ike the very rocky areas known as sasek, which formerly created the 
special ' is lands' of vegetation. In the past, according to elders, these would have 
been left to provide stocks of seeds for the older types of forest, to cast longer 
shadows which force crops and younger trees to grow faster and larger, and (a 
mixed blessing in the traditional perspective) to provide homes for various 
fauna. If current trends continue, the patchy landscape of the traditional Muyuw 
garden area wil l  be homogenised. 
The impact of a growing population is combined with the effect of Western 
notions of land and its ownership being grafted onto 'traditional ' Muyuw social 
categories. It is here that the legacy of the Neates has the greatest force. The 
idea behind WIDCO was that it would combine the island ' s  landowners in a 
single body so that they could represent themselves as a unit to the island' s  
probable future developers and receive a rent from that development. WIDCO 
has in fact distributed dividends - twenty times most people ' s  original 
investments, according to Christiansen - and the desire for such income is so 
great that Christiansen bel ieves any attempt to divert it to productive investment 
would lead to major tribulation. 
WIDCO's  intended purpose needs to be seen in l ight of the island 's  
contradictory history of land tenure . As gold and copra production started in  the 
1 890s, the colonial administration solved the problem of land tenure at a stroke 
by declaring 95 percent of it to be state land . The original development never 
proceeded as intended, and especially after the international economic col lapse 
of 1 929, there were no more new attempts to claim land for large coconut 
plantations. However, successive generations of outsiders and islanders have 
continually revisited the question of whether they should consider most of the 
island to be alienated government land or follow the ' indigenous' system of land 
ownership . And, as it turns out, this is a choice between an act of expropriation 
which nobody could now defend (even if some government officials take it as a 
fact of l ife) and a system which clearly varies with the eyes of the beholder, 
especial ly the Western beholder.29 As all recent distributions of resources, 
29 'Traditional ' notions of landownership, as they emanate from the subclan construct cal led 
data, are discussed in Damon ( 1 990), while the current situation is considered at greater length in a 
forthcoming article (Damon n.d .) .  
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whether from mmmg or logging, have followed from these real ities, some 
attention needs to be paid to them here. 
In 1 996, Muyuw people told me that; in 1 978, the Neates organised a 
meeting of al l  the is land ' s  e lders so that they could write down a record of the 
land owned by each subclan, and thereby create an enduring and official 
document. All copies of this document are now reportedly lost. The 
descriptions of the meeting which I have col lected make it quite clear that no­
one could figure out what was actually ' said' without a deep knowledge of the 
social personal ities who did or did not make themselves heard, as wel l  as a good 
understanding of the local rules of publ ic discourse . Elsewhere I have described 
some of the rhetorical forms used in Muyuw publ ic meetings (Damon 1 983) .  
Suffice i t  to say here that publ ic speaking and decision making usual ly flows, as 
does much in the culture, through the negation of some initial perspective. 
Moreover, when people speak as they spoke in that 1 978 meeting, they do not 
speak as autonomous persons freely entitled to their opinions. They speak as 
representatives of an indigenously defined distribution of resources whose 
understanding is, by our standards, situational . One aspect of that particular 
situation was the consciousness on the part of some younger participants that the 
older participants would soon die. As is the case throughout much of PNG, 
Muyuw l ife courses are structured so that most events and decisions can be 
reversed in the future. Consequently, there is no straight . l ine to be drawn 
between an accurate record of that meeting and the present state of affairs, since 
a younger generation of spokesmen has redefined what was said. 
' Subclans' are defined by Westerners and most government officials as the 
agencies which lay claim to land (as a source of rent). The Muyuw are a 
matri l ineal people :  everybody is in the same group as their mother. There are 
two tiers to their notion of a group, one containing the other. The superordinate 
category kum, customari ly translated as 'clan ' ,  is not a land-holding, or other 
resource-holding, unit. Instead, it regulates marriage : people must find spouses 
from a different 'c lan ' .  This is a formulation that is regional in scope. The clan 
identities of people from the north and west are virtual ly identical to those in 
Muyuw, and where they are different, in the south, there is a set of animal 
identifications which al lows people to convert the terms of one system into those 
of the other. Unl ike the system noted earl ier in this paper, which designates 
differences between regions by reference to their special trees, this one specifies 
simi larities or identities between peoples in this vast, nearly province-wide 
social system. In any case, there is a lower- level category, that of the ' subclan' 
(dal), and th is is the category to which the ownership of resources is in principle 
assigned. So there may be two subclans in the same clan, but they wil l  not 
necessarily own the same things. Their difference is represented by where they 
or their ancestors (often a brother and a sister) supposedly came out of the 
ground - usually on some mountain top, in a swamp or estuary, on a tiny island, 
or elsewhere in what is now Mi lne Bay Province. Just as there are people in 
Muyuw who think they came out of the ground on Rossel Island, for example, in 
the southeastern corner of the province, so there are other people elsewhere who 
think they came from Muyuw. Lots of people who supposedly came out of the 
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ground atop one of Muyuw's  mountain ranges, Lukiduse, are to be found on 
Gawa, Kweywata, lwa, and elsewhere . Sometimes people know, or once knew, 
the story of how their ancestors travel led from their places of origin to the 
vicinity of their current place of residence. Such knowledge actual ly increases 
as one moves west from lwa to Kitava and the Trobriands - a difference that is  
recognised on Muyuw, and is a matter of no l ittle concern to elders worrying 
about the future. Not surprisingly, in 1 996, after twenty years of more intense 
Western resource exploitation on the island, there were lots of young people 
under thirty years old who were tel l ing me much more than their e lders could 
tel l  me back in 1 975 or 1 982. And several of those elders sti l l  al ive in 1 996 
would ask me what I had been told, and then, in d isbe l ief, correct it, or else cal l 
it a l ie, and wince at some of the bizarre t::iles which were now being used to 
claim 'ownership' ,  but which nobody would have imagined a few years earl ier. 
Taken as a set, many of these subclan stories are contradictory, or at least 
create contradictory claims about places of origin. Such contradictions have no 
bearing on s ignificant resources and transformations in the society 's  traditional 
forms of wealth, which were located in affinal relations and not in subclans. The 
stories may have created differences, but they did not arbitrate or determine 
resource claims. The locations specified in myth were real ities negated by 
further developments, in much the same way that speeches are negated in publ ic 
meetings. Ambiguities over real resources (as opposed to places of origin) were 
resolved by a system of credits and debts which operated through the exchange 
of produced items or resources, pigs, and vegetable produce in mortuary rituals .  
Although they vary from one island to another, rituals of this kind are important 
everywhere in Mi lne Bay Province for defining the conditions of the future by 
actions performed over deceased persons and their relationships (see Damon and 
Wagner 1 989). Access to resources, including s ignificant garden and vi l lage 
land, and also such things as sago and betelnut orchards, was always regulated 
by the outstanding balance of debts and credits between intermarried groups. 
Land was not 'owned' as such, it was ' entitled' by this or that group making 
reference to debt relations which were always reversible if sufficient resources 
could be mustered to cancel outstanding debts . The future, so to speak, 
determined those real ities which the West l ikens to contracts about land 
ownership which are fixed in terms of its own notion of the past or of 
'precedent' . To the Muyuw elders, and most other people now more than forty 
years old, the dialectical relationship between mythical origin places and real 
resource claims was transparent, for it was mediated by ritual . To increasing 
numbers of younger people, and to the European social order, the relationship is 
opaque and the rituals are a waste of time. 
Occasional government action, that 1 978 meeting about ' landownership' ,  
and the arrival of resource-extracting companies l ike MBL and Auridiam (the 
mining company) have al l  helped to dispense with the old system and usher in a 
new one. External agencies want unambiguous claims to land to follow from 
people 's  p laces of origin, whether they came out of the ground or landed on the 
island. So now, claims to land are being made which elders sti l l  th ink, and 
virtual ly everyone twenty years ago would have thought, to be extraordinary and 
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sinister.30 By any standards, of course, real money is involved. For example, 
WIDCO maintains absolute control over the island's  ebony, but it contracts the 
cutting and sel l ing to MBL. If MBL can effect some sales, WIDCO gives it a 
contract. Then MBL goes to people who have land claims and asks them to 
identify appropriate trees. MBL then harvests the logs and pays the 
' landowners ' a sign ificant portion of the income from its sales. In 1 995,  this 
was KSOO per tree, each of which might generate 1 -3 cubic metres of black 
ebony which could be sold for about US$2,000 per cubic metre. When I left the 
island, Christiansen was looking forward to disbursing some K80,000 in 
royalties to ' landowners' ,  as wel l  as dividends to WIDCO shareholders, Muyuw 
' individuals ' ,  'business associations ' ,  clans or subclans, and 'vi l lages' .3 1 
Local people are increasingly making the assumption that land is owned by 
specific social units, and that al l  previous ways of deal ing with resources are 
defunct. One consequence of this is that smal ler units of people are moving onto 
'their land ' ,  basing their claims on origin stories, so that they can keep an eye on 
it and, given the extent of overlap in origin and migration stories, make their 
presence incontestable when the time comes to distribute royalties . When they 
move to these areas, they garden on the land, and thus continue the process of 
cutting down older forests, usual ly following the aesthetic norms l isted above -
they cut everywhere . Muyuw people who have actually l ived on the island for 
the last five to ten decades are not the only ones doing this .  When these new 
procedures were explained to me, I raised the question of the greater verbal 
abi l ities and propensities of peoples to the west. Friends in southeastern Muyuw 
indicated that the government had already decreed against any claims from th is 
quarter, thus protecting them from a problem they agree would otherwise exist. 
I then d iscovered some Kitavan men who came to the is land when MBL was 
recruiting labour in the early 1 980s, and who claim that they belong to a subclan 
which came out of the ground in Muyuw and, in the process of moving west, 
gained a right to a large sector of land near one of the lakes on the western half 
of the island. These were dismissed as idle claims by some elders whom I 
questioned in central Muyuw, and yet the young man serving as the Muma Local 
Government Council President completely agreed that the Kitavans owned the 
land because they were ' traditional landowners ' - a statement he made in 
Engl ish, even though he and I conducted all our other formal and informal 
30 And thus capable of generating witchcraft (bwagau) accusations. At the time of writing, these 
seemed to be passe in the eastern third of the island, but a good deal of migration and new vi l lage 
construction on the western end of the island is the result of witchcraft fears. 
3 l Ebony harvesting does appear to be very wasteful, and if the forestry officials are correct in 
their understanding of how the trees mature, there is virtual ly no-one, from Rolly Christiansen 
down to the landowners, who knows how to deal with the tree. 'Landowners' merely walk through 
the deep woods looking for large trees, and then insist that MBL workers cut down the trees which 
they select. Sometimes they do not meet the l imit Christiansen has imposed (55 cm dbh), but there 
is l ittle the MBL workers can do when an irate landowner insists on the cutting. But the critical 
issue is how much of the blacker heartwood is  in the tree. Large trees (over 55 cm dbh) might sti l l  
have very little, and so  end up being wasted almost completely, though some of this rejected wood 
is shunted into the increasingly active individual craft carving sector. 
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conversations in Muyuw. In short, not only is the population increasing, it js 
also spreading out, as people from near and far turn origin places and mythical 
wanderings into c laims of ownership which they think they can best substantiate 
by their physical presence. 
This shift in the definition of land ownership has a related consequence. 
Although government forestry officials have apparently denied MBL new 
permits to cut on the island, they have declared the whole island to be a s ingle 
'Forest Management Area' . This runs contrary to the inferences which local 
people are making from the 'new ideals '  of land ownership. For one of the 
reasons why MBL has not been able to gain permission to log east of the central 
mountain ranges is that people who consider themselves to be the owners of that 
land want to find their own logger and have him set up a logging operation just 
for them. What is at issue here is an enormous portion of the southeastern part 
of.the island, perhaps some 20 percent of the total .  Although some people find 
these claims to be ludicrous, especially those holding major debts from the 
relevant subclan, most people agree that one subclan owns most of this land. 
The members of this group claim to have signed papers with an Austral ian who 
wil l  soon turn up and start work. They bel ieve that one of their subclan brothers, 
wel l-ensconced in the government bureaucracy in Alotau, the provincial capital, 
is actual ly organising and safeguarding their interests. Because of this, they say 
that they wi l l  refuse to release any of their land for mineral exploration or any 
other purpose.32 
Suggestions for the Future 
The consol idation of new landowning principles, the operations of MBL, the 
exploration work by various mining companies over the last two decades - all 
leave the inhabitants of the island positioning themselves to claim royalties from 
other people's work. Their own work is another matter. In this section, I 
suggest how current ' traditional ' land use patterns might be harmonised with 
small-scale timber extraction or lumber production. Smal l-scale extraction is 
consistent with what seems conceivable by the only resident with real experience 
in making commodity production viable on the island - Rol ly Christiansen.33 
The nature of the market which exists outside the island, and the organisation of 
capital and labour which would be necessary or sufficient to acquire and 
reproduce this hypothetical system of production, are important issues which l ie 
beyond the scope of my discussion here. Yet it might be pointed out, in this 
respect, that new activities to absorb the island ' s  increasing population are 
32 From conversation with this person in July 1 996, I would say that nothing is going to happen, 
because the deal with the Australian logger has apparently dissolved. This case i l lustrates some of 
the d ivergence in v iewpoints between islanders who live on the island and those who only frequent 
it for special occasions, some of whom regard the place as a vacation spot which they prefer to be 
undisturbed. 
33 In late 1 996, partly due to Christiansen' s influence, a vi l lager in south eastern Muyuw 
purchased a smal l sawmil l  in the hope that he could do some cutting for his fellow vi l lagers and 
other potential buyers. 
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urgently needed, and one of the most important reasons for this is the 
undermining of traditional forms of ski l l  and knowledge, which means that 
something new must come to absorb an idle creativity. 
The central fact which emerged from the earl ier discussion of local ecology 
is that many, if not most, of the commercially valuable species of trees which 
grow on the island are trees that can or must grow from disturbances created by 
human activities.34 The potential, then, is to take advantage of growth patterns 
created as part of the culture ' s  normal agricultural periodicities. For several 
decades, current gardening practices that follow from island-wide desires to cut 
old fallows could result in much wood suitable for producing lumber. Many 
vi l lages clear several hectares of old-fallow forests every year. In southeastern 
Muyuw, the older fallows tend to have lots of Dysoxylum,35 as wel l  as groves 
of Calophyllum, Palaquium, and Endospermum medulosum, the last of 
which appears very quickly and in great numbers along roads and in early 
succession growth from older forests . Odd numbers of several Syzygium 
species are also found in southeastern Muyuw, whi le in the north-central part of 
the island, along with Pometia pinnata, several Planchonella species and a 
different Syzygium species (the ritual firewood) are abundant. If one were 
considering the export of raw logs, this opportunity would not really exist 
because, with the exception of the Calophyllum and some of the Dysoxylum, 
few of these trees reach or exceed the 50  cm dbh l imit. But if the point at issue 
is local production of relatively high qual ity lumber from trees with 20-45 cm 
dbh, many vi l lages could generate enough wood to keep small sawmil ls  running 
for as long as a market and local wil lpower are present. 
Sooner or later, ecological, demographic, or other conditions wil l  mean that 
it is inadvisable to simply cut down what appear to be the island 's  abundant and 
undisturbed forests for gardening purposes. The question then is how to adapt 
these conditions to gardening and smal l-scale logging requirements. Here again, 
traditional practices probably supply a key. The point on which to focus is the 
patchy environment which the traditional system already takes advantage of 
through its intentional creation of those ' islands' of higher trees surrounded by 
gardens. In southeastern Muyuw, I have found every significant commercial 
tree inside these islands (with the exception of Pometia pinnata). In some of 
them, Calophyllum, several species of Sterculia and Dysoxylum, and 
Palaquium and Endospermum medulosum are particularly common . In north­
central and western Muyuw, Palaquium and Endospermum medulosum, 
Syzygium, and (in older areas) Pometia pinnata are abundant. Clearly these 
areas would have to be careful ly monitored, but for smal l-scale production 
34 I am sure my knowledge is incomplete, but the only tree I know of that is commercially 
significant, and that does not seem to require major (human) environmental modification, is 
Mastixiodendron smith i i  M. and P. It is found in many of the island's environments, sometimes 
in very high concentrations, and sometimes clearly in late successional fallows. 
35 In eastern Muyuw, Dysoxylum are thought to be beneficial to crops, perhaps even better than 
the Rhus taitensis discussed above. Stable isotope analyses do indeed suggest that at least one 
species fixes nitrogen. 
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purposes this might not be difficult, and might even represent a continuation of 
the existing practice of monitoring the growth of Calophyl lum for outrigger 
canoe production. 
In short, ' current' ideals of land use present a viewpoint on consumption of 
the island' s  resources which might bring valuable practices from the past into a 
future where new values have to be produced - and reproduced. 
Conclusion 
I conclude this chapter by reviewing its main points and trying to answer the 
questions posed for this part of the monograph - at least insofar as their answers 
suggest a possible future for the island. 
Muyuw, considered as an ecological and social entity, was, and 
s ignificantly remains, a node in a vast social system, designed in such a way that 
it can endure, albeit problematically, through various natural and social 
perturbations. The islanders' ski lls, knowledge, and social relations were not 
conceived, and never have existed, in , isolation . Europeans, and the new 
representatives of a European order, always think the place is far from home, 
forgetting �hat it is home for the people who l ive there . In any case, it is l ikely 
that the timber resources which_ the new European order has found on the island 
during the latter half of this century were created by the h istorical development 
of a pre-existing social system. I have tried to suggest that future development 
might appropriately be bui lt on what is left of the traditional system, because 
that system may be useful for constructing a sustainable future. And the island's  
most recent history strongly suggests that a full-scale industrial logging system 
wil l  not be capable of doing so. 
The main turning point in the island ' s  logging history is the replacement of 
the Neates'  Kulumadau Enterprises by Milne Bay Logging. It may be that the 
most valuable resources created by that transit ion will turn out to have been the 
business models which both companies have bequeathed to the island. The 
Neates were perfectionists on a small scale, presenting a contrast, in many 
people ' s  eyes, to MBL's  broken machinery and apparent inattention to detai l .  
Although he radically transformed the scale of business operations, developed 
Western infrastructure and Western desires, and created the promise (and even 
the real ity) of integrated social relations, Christiansen has provided people with 
a problematic model of how to run a business. 
If, out of the ashes of MBL's  decade-long experience of industrial logging, 
there comes the successful institutional isation of smal ler scale lumber 
production based in several vi l lages, whether in the hands of MBL or other 
islanders, then this too wil l  be a major turning point in the island's  h istory. It is 
evident, however, that there wil l  be a decade or more of trial and error before 
that point can be reached. 
Muyuw culture is the complex effect of the is land's  place in the 
northeastern corner of the Kula Ring (the traditional inter- island exchange 
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system) and its location at the very end of the Western world-system (which may 
or may not be laden with resources). Furthermore, local people's  interests, 
motives, and knowledge vary radical ly with their differential perspectives. For 
those actively or passively ensconced in the traditional system, the periodic 
arrival and subsequent behaviour of Europeans have always been treated as extra 
resources to satisfy the long-term and never-ending demands of Kula and 
kinship obl igations. In the mid- 1 970s, Christiansen 's  Muyuw father-in-law was 
an ambitious man from Dikwayas whose Kula aspirations were frustrated by the 
two most powerful elders of that vi l lage. After marriage, his luck changed: by 
1 995 ,  he had received what is probably the most famous Kula valuable in the 
Kula Ring.36 For younger Muyuw people, men mostly, educated in the church 
and government school system, MBL represents the latest failure in 
'development ' .  Some told me that they thought they would find development in 
logging, and having learnt their lesson, they are now anxious to try mining 
instead. There are, of course, people between these two extremes who treat 
logging and its offshoot activities merely as a source of European exchange 
items useful for acquiring the 'things' of the 'new order' - from clothes to food 
to church bui ldings to school fees. Very few if any of these people have 
ingrained into their consciousness the labour requirements of commodity 
production. Focussed Western desires, for some commodities and activities, are 
becoming more apparent. Yet these desires are not as strong as the negative 
features which most associate with commodity production. There are a number 
of people from north-central Muyuw, between the ages of thirty and fifty, who 
once worked with the Neates, then with WIDCO in the late 1 970s and early 
1 980s, some even with MBL, and who now enjoy themselves, their chi ldren, and 
their grandchildren back in their vi l lages. This is another reason why smal l­
scale lumber production, if it could be periodic, might represent a more realistic 
economic future than anything else. Few if any Muyuw people on the island 
have to work l ike Europeans, and WIDCO dividends are helping, in a way, to 
assure this outcome. Those interested in 'development' should perhaps 
remember what it took for European standards of work to become the implicit, 
tacitly accepted, order. For a whi le, at least, most Muyuw will keep to their own 
standards. 
36 The mwal Klibulouboul, which figures importantly in Damon ( 1 983 ) . 
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CHAPTER 10 
A STATISTICAL PROFILE OF 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA' S  LOG EXPORT INDUSTRY 
COLIN FILER 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a summary account of the 'official 
statistics' through which the Government of Papua New Guinea (PNG) 
endeavours to assess the economic significance of the country's  log export 
industry. Having considered the general size and shape of the industry in the 
period since Independence, I shall go on to consider three particular questions to 
which the government 's  statistical endeavours have recently been addressed. 
These are : 
• the concentration of capital within the log export industry; 
• the definition and measurement of ' sustainable forest management' ; and 
• the distribution of log export revenues between stakeholders . 
I have also included two appendices which show the current state of knowledge, 
within the PNG Forest Authority, about the ownership, control ,  size, and output 
of each individual logging project in the country. While some readers may find 
this volume of information to be somewhat indigestible, I should point out that 
some of it has been quite hard to come by, and there is some evidence to suggest 
that the Forest Authority is currently engaged in one of the favourite pastimes of 
the national bureaucracy, which is the conversion of official statistics of al l 
kinds into ' state secrets ' .  Hopefully, the publ ication of this chapter wil l  serve, in 
some small way, to discourage this pursuit. 
There are several measurable aspects of the log export industry which have 
not been discussed in this chapter, e ither because they are of rather l imited 
interest as matters of current pol icy debate, or else because they are discussed by 
other contributors to the present volume. For example, l ittle or nothing has been 
said about the income and expenditure of the Forest Authority itself, the 
economics of 'downstream processing' or ' small-scale forestry ' ,  the financial 
operations of landowner companies, or the ' non-timber' values of the rainforest. 
In the final section of this chapter I shal l briefly discuss the inferences 
which can be drawn from publ ic debate about the significance of statistical 
information on the log export industry in an attempt to understand the 
relationship between ' science' ,  'capital ' ,  and 'politics ' in PNG. 
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The Significance of Log Exports in the National Economy 
Some economists would say that PNG is a mineral-dependent economy, whi le 
others might prefer to say that it depends on the extraction of a narrow range of 
natural resources - oil ,  gold, copper, fish, and logs. If we only consider the 
formal sector of the national economy, leaving aside the great mass of economic 
activity which is undertaken outside it, both forms of dependency are much in 
evidence. Extractive industry, almost entirely under the management of foreign 
capital, currently accounts for something l ike 90 percent of the value of PNG's  
domestic exports, and probably contributes about half of the government' s  non­
grant revenues. From this point of view, PNG might therefore be described as a 
nation (and a government) of resource rent col lectors (see Fi ler 1 997b). 
There has been a slow but steady increase in the significance of mineral 
exports in the period since Independence, from something less than half to 
something more l ike two thirds of al l  domestic exports. Raw log exports, by 
comparison, contributed less than 5 percent of domestic export values during the 
1 970s, between 5 and 1 0  percent from 1 98 1  to 1 992, but 1 6 .3 percent in 1 993 
and 1 8 . 1  percent in 1 994 (see Table 1 0 . 1  ) . In 1 994, the government collected 
about K 1 3  1 .3 mi l l ion in log export taxes - more than 1 0  percent of al l  non-grant 
revenues, and almost half the amount which the mining and petroleum 
companies paid in corporate taxes during that year. However, the recent 
increase in the quantities of ' resource rent' captured by the state has gone hand 
in hand with a serious fiscal crisis and a substantial devaluation of the kina. 
The figures shown in Table 1 0 . 1  are mainly those published by the Bank of 
PNG, on the basis of information suppl ied by the Internal Revenue Commission. 
These figures do not contain a breakdown of total export tax revenues, but it is 
normally assumed that log export taxes have accounted for more than 95 percent 
of such revenues in recent years. 1 Confusion sometimes arises because of the 
apparent discrepancy between the figures publ ished by the Bank of PNG and 
those produced by the Forest Authority (and occasionally published in the PNG 
Timber Digest) on the basis of information contained in its own database .2 
Early in 1 995,  the figures produced by the Internal Revenue Commission 
showed that log export volumes had risen from 1 .75 mi l l ion m3 in 1 992 to 2 .43 
mi l l ion m3 in 1 993 , and about 2 .8  mi l l ion m3 in 1 994, while the Forest 
Authority' s  figures for the same period showed an increase from 2 .04 mi l l ion m3 
in 1 992 to 2 .  76 mi l l ion m3 in 1 993 , followed by a decl ine to about 2 .5 mi l l ion m3 
in 1 994. This discrepancy naturally flowed through to the calculation of log 
export revenues. When the Commission initial ly estimated that log export taxes 
would be worth about K 1 4 1  mi l l ion in 1 994, the Authority was simultaneously 
1 The assumption in Table I 0. I is  that log export taxes have constituted 96 percent of all export 
taxes throughout, though recent changes in the forest revenue system (discussed later in this 
chapter) would suggest that the proportion has recently been increasing. 
2 The estab lishment of this database was one of the achievements of the World Bank-funded 
Forest Management and Planning Project in the National Forestry and Conservation Action 
Programme. 
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estimating that they would only be worth K l  1 3  mi l l ion.3 The explanation for 
this discrepancy seems to l ie in the timing of the measurements made by the 
Commission and the Authority, because the former measures the volume and 
value of the log exports on which taxes are paid in a particular year, whi le the 
latter measures the volume and value of the logs which are actually shipped out 
of tlie country. Although this means that the Forest Authority' s  data are more 
'up to date' than those of the Internal Revenue Commission, they are less 
accessible, and cannot readily be compared with other economic data published 
by the Bank of PN G.  
Table 10. 1 :  Volume, value, and revenue contribution of PNG' s  log exports, 
1 978- 1 999. 
Year 
1 978 
1 979 
1 980 
1 98 1  
1 982 
1 983 
1 984 
1 985 
1 986 
1 987 
1 988 
1 989 
1 990 
1 99 1  
1 992 
1 993 
1 994 
1 995 
1 996 
1 997 
1 998 
1 999 
Export 
volumes 
('OOO m3) 
42 1 
476 
6 1 8  
749 
1 ,063 
1 ,003 
1 ,278 
1, 1 5 8 
1 ,299 
1 ,450 
1 ,348 
1 ,349 
990 
1 ,062 
1 ,60 1 
2,375 
2,944 
2,5 1 3  
3 ,000 
3 ,090 
3 , 1 80 
3 ,280 
Export 
values 
(K million) 
1 1 .8 
20.9 
30.0 
3 1 . 5 
49. 6  
43 .2 
69.9 
58 .4 
68 .0 
1 03 .0 
90. 5  
90.0 
65 .2 
8 1 .2 
1 40 .0 
400.2 
483 . 1  
436 .7  
564.0 
605 .6  
648 .7  
695 .4 
% share of 
domestic 
export values 
(02 .3) 
(03 .0) 
(04.7) 
(05 .8) 
(09. 1 )  
(06.5 )  
(08.7) 
(06 .5)  
(07.0) 
(09 .3) 
(07 .4) 
(08.6) 
(06.2) 
(06.2) 
(08 .0) 
( 1 6 .3)  
( 1 8 . 1 )  
( 1 2 .8) 
( 1 6 .9) 
( 1 9 .3 )  
( 1 8 . 5 )  
( 1 9 .8) 
Log export 
taxes 
(K million) 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n .a. 
n.a. 
4 .7 
1 2 .4 
1 2 .6 
1 3 .7 
1 6 .5  
1 5 .6 
1 1 .4 
1 2 .2 
1 7 .7  
25 .0 
70.9 
1 3 1 .3 
1 27 .6 
1 44.0 
1 46.9 
1 49 .9 
1 52 .8  
% share of 
non-grant 
revenues 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n .a .  
n.a. 
(0 1 . l )  
(02.6) 
(02.3)  
(02 .5)  
(02 .5)  
(02.3)  
(0 1 .4) 
(0 1 .6) 
(02.2) 
(02.7) 
(06.3)  
( 1 0.2) 
(08 .6) 
(09.6) 
(09.7) 
(09.9) 
(09.5 )  
Sources: Bank of  PNG Quarterly Economic Bulletins for a l l  actual figures to 1 995 ; 1 996 
Government of PNG Budget Papers (Tables 2 .2, 2 .3 ,  4 . 1 )  for 1 996-99 projections. 
3 Table 1 0. 1  shows that the Commission later adjusted its figures downwards, but not far enough 
to match the estimates made by the Forest Authority. 
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Table 1 0 . 1  shows that, by the end of 1 996, government planners were 
predicting an increase in the nominal export price of raw logs at the rate of K8 
per cubic metre each year for the next four years . It also shows that they were 
projecting an increase in the physical volume of exports beyond the level of 3 
mil l ion cubic metres per annum, which some commentators ( including the 
World Bank) regard as the l im it of ' sustainabi l ity' . The government 's  
incl ination to ' solve' its fiscal crisis by issuing new timber permits, despite the 
efforts of the World Bank to prevent it from doing so, is partly due to the fact 
that government revenues from log exports are worth considerably more, per 
unit of export value, than those obtained from the mining and petroleum sector. 
Log export taxes currently account for more than one third of log export values, 
while corporate taxes paid by min ing and petroleum companies account for less 
than 1 2  percent of mineral export values. Furthermore, the 'production ' of a 
new mining or petroleum project is a far more complex and time-consuming 
business than the issue of a new timber permit. 
Figures produced by the PNG Forest Authority show that Japan is currently 
the destination for wel l  over half of PNG's  raw log exports, while South Korea 
accounts for s l ightly more than one quarter, and a variety of other countries 
import the remainder. Table 1 0 .2 shows that the volume of Japanese imports fel l  
quite noticeably between 1 994 and 1 995 ,  and this is consistent with a long-term 
decl ine in the Japanese market, which is due to material substitutions in the 
Japanese plywood industry and competition from its Indonesian counterpart (see 
chapters by Cooke and Light, this volume). On the other hand, these figures 
need to be treated with considerable caution, firstly because they may represent 
short-term fluctuations which disguise the long-term trend, and secondly 
because of the level of 'pol itical interference' with long-term trends in the 
regional log export trade.4 Figures for the first half of 1 996 show that Japan 
imported more than 63 percent of the 1 .4 mi l l ion cubic metres exported in that 
period, while the South Korean share decl ined to less than 20 percent, and the 
Phi l ippines accounted for nearly 1 0  percent, of this total .  The rapid growth of 
PNG' s  exports to the Phi l ippines over the last three years can be explained by 
the exhaustion of that country ' s  own timber resources, and the consequent need 
to supplement the supply of raw material to its domestic plywood industry, but 
since that industry is also in decl ine, it is unl ikely that PNG' s  exports to this 
market wil l  increase much further (personal communication, Peter Dauvergne, 
1 997). Representatives of PNG' s  log export industry appear to bel ieve that 
mainland China represents their best chance of compensating for any further 
contraction in the Japanese and South Korean markets (personal communication, 
4 For example, PNG 's share of the Japanese market may actually grow, while the total size of that 
market continues to shrink, because other countries in the region decide to follow the Indonesian 
example of imposing a log export ban in order to encourage the development of a domestic 
plywood industry. Furthermore, Table 1 0.2 appears to understate the volume of PNG' s  exports to 
Japan by a very considerable (and annually variable) margin. Data produced by the Japanese 
Lumber Importers Association show that Japan imported more than 1 .9 mil lion cubic metres of 
logs from PNG in 1 994, and almost 1 .6 mil l ion cubic metres in 1 995 (personal communication, 
Peter Dauvergne, 1 997). 
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Bob Tate, 5 1 997), but there is as yet l ittle evidence of growth in the Chinese 
market.6 
Table 10.2 : PNG log exports by country of destination, 1 994-95 . 
Country 1994 exports Av. price 1995 exports Av. price 
('OOO m3) (%) (USD/m3) ('OOO m3) (%) (USD/m3) 
Japan 1 ,509 .8  64 .9 1 65 1 ,388 .8  57 .7  1 40 
South Korea 60 1 .0 25 .8  1 37 656 .8  27.3 1 1 6 
Hong Kong 7 1 . 3 3 . 1 209 78.5 3 .3 230 
China 47.9 2 . 1 1 67 49.9 2 . 1 1 7 1 
Taiwan 4 1 .0 1 . 8 1 3 5 60.9 2 . 5  1 04 
Phi l ippines 3 5 .2 1 .5 1 1 1  1 26.9 5 .3 1 04 
Thai land 1 0 .2 0.4 1 2 1  1 3 .8 0 .6 1 1 7 
India 9.4 0.4 220 1 7 . 5  0.7 2 1 7  
Malaysia 1 5 .9 0 .7 1 1 3 
TOTAL 2,325 .7  1 00.0 1 5 8 2,409.0 1 00.0 1 3 5  
Source: PNG Forest Authority Timber Digest. 
According to the Bank of PNG, raw logs currently account for between 97 
percent and 98 percent of all exports of 'forest products' .  Jant 's  woodchip 
exports from Madang Province account for most of the balance (see Montagu, 
this volume). The domestic market currently consumes about 400,000 cubic 
metres of timber a year, or roughly 1 5  percent of the current log harvest 
(personal communication, Bob Tate, 1 997). Despite the appearance of a national 
pol icy consensus in favour of 'downstream processing' ,  the raw log export 
business is sti l l  responsible for an unprecedented share of output and activity in 
PNG's  forest industry. 
It is thought that the forestry sector, as a whole, currently employs between 
6,500 and 7,000 people (nearly al l  men).7 This represents about 3 . 5  percent of 
formal sector employment, which is roughly the same as the proportion of jobs 
normal ly occupied in the mining and petroleum sector. Of this total, there are 
some 500 publ ic servants employed in the regulation of the forest industry, and 
perhaps another 2,000 people employed in the sawmil l ing business, while the 
rest are engaged in logging and log exports. There has been some public debate 
about the numbers of 'Asians' employed in the logging industry (see Henderson 
5 Research Officer, PNG Forest Industries Association. 
6 In the first half of 1 996, PNG exported roughly 37,000 cubic metres of logs to China, which 
represented 2.6 percent of total log exports during that period. 
7 A recent newspaper advertising campaign by the Forest Industries Association claims that more 
than twice this number of people are dependent on the forestry sector for their employment. This 
claim takes account of additional jobs which are thought to be generated by the industry ' s  
backward l inkages (personal communication, Bob Tate, 1 997). 
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l 996a), but the poor qual ity of PNG' s  employment statistics does not warrant 
further discussion of this point. 
The Concentration of Capital in the Log Export Industry 
Under Part IV of the 1 99 1  Forestry Act (Sections I 04- 1 1 4  ), al l  'forest industry 
participants and consultants' are obl iged to register with the Forest Authority 
before doing business in the forestry sector. The National Forest Pol icy 
(Ministry of Forests 1 99 1  : 3 5 )  regards the process of registration as one of the 
strategies that was designed to secure the goal of greater national participation, 
but the Act treats it as an instrument for the control of malpractice. One of the 
outcomes of the registration process was an attempt by some senior staff and 
consultants of the Forest Authority to establ ish the form and extent of the 
interconnections between the various companies engaged in the log export 
industry. 
During the last few months of the Namaliu government, and then again 
during Tim Nevi l le ' s  occupation of the Forests Ministry from 1 992 to 1 994, the 
main focus of publ ic debate on this issue was the form and extent of the control 
exercised over the log export industry by one Sino-Malaysian company, 
Rimbunan Hijau (RH).8 The debate came to a head in June 1 993 , when the 
Minister seems to have concluded that this company was using all sorts of 
'connections'  to b lock the implementation of the National Forestry Development 
Guidel ines (PNGMOF l 993b ), even whi le it was supposedly seeking to 
influence public opinion in its favour by financing a new national dai ly 
newspaper. At th is juncture, the Post-Courier publ ished a feature article 
(Togarewa 1 993 ) which c laimed, amongst other things, that RH control led 80-86 
percent of PNG's  log export market, and had made a profit of between K350 and 
K400 mi l l ion on the export of PNG logs in 1 992. These c laims were vigorously 
denied by the directors of RH and its affil iated companies, who maintained that 
they only control led ' about, or less than, 40 percent' of PNG' s  log exports, and 
could hardly have made such a remarkable profit on logs exported in 1 992 when 
the total value of PNG's  log exports in that year was only about K l  79 mi l l ion 
(Post-Courier, 23 June 1 993 ). 
Official figures show that the value of PNG' s  log exports in 1 992 was 
certainly not more than K 1 79 mi l l ion, and might even have been less (see Table 
I 0. 1 ) .9 But the proposition that RH controls a very substantial proportion of 
PNG's  log export market has been repeated in numerous writings on the subject. 
For example, Kiirschner-Pelkmann and Cal l ick ( 1 995 : 39) cite two other 1 993 
newspaper articles, including one publ ished in Malaysia, as evidence that RH 
already control led at least 60 percent of PNG's log exports, whi le Henderson 
( 1 996a: 1 43 )  mentions an ' internal report made for the Department of Forests ' 
8 ' Sino-Malaysian'  companies are defined here as Malaysian companies owned or control led by 
persons of Chinese ethnic origin. 
9 The company directors were apparently quoting the Forest Authority 's figures, rather than those 
of the Internal Revenue Commission. 
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which held 'one Malaysian logging company' responsible for 8 6  percent of the 
total t imber harvest. l o  However, these claims cannot b e  substantiated directly 
from the Forest Authority' s  own register of ' industry participants ' ,  which was 
establ i shed shortly after the gazettal of the new Forestry Act in 1 992. 
F igure 1 0 . 1  shows, in summary form, the connections which could be 
shown to exist, in 1 993 , between those 'forest industry participants' who were 
thought to be part of a Sino-Malaysian cartel which was either dominated or 
control led by RH. The evidence clearly revealed the existence of several distinct 
clusters of companies, each containing a combination of foreign companies 
( including some which were directly engaged in PNG' s  log export industry) and 
national companies (normally local landowner companies) with which they were 
obviously doing business. The foreign companies in each c luster were 
connected by mutual shareholdings, overlapping directorships, or shared office 
faci l ities (as revealed by common fax and phone numbers), whi le their l inks to 
the national companies were typically revealed by the use of sequential cheques 
from a s ingle chequebook to pay their registration fees to the Forest Authority. 
In this way, it was possible to identify a core group of companies associated 
directly with RH, and five other companies or groups of companies whose l inks 
to RH and each other were e ither tenuous or dubious: 
• Cakara Alam, a subsidiary of Land and General Bhd, which was contracted to 
export logs from the West, Central and East Arawe timber permits in West 
New Britain Province; 
• WTK Realty and its local subsidiaries, whose main operations were in the 
Vanimo area of West Sepik Province, but which also had contracts in 
Madang and West New Britain; 
• the 'Monarch group'  of companies, al l  subsidiaries of a S ingaporean 
company cal led Monarch Logging, whose main operations were in the Lolo 
area of West New Britain, but which also had contracts in Madang, Oro, and 
Milne Bay, and was effectively managed by Mr Hii Yii Ann; 
• Dominance Resources, which held the Umbukul timber permit in New 
Ireland, and was one of a group of companies under the effective control of 
Dr Phi l l ip Ling; and 
• a group of companies registered in the Phi l ippines, including Super 
Mahogany and Timber Producers and Marketing, which had one logging 
contract in Morobe Province. 
1 0 Henderson' s article was also written in 1 993 . In a paper written in early 1 994 (Fi ler 
l 996b:289), I myself have previously estimated that RH control led more than 70 percent of PNG ' s  
log exports, since this was the percentage suggested by one of the Forest Authority ' s  own former 
consultants (PNGADCP 1 993 ). 
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Figure 10. 1 :  The putative Sino-Malaysian logging cartel ,  1 993 . 
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Although the Forest Authority' s  database contained l ittle or no evidence to show 
that RH actually controlled all or any of these other corporate interests, 
suspicions were converted into rumours, and even into 'facts ' ,  by the circulation 
of long l ists and elaborate diagrams based on this body of data. 
It is somewhat ironic that the Forest Authority' s  own efforts to prevent the 
continued ' leakage' of such information into the publ ic domain have been 
accompanied by complaints from the Forest Industries Association (FIA), as 
wel l  as from non-governmental organisations (NGOs), that the Forest Authority 
is now being far too secretive with its data. From information suppl ied by 
sources within the FIA itself, it is possible to confirm some of the l inkages 
represented in Figure 1 0 . 1 ,  but also to identify some changes (or some new 
revelations) in the pattern of corporate relationships since 1 993 . 1 1 These 
changes do seem to indicate that RH has strengthened its own position in the log 
export business, but not to the extent of directly control l ing much more than 50 
percent of it. 
Table 1 0 .3 shows that the core group of companies associated directly with 
RH has increased its share of the log export market from about 3 6 percent in 
1 994 to just over 40 percent in the first half of 1 996. However, these figures 
definitely understate their current market share, and probably also understate the 
rate of its growth over the last three years . Firstly, the Hong Kong-based Seal 
Corporation sold its PNG logging interests to RH in 1 992 . 1 2 Secondly, the 
Monarch group of companies, though not shown to be part of the RH core group 
in the Forest Authority' s  database, appears to have been taken over some time in 
1 99 1 ,  not long after RH had made its debut in the PNG logging industry. 1 3 
Monarch Investments, Saban Enterprises, and Putput Logging are certainly now 
regarded as RH subsidiaries by officers of the FIA, and there is widespread 
circumstantial evidence of col laboration between the two groups of companies 
over the last five years . On the other hand, the same sources maintain that the 
Dominance group, under the leadership of Phi l l ip Ling, is sti l l  operating 
independently of RH, and that this group has increased its own share of the 
export market through the acquisition of Yema Timbers from the Monarch 
group, and through the exercise of greater control over the Super Mahogany 
group. 1 4 WTK Realty is also widely regarded as a competitor of RH, despite 
1 1  Information in the following paragraphs is primarily derived from Bob Tate (personal 
communication, March 1 997). 
1 2 These comprised timber permits in Manus (West Coast) and Western (Oriomo-Wimare) 
provinces, the latter being held through a subsidiary called Forest Management Services (see 
Appendix A). 
1 3 If the takeover had been an offshore transaction, perhaps involving the purchase of ProExcel 
Sdn Bhd (the Malaysian parent company of Saban Enterprises), then this might explain the absence 
of any clear l inkage in the Forest Authority ' s  database. Maj id Cooke (this volume) treats ProExcel 
as an RH subsidiary. 
1 4 The Forest Authority database indicates that Monarch Holdings held a 70 percent stake in 
Yema Timbers in 1 992 or 1 993, but FIA staff maintain that Yema Timbers is now definitely part of 
the Dominance group. The Forest Authority database suggests that the Monarch, Dominance, and 
2 1 6  The Political Economy of Forest Management in Papua New Guinea 
the fact that these two companies are owned and control led by separate branches 
of a single Chinese 'clan' which dominates the logging industry in Sarawak. 1 5 
And Cakara Alam hardly even qualifies for membership of the putative cartel ,  
since the chairman of its parent company, Wan Azmi Wan Hamzah, is a member 
of the ethnic Malay business e lite which has been promoted by the Malaysian 
government to counter the influence of the ethnic Chinese business community. 
Table 10.3 : Percentage share of PNG log exports produced by different 
corporate interests, 1 994-96. 
Interest group 1994 1995 1-6/96 
Rimbunan Hijau core group 36 . 1 3 8 . 1 40.4 
Seal group (under RH) 0 .8 0 .5  0.4 
Monarch group (under RH) 1 0 . 5  7 .6 5 .0 
Dominance group 1 . 8 2 .0  2 .2 
Super Mahogany group 1 .3 0 .2 0.5 
WTK Realty 1 3 .3 1 7 .4 1 4 .6  
Cakara Alam 9 .8 1 1 .4 1 0 .0 
Turama Forest Industries 6 .0 4 .4 6 .2 
Stettin Bay Lumber 4 .7 2.4 5 . 8  
Open Bay Timber 4.4 2.7 3 . 5  
Nam Yang Timbers 3 .0 2 .7 2 .4 
Other/unknown interests 8 .2 1 0 . 8  9 .0  
Source: PNG Forest Authority Timber Digest. 
There have been suggestions that RH exercises some kind of control over 
Turama Forest Industries (TFI), e ither through its stake in an offshore parent 
company, or through the contractual relationship between TFI and Concord 
Pacific, but these suggestions do not appear to carry much weight. 1 6  There is no 
suggestion that RH exercises any kind of control over the Japanese companies 
which run the Stettin Bay and Open Bay logging operations, or over the Korean 
company, Nam Yang Timbers. If we assume that RH controls half of the 
business assigned to 'other/unknown interests' in Table 1 0 .3 ,  but we do not 
Super Mahogany groups were (and may stil l  be) connected through the multiple directorships of 
John Boo and his wife, Delma Dumas, but Boo's role in the management of these companies may 
be l imited to his professional capacities as an accountant. 
1 5 The two branches of the clan, now commonly known as the Wongs (WTK) and the Tiongs 
(RH), are thought to have 'fal len out' some years ago. An article in the Asian Wall Street Journal, 
reprinted in the Times of PNG (3 March 1 994 ), dates the 'family feud' back to 1 975 . On the other 
hand, they are stil l  connected through financial institutions such as the Hok Hua Bank, which 
might therefore be regarded as the axis of any S ino-Malaysian cartel .  
l 6 According to the Forest Authority database, the directors of Concord Pacific include the 
ubiquitous John Boo (see Figure 1 0. l and Footnote 1 4), but TFI appears to have terminated its 
relationship with this company in 1 995 .  TFI itself  (along with PNG Forest Products) belongs to 
the Prime group of companies, which is l isted on the S ingapore stock exchange and control led by 
ethnic Chinese interests, but I have no further evidence of a link with RH. 
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assume that it controls TFI or the Dominance/Super Mahogany group, then RH 
is left with approximately 50  percent of the total log export business. And we 
arrive at much the same result if we make the equal ly plausible assumption that 
RH does exercise some kind of control over the Dominance/Super Mahogany 
group, but only controls about 20 percent of the 'other/unknown interests ' .  
I n  either case, one would have to conclude that RH i s  certainly the 
dominant player in PNG's  log export industry - a fact which is confirmed by 
Francis Tiong' s  present role as President of the FIA - but this does not amount 
to a monopoly. The role which RH plays within the log export industry might 
then be compared with the role payed by Chevron, Placer Dome, and BHP, 
respectively, within the petroleum, gold, and copper export industries - in other 
words, a relatively standard pattern of capital concentration in the business of 
resource extraction. 
Sustainable Forest Management 
The Tropical Forestry Action P lan Review found a number of deficiencies in the 
way that the Department of Forests had dealt with the problem of defining and 
measuring ' sustainable forest management' : 
• the actual log harvest levels forecast in the revised National Forestry 
Development Programme of 1 988 were not shown to be related to any clear 
conception of ' sustained yield management' (World Bank 1 989: 1 8); 
• the Department 's  plan to achieve the goal of 'sustainabi l ity' by converting 1 0  
percent of al l  logged-over areas to forest plantations was evidently 
contradicted by its plan to sel l  off the smal l  areas of government plantations 
which already existed (ibid: 1 9); and 
• official estimates that each hectare of productive forest contained 50-60 cubic 
metres of commercial timber did not match the actual measured output of 20-
30 cubic metres (ibid:2 1  ). 
The World Bank produced its own calculation of sustainable yields from 
the natural forest by: 
• estimating that 40 percent of the gross 'operable area' of 1 5  mi l l ion hectares 
was actual ly avai lable for logging; 
• multiplying the net uti l i sable forest area of 6 mi l l ion hectares by an estimated 
harvesting yield of 30 cubic metres per hectare; and 
• dividing this total by an estimated rotation length of 50 years to arrive at a 
maximum annual al lowable cut of 3 .6  mi l l ion cubic metres (ibid :2 1 ) .  
I t  was assumed here that the overal l  rate of deforestation would be roughly equal 
to the rate of reforestation, given that the area under forest plantations had grown 
from 23 ,580 hectares in 1 979 to 3 5 ,896 hectares in 1 988 ( ibid :23), and that a 
good deal of government land was sti l l  theoretical ly avai lable for this purpose 
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(ibid : 26), even if the Department ' s  own target of 1 00,000 hectares by the year 
2000 was clearly unreal istic (ibid:27). l 7 
In 1 99 1 ,  the new Forestry Act and National Forest Pol icy addressed the 
problem of sustainabi l ity by setting out the conditions for production of a 
National Forest P lan. According to the Pol icy (PNGMOF 1 99 1  : 5), each 
provincial government was required to identify five different types of land 
within its own borders : 
• ' production forests ' ,  meaning long-term timber production areas; 
• ' protection forests ' ,  excluded from production by various environmental 
considerations; 
• ' salvage forests ' ,  meaning forested areas to be cleared for other uses; 
• land currently without forest cover which would be ' suitable for 
afforestation ' ;  and 
• 'reserve forests ' - a residual category for forested areas which had not yet 
been classified. 
It seems that this classification was meant to form the basis for a ' schedule for 
the management and uti l ization of forest areas within the province' ( ibid:6), 
which would itself  be part of the Provincial Forestry Development Guidel ines, 
while the Provincial Forest Development Programme would be required to 
demonstrate a more specific commitment to ' sustained yield management' of 
those areas designated as 'production forests ' .  For this purpose, the ' al lowable 
cut' would initially be set 'by dividing the total merchantable resource within the 
production forest by an assumed cutting cycle of 40 years' ( ibid:6), this being a 
provisional estimate of the period of time which the average stretch of 
production forest would take to recover its timber value after selective logging. 
These calculations would then be incorporated into the National Forest Plan, 
allowing the latter to arrive at an annual statement of ' al lowable cut' in each 
province for the succeeding year . 1 8 
Barnett ( 1 992 : 1 09) took particular exception to this method of achieving 
the goal of sustainabi lity, describing it as a ' simplistic and unsatisfactory 
device' .  
This formula i s  not based upon research on Papua New Guinea forests, 
in fact the very concept of there being a scientifically determined 
1 7 In 1 988, roughly 70 percent of the area devoted to forest plantations was under government 
control. The government was attempting to enlarge the area of plantations on customary land 
through the New Zealand-funded Demonstration Reforestation Project (see Fi ler 1 989), but the 
problems encountered by this project were cited by the World Bank as evidence of the 
implausibil ity of the official target. 
1 8 This statement appears to be missing from the National Forest Plan which final ly made its 
appearance in 1 996 (PNGFA 1 996). 
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sustainable yield cycle has been challenged by many competent 
authorities. Moreover, many of those who do bel ieve in the concept 
would advocate a much longer cutting cycle of around 70 to 80 years. 
In any event, to work out a formula on a province-wide basis rather 
than to consider the characteristics and needs of each individual forest 
area would allow for gross and unnecessary overcutting of some 
valuable and irreplaceable forests on the rationale that other forests 
exist in the same province so that for the province as a whole, the 
annual al lowable cut wi l l  not have been exceeded (ibid: 1 1 5) 
The National Forest Pol icy did state ( 1 99 1  :6) that the formula would be 
' subject to review in the l ight of further research ' ,  and although there was no 
mention of such activities in that part of the document which was devoted to 
research policies and strategies, the National Forestry and Conservation Action 
Programme (NAFCAP) included a Rapid Resource Appraisal (RRA) project 
which was part of this process of review. This project was largely funded by the 
Australian government, and a report was produced in 1 993 . The main aim of the 
exercise was to produce an interim body of data which would enable the 
National Forest Service to produce the provincial and national plans required by 
the National Forest Pol icy, and thus to meet the conditions required by the 
World Bank and other aid donors for further funding of the NAFCAP (personal 
communication, John McAlpine, l9 1 997). Some of the main findings of this 
study are summarised in Tables 1 0 .4 and 1 0 . 5 .  
The consultants engaged i n  this study arrived at their defin ition of  the 
'maximum annual sustainable yield' for each province (see Table 1 0 . 5) through 
the analysis of data produced by the Department of Forests in respect of al l  
actual and potential concession areas, and comparison of this data with other 
information obtained from the PNG Resource Information System .20 
• First, they deducted from the 'gross operable area' ,  which amounted to a total 
of 1 2 .6 mi l l ion hectares,2 1 those areas which were not avai lable for logging 
because of previous disturbance or problems of access, and thus arrived at a 
'net productive area' total l ing 8 . 8  mi l l ion hectares. 
• Having subtracted another 1 0  percent (800,000 hectares) from this total to 
al low for 'buffer zones ' around streams and water holes, they estimated that 
approximately 7 1 2,000 hectares out of the remaining area had already been 
logged before 1 993 , while another 7.2 mi l l ion hectares had not yet been 
harvested by that date (see Table 1 0 .4). 
1 9  Team Leader, Rapid Resource Appraisal project. 
20 The basis of these calculations was a map of forest types at a scale of I :  1 ,000,000 (see 
Saunders 1 993), although some work was also done on the mapping of vegetation types at a scale 
of 1 :  1 00,000, in recognition of the fact that this interim study would eventually be supplanted by a 
more detailed forest inventory (personal communication, John McAlpine, 1 997). 
2 1 Rather less than the estimate of 1 5  mi l l ion hectares previously made by the World Bank. 
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• 
• 
A further 1 5  percent deduction was made from this combination of logged 
and unlogged forest in order to al low for reading and other infrastructural 
requirements of logging operations, thus leaving a 'potential forest area' of 
approximately 6 .8  mi l l ion hectares (see Table 1 0 .4) . 
Assuming that this would be the maximum area avai lable to a regime of 
sustainable natural forest management, they proceeded to calculate the 
'maximum annual sustainable yield' by making further estimates of the 
volumes of commercial timber contained in the area which had not yet been 
harvested, and the natural growth rates of commercial timber species after 
selective logging had occurred. 22 
Table 10.4: PNG's  commercial forest areas by province, 1 993 . 
Province Forest logged Forest not yet Potential forest 
before 1993 logged in 1993 area in 1993 
'000 ha (%) '000 ha (%) '000 ha (%) 
Western 3 5 . 1 (4.9) 1 ,460.6 (20.2) 1 ,27 1 .3 ( 1 8 .8) 
Gulf 3 5 . 1 (4.9) 925 . 5  ( 1 2 .8) 8 1 6 . 5  ( 1 2 . 1 )  
Central 23 .4 (3 .3)  3 1 8 .7  (4.4) 290.8  (4 .3)  
Milne Bay 40.0 (5 .6) 8 1 .4 ( 1 . 1 )  1 03 .2 ( 1 . 5 )  
Oro 60.2 (8 .5)  1 8 1 .5 (2 . 5 )  205 . 5  (3 .0) 
S .  Highlands 7 .8  ( 1 . 1 )  52 .0 (0.7) 50 .8  (0 .8) 
Eng a 1 .0 (0. 1 )  1 8 .9 (0 .3) 1 6 .9 (0.2) 
W. Highlands 1 3 .6 (0.2) 1 1 .6 (0.2) 
Chimbu 50 .5  (0.7) 42.9 (0.6) 
E. Highlands 2 .6 (0.4) 94. 1 ( 1 . 3 )  82.2 ( 1 .2) 
Moro be 22 . 1  (3 . 1 )  3 80 .9 (5 .3)  342 .6 (5 . 1 )  
Madang 58 .6 (8 .2) 449.7  (6.2) 432 .0 (6.4) 
East Sepik 662 .7  (9. 1 )  563 .3 (8 .3)  
West Sepik 42.4 (6 .0) 836.4 ( 1 1 . 5 )  7 1 9 .9 ( 1 0 .6) 
Manus 4 .8  (0.7) 70.2 ( 1 .0) 63 .8  (0.9) 
New Ireland 1 33 . 5 ( 1 8 .8) 262.0 (3 .6) 336 .2 (5 .0) 
E .N.  Britain 1 03 .2 ( 1 4 .5 )  3 1 1 . 1  (4 .3)  3 52 .2 (5 .2) 
W.N. Britain 1 1 8 .4 ( 1 6 .6) 893 .2 ( 1 2 .3)  859.9 ( 1 2 .7) 
N. Solomons 23 .5  (3 .3)  1 84 .8  (2 .5 )  1 77 .0 (2 .6) 
TOTAL 7 1 1 . 8 ( 1 00 .0) 7,247 .8  ( 1 00.0) 6,765 .6  ( 1 00 .0) 
Source: McAlpine 1 993 . 
22 These growth rates were estimated at between 0 .8 and 1 .0 cubic metres per hectare per annum. 
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Table 10.5: Provincial resources and estimates of sustainable yields, 1 993 . 
Province 
Western 
Gulf 
Central 
Milne Bay 
Oro 
S. Highlands 
Enga 
W. Highlands 
Chimbu 
E. Highlands 
Mo robe 
Madang 
East Sepik 
West Sepik 
Manus 
New Ireland 
E.N. Britain 
W.N. Britain 
N. Solomons 
Unknown 
TOTAL 
Commercial timber 
standin� in 1993 
'000 m (%) 
29,23 1 ( 1 7 .3)  
1 9,435 ( 1 1 . 5)  
6,879 (4. 1 )  
1 ,864 ( 1 . 1 )  
4,5 82 (2 .7) 
880 (0.5) 
844 (0 .5)  
747 (0.4) 
2,047 ( 1 .2) 
3 ,762 (2.2) 
1 1 ,039 (6. 5)  
1 1 ,33 8  (6.7) 
1 3 ,  1 84 (7.8) 
20,906 ( 1 2 .4) 
3 , 1 05 ( 1 .8) 
4,507 (2 .7) 
7,78 1 (4.6) 
23, 1 1 3 ( 1 3 .7) 
3 ,800 (2 .2) 
1 69,047 ( 1 00.0) 
Max. sustainable Actual log 
yield from 1993 
'000 m3 (%) 
exports in 1994 
'000 m3 (%) 
1 ,05 1 ( 1 6 .5)  203 (8 .7) 
757 ( 1 1 .9) 1 7 1  (7.4) 
233 (3 .7) 1 1 2 (4 .8) 
1 03 ( 1 .6) 3 7  ( 1 .6) 
205 (3 .2) 43 ( 1 . 8) 
4 1  (0.6) 
1 4  (0.2) 
9 (0. 1 )  
34 (0 .5)  
66 ( 1 .0) 
343 (5 .4) 53  (2 .3) 
432 (6 .8) 28 ( 1 .2) 
563 (8.9) 1 6  (0.7) 
720 ( 1 1 .3 )  1 1 2 (4 .8) 
64 ( 1 .0) 1 8  (0.8) 
336  (5 . 3 )  82 (3 .5)  
3 52 (5 .5 )  203 (8 .7) 
860 ( 1 3  .5)  1 ,237 (53 .2) 
1 77 (2 .8) 
1 1  (0 .5) 
6,3 59 ( 1 00.00) 2,326 ( 1 00.0) 
Sources : PNG Forest Authority Timber Digest, December 1 994 ( 1 994 export volumes); 
McAlpine 1 993 (other data). 
If we compare the result of these calculations with the actual volume of log 
exports in 1 994 (see Table I 0 .5), it would appear that a claim to 'sustained yield 
management' could be made in all provinces except West New Britain, which 
accounted for more than half of al l the logs exported in that year. However, the 
authors of the study went on to point out that a substantial proportion of the 
'potential forest area' would not continue to be avai lable for timber harvesting, 
either because it would be set aside for conservation purposes or (more l ikely) 
because it would be converted to other uses - primarily agriculture. 23 In other 
23 According the the B iodiversity Country Study (Sekhran and Mil ler 1 994 ), 25-30 percent of the 
area designated as 'operable forest' by the Forest Authority has biodiversity values which should 
warrant conservation. At the same time, over the last few years, there have been several so-called 
'agro-forestry' development proposals which would entail the total clearance of substantial areas of 
forested land for oil palm or other tree crop plantations (see Wood, this volume). But the RRA 
considered that the main threat to the 'potential productive area' would be the subsistence 
gardening needs of a rapidly growing rural population. 
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words, the 'potential forest area' could not be equated with the area of 
'production forests ' defined in the National Forest Pol icy because parts of it 
would e ither become 'protection forests ' or ' salvage forests ' .  The problem, 
then, was to arrive at a more real istic estimate of the 'probable ' ,  as opposed to 
the 'maximum' ,  potential forest area. The authors of this particular study 
suggested that the figure could be as low as 3 .  7 mil l ion hectares, which would of 
course entai l a corresponding reduction in the estimates of sustainable yield. 
Other commentators have suggested figures as low as 3 mi l l ion hectares, with a 
sustainable log harvest of only 3 mi l l ion cubic metres a year (see PNGADCP 
1 993 ; Nadarajah 1 994). 
There were already a number of additional reasons for doubting the 
sustainabi l ity of the harvest levels of 1 994 . 
• F irstly, the official export figures almost certainly underestimated the actual 
export volumes, since there were bound to be some operators whose 
shipments were not ful ly reported to the government. 24 
• Secondly, the level of harvest wi l l  always be greater than the level of exports. 
Over the last few years, the difference has been official ly estimated at 
between 600,000 and 1 mi l l ion cubic metres per annum .25 This figure is 
understood to apply to timber which is subject to further processing before 
being exported or consumed by the domestic market. 
• Thirdly, the volume of timber which i s  official ly 'harvested' may not include 
a substantial number of full-size logs which are wasted in one way or another, 
and certainly does not include those very substantial volumes contained in the 
(mainly immature) trees which are critical ly damaged by careless logging 
practices, even though this second form of wastage represents a substantial 
detraction from some future harvest. 
• F inally, the very uneven spatial distribution of logging operations (as shown 
in Table 1 0 . 5 )  was l ikely to create additional pressures for the conversion of 
forested land to agricultural use in those areas (such as West New Britain) 
where current harvest levels were extremely h igh, and those provinces in 
which harvest levels were obviously unsustainable would also be those in 
which logged-over forests were more l ikely to be cleared for other uses. 
For these various reasons, it now seemed very unl ikely that sustainable timber 
production would be possible if the country official ly exported more than 2 
mi l l ion cubic metres a year for any sign ificant period of time. But Table 1 0 . 1  
shows that exports have substantially exceeded th is amount each year since 
1 993 , and that the government is currently projecting exports in excess of 3 
mi l l ion cubic metres for the forseeable future . 
24 The volume of such ' concealed' exports may be less significant than their value, because they 
are l ikely to comprise those species (such as rosewood) which are subject to a species-specific 
export ban. 
25 Jant' s  woodchip mi l l  alone accounts for 200,000 cubic metres of logs processed onshore. 
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In 1 994, the PNG government was obl iged by its own fiscal crisis to 
negotiate an 'economic recovery' (or ' structural adjustment' )  programme with 
the World Bank. The practice of ' sustainable forestry' was one of the main 
conditions which the Bank imposed on the financing of this programme. The 
numerical d imensions of this practice were specified in three government 
commitments : 
• to l imit the total annual log harvest from existing timber concessions to the 
level attained in 1 994 (approximately 3 mi l l ion cubic metres); 
• to refuse requests from logging companies to carry forward unused permitted 
cuts from one year to the next;26 and 
• to l imit the annual harvest in al l  new concessions (or extensions of existing 
concessions) to one thirty-fifth of the net loggable area. 
During the course of 1 996, however, the government appeared to back away 
from these commitments when the Forests Minister declared that the Forest 
Authority would speed up the al location of new timber permits in order to raise 
the annual harvest to 5 mi l l ion cubic metres, and sought to amend the Forestry 
Act in ways which appeared to raise the level of ministerial control over this 
process. These actions provoked a stand-off between the government and the 
World Bank, as the latter held out for restoration of the original commitments 
and preservation of the existing legislation before it would release the second 
tranche of the economic recovery loan. 
The Minister 's position was apparently supported by the Forest Authority' s  
departure from the conservative calculations of ' sustainable yield ' which had 
been made in the wake of the RRA. The 1 996 National Forest P lan (PNGFA 
1 996: 1 1 ) declared that the total area of 'production forest' was 1 1 .9 mi l l ion 
hectares, and the 25 .7  mi l l ion hectares of ' reserve forest' included another 8 .2 
mi l l ion hectares of 'potential production forest' . The area of 'protection forest' 
was given as 1 .  7 mi l l ion hectares, but no attempt had yet been made to specify 
the area of ' salvage forest' . It seems that the National Forest P lan was now 
equating the combination of actual and potential ' production forest' with what 
the RRA had defined as the ' gross operable area' ,  and that the Forest Authority' s  
estimate of the s ize of this area had grown from 1 2 .6 mi l l ion hectares to  20. l 
mil l ion hectares. These calculations appeared to justify a projected annual 
harvest, from 1 997, of 4 .7 (or perhaps 4.9) mi l l ion cubic metres, of which 
approximately 2.9 mi l l ion cubic metres would be derived from existing projects 
(ibid: 1 3) .  
At first sight, it may seem that these optimistic forecasts have received a 
measure of support from the Forest Inventory Mapping System (FIMS), the 
26 According to Max Aitken (PNGADCP 1 993), the combined 'maximum al lowable cut' under 
the permits issued before the end of 1 994 was 8.45 mil lion m3 in 1 993, 7 .82 mil l ion m3 in 1 994, 
7.49 mil l ion m3 in 1 995, then fall ing to 6.4 1 mi ll ion m3 in 1 998 and 4.82 mil l ion m3 in 200 1 .  
Aggregate harvest levels have regularly fallen well short of the maximum allowable cut. 
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long-promised inventory of PNG's  forest resources which has now supplanted 
the earlier RRA in the calculations of the Forest Authority. As in the case of the 
earlier exercise, construction of the FIMS has been funded by the Australian 
government, and the system was instal led as a database in the Forest Authority' s  
computers early i n  1 997.  The system i s  based on  a mapping and description of 
the nation 's  forest resources and other vegetation, at a scale of 1 :  1 00,000, in the 
years 1 975 and 1 996 (Hammermaster and Saunders 1 995) .27 From the 1 975 
data, the whole country has been divided into a very large number of individual 
'forest mapping units ' (FMUs), each of which has then been allocated to one of 
fifty-nine 'vegetation types ' ,  of which thirty-six have been classified as 'forest 
types ' .  A further distinction has been made between forty-two 'forest zones' ,  
each of  which contains those FMUs of  the same forest type which also contain 
the same combination of merchantable tree species. 
As in the case of the RRA , the definition and measurement of what is now 
called 'potential production forest' has been based on the progressive exclusion 
of other categories from the 'gross forest area' . 
• First, the 'gross forest area' ,  which is defined as the total area of forest 
identified in al l vegetation types, has been reduced to an 'adjusted forest area' 
by the exclusion of small patches of natural or human disturbance. 
• Second, those areas of land which ought to be excluded from logging because 
of the existence of extreme or serious physical l imitations of altitude, slope, 
terrain, or inundation have been classified as 'non-potential production 
forest' within this 'adjusted forest area' .28 
The 'adjusted forest area' which existed in 1 975,  both 'potential ' and 'non­
potential ' production forest, is then divided into four parts by reference to the 
change which has (or has not) occurred between 1 975 and 1 996: 
• part has been logged and left to regenerate; 
• part has been logged and then cleared for conversion to permanent land use; 
• part has been cleared for conversion to permanent land use without being 
logged beforehand; and 
• the remain ing part has neither been logged nor cleared for conversion to 
permanent land use. 
Tables 1 0 .6 and 1 0 .7  show the total areas of 'potential ' and 'non-potential ' 
production forest, respectively, which existed in each province in 1 975 and 
1 996, and the areas which have either been logged (with or without being 
27 The 1 975 data was based on air photographs taken over the years 1 972-75, while the 1 996 data 
was based on a combination of Landsat imagery and rapid ground surveys by Forest Authority 
staff and consultants. 1 975 was chosen as the baseline year because there had been very l ittle 
commercial logging activity before that date. 
28 This area of exclusion includes al l land covered by mangroves. 
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cleared) or cleared without being logged in the intervening period. The 
summary data avai lable to me do not provide separate measurements of the areas 
of 'potential ' and 'non-potential ' production forest which have been logged and 
cleared, but they indicate that the aggregate area which has undergone this 
particular transformation is 42 1 ,029 hectares, leaving an aggregate area of 
2,3 74,232 hectares which has been logged and left to regenerate .29 
Table 10.6: Transformation of PNG's  ' potential production forest ' ,  1 975- 1 996 . 
Province Total Logged Cleared but Total 
area in 1 975 (some cleared) not logged area in 1 996 
'000 ha (%) '000 ha (%) '000 ha (%) '000 ha (%) 
Western 4,694 .6 (34.9) 1 75 .4 (9.5) 1 08 .2 ( 1 7.0) 4,447.5 (3 8.5) 
Gulf 1 ,258 .6 (9.4) 86.0 (4 .7) 1 0 .5 ( 1 .7) 1 , 1 70 .4 ( 1 0. 1 )  
Central 682.6 (5 . 1 )  1 93 .9  ( 1 0 .5) 25 .7 (4 . 1 )  522 .6 (4.5) 
Milne Bay 336 .7 (2 .5) 1 02 .2 (5 .5) 29. 1 (4 .6) 25 1 .4 (2 .2) 
Oro 569.8 (4 .2) 1 24.2 (6 .7) 37 .4 (5 .8) 452.3 (3 .9) 
S. Highlands 403 .8  (3 .0) 2 .3  (0. 1 )  40.8 (6.4) 375 .4 (3 .3) 
Enga 474.2 (3 .5) 1 9 . l (3 .0) 460.3 (4 .0) 
W. Highlands 62.6 (0 .5) 8 .8 ( 1 .4) 56.4 (0 .5) 
Chimbu 1 42.4 ( 1 . 1 )  26.4 (4.2) 1 28 .5 ( 1 . 1 ) 
E. Highlands 90. 1 (0.7) 7.4 (0.4) 1 1 .3 ( 1 .7) 82.2 (0.7) 
Moro be 32 1 .7 (2.4) 67.4 (3 .6) 20.7 (3 .3) 265 .0 (2 .3) 
Madang 6 1 1 .7 (4 .5) 78.3 (4.2) 66.0 ( 1 0 .4) 525.0 (4 .5) 
East Sepik 6 1 8 .7 (4.6) 23 . 1  ( 1 .2) 46.0 (7.3) 568.6 (4.9) 
West Sepik 1 ,572 . 1  ( 1 1 .7) 93 . 7  (5 .0) 1 24.6 ( 1 9.7) 1 ,407.4 ( 1 2 .2) 
Manus 1 0 1 .3 (0 .8) 14 . 8  (0.8) 45.0 (7. 1 )  62 .8  (0 .5) 
New Ireland 332.0 (2 .5) 1 97.0 ( 1 0 .7) 1 .8 (0.3) 1 70 .9 ( 1 .5) 
E.N. Britain 227 .8  ( 1 .7) 1 50.9 (8 .2) 7.9 ( 1 .3) 96.0 (0.8) 
W.N. Britain 708.2 (5 .3) 530.9 (28 .7) 4.9 (0 .8) 259.5 (2 .2) 
N.  Solomons 244 .8  ( 1 . 8) 244 .8 (2. 1 )  
TOTAL 1 3 ,453 . 5  ( 1 00.0) 1 ,847 .3  ( 1 00.0) 634.0 ( 1 00.0) 1 1 ,547. 1 ( 1 00.0) 
Source: PNG Forest Inventory Mapping System. 
29 Observant readers may note that the measured decl ine in the aggregate area of both 'potential ' 
and 'non-potential ' production forest between 1 975 and 1 996 (a total of 3,053,4 1 6  hectares) is 
considerably greater than the sum of the areas which have been 'converted to permanent land use' 
(a total of 1 ,554,2 1 8  hectares). I have not yet been able to obtain a satisfactory explanation of this 
anomaly, but it may be due to the existence of substantial areas of logged-over forest which have 
been ' left to regenerate' ,  but have not (yet) done so. It should also be noted that the statistics 
presented here are sti l l  regarded as provisional outputs of the database (personal communication, 
John McAlpine, 1 997). 
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Table 10.7 : Transformation of PNG' s  ' non-potential production forest' , 1 975-
1 996. 
Province 
Western 
Gulf 
Central 
Milne Bay 
Oro 
S. Highlands 
Eng a 
W. Highlands 
Chimbu 
E. Highlands 
Moro be 
Madang 
East Sepik 
West Sepik 
Manus 
New Ireland 
E .N. Britain 
W.N. Britain 
N. Solomons 
Total Logged 
area in 1 975 (some cleared) 
'000 ha (%) 
1 ,046 .  7 ( 6 .5)  
1 , 1 75 .0 (7.3) 
1 ,25 1 .3 (7.7) 
522.0 (3 .2) 
1 ,0 1 9 .9 (6.3) 
1 ,500.8 (9.3) 
242 .2 ( 1 .5) 
39 1 .2 (2.4) 
224.0 ( 1 .4) 
440 .3 (2 .7) 
1 ,733 .7 ( 1 0.7) 
972 .0 (6 .0) 
1 ,46 1 . 1  (9.0) 
1 ,495 .6 (9.2) 
6 .3 (0.0) 
409.8 (2.5) 
998.  l (6 .2) 
990 .5 (6 . 1 )  
324.4 (2.0) 
'000 ha (%) 
48.3 (5 . 1 )  
1 6.0 ( 1 .7) 
44. 1 (4.6) 
20.2 (2. 1 )  
7 . 3  (0.8) 
5 .6 (0.6) 
4 .5  
96.9 
1 9.3 
4 .5  
29.9 
1 . 1  
1 86 .2 
1 62 . 1 
302.0 
(0.5) 
( 1 0 .2) 
(2 .0) 
(0 .5) 
(3 .2) 
(0. 1 )  
( 1 9 .6) 
( 1 7 . 1 ) 
(3 1 .9) 
Cleared but 
not logged 
'000 ha (%) 
47.5 (9 .5) 
7 .4 ( 1 .5)  
1 3 .5  (2.7) 
1 4.0 (2. 8) 
1 3 .8 (2 .8) 
86.3 ( 1 .7) 
1 4 .8  (3 .0) 
87. 1 ( 1 7.4) 
1 6.0 (3 .2) 
1 1 .8 (2 .4) 
70 .5  ( 1 4. 1 )  
30 .5 (6 . 1 )  
1 7.6 (3 .5) 
30.3 (6. 1 )  
1 .9 (0.4) 
0.4 (0 . 1 )  
25 .7 (5 . 1 )  
1 0.0 (2.0) 
TOTAL 1 6,204.8 ( 1 00 .0) 948 .0 ( 1 00 .0) 499.2 ( 1 00 .0) 
Source: PNG Forest Inventory Mapping System. 
Total 
area in 1 996 
'000 ha (%) 
97 1 .4 (6 .5) 
1 , 1 59 .7 (7.7) 
1 ,205.4 (8.0) 
498.9 (3 .3)  
1 ,006 .5  (6.7) 
1 ,442 .2 (9.6) 
229.0 ( 1 .5)  
337 .0 (2 .2) 
2 1 2 .0 ( 1 .4) 
430.7 (2 .9) 
1 ,600 .7 ( 1 0.6) 
945 .0 (6 .3) 
1 ,448 .7 (9 .6) 
1 ,44 1 .6 (9.6) 
4 .4 (0.0) 
233 .9 ( 1 .6) 
828 .8 (5 .5) 
737.3 (4.9) 
324.4 (2.2) 
1 5 ,057 .8  ( 1 00.0) 
If we now compare the provisional outputs of the FIMS (Tables 1 0 .6 and 
1 0 .7) with the corresponding estimates made in the RRA (Table 1 0 .4), we may 
be struck by the difference between the 6 .8  mi l l ion hectares of 'potential forest 
area' which was thought to exist in 1 993 and the 1 1 . 5 mi l l ion hectares of 
'potential production forest ' which is now said to have existed in 1 996. If we 
assume that these are two attempts to measure the same thing, then it seems that 
the estimated area of 'potential production forest' was 70 percent greater in 1 996 
than it was in 1 993 . This discrepancy is al l the more remarkable when we 
compare the earlier estimate that 7 1 2,000 hectares of forest had already been 
logged before 1 993 with the current estimate that 2 .8  mi l l ion hectares had been 
logged by 1 996, which seems to represent a simultaneous increase of nearly 300 
percent in the area of forest whose potential production values have (at least 
temporarily) been real ised. Should we therefore conclude that this new set of 
data justifies a corresponding increase in the estimates of aggregate sustainable 
yield, and therefore supports the c laim implied in the National Forest Plan (and 
openly stated by representatives of the log export industry) that PNG's  natural 
forest resource can sustain an annual harvest of approximately 5 mi ll ion cubic 
metres, instead of the 3 mi l l ion cubic metres impl ied by the calculations of the 
RRA? 
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The architects of the FIMS maintain that there are three main reasons why a 
positive answer cannot be given to this question : 
• Firstly, the database shows that more than one third of the area which has 
already been logged falls is classified as 'non-potential production forest' 
(see Table 1 0 . 7), which means that it should not have been logged under a 
regime of sustainable forest management. 
• Secondly, the area of 'potential production forest' includes several 'forest 
types'  or 'forest zones' whose combination of tree species do not warrant 
commercial exploitation under current market conditions, and which are 
therefore excluded, in practice, from the area of interest to logging 
companies.30 
• Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the estimates which have previously 
been made of 'typical ' regeneration rates, and which support the idea of a 
' standard cutting cycle' of 30-40 years, are now regarded as maximum, rather 
than average, rates, and there are many 'forest types'  or 'forest zones'  in 
which the rates of regeneration are now shown to be much lower, and in 
which the ' cutting cycle' should therefore be twice or three times the 
' standard' length (personal communication, John McAlpine, 1 997). 
From these considerations, it can be argued that the FIMS provides more reasons 
for the Forest Authority to l imit the numbers and types of forest area which are 
made avai lable for commercial logging than arguments in favour of extending 
the aggregate area of 'production forest ' . 
The Political Distribution of Log Export Revenues 
During the period of national independence, logging companies have been 
obl iged to share their revenues with the government and with local landowners 
in various forms and various proportions. 
• At the time of Independence in 1 975 ,  t imber royalties were levied at the rate 
of K3 . l 8 per cubic metre . The rate was raised to K3 .95/m3 in 1 976, then to 
KS .4 l /m3 in 1 98 1 ,  and finally to K 1 O/m3 in 1 996. In the early years of 
Independence, timber royalties were divided between the national 
government, the provi.ncial government, and local landowners in the ratio 
1 : 2 : 1 ;  from 1 986, they were divided between the provincial government and 
local landowners in the ratio 3 :  1 ;  as of 1 996, local landowners are due to 
collect the entire amount, in recognition of their status as the true 'resource 
owners' .  
30 Although the FIMS contains estimates of 'gross merchantable volume' for both 'potential ' and 
'non-potential ' production forest, these estimates are not presented here because they create the 
misleading impression that these are volumes of timber which can be profitably extracted and sold. 
According to Lamb ( 1 990:35), a 'typical ' hectare of forest in PNG yields only 30 cubic metres of 
marketable timber out of a ' standing volume' of 1 00- 1 30 cubic metres. 
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• Any income which the government may have lost in the process of ' giving 
away' an increasing share of timber royalties to local landowners has been 
more than made up by the imposition of a log export tax, which was first 
imposed in 1 979, and whose average rates have been raised on four separate 
occasions during the 1 990s. From 1 979 to 1 995,  different rates of tax were 
imposed on different species of timber, but tax rates have now been l inked 
directly to the export price of logs . 
• Local landowners or landowner companies have been able to secure a variety 
of additional cash benefits from logging contractors in the process of 
negotiating the development of specific projects . Before 1 996, the value of 
such ' levies ' and ' premiums' varied widely between one project and another, 
but the national government has now attempted to rational ise this form of 
redistribution through the creation of a standardised Project Development 
Levy. 
• Final ly, permit holders have general ly agreed to spend some of their own 
revenues on the provis ion of ' social infrastructure' within their concession 
areas, and this may be regarded as a 'benefit in kind ' to local landowners, or 
an indirect form of budgetary support to the government (which would 
otherwise pay for such provision). The value of such benefits has normally 
been equated with the combined cash value of royalties, levies, and premiums 
(see World Bank 1 989). 
The Tropical Forestry Action Plan Review criticised (and effectively 
stal led) the government' s  proposal to revise the fiscal regime in the forestry 
sector in such a way that royalties and export taxes would both be charged as a 
fixed percentage of export value, because it carried ' a  potential pol itical risk of 
exposing resource owners to the consequences of market instabil ity, from which 
they are presently shielded ' (ibid :32) .  It was also critical of the use of royalty 
rate allowances and indirect infrastructural levies as the preferred method of 
compensating for variations in the average cost of production between different 
logging operations, since low-cost producers would probably sti l l  have the upper 
hand, and inefficient loggers might also be inefficient in the business of 
providing social infrastructure (ibid :33) .  
Under Part VI of the 1 99 1  Forestry Act (Sections 1 1 9- 1 2 1  ), the government 
was committed to the establishment of a new 'forest revenue system' ,  but no 
details were provided in the legislation . The National Forest Policy (PNGMOF 
1 99 1  :40) promised an 'early comprehensive study on State taxes, levies, 
royalties, charges, and obligations to be imposed on the forest industry, and 
minimum rentals and purchase prices due to resource owners ' ,  and in the 
meantime undertook to maintain the existing method of calculating and 
distributing royalties, so that: 
• 'Resource owners wil l  continue to receive all royalties collected from timber 
and other forest produce harvested from natural forests . '  
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• 'The national and provincial governments shal l continue to receive 25 
percent and 75 percent, respectively, of royalties from timber and other forest 
produce harvested from State land. '  
The Act allowed the Minister and Board a substantial measure of discretion in 
deciding the rate at which royalties and levies would be charged on individual 
projects, presumably so that the Act would not have to be amended in l ight of 
the revenue study promised in the Pol icy.3 1 
The Forest Revenue Study, l ike the RRA and the FIMS, was funded by the 
Australian government as one of the projects implemented under the 
NAFCAP.32 The revenue study found that the existing fiscal regime in the 
forestry sector was ' reasonably efficient' ,  but it was 'probably not fair, certainly 
not simple, and does not seem to encourage good forest management' (Shedden 
Agribusiness 1 99 1  :vi i i ) .  It went on to propose that: 
• resource owners should receive a royalty payment of between K4 and KS per 
cubic metre of all logs harvested; 
• the government should tax the logging industry by a combination of 
'stumpage' charges on all logs harvested, and an additional export tax on all 
logs exported, and thus encourage downstream processing by subjecting 
processors to the former, but not the latter, charge; 
• stumpage charges should vary with the value of the species being harvested, 
while log export taxes should vary with the export price; and 
• tax receipts should be credited to a Forest Revenue Stabil isation Fund which 
would first be used to cover the government' s  own costs in regulating the 
industry, and surplus then made avai lable to Local Area Development Funds 
in each concession area. 
For reasons discussed elsewhere (see Taylor, this volume), four years 
elapsed between the completion of the revenue study and the introduction of a 
new forest revenue system in the government's 1 996 budget. The 
recommendations of the revenue study were subject to a certain amount of 
interdepartmental consultation during 1 992, but ran into opposition from the 
logging industry and landowner company representatives in 1 993 . In December 
1 993 , Cabinet decided to defer its final approval of a new system pending further 
evaluation of its merits by a m inisterial committee which failed to hold a single 
3 1 Some commentators, such as John Mil lett ( 1 99 1  ) , complained that this would cause 
'considerable investor uncertainty ' because it gave no guarantee of a level playing field. Mi llett 
also expressed some doubt about the allowance made in Section 1 2 1  for the Forest Authority to 
meet its own costs out of levies charged on the industry, especially in l ight of its stated aim of 
achieving ' increased down-stream processing ' .  
32 I t  was, in fact, the first stage of  a 'Forest Revenue and Financial Study ' which also included a 
'Corporate Planning' component which was desgined to develop the financial administration of the 
new Forest Authority. 
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meeting throughout 1 994. The introduction of the new system in the budget of 
November 1 995 was largely the result of further pressure appl ied by the World 
Bank during the negotiation of the ' economic recovery programme' . 
Meanwhi le, the government had attempted to reduce the extent of its fiscal crisis 
by the simple expedient of raising the rates of export tax levied under the old 
revenue system, once in the budget of November 1 993 , and then again in the 
'mini-budget' of March 1 994 (see Table 1 0 .8) .  
Table 10.8: Export tax rates under the old revenue system, 1 979- 1 995 . 
Species 1979-90 1/91-1 1/93 1 1/93-3/94 3/94-1 1/95 
Kwi la, Penci l  Cedar, 
Planchonella: 1 0% 30% 33% 46% 
Calophyllum, Mersawa, 
Taun, Walnut: 1 0% 20% 23% 36% 
Burckella, Canarius, 
Gluta, Hopea, Terminalia: 1 0% 1 2% 1 5% 28% 
All other species: 1 0% 9% 1 3% 26% 
Weighted average: 1 0 .0% 1 4 .3% 1 7 .3% 3 1 . 1 %  
Note: the weighted average represents the effective subsidy to downstream processors. 
Source: PNG Forest Authority. 
The government' s  failure to introduce the new revenue system, or even to 
raise the rate of taxes charged under the old system, before the end of 1 992, 
seems to have created a substantial 'windfall profit' for the logging companies 
during 1 993 and 1 994, when prices were hovering around US$ l 70 per cubic 
metre. One economist (Duncan 1 994) has estimated the s ize of this windfall 
profit to have been about K225 mi l l ion - more than the sum of about K200 
mi l l ion which the government actual ly col lected in log export taxes over the 
same period (see Table 1 0 . 1  ). Another economist (personal communication, 
John Mi l lett, 1 997) has estimated that the government would have made an extra 
K200 mi ll ion in log export taxes over the four years from 1 992 to 1 995,  if the 
new revenue system had already been in place during that time. 
The new revenue system proposed in the 1 996 budget differs from the one 
which was recommended by the Forest Revenue Study: 
• resource owners were to receive a substantial ly higher royalty payment of 
K I O  per cubic metre of al l  logs harvested (from which the national 
government would deduct a 5 percent royalty withholding tax), and a Project 
Development Levy whose value would also be greater than the various levies 
and premiums which they had previously been receiving; 
• there would be no system of ' stumpage ' charges on all logs harvested, only 
an export tax on all logs exported; and 
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• there was no provision to channel tax receipts through a Forest Revenue 
Stabi l isation Fund in order to cover the operating costs of the 'Forest 
Authority. 
However, the new revenue system does follow the prescriptions of the Forest 
Revenue Study in its creation of an export tax regime which is considerably 
more 'progressive ' than its predecessor, because the rate of tax is tied directly to 
the export value of the logs, and so the government' s  share of the economic rent 
increases with the market price of the commodity. Table 1 0 .9 shows how export 
tax rates are calculated under the new revenue system, whi le Table 1 0 . 1 0  
compares the levels of tax col lected under the old system and the new system at 
different log export prices. Tables 1 0 . 1 1 and I 0. 1 2  incorporate the effects of the 
new revenue system into a portrait of the changes which have taken place in the 
overall distribution of log export values between different stakeholders and 
different forms of income over the period from 1 988 to 1 996.  
Table 10.9: Export tax rates under the new revenue system, 1 996. 
Price band Tax rate 
Up to K90/m 1 5% of f.o.b. value 
K9 1 - l  1 0/m3 K l 3 .50  + 30% of amount above K90 
K l  1 l - 1 30/m3 K l 9 .50 + 50% of amount above K l  1 0  
K l 3 1 - 1 50/m3 K29.50 + 55% of amount above K l 30 
K 1 5  l -200/m3 K40 .50  + 60% of amount above K l 50 
Over K200/m 3 K70.50 + 70% of amount above K200 
Source: PNG Forest Authority. 
Table 10.10:  Comparison of export taxes under the old and new revenue 
systems. 
Log price Log price Tax under old system Tax under new system 
(USD/m3) (PGK/m3) (K) (%) (K) (%) 
1 1 0 1 47 45 .80 3 1 .2 39 .50 26.9 
1 20 1 60 49.85 3 1 .2 46.89 29.3 
1 30 1 73 53 .90 3 1 .2 54.82 3 1 .7 
1 40 1 87 58 .27 3 1 .2 63 .72 34. 1 
1 50 200 62 .32 3 1 .2 72 .06 36 .0  
1 60 2 1 3  66.36 3 1 .2 80.56 37 .8 
Note: average log price in 1 996 has been K 1 75/m3, giving a weighted average tax rate of 
3 K56/m under the new system . 
Source: PNG Forest Authority. 
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Table 10. 1 1 :  Distribution of PNG log export revenues, 1 988- 1 996 (in kina) .  
INCOME CATEGORY 1988 1990 1992 1993 93-94 1994 1995 1996 
Average log price (Kina/m3) 71 .00 66.00 87.00 169.00 163.00 158.00 160.00 1 75.00 
Income to local landowners : 6.34 6.21 6.73 8.79 8.64 8.51 8.56 2 1 . 1 1  
Royalties 3 .56  3 . 56 3 .56 3 .56 3 .56 3 .56 3 .56 9.50 
Other levies & premiums 2.78 2.65 3 . 1 7  5 .23 5 .08 4.95 5 .00 1 1 . 6 1  
Income to  provincial gov't: 1 .25 1 .25 1 .25 1 .25 1 .25 1 .25 1 .25 0.00 
Income to national gov't: 8.29 7.79 14.36 26.80 30.78 50.42 51 .04 57.59 
Log export tax 7. 1 0  6 .60 1 3 . 1 7  25.6 1 29.59 49.23 49.85 56.09 
Reforestation levies 1 .00 1 . 00 1 .00 1 .00 1 .00 1 . 00 1 .00 1 .00 
Royalty withholding tax 0. 1 9  0. 1 9  0. 1 9  0. 1 9  0. 1 9  0. 1 9  0. 1 9  0.50 
Income to logging contractor:  55. 12  50.75 64.66 132.16 122.33 97.82 99. 15  96.30 
Assessed logging costs 38.23 42.51 47.33 49.50 49.50 50.29 57.79 66.96 
Balance to logging contractor :  16.89 8.24 1 7.33 82.66 72.83 47.53 41 .36 29.34 
Balance in real 1996 Kina 29.58 12.98 24.51 1 1 1 .82 98.52 63.28 47.93 29.34 
Table 10. 12 :  Distribution of PNG log export revenues, 1 988- 1 996 (% shares). 
INCOME CATEGORY 1988 1990 1992 1993 93-94 1994 1995 1996 
Average log price 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Income to local landowners: 8.93 9.41 7.74 5.20 5.30 5.39 5.35 12.06 
Royalties 5 .0 1  5 . 39  4.09 2 . 1 1  2. 1 8  2.25 2.23 5 .43 
Other levies & premiums 3 .92 4.02 3 .64 3 .09 3 . 1 2  3 . 1 3  3 . 1 3  6.63 
Income to provincial gov't: 1 .76 1 .89 1 .44 0.74 0.77 0.79 0.78 0.00 
Income to national gov't: 1 1 .68 1 1 .80 16.51 15.86 18.88 31 .91  3 1 .90 32.91 
Log export tax 1 0.00 1 0.00 1 5 . 1 4 1 5 . 1 5  1 8 . 1 5  3 1 . 1 6 3 1 . 1 6 32.05 
Reforestation levies 1 .4 1  1 . 52 1 . 1 5  0 .59 0.6 1  0.63 0.63 0. 57 
Royalty withholding tax 0.27 0.29 0 .22 0. 1 1  0. 1 2  0. 1 2  0 . 1 2  0.29 
Income to logging contractor:  77.63 76.89 74.32 78.20 75.05 61 .91  61 .97 55.03 
Assessed logging costs 53.85 64.41 54.40 29.29 30.37 31 .83 36. 12  38.26 
Balance to logging contractor:  23.79 12.48 19.92 48.91 44.68 30.08 25.85 16.77 
Balance in real 1996 Kina 41 .66 19.67 28. 17  66. 17  60.44 40.05 29.96 16.77 
Note: The ' 93-94' column shows the distribution of log export revenues between the 
budget of November 1 993 and the mini-budget of March 1 994 . The adjoining columns 
show the distribution during the remaining months of those years. 
Source: PNG Forest Authority. 
The figures given in Table 1 0 . 1 1 for 'other levies and premiums '  paid to 
landowners before November 1 995 are estimated averages and exclude any 
additional non-monetary benefits (infrastructure, for example) provided by 
logging contractors or landowner companies. The Project Development Levy 
which now replaces these m iscel laneous forms of income has a standard 
minimum rate (as shown in Table l 0. 1 1  ), though higher rates are to be charged 
when export prices are unusual ly high .  It should also be noted that the figures 
shown in the final ( 1 996) column apply to existing projects . The distribution of 
revenues arising from new projects is identical except that the ' reforestation 
levy' is transferred from the national government to the landowners, and is 
therefore added to the Project Development Levy. 
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Tables 1 0 . 1 1 and 1 0 . 1 2 show the logging contractor' s  residual share of log 
export revenues in both nominal and real prices. The bottom l ine represents the 
balance in terms of current purchasing power, and thus takes account of the fact 
that one kina could buy more in 1 988 than it can now, because of the effects of 
devaluation and inflation. This balance is understood to contain the contractor' s 
own profits and the cost of providing any additional benefits for landowners 
which may have been negotiated outside the terms of the official fiscal regime. 
At a log export price of US$ l 30 (K 1 75 )  per cubic metre, which is close to 
prevai l ing market prices in 1 995 and 1 996, Table 1 0. 1 2  shows that the new 
system has the immediate effect of reducing the logger' s share log export 
revenues from 62 percent to 5 5  percent of the gross revenue, while increasing 
the landowner's share from less than 6 percent to more than 1 2  percent. The 
government's  share, which had been raised substantially by the 'mini-budget' of 
March 1 994, has hardly been altered by the introduction of the new system. 
In 1 996, the logging companies have mounted a vigorous campaign against 
the new revenue system, even threaten ing at one point to mount a 'capital strike' 
against payment of the new royalty rates and the Project Development Levy. 
Industry representatives have argued that the government' s  figures overstate the 
size of the balance which wil l  now end up in the contractor' s  pocket because 
they understate the average cost of production, which means that some operators 
will no longer be able to achieve a normal rate of return on their operations 
(Post-Courier 1 4  March 1 996, 9 April 1 996). The 'assessed logging costs ' 
shown in Table 1 0 . 1 1 are assumed to be equivalent to US$50/m3 in 1 993 (when 
the US dol lar had roughly the same value as the PNG kina). Economists 
associated with the World Bank and the PNG Forest Authority currently 
maintain that average logging costs fall within the range of K60-70/m3, while 
industry representatives claim that they fal l within the range of K90- 1 1 O/m3. If 
the industry representatives are right, then the typical logging contractor has 
hardly made any profit at al l for the last three years. 
Part of the problem here is to take account of the wide range of variation 
which is known to exist between the gross revenues and the production costs of 
individual logging operations. The Forest Authority' s  own database showed that 
logs exported from the Rottock Bay project during 1 995 secured an average of 
US$205/m3, while logs exported from the Gar project (also in East New Britain 
Province) secured an average of only US$89/m3. There are currently no data 
that would permit an assessment of the extent to which this range of variation is 
due to the vagaries of corporate accountancy, rather than differences in the 
quality of timber being harvested. Nevertheless, the 'progressive' features of the 
new revenue system are partly intended to mitigate the effects of such variation 
on the profitabil ity of different operations. But they do not take account of the 
separate, and possibly unrelated, range of variation in the costs of production. 
The Forest Revenue Study did include an assessment of this second range 
of variation, based on a smal l stratified sample of logging projects in different 
parts of the country. The results of this exercise were later reviewed and 
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summarised by consultants working on the World Bank-funded PNG Forest 
Management and Plann ing Project (see Table 1 0 . 1 3) .  Their calculations have 
apparently formed the basis of the Forest Authority' s  decision to assess the 
average logging cost at US$50/m3 in 1 993 . The recent burst of complaints from 
the logging industry has prompted the World Bank to promise a further 
investigation of this subject, but no such study had been undertaken by the end 
of 1 996. 
Table 10. 13 :  Estimated range of logging costs in PNG, 1 993 . 
Item 
Planning/survey 
Road construction 
Fel l ing (labour contract) 
Skidding 
Scaling (labour contract) 
Loading/trucking 
Log dump (sort/stack) 
Shipping (barging) 
Shipping (stevedores) 
Fuel, oi l  and parts 
Administration 
TOTAL 
Low cost 
Nil 
K l 0/m3 
K2/m3 
K2/m3 
50t/m3 
K2/m3 
K l /m3 
K2/m3 
50t/m3 
1 0% 
1 0% 
K22 .40/m3 
Source: PNG Forest Management and Planning Project. 
Conclusion: Science, Capital, and Politics 
High cost 
K2.50/m 
K20/m3 
K5/m3 
K5/m3 
K l /m3 
K l 0/m3 
K2/m3 
K7.50/m3 
K l /m3 
20% 
1 0% 
K66.00/m3 
What might now be said, by way of conclusion, about the relationship between 
these various sets of numbers, apart from the fact that they al l fit then original 
definition of ' statistics ' ,  being bodies of data collected on behalf of the state? 
The answer to this question needs to take account of the additional fact that these 
data have been assembled and interpreted as integral components of a single 
process of policy reform, in which donor-funded experts and their bureaucratic 
counterparts have sought to pit the force of 'scientific argument' against the 
powers of logging capital and the erratic qualities of national and local-level 
politics in PNG. The question itself can therefore be divided into three parts : 
• How have the reformers themselves conceived the 'big picture' revealed by 
their numerical calculations? 
• How have other stakeholders reacted to arguments which stem from such 
conceptions? 
• What is the value of statistics as an instrument of persuasion in this political 
setting? 
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We may begin to assemble answers to these more specific questions by 
considering the relationship which may or may not exist between the calculus of 
'sustainable forest management' ,  taken as the middle term in our general 
equation, and the two measurable 'objects' which exist to either side of it - first, 
the distribution of log export revenues, and second, the concentration of logging 
capital . 
Sustainability, Efficiency, and Equity 
It should be apparent, from my previous discussion, that the World Bank's  
approach to the first of  these matters tends to assume the feasibil ity of 
harnessing a progressive log export tax to the goal of maintaining a form of 
'sustained yield management' which can be defined in terms of an aggregate 
national log harvest and the imposition of a standard 3 5-year cutting cycle on all 
new timber concessions granted by the Forest Authority. Although the Bank has 
been prepared, at times, to countenance a more complex definition of 
' sustainabi l ity' ,  and a fiscal regime whose own complexity might be justified in 
light of this definition, these complexities have apparently been sacrificed to the 
more urgent task of defending the fundamental provis ions of the Forestry Act 
against a coal ition of national pol iticians, logging companies, and landowner 
company executives who are unable or unwil ling to grasp the merits of detailed 
scientific and economic arguments. 
This is not a position which naturally recommends itself to the experts who 
have been paid to integrate measures of 'sustainabi l ity' into the planning process 
envisaged by the National Forest Policy. As we have seen, the natural scientists 
were obliged to produce a number of 'guesstimates ' in order to satisfy the 
Bank's desire to keep the process of pol icy reform moving along a particular 
path, knowing full  wel l  that a great deal more time and money would have to be 
spent before they could produce the kind of database which would enable the 
Forest Authority or the Department of Environment and Conservation to make 
an accurate assessment of 'the l ikely physical environmental outcomes from any 
significant forestry operation ' (personal communication, John McAlpine, 1 997) . 
From their point of view, it is hard to imagine a fiscal regime which could serve 
as an administratively simple method of transferring a larger proportion of log 
export revenues to the national government and local resource owners, yet 
simultaneously function to encourage the sustainable management of individual 
timber concessions . This is primari ly because the very wide variation in the 
economic value and physical accessibil ity of different parts of the national forest 
resource provides a clear incentive for loggers to concentrate their operations in 
the most highly valuable and most accessible areas, to the point where these 
areas are 'over-exploited ' ,  while other areas are sti l l  ' under-exploited' ,  even 
while the aggregate national harvest remains at a level which is theoretical ly 
sustainable.33 
33 I am grateful to Gerard Ward (personal communication, March 1 997) for providing me with a 
more detailed argument along these l ines. The problem, according to Ward, is that 'one needs to 
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The planning process envisaged by the new Forestry Act and the National 
Forest Policy is one which actual ly mil itates against the appl ication of a 
scientifical ly soph isticated approach to the business of sustained yield 
management, precisely because it requires each of the country ' s  nineteen 
provinces to produce its own forest plan for national approval, but without the 
availabi lity of sufficient scientific expertise at the provincial level, without due 
recognition being given to the private (communal) ownership of local forest 
resources (see Taylor, this volume), and without any statutory mechanism for 
ensuring consistency between these nineteen plans and their national counterpart 
(personal communication, Ben Everts,34 1 996). The apparent contradiction 
between the practice of sustainable forest management and the pursuit of 
provincial participation has been further exaggerated by the more recent reforms 
of the provincial government system itself, as embodied in the New Organic 
Law of 1 995 (see chapters by Nen and Taylor, this volume). In practice, the 
provincial p lanning function has been taken over by the newly centralised 
National Forest Serv ice (see PNGF A 1 994, 1 995a), but the planning process as a 
whole has become a pol itical footbal l  kicked back and forth between a Minister 
whose prime concern is to expedite the issue of new timber permits, by 
commanding the production of the National Forest Plan, and government 
officials who can sti l l  block his shots with their mastery of legal techn icalities 
and scientific data. 
This may help to explain why the World Bank has studiously avoided any 
reference to the planning process in the conditions attached to PNG' s  structural 
adjustment programme, and why some of the planners in the National Forest 
Service have concluded that the planning requirements of the Forestry Act are a 
positive hindrance to the achievement of ' sustainabil ity' at the on ly level where 
this can be sensibly pursued - which is the level of operational project 
management. Any attempt to rational ise these aspects of the Act carries the 
obvious risk of encouraging pol iticians to continue their pursuit of more dubious 
amendments, of the kind most recently blocked by the World Bank' s  loan 
conditions, which would give them greater control over the National Forest 
Board. The main focus of bureaucratic reform has therefore shifted to the 
practical enforcement of the Logging Code of Practice (PNGFA/DEC 1 995) and 
the Planning, Monitoring, and Control Procedures for Natural Forest Logging 
(PNGFA 1 995b). 
There is no doubting the need for greater regulation at the local level ,  with 
or without the warrant provided by national plans and guidelines, but the current 
pattern of relationships between logging companies and local communities, 
which has been documented at great length in the first part of this volume, does 
get temporal and spatial sequencing running properly to attain effective national sustainabil ity ' and 
this cannot follow from the imposition of a 's imple annual maximum cut ' ,  whether by fiscal or 
other means. 
34 Team Leader, Forest Management and Planning Project. The discussion which fol lows is 
based on an interview with Mr Everts conducted in June 1 996, at the conclusion of this World 
Bank-funded project. 
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not bode wel l  for its achievement. Even if a broad consensus had been reached 
over the future direction of national pol icy, it might sti l l  be argued that the 
diversity of tree species and low timber volumes which are characteristic of 
PNG's  forest resource mean that large-scale industrial logging is unl ikely to 
remain an attractive economic proposition unless it continues to be carried out in 
an environmental ly destructive manner. This is one of the reasons why 
commentators l ike Barnett ( 1 992) have doubted the val idity of the forty-year 
'cutting cycle' which has commonly been used in calculations of sustainable 
yield. Such arguments have now been reinforced by the evidence of variable 
regeneration rates contained in the Forest Inventory Mapping System. But then 
one may wonder whether the ' fine-tuned' planning which is theoretical ly 
possible with the aid of th is new database can be appl ied, in practice, to an 
industrial and pol itical setting which has so many messy features. 
Although the pol icy reformers have applauded the World Bank's apparent 
concern to raise the share of resource rent which ends up in the pockets of local 
landowners, they have general ly failed to comment on the possibi l ity that such 
an increase in landowner revenues wi l l  provide an additional financial incentive 
for landowners to applaud the unsustainable exploitation of their own forest 
resources. The disappearance of the ' reforestation levy' into their 'consolidated 
revenues' may l ikewise be seen as a way of discouraging the local pursuit of 
sustainabi l ity (personal communication, Gerard Ward, 1 997). The reformers 
have tried to square th is particular circle by suggesting that landowners have not 
previously possessed the knowledge, or perhaps even the power, to make a 
' rational ' response to market s ignals (see Brunton 1 996), but it is not at al l  clear 
whether other stakeholders have now deve loped the capacity to convince 
landowners that the short-term financial gains from large-scale logging carry a 
long-term price which ought not to be paid by future generations or the global 
community (see Fi ler l 997b). 
Meanwhi le, the log export industry may have its own vested interest in 
pushing the definition of ' sustainable management' back to the national level ,  
where its argument with the World Bank can be pursued as a fairly 
straightforward public debate about the impact of taxation levels on the 
aggregate national harvest. On the other hand, one of the few th ings which 
industry representatives Gurrently share with many of their local critics is a high 
level of suspicion about the Bank's own motivations in the conduct of th is 
argument. Amongst the ranks of the reformers, there are some who bel ieve that 
the Bank' s concern with ' sustainabi l ity' has always been subordinate to its other 
aim of distributing log export revenues in what it considers to be the most 
equitable and efficient manner, whi le others maintain that th is concern has 
largely been driven by the need to gratify a Western green lobby which has very 
l ittle idea about the best way to regulate forestry practice in a country l ike PNG.  
One of the government' s forestry consultants has told me that the Bank' s 
'heavy-handed approach' has been motivated by the frustrations of its failure to 
influence the direction of forest pol icy in Indonesia, whi le an official of the 
Forest Industries Association attributes the same phenomenon to a desire to take 
revenge on the Malaysian logging industry for a simi lar refusal to toe the l ine. 
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In PNG' s  rumour-driven political system, which sits uneasi ly alongside its 
donor-driven policy process, it is  hardly possible to assess the relative merits of 
such conjectures. But they to serve to show how the various sets of numbers 
recently installed in the Forest Authority' s  computers are primari ly connected by 
the logic of stakeholder relat ionships. 
State, Capital, and Community 
The question of capital concentration is commonly treated, by all stakeholders, 
as a question about the extent to which 'monopoly power' may either hinder or 
faci litate the imposition of a regime of ' sustained yield management' and the 
optimal distribution of log export revenues between ' industry participants ' .  
Those who complain about the dominant position occupied by a s ingle company 
(RH), and who publicise figures which seem to exaggerate the extent of its 
control over the log export industry, are clearly convinced that this purported 
mdnopoly is inimical to the values of ' sustainabi l ity' and ' equity' alike. As we 
have seen, the 'battle against big capital ' reached its peak in 1 993, when the 
reforming zeal of the Forests Minister and the newly appointed General Manager 
of the Forest Authority resulted in a very publ ic confrontation with RH, whose 
reputation as a monopol ist has been firmly embedded in subsequent publ ic 
debate about the log export industry (see Fi ler l 996b ) . This confrontation was 
coupled with the preparation of the Forestry Development Guidel ines, which not 
only required the imposition of a new revenue system and the l imitation of log 
harvests to ' sustainable levels ' ,  but also proposed an end to raw log exports by 
the turn of the m illenium . In this way, it was impl ied that the economic power 
of RH was one of the main reasons for the absence of ' sustainabil ity' and 
'equity' in the log export industry, and the imposition of a log export ban was 
the most effective way of breaking this stranglehold. 
As previously noted, it is  the form, rather than the extent, of capital 
concentration which seems to warrant the suspicion that S ino-Malaysian 
domination of the log export industry is the main obstacle to the rational isation 
of forest management in PNG, primari ly because the relevant companies are not 
accountable to the shareholding public in the same way as their counterparts in 
the mining and petroleum sector, and therefore deserve to be portrayed as a 
corrupting influence on the body pol itic.35 But this imputation is not amenable 
to statistical analysis, and despite its pol itical appeal, it also tends to conceal a 
more complex dynamic in the mutual relationships of the major stakeholders. 
Firstly, the loggers and the donors have found some common ground in 
their opposition to the log export ban proposed in the Forestry Development 
Guidelines, s ince the donors and their affil iated experts have consistently argued 
that 'downstream processing' is l iable to dimin ish the proportion of economic 
rent which accrues to the resource owners without creating any new incentives 
35 Henderson ( 1 996a) has publ ished the most fulsome account of 'corruption ' in PNG's  log 
export industry. 
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for sustainabi lity (see World Bank 1 989; Duncan 1 994).36 Such arguments have 
helped the loggers to persuade some resource owners, or their representatives, to 
join in their campaign against the Guidel ines, even whi le the donors have been 
funding other projects in the process of reform which seek to undermine this 
'unholy al l iance ' (see S impson, this volume), and also funding the activities of 
local NGOs whose members have continued to support the imposition of an 
export ban (see Brunton 1 996).37 Meanwhile, some of the 'reformist' elements 
within the forestry bureaucracy have come to the conclusion that it is easier for 
the state to negotiate the rationalisation of forest management with one or two 
'big operators ' than it is to deal with a larger number of smal ler companies with 
less experience of PNG, with lower levels of investment, and with fewer reasons 
to participate in an efficient management regime. In th is respect, the common 
ground between the larger logging companies and government authorities is the 
pursuit of institutional sustainabi l ity when deal ing with a host of resource­
owning groups whose own capacity to speak with a united voice is currently as 
l imited as their capacity to deal with the statistics of resource development. 
36 The Indonesian government's promotion of its own plywood industry is held up as an 
i l lustration of this point (see Maj id Cooke, this volume). 
37 In 1 996, World Bank officials were dangl ing substantial financial carrots in front of previously 
hostile NGOs in order to attract their support for crucial features of the country ' s  structural 
adjustment programme. 
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Appendix A: The Current Distribution of Timber Permits (June 1996) 
Most of the information contained in this appendix is based on two sources: 
• A PNG Forest Authority ' Projects List ' ,  dated 1 2  June 1 996. 
• Annex 4 of a report on 'Representative Resource Owner Bodies for Forestry 
Projects ' (Whimp 1 995), whose information is sourced to the PNGFA 
Company Registration Database as of May 1 995 . 
Al l  permits l isted in either of these sources have been included in this append ix. 
Those which appear in the earlier, but not the later, of the two sources are 
presumably permits which had expired by June 1 996. Footnotes are used to 
indicate any d iscrepancies between these two sources in respect of permits 
which are l isted in both. 
Most of the permits l isted in either of these two sources are shown on the 
maps contained in the 1 996 National Forest Plan, dated May 1 996. Those 
permits which do not appear on these maps (and which have presumably 
expired) are marked with an asterisk. 
Information on the identity of contractors (as opposed to permit-holders) is 
derived from the second of these two sources. Footnotes are used to indicate 
those cases in which such information is known to be out of date. 
Provinces have been arranged in the order used by the National Census 
Office rather than the PNG Forest Authority. Projects with in provinces have 
been arranged in an order which reflects their spatial relationship, initially by 
census district, but potential ly by open electorate. This means that all projects 
which fall within the boundaries of a single district (or electorate) are grouped 
together. 
There are two additional projects (Putput Freehold and Utan Plantation) 
which appear in the Forest Authority' s  records of 'Exports by Projects ' for the 
years 1 993-95 (see Appendix B), but which do not appear in any of the other 
three sources mentioned here. They are therefore omitted from this appendix. 
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PROVINCE & PERMIT 
WESTERN 
TP- 1 -6:  Oriomo Wimare 
TP- 1 -7:  Wawoi-Guavi B locks 1 -3 
TP- 1 -9 :  Makapa 
GULF 
FMA 2- 1 2 : Turama3 
TP-2- 1 5 : East Kikori/Urama Gopera 
TP-2- 1 4 : Vai lala Consolidated 
CENTRAL 
TP-3-35 :  Orne Orne 
TP-3-27: Iva Inika 
TP-3-26 : Gorohu 
TP-3-32 :  Vanapa North 
TP-3-34: Edevu 
TP-3-30: Orman Lako 
LFA 3-2 :  Lako lmi la 
TP-3-33 : Marshall Lagoon 
TA-025 :  Cape Rodney-Kupiano* 
TL-3-8:  Yanu Land Lease* 
TP-3-28 : Bonua Magarida 
TP-3-29 :  West Gadaisu 
MILNE BAY 
TP-4-3 : Sagarai Gadaisu 
TP-4-6: Gara Modewa 
TP-4-5 : West Gurney 
TL-4-2: Woodlark Islandd 
ORO 
TL-5-2 : Awowota State Land* 
TP-5- 1 0 : Embi Hanau 
TP-5-9: Joma Block 4 
LF A-5- 1 :  Y ema Gaiapa 
WESTERN HIGHLANDS 
TP-9- 1 3 :  Kul i  LPA 
MORO BE 
TP- 1 3-34: Morobe Coast 
TP- 1 3-32 : Kui Buso & Extension 
TL- 1 3- 1 5 :  Bulolo Forest Plantation 
TP- 1 3-33 :  Watut West 
TP- 1 3-3 1 :  Buhem Mongi 
TP- 1 3-27: Umboi Island 
PERMIT HOLDER [CONTRACTOR] 
Forest Management Services (PNG) 
Wawoi Guavi Timber Co. 
Innovision (PNG) 
Turama Forest Industries [Concord Pacific] 
Gopera Investments [Rimbunan Hijau (PNG)] 
Shisei Enterprises Co. 
Orne Orne Forest [Niugini Lumber Merchant] 
lmi Development Co. [Kerawara]b 
Hams Forest Development 
Koneri Development [Niugini Lumber Merchant] 
Honeri Timber Resources Dev 't  
T L Timber Development 
Abau Timbersc 
Landwell  Resources 
Landwel l  Resources 
Landwell Forestry 
Magarida Timbers [Rimbunan Hijau (PNG)] 
Maisi Trust Co. [Santa (PNG)] 
Ulabo Timber Co. 
Suau Investment Co. [Saban Enterprises] 
Hiai Magi Timber Co. [Ulabo Timber Co.] 
Woodlark Island Dev 't Corporation 
Ambogo Sawmil l  
Ambogo Sawmil l  
Binandere Holdings [Green Mountain] 
Yema Timbers 
Angal imp Business Group 
Golden Pines Sawmil l ing Co. [contractor unknown] 
SKB Development [Timber Prod. & Mark. Co. (PNG)] 
PNG Forest Products 
PNG Forest Products 
Low Impact Logging 
Umboi Timber Investment [Rimbunan Hijau (PNG)] 
a The new FMA includes the old Turama Timber Permit (TP 2- 1 2) held by Long-Term Trading 
Pty Ltd. 
b The current contractor has been identified by staff of the FIA (personal communication, Bob 
Tate, 1 997). According to Whimp ( 1 995), it was formerly Hong Jeon Co. 
c Whimp ( 1 995) gives the permit holder as Landwell Resources. 
d Now shown as a Timber Permit in the National Forest Plan. 
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PROVINCE & PROJECT 
MADA NG 
TP- 1 2- 1 8 : Rai Coast 
TP- 1 2-2 1 :  Gogol Valley 
TP- 1 2-20: Sogeram 
TP- 1 2-3 : North Coast & Naru Gum 
TP- 1 2-6: Far North Coast 
TP- 1 2-22 : Kumil 
EAST SEPIK 
LF A- 1 1 - 1 :  Lower Sepik 
LFA- 1 1 -2 : Hawain 
WEST SEPIK 
TP- 1 0-8 : Vanimo Timber Area 
LF A- 1 0- 1 :  Bewani 
LFA- 1 0-2: Pegi Pulan 
�ANUS 
LFA- 1 8-2: Kali Bay 
LFA- 1 8- 1 : Jaha 
TP- 1 8-2: Manus West Coast 
NEW IRELAND 
TP- 1 6-4 1 : Mussau 
TP- 1 6-48 : Umbukul 
TP- 1 6-45 : West Kaut 
LFA- 1 6- 1 :  Nakmai 
LFA- 16-2: Ugana 
TL- 1 6-2 : Komale Plantation P.323 * 
TP- 1 6-4 7 :  Konogogo* 
TP- 16-42 : Central New Ireland 
LFA- 16- 1 2 :  Sural i l Rasrik* 
TP- 1 6-46: Lenai 
TP- 1 6-43 : Lak 
EAST NEW BRITAIN 
TP- 1 5-49: Inland Pomio 
TP- 1 5-55 : Waterfall Bay Extension 
TP- 1 5-59: Nutuve 
TL- 1 5- 1 1 :  Bergberg 
TL- 1 5- 1 2 :  Bergberg Extension 
TP- 1 5-45 : Tokai Matong 
TP- 1 5-56: Cape Orford 
TP- 1 5-44: Gar 
TP- 1 5-52: Senbam Extension 
PERMIT HOLDER [CONTRACTOR] 
Raikos Holdings [Saban Enterprises] 
Jant 
Sogeram Development Co. [Madang Timbers] 
Jant [Madang Timbers] 
Madang Timbers 
Papir Development Corporation 
Sepik River Dev't Corporation [Mosko Lumber (PNG)] 
Wongwong Logging [Sovereign Hill (PNG)] 
Vanimo Forest Products [WTK Realty] 
Wawunai [WTK Realty] 
Wawunai [WTK Realty] 
Kali Bay Dev 't Corporation [Rimbunan Hijau (PNG)] 
Jaha Development Corporation [Monarch Investment] 
Kai Beseu Kampani [Seal (Manus)] 
Concord Pacific8 
Dominance Resources 
Kabato Development Co. [Timbers (PNG)] 
Nakmai ( 1 989) [Niugini Lumber Merchant] 
Ugana Timbers [Rimbunan Hijau (PNG)] 
Komale 
Konogogo Timber Resources [contractor unknown] 
Basoma Holdings [Lombda] 
Sopathin Development Co. [Santa (PNG)] 
Lenai Dev 't Corporation [Lusco Enterprise] 
Metlak Development Co. [Niugini Lumber Merchant] 
Magasaki [Jumbo Enterprises] 
Mumore Co. [Niugini Lumber Merchant] 
Kisoi Development Corporation [contractor unknown] 
Palmalmal Investments [Lombda] 
Mid-Rivers [Niugini Lumber Merchant] 
Elmere Legru [Niugini Lumber Merchant] 
Balokoma [Niugini Lumber Merchant] 
Maden Co. [Bismark Industries] 
Muvanastum [Bismark Industries] 
a According to Whimp ( 1 995), the permit was formerly held by a landowner company, Mussau 
Timber Development, with Concord Pacific as its contractor. 
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PROVINCE & PERMIT 
EAST NEW BRITAIN (cont.) 
TL- 1 5-8: Warongoi L.P.A. 
TL- 1 5-9: Taraiwara• 
TP- 1 5-40: Gaulim Extension 
TP- 1 5-54: Vudal 
TP- 1 5-34: Kerevat Balsa Plant 'n 
TP- 1 5-57: Ramandu Portiona 
TP- 1 5-58: Seraj i 
TP- 1 5-53 : Open Bay Consolidated 
WEST NEW BRITAIN 
TP- 1 4-4 1 :  Bakada Madedua Ext'nb 
TP- 1 4-43 : Ulamona Consolidated 
TP- 14-38 : Hargy Consol idated 
TP- 14-58: Maututu (Hargy)* 
TP- 1 4-52: Ania Kapiura Consol 'dd 
TP- 14-57: Mosa-Laeim 
TP- 14-50: Kapuluk & Ext'n 
LFA- 1 4-6: Aria Vanu Block 1 
LFA- 1 4- 1 3 :  Aria Vanu Block 3 
TP- 14-56: Rottock Bay 
LFA- 14-2: Lolo Block 1 
LF A- 1 4-3 : Lo lo Block 2 
LFA- 1 4- 1 2 :  Lolo Block 2 Ext'n 
TP- 1 4-53 :  West Arawe 
TP- 1 4-54: Central Arawe 
TP- 1 4-55 :  East Arawe 
LFA- 14-4 : Pulie Anu 
LFA- 14-5 : Anu Alimbit 
LFA- 1 4-8: Alimbit Andru 
LFA- 1 4- 1 0 : Passismanua Block 1 
LFA- 1 4- 1 4 : Passismanua Ext'n 
LF A- 1 4- 1 1 :  Andru Johanna 
LFA- 1 4- 1 :  Atuvo 
LFA- 14-7: Atuvo Extension 
LFA- 14-9: Avio Amgen 
NORTH SOLOMONS 
TP- 1 7- 1 3 :  Kunua 
TP- 1 7- 1 4 : Manetai 
PERMIT HOLDER [CONTRACTOR] 
Richard Gaul� Industries [Taraiwara] 
Taraiwara 
Gaulim Logging Corporation [Richard Gault Industries] 
Kairak Investment [Lombda] 
Teperoi Timbers 
Urisikuat Timbers [Leytrac] 
Nangal [contractor unknown] 
Open Bay Timber 
Unevulg Development [Open Bay Timber] 
Ulamona Sawmill Development [PNG Forest 
Resourcest 
Shin Asahigawa 
Kumo Development Corporation 
Stettin Bay Lumber Co. 
Stettin Bay Lumber Co. 
Nam Yang Timbers (PNG) 
Aria Vanu Timber Co. [Rimbunan Hijau (PNG)] 
Aria Vanu Timber Co. [Rimbunan Hijau (PNG)] 
Evenpio Investments [Rimbunan Hijau (PNG)] 
Lolo Development Co. [Monarch Investment] 
Lolo Development Co. [Monarch Investment] 
Lolo Development Co. [Monarch Investment] 
Milupol Development Co. [Cakara Alam (PNG)] 
Central Arowe Resources [Cakara Alam (PNG)] 
East Arowe Timber Resource [Cakara Alam (PNG)] 
G.R. Logging [WTK Realty] 
G.R. Logging [Fonsen Logging] 
Kandrian Timber Investment [Island Forest Resources] 
Passismanua Inland Timber Res. [Timbers (PNG)] 
Passismanua Inland Timber Res. [Timbers (PNG)] 
A J Timber Development [WTK Realty] 
Menvuvu [Timbers (PNG)] 
Menvuvu [Timbers (PNG)] 
Sare Resources [Timbers (PNG)] 
Northwest Bougainville Dev 't 
Asikopan 
a TP- 1 5-57 apparently replaces TL- 1 5- 1 0  of the same name, as shown in Whimp ( 1 995). 
b Also known as Extended Mengen. 
c Whimp ( 1 995) records the permit holder as Archdiocese of Rabaul TA Vunapope. According to 
FIA staff, PNG Forest Resources is not the operator, but purchases and exports logs cut by the 
landowner company, Ulamona Sawmill Development, which acquired the permit from the Catholic 
mission (personal communication, Bob Tate). 
d Includes TP- 1 4- 1 4  (Bulu) and TP- 1 4- 1 9  (Fulleborne Extension). 
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Appendix B: Log Export Project Profiles 
Most of the information contained in this appendix is based on two separate 
outputs from the PNG Forest Authority database, both dated 1 2  June 1 996 : 
• Information on current project status, timber permit period, project area, and 
estimated resource are al l  derived from the 'Projects List' which has also 
been used as the primary source of information for Appendix A. 
• Information on actual exports for each year from 1 993 to 1 995 has been taken 
from a separate l isting of 'Exports by Projects ' for each of these years. 
Information on projected harvest levels for the years 1 996-200 1 has been taken 
from Appendix 7 of the 1 996 National Forest Plan. 
The following codes are used to indicate the ' status' of each project in June 
1 996 (Column 1 ) : 
OP = operating; 
NO = not operating; 
AC = accepted; 
PE = permit extended; 
PS = permit suspended; 
NA = no information avai lable. 
In those cases where information on exports during the years 1 993-95 i s  not 
matched by any corresponding information on project status, permit period, 
project area or estimated resource, it can normally be assumed that the permit 
had expired by June 1 996. 
For ease of cross-reference, the permits l isted in Appendix B are l isted in 
the same order as in Appendix A. 
PROVINCE Permit 
& PERMIT period 
[STATUS] (years) 
WESTERN 
TP- 1 -6 [OP] : 87-97 
TP- 1 -7 [OP] : 92-02 
TP- 1 -9 [AC] :  92- 1 2  
Total 
GULF 
FMA 2- 1 2  [OP] : 88-08 
TP-2- 1 5  [OP] : 92-02 
TP-2- 1 4  [OP] : 9 1 -03 
Total 
CENTRAL 
TP-3-35 [OP] : 92-02 
TP-3-27 [OP] : 88-98 
TP-3-26 [NO] : 89-99 
TP-3-32 [PS] : 90-00 
TP-3-34 [OP] : 92-02 
TP-3-30 [OP] : 90-00 
LFA 3-2 [OP] : 89-99 
TP-3-33 :  
TA-025 : 
TL-3-8: 
TP-3-28 [NO] :  88-08 
TP-3-29: 
Total 
MILNE BAY 
TP-4-3 [NO] :  87-02 
TP-4-6 [OP] : 90-00 
TP-4-5 [NO] :  90-98 
TL-4-2 [PE] : 93-96 
Total 
ORO 
TL-5-2: 
TP-5- 1 0 : 
TP-5-9 [NO] : 88-98 
LFA-5- 1 [OP] : 9 1 -06 
Total 
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Project Estimated Actual exports (m3) Projected 
area resource --------------------------------- harvest 
(ha.) (m3) 1993 1994 1995 1996-2001 
24,289 729,040 28,788 
474,078 3 ,228,9 1 2  328,373 285,59 1 275,0 1 4  1 ,983, 1 56 
30 1 ,494 7,900,000 
799,86 1 1 1 ,857,952 328,373 285,59 1 275,0 1 4  2,0 1 1 ,944 
1 87,733 2,7 1 6,077 1 7 1 ,526 285,59 1 1 04,9 1 8  970, 1 76 
83,800 1 ,509,3 1 2  4,942 1 2, 1 55 99,534 
88,680 1 ,43 1 ,508 3 ,60 1 2,926 92,400 
360,2 1 3  5,656,897 1 80,069 288,5 1 7  1 1 7,073 1 ,  1 62, 1 1 0 
25,870 376,667 1 1 5, 1 52 
1 3 ,463 1 84,400 57,576 
23,64 1 965,752 
78,422 300,000 27,049 5,945 
26,850 326,652 9,596 
20,275 357,652 43, 1 82 
45,000 900,000 1 3 , 1 66 7, 1 34 
29,254 1 7,803 
1 5,545 
1 7,8 1 8  1 4,588 
1 08,000 1 ,5 1 8,630 73,8 1 5  5 1 ,779 
1 2,285 5,446 99,534 
34 1 ,52 1 4,929,753 1 33,  1 72 1 1 6,665 28, 7 1 1 280,543 
1 1 8,95 1 540,378 57,072 
23,000 1 29,200 46,720 36,399 1 7,722 59,448 
22,673 354,230 1 9, 1 92 
30,332 70,000 3,953 2, 1 79 
1 94,956 1 ,093,808 46,720 40,352 1 9,90 1 1 07, 1 76 
5,40 1 4,660 
32,432 99,870 
29,620 566,400 1 1 5 , 1 52 
38,930 1 ,  1 70,000 35,47 1 64, 1 1 1  1 0,539 1 99,740 
68,550 1 ,736,400 73,304 64, 1 1 1  1 5 , 1 99 207,38 1  
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PROVINCE Permit Project Estimated Actual exports (m3) Projected 
& PERMIT period area resou rce --------------------------------- harvest 
[STATUS] (years) (ha.) (m3) 1993 1994 1995 1996-2001 
W. H'LANDS 
TP-9- 1 3  [NO] : 88-98 1 , 6 1 8 3 5,000 
Total 1 ,6 1 8  3 5,000 
MORO BE 
TP- 1 3-34 [NA] : 96-05 440,800 1 ,22 1 ,800 
TP- 1 3-32 [NO] : 9 1 -0 1  45,o"OO 640,000 58,335 38,99 1 4,506 73,7 14 
TL- 1 3 - 1 5  [PE] : 96-3 1 4,500,000 
TP- 1 3-33 [NO] : 92-02 3 1 ,950 436,840 1 72,728 
TP- 1 3-3 1  [OP] : 9 1 -96 38, 1 90 373,350 
TP- 1 3-27 [OP] : 9 1 -0 1  42,26 1 56,946 70,00 1 29,259 6 1 ,  1 77 1 3 5,540 
Total 598,20 1 7,228,936 1 28,336 68,250 65,683 295,6 1 8  
MADA NG 
TP- 1 2- 1 8  [OP] : 92-02 75,000 860,375 1 9,957 43,455 35 ,023 1 78,344 
TP- 1 2-2 1 :  
TP- 1 2-20 [OP] : 90-00 56,480 276,073 1 72,440 
TP- 1 2-3 : 
TP- 1 2-6 [OP] : 88-98 9,950 344,799 3 ,263 4,992 
TP- 1 2-22 [NO] : 95-04 59,200 592,200 
Total 200,630 2,073 ,447 23,220 43,455 35,023 1 77,888 
EAST SEPIK 
LFA- 1 1 - 1  [OP] : 9 1 -0 1 39,978 640,000 1 4 1 ,830 
LFA- 1 1 -2 [OP] : 92-02 40,000 1 ,282 ,000 9, 1 07 1 6, 1 78 1 4,966 35 ,667 
Total 79,978 1 ,922,000 9, 1 07 1 6, 1 78 1 4,966 1 77,497 
WEST SEPIK 
TP-I 0-8 [OP] : 9 1 - 1 1 287,428 3 1 I , 1 00 1 35,820 1 82,639 1 94,934 920,244 
LFA- 1 0- 1  [OP] : 88-03 38,600 54,577 7 1 ,8 1 4  78,209 23 I ,336 
LFA- 1 0-2 [OP] : 89-98 1 0,000 500,000 769 25,385 233 ,448 
Total 336,028 8 1 I , 1 00 I 9 1 ,  1 66 254,453 298,528 1 ,385,028 
PROVINCE Permit 
& PERMIT period 
[STATUS] (years) 
MANUS 
LF A- 1 8-2 [OP] : 9 1 -0 1  
LFA- 1 8- 1  [OP] : 89-99 
TP- 1 8-2 [OP] : 88-03 
Total 
N. IRELAND 
TP- 1 6-4 1 [OP] : 9 1 -96 
TP- 1 6-48 [OP] : 92-02 
TP- 1 6-45 [OP] : 9 1 -96 
LFA- 1 6- 1  [NO] : 74-96 
LFA- 1 6-2: 
TL- 1 6-2 [OP] : 92-96 
TP- 1 6-47 [NO] 95-00 
TP- 1 6-42 [OP] : 9 1 -0 1  
LFA- 1 6- 1 2 : 
TP- 1 6-46 [OP] : 92-97 
TP- 1 6-43 [OP] : 90-00 
Total 
E.N. BRITAIN 
TP- 1 5-49 [OP] : 92-02 
TP- 1 5-55 [OP] : 92-02 
TP- 1 5-59 [NA] : 95-05 
TL- 1 5- 1 1 [OP] : 92-96 
TL- 1 5- 1 2  [NO] : 92-97 
TP- 1 5-45 [OP] : 89-99 
TP- 1 5-56 [OP] : 92-02 
TP- 1 5-44 [OP] : 89-98 
TP- 1 5-52 [OP] : 9 1 -99 
TL- 1 5-8 : 
TL- 1 5-9 [OP] : 92-98 
TP- 1 5-40 [PE] : 88-96 
TP- 1 5-54 [OP] : 92-97 
TP- 1 5-34 [OP] : 87-97 
TP- 1 5-57 [OP] : 95-05 
TP- 1 5-58 [OP] : 95-05 
TP- 1 5-53 : 
Total 
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Project Estimated Actual exports (m3) Projected 
area resource --------------------------------- harvest 
(ha.) (m3) 1993 1994 1995 1996-2001 
1 0,067 84,000 . 4 1 ,479 2 1 , 1 76 6, 1 46 66,580 
9,000 3 1 ,500 22,326 38, 1 07 57,066 
32,667 1 ,6 1 4,437 62,049 23,736 1 2,096 1 78,350 
5 1 ,734 1 ,729,937 1 25,854 83,0 1 9  1 8,242 30 1 ,996 
35 ,736 236,000 33 ,42 1 23,638 
22,700 520,000 22,250 55 ,849 35,949 66,580 
1 1 , 1 90 2 1 9,750 30,460 5,48 1 1 3 ,370 2 1 ,400 
1 1 0,050 800,000 
40,424 6,572 
347 1 0,400 
1 ,3 1 5  73, 1 53 
98, 1 00 840,000 1 8,548 30, 1 98 1 1 ,7 1 4  1 7 1 ,2 1 0  
1 ,224 
2,290 48,830 3 ,478 2,42 1 4, 1 62 
80,629 648,900 4 1 ,294 1 1 ,652 30, 1 65 35,668 
362,357 3,397,033 1 57,678 1 1 2, 1 73 1 24,6 1 9  322,658 
83,000 2,000,000 1 5,067 36,350 58,596 78,468 
1 5,860 300,000 5,200 8,696 
52,600 1 ,052,000 
2,900 60,000 1 1 ,245 1 5,03 1 
5,000 1 50,000 35,668 
22, 1 70 420,000 70,672 48,282 52,803 45, 1 80 
33 ,760 1 ,82 1 ,9 1 3  5 1 ,6 1 5  83,225 
l 0, 1 1 1  40,000 5 1 ,709 1 7,5 1 7  23 1 
9, 1 00 1 03 ,000 43 ,474 38,98 1 1 1 3 ,464 
3 1 ,463 3 ,466 5,903 63,576 
1 7,000 300,000 20,589 9,859 8,323 
2,845 1 35,000 
9,770 99,000 28,788 
1 20 36,000 
23,592 8 1 2,800 32,585 
1 5,000 300,000 
84,405 80,759 48,692 627,762 
302,828 7,629,7 1 3  297, 1 46 270,668 275,376 1 ,084,454 
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PROVINCE Permit Project Estimated Actual exports (m3) Projected 
& PERMIT period area resource ------------------------------- harvest 
[STATUS] (years) (ha.) (m3) 1993 1994 1995 1996-2001 
W.N. BRITAIN 
TP- 1 4-4 1 [NO] : 86-96 57, 1 00 680,000 47,2 1 1  5 1 ,879 1 7,454 243 ,735 
TP- 1 4-43 [OP] : 87-96 2 1 ,565 760,000 20,458 24,520 1 0,8 1 1 1 62,290 
TP- 1 4-38 [NO) : 88-98 25,300 400,000 
TP- 14-58 [NO] : 95-05 1 4,045 6 1 3,906 57,576 
TP- 14-52 [OP] : 90- 1 4  409,793 7, 1 00,000 1 1 2,935 90,304 29,262 1 ,055,784 
TP- 1 4-57 [OP] : ??-02 20,980 685,645 67,490 53, 1 94 29,742 
TP- 1 4-50 [OP) : 89-09 1 69, 1 40 3 ,500,000 75,444 93,045 64,794 577,824 
LFA- 14-6 [OP] : 89-04 39,650 1 ,  1 07,000 69,647 47,667 32,868 1 1 6,5 1 6  
LFA- 14- 1 3  [OP) : 92-02 39,650 1 ,035,000 1 9 1 ,920 
TP- 1 4-56 [NO] : 9 1 -96 20,640 240,000 2, 1 49 3 , 1 49 
LFA- 14-2 [OP] : 90-99 39,500 800,000 1 0,678 38,844 1 1 7,705 
LFA- 1 4-3 [OP] : 90-02 40,000 800,000 63,006 52,054 34,8 1 3  228,276 
LFA- 1 4- 1 2  [OP] : 92-02 40,000 676,000 32, 1 23 77,02 1 56,385 335,280 
TP- 1 4-53 [OP] : 90-00 68, 1 8 1  1 ,6 1 7,000 1 30, 1 59 99,890 9 1 ,568 299,6 1 2  
TP- 1 4-54 [OP] : 9 1 -06 63,500 1 ,397,760 32,527 1 05,236 1 04,839 266,324 
TP- 1 4-55 [OP] : 9 1 -0 1  6 1 ,600 1 ,397,760 42,370 94,009 76,888 347, 1 72 
LFA- 1 4-4 [OP) : 88-98 40,000 800,000 65,7 1 9  64,299 42,670 1 04,628 
LF A- 1 4-5 [OP] : 89-09 32,800 800,000 44,932 90, 1 1 5  74,036 1 67,640 
LFA- 1 4-8 [OP) : 90-05 39,930 1 ,200,000 59,569 96,395 73,9 1 7  1 78,344 
LFA- 1 4- 1 0  [OP) : 92-02 40,000 650,000 36,076 1 42,366 90,375 1 78,34 1 
LFA- 1 4- 1 4  92-02 34,840 650,000 290,995 
[NO) : 
LFA- 1 4- 1 1 [OP] : 92-07 40,000 1 ,3 85,000 70,88 1 88,002 77,920 577,824 
LFA- 1 4- 1  [NO) : 9 1 -0 1  4,548 
LFA- 1 4-7 [OP) : 9 1 -0 1  40,000 1 ,000,000 1 1 5 ,848 1 04,550 62,486 27 1 ,080 
LFA- 1 4-9 [OP] : 9 1 -0 1  37,980 1 ,000,000 1 47,009 1 1 0,602 54,93 1 1 1 7,705 
Total 1 ,440,742 30,295,07 1 1 ,233,404 1 ,497,975 1 ,067,752 5,886,57 1 
N. SOLOMONS 
TP- 1 7- 1 3  [NO) : 88-98 23 ,864 380,000 38,384 
TP- 1 7- 1 4  [NO] : 88-98 24,070 327,3 1 0  
Total 47,934 707,3 1 0  38,384 
UNKNOWN 1 3 ,607 1 2,480 52,879 
NAT. TOTAL 5, 1 87, 1 5 1  8 1 , 1 04,357 2,94 1 , 1 56 3, 1 53,887 2,408,966 1 4,054,569 
CHAPTER l l  
THE STATE VERSUS CUSTOM: 
REGULATING PAPUA NEW GUINEA'S TIMBER INDUSTRY 
Roo TAYLOR 
Background 
A unique feature of the Constitution of Papua New Guinea (PNG) is its 
recognition of custom . Custom is defined (in Schedule 1 )  as ' the customs and 
usages of indigenous inhabitants of the country existing in relation to the matter 
in question at the time when and the place in relation to which the matter arises, 
regardless of whether or not the custom or usage has existed from time 
immemorial ' .  Except where it is  inconsistent with statute law, custom forms 
part of the underlying law along with adopted principles of Engl ish common law 
and equity. Through custom, local kinship groups own 97 percent of PNG's  
land mass and most of  its natural forest resources. 
PNG's commercially accessible timber volumes are concentrated in 
lowland and coastal areas with low population densities. In these areas, people 
general ly practise shifting cultivation within wel l-defined pockets of secondary 
vegetation (Al len 1 993) .  Through kinship groupings, they claim customary 
ownership of the large tracts of natural forest, between their gardening areas, 
that contain the timber resources targetted for industrial logging. 
At Independence, PNG inherited two very different forestry laws - the 
h ighly interventionist Forestry Act and the laissez-faire Forestry (Private 
Dealings) Act. Under the Forestry Act, only the state could acquire timber rights 
from customary landowners. 1 The state purchased these rights under a standard­
form Timber Rights Purchase Agreement. Landowners received royalties at a 
prescribed rate, and had no legal say over which logging company held the 
timber permit, what infrastructure was bui lt, or the rate at which the timber was 
harvested. 
The Forestry (Private Dealings) Act perm itted customary forest landowners 
to sell their timber privately. The usual practice was for a ' landowner company' 
to acquire timber harvesting rights from landowners and then on-sel l  the rights 
to a foreign logging company. Provided the Minister assented to the 'deal ings ' ,  
the logging company could operate without a timber permit and with minimal 
state supervision. 
1 The term ' landowners' is used in PNG to describe groups or individuals with customary rights 
to land and resources. The term covers resource rights, as wel l  as land rights, and masks the 
distinction between group ownership rights and individual use rights (see Fingleton 1 993 :43). 
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In 1 989, the Commission of Inquiry into Aspects of the Forest Industry 
(Barnett 1 989c) documented an 'out of control ' timber industry characterised by 
pervasive corruption, transfer pricing, and reckless logging practices . The new 
National Forest Policy (approved in 1 990) and the new Forestry Act (passed in 
1 99 1  and gazetted in 1 992) responded to the Commission 's  cal l  for increased 
state control and planning in the forestry sector. The new Act incorporated the 
PNG Forest Authority and vested it with responsibil ity for timber industry 
regulation under the guidance of the National Forest Board. 
Under the new Forestry Act, the state has reserved to itself a monopoly on 
the right to enter into a Forest Management Agreement with landowners. If they 
cannot strike an acceptable deal with the Forest Authority, landowners are barred 
from arranging industrial-scale logging on their land.2 If a Forest Management 
Agreement is concluded, it is the National Forest Board, not the landowners, 
which selects a forest industry participant to implement the agreement and 
recommends to the Minister that a timber permit be granted.3 
The Act also cal ls for the formulation of a National Forest Plan and requires 
all forest development to accord with it (Section 54 ). The Plan is intended to 
comprise a pol icy statement, the National Forestry Development Guidel ines 
( ' the Guidelines ' ), a development programme, and a statement of annual 
allowable cut (Section 47). Whi le the Guidel ines were approved ' in-principle ' 
in 1 993, the Plan itself did not make its first publ ic appearance until May 1 996 
(see F iler, this volume). 
The new Act saved al l projects and agreements approved under former 
legislation, but gave the new National Forest Board power to make variations to 
bring them into l ine with the new regime (Section 1 37) .  As late as February 
1 996,4 the Board had not yet exercised this power nor issued any permits under 
the new Act. All current projects were operating under arrangements that 
predated the new regime. 
Environmental Protection Measures 
Strategic Land- Use Planning 
The Forestry Act (Section 54) requires all forest resources to be developed in 
accordance with the National Forest Plan .  According to the Forest Pol icy 
2 No timber permit over customary land can be granted unless landowners have entered into a 
Forest Management Agreement with the Forest Authority (Section 55) . Logging can be carried out 
under a Timber Authority without a Forest Management Agreement, but the timber harvested 
cannot exceed 5,000 cubic metres per year and cannot be exported in round log form (Section 87). 
3 It is possible for landowners, through the terms of their Forest Management Agreement, to 
insist that the selected industry participant be contracted to a permit-holding landowner company 
rather than hold the permit itself. 
4 The first draft of the present chapter was completed in February 1 996, and the remainder of the 
text makes very l ittle reference to subsequent events. 
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(PNGMOF 1 99 1  : 5 ), the Forest Authority should help provincial governments to 
identify forest areas for IOng-term timber production or protection for ecological, 
cultural, or environmental reasons, or clearance for other uses. 5 These 
class ifications are to form the basis for Provincial Forest Development 
Programmes within the National Forest Plan (ibid: 1 3 - 1 4) .  
Forest classification, as proposed in the National Forest Pol icy, has proved 
difficult to implement. First, pol itical friction between national and provincial 
governments has constrained provincial input.6 Second, the Forest Authority' s  
part in coordinating the process cal led for close management and enormous 
technical input at a time when its attention was focussed on internal 
reorganisation and unresolved pol icy issues. But perhaps the major obstacle to 
completion of this exercise has been growing doubt over its abi l ity to win the 
respect of landowners .7 The v iew came to prevai l  that landowners would reject, 
outright, any l ines drawn on maps, at the whim of government officials or 
pol iticians, which purported to tel l  them what they could or could not do with 
their resources. The alternative of country-wide consultation with all landowner 
groups was simply not feasible. 
Despite the lack of progress and widely-held susp1c1on that forest 
classification is an exercise in futi l ity, no alternative basis for the Forest 
Development Programme has been agreed. A National Forest Plan remains a 
key component of the Forestry Act. Without a plan in place it is questionable 
whether permits can be legitimately granted, given the stipulation in Section 54 
that forest resources can only be developed in accordance with the Plan. 
5 The policy allowed provincial governments to defer a land-use decision by classifying an area 
as a 'reserve forest ' .  
6 Increasingly, provincial and national pol iticians saw themselves as competitors for control over 
the distribution of resources and delivery of government services. In the early 1 990s, the national 
government considered a series of reform proposals clearly intended to undermine the pol itical 
base of provincial governments (Axline 1 993). The Bipartisan Select Committee on Provincial 
Government reported to Parliament in March 1 993, recommending replacement of the existing tier 
of provincial pol iticians with provincial authorities. These were to comprise national government 
members from the province and local government leaders. The recommendations formed the basis 
of reforms that became law in 1 995. 
7 The unofficial demise of the classification endeavour can be traced through successive drafts of 
the Guidelines. The first draft presented to the National Forest Board in April 1 993 merely 
acknowledged some slippage in the time needed to complete the task, nominating Apri l 1 994 as a 
' realistic target' .  The version approved by the National Executive Council in December 1 993 
omitted the whole chapter on preparation of the Forest Plan and made no reference to forest 
classification or land-use zoning. 
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Logging Practice Standards 
Nearly al l  commercial forestry operations in PNG' s  natural forests are 
conducted under a ' se lective logging' regime.8 Beyond this  common ground, 
current timber permits, logging agreements, environmental plans, and forest 
working p lans contain piecemeal, and often contradictory, controls on logging. 
The lack of consistent and comprehensive standards, combined with poor 
compl iance monitoring, has resulted in excessive canopy removal , damage to 
residual trees, soi l  erosion, and si ltation of rivers and reefs (see Cameron and 
Vigus 1 993 ). 
In August 1 995,  the Forest Authority and the Department of Environment 
and Conservation circulated a final draft Logging Code of Practice 
(PNGFA/DEC 1 995) .  The two agencies intend for the code, once it is final i sed, 
to be brought into force through regulations under the Forestry Act.9 The 
proposed regulations will give the Forest Authority power to enforce the code 
against all commercial logging projects, including those within Local Forest 
Areas that currently operate outs ide its jurisdiction . 1 0 
The draft code prohibits logging on steep slopes, permanently inundated 
land, karst country, and mangrove areas. Thus the code wi l l  operate as a land­
use planning instrument, but one that is more manageable and less 
confrontational to landowners than a nationwide forest zon ing strategy of the 
kind already described . The code sets clear and unequivocal standards for 
protection of watercourses and coastl ines, curtai l ing soi l  disturbance and damage 
to residual trees, managing waste, and operational planning. If it can be 
enforced, the code should substantial ly reduce the environmental impacts of 
logging. 
8 Exceptions are clear-fel l ing operations for plantations, road-l ines, and so on. In selective 
logging projects, the common bottom-l ine constraint is the prohibition on felling trees of less than 
50 cm in diameter at breast height (dbh). It could be argued that the form of selective logging 
practised in PNG is determined purely commercially, due to the wide dispersion of commercial ly­
valued species within the forest (Louman and N icholls 1 994 : 1 60). 
9 According to the preface to the draft, comments are to be considered before a final draft is 
prepared and presented to the relevant ministers with a recommendation for adoption and 
implementation. 
I O Operations in a Local Forest Area are conducted in accordance with a private agreement 
(usually between the resource owners and a ' landowner company ' )  approved under the now 
repealed Forestry (Private Dealings) Act. With no permit to enforce in these areas, Forest 
Authority officers have had no direct role to play in monitoring logging operations. As it moves to 
bring logging operations in Local Forest Areas under its control, the Forest Authority may face 
considerable resistance to its intrusion. In-principle resistance to new controls might be avoided if 
forest landowners are given the option of bringing their operations under the code rather than 
having it forced on them. 
Local Impact Assessment and Planning 
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Before the Forest Authority can sign a Forest Management Agreement with 
landowners, it must arrange a Development Options Study over the area 
concerned (Forestry Act, Section 62) .  According to  the Guidelines (PNG 
Ministry of Forests 1 993b:6), the study should assess social, economic, and 
environmental considerations in the area to identify possible uses of the forest 
with the potential of offering 'v iable and sustainable development ' .  For uses 
acceptable to landowners, the study should make 'a prel iminary assessment of 
their l ikely socioeconomic impact' . This information wil l  be presented to 
landowners ' in order that they can make an informed decis ion on the nature of 
the project to be establ ished ' . 
After landowners have s igned a Forest Management Agreement, the 
screening process for issue of a timber permit requires the submission of an 
environmental plan for approval under the Environmental Planning Act. In 
preparing the plan, the project proponent is required to undertake an 
environmental impact assessment. 
Landowners are the cl ients of the development options study, with 
responsibil ity for its completion fall ing to government. By contrast, the 
environmental plan is prepared by the private sector proponents of a project for 
consideration by government consent authorities. The government 's  record in 
fulfil l ing its obl igations under either process is poor. With development options 
studies, the Forest Authority has failed to carry out any form of study resembl ing 
that described in the Guidel ines with respect to the Forest Management 
Agreements it has made so far. As for environmental plans, the under-resourced 
Environment and Conservation Ministry has accepted poor-qual ity plans and 
undertaken monitoring on an ad hoe basis only (Hedemark and Sekhran 
1 994:34 1 ) . 
Sustained Timber Yield 
Poore ( 1 989 :  1 2) defines sustainable forest use as the practice of maintain ing the 
forest' s  potential to provide a sustained yield of certain products while also 
maintaining the forest ecosystem in a desired cond ition . The National Forest 
Pol icy adopts ' sustained yield management' as a 'guiding principle ' .  If we 
assume that the 'forest condition ' component of sustained yield needs to be 
addressed through the environmental protection measures examined in the 
previous section, we are sti l l  left with the problem of control ling harvest rates. 
The Forestry Act (Section 47) requires the National Forest Board to prepare 
a yearly statement of the al lowable cut for each province. Th is statement forms 
part of the National Forest Plan, and its purpose, according to the Act, is to 
ensure that designated production forests with in each province are 'harvested on 
a sustained yield basis ' . The Act provides no defin ition of ' sustained yield ' .  
According to the National Forest Pol icy (PNG Ministry of Forests 1 99 1  : 5 ), it 
means 'continuous production on a provincial basis with the aim of maintaining, 
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at the earliest practical time, desirable net growth at least in balance with 
harvest' .  
The National Forest Pol icy proposes that the al lowable cut for each 
province be set initially by dividing the estimated volume of merchantable 
resources zoned for production by an assumed cutting cycle of forty years. 
Statements of allowable cut are thus predicated upon the designation of 
production forests through the currently-stal led forest class ification exercise. No 
official statements had been made by the end of 1 995 . 
The National Forest Pol icy proposes a reduction in the ' permitted harvest 
volumes' where they exceed a province ' s  allowable cut, 1 1  but is silent on the 
vexed issue of how to fairly apportion the reduction between existing projects . 
Any apportionment wi l l  need to take account of the poor correlation between 
permitted, actual, and sustainable cut levels. Another issue which has not been 
addressed is whether landowners and logging companies in existing projects 
should absorb the entire cut to the exclusion of those seeking new project 
approvals. 
The Guidel ines make no reference to allowable cuts by province. Instead, 
they introduce the notion of a ' sustainable unit ' ,  being an area ' large enough to 
provide a viable operation on a sustained yield harvest basis' (PNG Ministry of 
Forests l 993b: 1 1  ). To ach ieve this, they propose a review process in which 
existing permitted cuts wil l  be reviewed, as necessary, to ach ieve a sustained 
yield within each unit. 1 2  So  far, the National Forest Board has not reduced the 
permitted cut for a s ingle project on sustained yield grounds. 
Capture, Distribution, and Investment of Rent 
The state, landowners, landowner companies, and logging companies are m 
competition for the economic surplus from timber extraction . The state 
appropriates its share through the tax laws. The remaining surplus is distributed 
1 1  Presumably, such reductions could be effected under Section 1 37(2) of the Forestry Act. This 
transitional provision gives the National Forest Board power to vary any condition in an old permit 
or agreement that, in its opinion, is 'at variance with the provisions of [the] Act to an extent which 
makes it unacceptable' . 
1 2  The state faces possible legal chal lenges i f i t  moves to reduce current permitted cuts . 
Landowners could claim that such reductions amount to unjust deprivation of their property rights 
in breach of Section 53 of the Constitution. In defence, the state could argue that landowners have 
contractual rights to receive royalties, but not a right to sell timber at a set rate, and thus will not be 
deprived of property rights through a cut reduction. Second, Section 53(5)(t) of the Constitution 
exempts property acquisitions reasonably necessary for the preservation of the environment - and 
arguably, sustained yield reductions can be characterised as environmental preservation measures. 
Alternatively, foreign logging contractors may chal lenge the reductions on the grounds that these 
will breach their investment guarantees under the Investment Promotion Act. In defence, the state 
could argue that any adjustment of permitted harvest rates does not comprise an expropriation 
because permits do not confer property rights, or because the 'creeping expropriation ' through 
regulation is not protected by the guarantees against expropriation. 
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according to private agreements between the parties. Under existing contractual 
arrangements, the proceeds of log sales accrue to the logging contractor, who is 
then required to make distributions to landowners and, under more recent 
agreements, to the landowner company. The landowners' share has usual ly 
comprised an agreed package of infrastructural development plus payment of a 
kina amount per cubic metre of timber extracted. Landowner companies have 
usually received an unconditional payment known as premium and special 
purpose levies (Shedden Agribusiness 1 99 1  ) . 1 3 
Nearly al l  current agreements were made before the new Act commenced, 
and thus reflect the low log prices that prevai led up to 1 992 . Because landowner 
entitlements are inelastic to log prices, landowners were largely denied a share 
of the increased surp lus when timber prices rose dramatical ly in 1 993 . 1 4 
The new Forestry Act (Section 1 1 9) cal ls for a new 'forest revenue system ' 
of prescribed royalties and other charges. Few constraints are imposed on the 
charges that can be levied (see Section 1 2 1  ) . The Guidel ines proposed that these 
provisions should be used to instal l a comprehensive new revenue regime that 
would override existing contractual arrangements. 
Draft Guidel ines presented to the National Forest Board in May 1 993 
(PNGMOF 1 993a) proposed payment of a set stumpage fee direct to individual 
landowner clans, plus an additional stumpage fee (essentially a share of the 
surplus on log sales) into a 'project area development trust' .  This trust was to be 
managed under government rules, with application of trust account funds 
confined to 'economical ly sustainable enterprises - on a loan basis '  or 
'construction and maintenance of physical infrastructure - by way of conditional 
grants ' .  Given the high prices prevai l ing at the time, this proposal would have 
diverted a s ignificant share of the proceeds of log sales away from logging 
companies and into the trust accounts. 
Not surpris ingly, the Forest Industries Association was highly critical of the 
proposal . Yet the strongest protests were voiced by the PNG Forest Resource 
Owners Association (PNGFROA), a body whose membership comprised the 
directors and senior management of landowner companies. The PNGFROA's  
motives were as m ixed as  the confl icting allegiances of  landowner companies. 
The revenue proposal made no provision for landowner companies, and severely 
restricted their capacity to continue to secure premiums from contractors, given 
1 3 The agreements typically earmark the levies for ' agricultural ' or ' community infrastructure' 
development, but are otherwise si lent on how the levy funds should be administered and applied. 
This means a great potential for misuse of the funds, which are often not held in an account 
separate from the operating funds of the landowner company. 
1 4 In some projects, landowners and landowner companies achieved more favourable 
arrangements by renegotiating these arrangements during the 1 993 boom. The average f.o.b. price 
per cubic metre of mixed logs from PNG stayed within the US$50-80 range from 1 987 to 1 992. In 
1 993, prices boomed to a peak of US$200 before slowly declining to around US$ l 00. In 1 994, 
prices peaked again at US$ l 50 then decl ined to a new plateau of around US$ I 1 0, where they 
remained up to the end of 1 995 (ITTO 1 995 :  1 1 3 ) . 
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the large rental share which was now due to go to the new trust accounts. 
PNGFROA members also relayed the concern of landowners in general at 
having their money locked up in trusts. PNG experience suggests that money set 
aside for a common purpose is l ikely to be spent wasteful ly, if not 
m isappropriated, by those entrusted with its management. Landowners had an 
understandable desire to see the money in their hands rather than in a remote 
trust account. PNGFROA members were also inextricably l inked with the 
logging companies. Not only were landowner companies dependent on logging 
companies for their income stream, but some also shared offices, fax numbers, 
and even bank accounts with them (Whimp 1 995 : 1 6 ; also Filer, this volume). 
As much as anything else, feel ings of ind ignation drove the PNGFROA's  
protests. Many landowner company principals saw themselves as  enterprising 
proponents of self-help. Where the state had failed to del iver even basic social 
services to their respective areas, landowner company principals, in negotiating 
the logging agreements, had procured roads, cash incomes, and economic 
activity. Landowner company principals considered that they had justly earned 
their prominent positions through the role which they had played in brokering 
progress. They were outraged by the state' s  complete fai lure to acknowledge 
their past efforts or current status . This emotion was compounded by the fear 
that the proposals would expose them as having bargained poorly on the 
landowners' behalf. As Simpson (this volume) observes, any publ ic show of 
weakness or uncertainty on the part of landowner company directors would have 
opened the door to rival aspirants to their positions. 
Proposed controls over additional stumpage were substantial ly revised in 
response to the PNGFROA-led protest. The final vers ion of the Guidel ines, 
approved in principle by the National Executive Council in late 1 993, proposes 
that additional stumpage be paid to 'a representative body appointed by 
landowners in each project area' .  Thus the Guidel ines left open the possibi l ity 
of landowner companies securing the additional stumpage by gaining 
recognition as representative bodies. However, these concessions were not 
enough to win the PNGFROA's  endorsement. In the face of continuing 
opposition, the state abandoned the original revenue proposals in 1 994, yet 
alternative models that would override existing contractual arrangements 
remained under active consideration (Whimp 1 995), and a modified revis ion of 
the fiscal regime was actual ly introduced at the end of 1 995 (see Fi ler, this 
volume). 
In the meantime, the state moved swiftly to secure a better revenue share 
for itself. It made two successive increases in export duty on round logs in 
November 1 993 and March 1 994, but no intervention was made on behalf of 
landowners. Their share of rent continued (unti l  1 996) to be determined 
contractual ly under arrangements which predated the timber boom, whi le their 
potential to negotiate a larger proportion of the economic rent was constrained 
by the hike in export duty. 
Justifying State Intervention 
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So far, this paper has chronicled the PNG government 's forestry reform efforts 
across diverse objectives - environmental protection, sustained timber yield, and 
equitable rent sharing. On all three fronts, implementation has faltered over 
reforms that threaten the right of customary landowners to exploit their forests as 
they see fit. The state ' s  waning commitment suggests growing doubt, on the 
part of pol iticians and bureaucrats, that the proposed forestry interventions are 
warranted . 1 5 
A state usually claims protection of the public interest as the justification 
for its private sector interventions .  In the language of economics, the state 
intervenes in the market to correct or prevent negative externalities. In legal 
terms, the state exercises common property rights in order to restrict private 
property rights. In pol itical terms, the elected government has a mandate to curb 
private interests in the publ ic interest. 
Another possible justification for state intervention in PNG is paternal istic 
protection of customary landowners. Given that customary systems have 
general ly evolved to serve subsistence and barter economies, those systems, and 
people who control natural resources within them, are newly exposed to the 
intricacies, technology, and scale of commercial industry. Arguably, state 
intervention is justified, at the interface between custom and commerce, to 
protect customary landowners who are vulnerable because of their inexperience. 
This justification is founded on the questionable belief that landowners wil l  do 
better under the state ' s  benevolent guidance than if they are left to make their 
own naive choices. 
The Local Public Interest 
Under the PNG Constitution, customary authority and state authority coexist. 
Locally at least, the two forms of authority are in competition for the right to 
govern community affairs. State intervention on publ ic interest grounds thus 
raises a threshold issue of whether customary authority or the state should div ine 
the local public interest. Intervention grounded in paternal ism raises a simi lar 
issue . If the state assumes the right to decide what course of action best serves 
the interests of local landowners, wi l l  it be better placed than customary 
authority to do so? The state' s  options are to: 
• make its own judgment of the local interest; or 
• accept the preference of those who claim customary authority. 
1 5  This trend is evidenced by the state' s  pol icy rhetoric. The National Forest Pol icy makes the 
bold assertion that 'overall responsibi l ity of ensuring that the country ' s  forests are managed and 
replenished wi l l  rest with the state' (PNG Ministry of Forests 1 99 1  :7). Only three years later, the 
state' s  official stance had softened. According to the Guidel ines, 'Responsibi l ity for forest 
management wi l l  be allocated between landowners and the [Forest] Authority according to the 
terms of the forest management agreement' (PNGMOF 1 993b: l 2). 
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Principles of Self-Determination 
At one extreme, it can be argued that customary processes command automatic 
respect because they have been honed by the wisdom of the ages and underpin 
community life. The counter view is that the state should judge customary 
systems on their merits, and support only those that meet reasonable standards of 
governance. The Constitution suggests a course somewhere between the two. 
Its fifth goal cal ls  for development 'primarily through the use of Papua New 
Guinean forms of social, pol itical and economic organisation ' .  Yet under 
Schedule 2 . 1 ,  custom is not recognised as part of the underlying law if it is 
' repugnant to the general principles of humanity' or inconsistent with state-made 
laws. 
A developing body of international law supports the v iew that customary 
leaders should self-determine the development paths of their constituents. 1 6  In 
the PNG context, respect for these principles would require the state to defer to 
customary authority rather than define the local publ ic interest itself. The state 
could intervene to protect and strengthen customary decision-making processes, 
but its objective should be to support, rather than supplant, custom . 
Would state definition of local priorities be respected in any event? As 
Jackson ( 1 992 : 82) notes, 'c lans or other localised forms of loyalty are of far 
greater importance to most Papua New Guineans than are loyalties to the state ' .  
Technical Capacity 
The state might lay claim to the right to define the local interest on the ground 
that it has technical ski l l s  and resources which rural landowners lack. Whi le 
landowners may have direct knowledge of local ecosystems, social relationships, 
culture, and aspirations, they may lack the capacity to assess impacts beyond 
their experience . Without first-hand exposure to large-scale logging operations, 
landowners are l ikely to underestimate physical and social impacts. Even after 
logging commences, there is a time lag before long-term effects on subsistence 
l ifestyles, such as contaminated water suppl ies, loss of bush foods and 
medicines, decl ine of fish stocks on s i lt-covered reefs, and increased malaria due 
to ponding, become apparent. 
1 6 The draft United Nations Declaration of Indigenous Peoples' Rights sets a contemporary 
standard for state relations with indigenous peoples (UNWGIP 1 993 ) . Article 26 describes a right 
of indigenous peoples to 'own, develop, control and use' their traditional lands and resources. 
This includes the right to full recognition of their ' laws, traditions and customs, land-tenure 
systems and institutions for the development and management of resources' and the right to the 
benefit of ' effective measures by States to prevent any interference with, alienation of, or 
encroachment upon these rights ' .  These rights are buttressed by Article 30, which describes the 
right of indigenous peoples to 'determine and develop priorities and strategies for the development 
and use of their lands and resources ' .  This includes the right to ' require that States obtain their free 
and informed consent ' before approving projects affecting their lands and resources. Article 3 1  
asserts a right of 'autonomy or self-government' in relation to a range of matters including 
' economic activities, land and resource management, environment and entry by nonmembers ' .  
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Yet the ski l ls base of the state is heavi ly concentrated in urban centres, and 
notoriously absent in the sparsely populated rural areas where large tracts of 
natural forest are found . Problems of mismanagement, waste, incompetence, 
corruption, disruptive pol itical conflict, over-government, and neglect further 
constrain the state ' s  abi l ity to make efficient use of its resources (Axl ine 
1 993 : 5 ). In forestry, the state has a poor record on technical input to help define 
the local interest. It has not managed to arrange a single development options 
study, and its scrutiny of environmental plans has been poor. 
Even if the state is better equipped than landowners to make technical 
assessments, the weight attached to these assessments is ultimately a matter of 
pol itical judgment. The state can make its assessments avai lable to landowners 
as readi ly as it can to its own pol iticians .  The state is not a disinterested party -
its self-interest as a rent-seeker underm ines any claim to neutral ity. If 
landowners are armed with technical information as wel l  as local knowledge, 
they are arguably in a better position than the state to judge the local interest. 
The proposed code of logging practice neatly demonstrates these issues. 
Whi le preparation of the code is clearly an efficient use of state expertise, the 
code is ultimately a value judgement on the merits of competing environmental 
and commercial interests. Landowners may or may not agree with that 
judgment. If landowners are to define the local interest, they should have the 
option of adopting the code, adjusting it to local circumstances, or rejecting it. 1 7 
To ensure that the code is not rejected out of ignorance, the state wi l l  need to 
educate landowners on how it works. 
If landowners adopt the code, the real chal lenge wi l l  be its enforcement. 
The state might best deploy its resources to train landowners to do their own 
monitoring, rather than field its own massive inspectorate. Landowners should 
be very effective in enforcing the code, given their local knowledge, proximity 
to operations, and self-interest motivation . 
In summary, on grounds of technical capacity alone, the state cannot make 
a stronger claim than custom to the pol itical task of defining the local interest. 
The state can deploy its technical capacity to supply landowners with resource 
management expertise and knowledge, yet refrain from imposing its judgment of 
how their commercial, social, and environmental concerns should be balanced . 
In adopting a supportive rather than coercive role, the state is more l ikely to 
mobi l ise landowners to monitor the timber industry themselves . In doing so, it 
should greatly reduce the pressure on its own resources of having to field 
inspectors for every logging project. 
Political Capacity 
The local interest in a logging project needs to be defined at two levels .  First, a 
single landowner group needs to decide whether, and on what conditions, it 
1 7 The code, or elements of it, might nevertheless be imposed on national interest grounds. 
Processes for reconci l ing the local and national interest are discussed later in this chapter. 
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should exploit its timber resources .  Second, the col lective interests of the 
various groups within the catchment or catchments affected by the logging need 
to be reconciled .  
Under most customary systems in PNG, the landowning group or clan is the 
basic social and pol itical unit (Power 1 994 : 3 ;  Lakau 1 994 : 80). Clan leaders are 
wel l-practised at making decisions at the clan level ,  though seldom with as much 
at stake as when a logging project is proposed . 1 8  Traditional Melanesian forms 
of pol itical organisation seldom extended to broader levels than the clan or 
vi l lage . Thus, in agreeing to take part in logging ventures that covered many 
clans and vi l lages, most landowners were acting in concert on a scale beyond 
traditional experience (Hide 1 990: 1 7). It is at this level that custom 's  abi l ity to 
steer events in the direction of the local interest is most open to question . 
Yet general isation on custom ' s  sway over events across a catchment is 
difficult. For example, in some areas, bush groups may get away with approving 
logging that damages the reefs of saltwater groups, but without compensating 
them . In other situations, a saltwater group may use a bush group 's  dependence 
on continued access to marine resources as leverage to persuade the bush group 
to restrain logging that would harm the local reef ecology (Hviding 1 992 :6). In 
some areas, non-assertive marginal ised clans wi l l  be unable to enforce claims 
against dominant clans. In other situations, a clan that is excluded from a 
logging agreement that purports to cover its resources wi l l  be able to invoke 
custom - or perhaps a state-sponsored mechanism for resolving customary 
disputes - in order to be instated as a party to the agreement or to exclude 
logging in its area. 
One method of testing custom 's  effectiveness at a catchment level might be 
to explore the question of whether it ranks the competing factional interests 
through some form of due process . However, the flaw with this approach is its 
assumption that customary systems should only be rel ied upon to define the 
local interest if they conform to external ideals of fairness. Customary systems, 
even when not distorted by new pressures of scale and urgency, are unlikely to 
meet such criteria. Fi ler ( 1 990) debunks the romantic notion that Melanesian 
customary societies typically choose their leaders by consensus, settle arguments 
by compromise, or ensure that everyone enjoys the same condition of 
' subsistence affluence ' .  While authority derives from popular consensus, 
leaders have traditionally won power through competition, and have often 
wielded it autocratical ly (Lawrence 1 97 1 :  1 4) .  Tradition often excludes women 
from important v i l lage meetings. Customary resource rights tend not to be 
matters of fact capable of objective identification and protection, but the 
outcomes of constant, and often aggressive, assertion and counter-assertion 
(Wolfers 1 992 :246). Thus, if the state expects custom to meet standards of 
participatory democracy, custom is l ikely to fail, not just within the context of 
1 8  Some local residents may not be members of any landowning group. However, they wil l  
derive their land occupation rights from the landowning groups under custom, and thus be 
incorporated within the customary tenure system. 
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logging negotiations, but general ly. Unless the state is prepared to intervene 
systematical ly, wherever custom fails to require procedural fairness, then it 
should not do so over forestry issues alone. 
A second approach is to accept custom ' s  systems as having inherent 
legitimacy, and not evaluate them against external criteria of good governance 
and equity. Assessment of custom ' s  abi l ity to resolve the local interest across a 
catchment would then become an investigation of whether negotiations with 
logging companies occur with in customoray systems or outside them. The 
difficulty is in identifying what is and what is not a custom-sanctioned action. 
Custom is unwritten, constantly evolving, and differs from place to place . 
Customary authority is not administered by discrete and accessible institutions, 
but pervades all facets of v i l lage life. Traditionally, rules were manipulated to 
provide 'elbow room' for pol itical manoeuvring (Lawrence 1 97 1 : 1 6). 
Where custom is confronted with issues of a scale and complexity beyond 
its traditional experience, innovative and opportunistic behaviour can equally be 
diagnosed as a breach of custom or as a healthy adaptation to modern times. A 
thin l ine separates anarchy and progressive adaptation. Ward and Kingdon 
( 1 995 : 1 5) suggest that many practices evolving to meet new conditions in the 
Pacific are 'neither traditional, nor customary, nor legal ' .  
Experience with landowner companies i l lustrates the complexity of  these 
issues. On one view, the landowner company is the vehicle that has evolved to 
take custom into the new territory of project-wide cooperation. Landowner 
companies can claim pol itical and commercial legitimacy through having 
received legal or de facto endorsement from landowners. 1 9 Privi leges enjoyed 
by landowner company principals (salaries, housing, travel, vehicle use, and 
'entertainment' )  might be regarded as custom-sanctioned rewards for initiative 
and leadersh ip. The community of right-holders under custom could be seen as 
having consented to logging and its internal distributional inequities. If less 
assertive clans were not consulted, or did not secure a share of royalties, these 
are custom-sanctioned outcomes of competitive claim making. Custom always 
has been responsive to 'pressure of circumstances and dominant interests' 
because of to the general lack of a superior neutral body charged with its 
administration (Hard ing 1 972 :606). 
The counter view is that landowner company directors and executives, in 
concert with foreign logging interests, have unfairly exploited custom ' s  inabil ity 
to control events at the scale and pace of a logging project. In operating beyond 
the reach of traditional customary checks and balances, they have pushed 
personal and factional interests with l ittle regard for the local publ ic interest. 
1 9 Under the Forestry (Private Dealings) Act, the legal expression of this endorsement was the 
making of the Dealings agreement with the landowner company, rather than directly with a logging 
company. Where landowner companies secured permits over Timber Rights Purchase areas under 
the old Forestry Act, the endorsement is not so obvious, but can be traced through the fact of 
formation of a landowner company and unchallenged lobbying of the Minister to grant it the 
permit . 
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From thi s  v iewpoint, a catchment or project area can be regarded as a plurality 
of individuals and factions which is not effectively constrained by custom, and 
whose self- interested behaviours generate externalities. Because customary 
authority cannot be asserted at this level, the local public interest is unprotected. 
Conflicts of interest, and apparent lack of accountabi l ity, of landowner 
companies and c lan agents support this v iew. Both landowner company 
principals and clan agents may have conflicting loyalties to the logging 
contractor that helped to install them in the process of setting up the project. 
Individual landowner company shareholders are rarely bound by any trust deed 
formally requiring them to act on behalf of their clan. Legal requirements, such 
as lodgement of company returns and cal l ing of general meetings, are often not 
understood and are poorly enforced. Landowner company headquarters are 
often located in provincial capitals rather than the project area. Clan agents are 
largely unchecked in their d istribution of royalties. 
Future projects have better prospects of achieving project-wide 
representation for landowners through bodies with greater formal accountabi l ity 
than existing landowner companies. The Forestry Act (Section 57) encourages 
landowners to form ' land groups' under the Land Groups Incorporation Act 
before entering into a Forest Management Agreement (see Holzknecht, this 
volume). Through this device, clans become legal corporations which are run 
according to customary law. These land groups can then become bui lding 
blocks for larger representative bodies with commercial or welfare objectives. If 
future landowner companies can be encouraged to incorporate along these l ines, 
they will be less susceptible to al legations of unrepresentativeness than the 
current models. 
Assessment of whether custom can cope with the events surrounding a 
logging project will also depend on whether a short-term or long-term view is 
taken. A snapshot analysis presents a gloomy picture. Timber resources have 
been sold cheaply, and to date only a smal l portion of the proceeds have been 
reinvested productively. Reckless logging practices severely diminish the 
capacity of the forest to supply clean water, halt erosion, and regenerate 
commercial timber. Pressures of change and the influx of cash have escalated 
alcohol abuse and associated violence (particularly against women) and have 
heightened internal tensions (for example, between land claim disputants, 
saltwater and bush clans, landowner companies and ' splinter groups') .  
Yet a dynamic analysis may yield a conclusion that is  less bleak. 
Involvement of landowners in the timber industry so far can be viewed as one 
stage in a longer-term process of self-determination . Landowners have retained 
their land, have generally not been displaced from their traditional vi l lages, and 
are not under immediate threat of encroachment by new settlers. Past mistakes 
and negative impacts m ight serve as important, though expensive, lessons for the 
future. Evolution of landowner companies, despite the initial impetus provided 
by foreign logging companies, m ight result in the development of corporate 
experience that can serve local communities in the mid to long term . 
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It is too early to judge whether landowners will emerge from the landowner 
company experience in a stronger position to advance their own welfare. An 
important test wi l l  come with the cessation of logging. Some groups may have 
squandered too much of their 'wealth ' through consumption spending, 
environmental damage, and delinquent social behaviour. The greed or apathy of 
the current generation may seriously d isadvantage future generations. Other 
groups may take remedial action before it is too late. They may negotiate a 
better resource rent, or establish agricultural enterprises and other investments to 
provide for the years between logging cycles. They may make their contractor 
employ less destructive logging practices. Their landowner company may 
evolve into a social ly responsible organisation which reinforces custom by 
helping it to adapt to the times. 
National, Future, and Global Interests 
The National Interest 
If the state is to trust in the open-ended processes of custom to decide local 
preferences, it wi l l  need to play a role in reconci ling those preferences with the 
national publ ic interest. 
The sustained yield issue shows this very clearly. Existing logging 
agreements show that the combined preference of landowners and logging 
companies favours rapid, rather than sustained, timber extraction. For logging 
companies, the h igh portabi lity of equipment, the cost of maintaining roads, 
economies of scale, and uncertainty of tenure due to the prospect of land 
disputes, are all incentives to harvest as quickly as possible. Most operators 
have not invested in substantial mi l l ing faci l ities, and thus do not require a 
steady timber supply over the l ife of the mi l J .20 
Sustained yield may also run counter to the financial interests of 
landowners. If mature timber in a forest is regarded as a fully grown crop, 
landowners have an incentive to harvest the crop as quickly as possible, in order 
to take advantage of economies of scale and al low production of the next 'crop'  
to start sooner. Provided the same selective logging practices are used in both 
cases, the harvest rate should have a neutral effect on the forest' s  capacity to 
regenerate the desired mix of timber and to supply subsistence services. Both 
logging companies and landowners may want flexibi l ity to increase production 
when market demand is h igh, and reduce production when demand is low. 
However, from a nat ional perspective, sustaining the timber yield offers 
clear advantages. For the national economy, continuous timber production 
provides a constant revenue flow, encourages instal lation and maintenance of 
permanent infrastructure, and offers lasting employment. These nat ional 
20 Even if a mi l l  is instal led, this wi l l  not necessarily create pressure for a sustained yield - if the 
plant is to be written off over fifteen years, for example, the operator may prefer a higher wood 
flow for that period than a permanent supply at a slower rate. 
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interests may be reinforced by external pressure. For example, the International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank require the national government to adopt 
sustained yield pol ic ies as a condition of the current structural adjustment 
programme. 
Future Interests 
The state has a constitutional duty to protect future generations from the self­
interested actions of the current generation. The Fourth National Goal requires 
that natural resources are 'conserved and used for the col lective benefit of all 
[Papua New Guineans] and replenished for the benefit of future generations' .  
Al l  government bodies are under a duty to pursue the goal, though the duty i s  not 
enforceable through the courts.2 1  
Future generations of landowners have an interest i n  maintaining their 
inheritance of natural, financial, and manufactured resources, yet lack a direct 
voice in today's  market. Their preferences are external to current commercial 
dealings, except to the extent that the current generation is concerned with their 
welfare. Arguably, the Constitution gives the state a mandate to curtail the 
decisions of current customary leaders on grounds of intergenerational equity .  
Global Interests 
According to neoclassical economics, the global interest in the b iodiversity and 
anti-greenhouse values of rainforests should only concern rational landowners to 
the extent that it offers a potential ' in s itu' market for their forest resources. The 
market in these global values is general ly weak because of the 'free-rider 
syndrome' . People in faraway places cannot eas i ly be excluded from enjoying a 
rainforest' s  'option' and 'existence' values or its carbon sequestration 
serv ices .22 
Sekhran ( 1 994) investigates the potential of various mechanisms to reward 
PNG landowners for global benefits derived from the maintenance of 
b iodiversity within their forests. The problems and countervai l ing pressures that 
have been identified suggest that short-term prospects for successful appl ication 
of such mechanisms are poor. 
Foreign interests are increasingly imposing their environmental concerns 
through the demand side of the timber market. According to the International 
Tropical Timber Organisation ' s  Target 2000, all exported tropical timber is to be 
sourced from ' sustainably' managed forests by the year 2000 (ITTO l 990 : i) .  
Environmental pressure groups and government timber purchasing pol icies in 
2 1  See Section 25(2) of the Constitution. The Ombudsman Commission can investigate alleged 
neglect of the duty, but can only recommend, not order, remedial action. 
22 'Existence value' refers to the non-consumption benefits derived from the mere knowledge 
that a thing exists. 'Options value' refers to the benefit in keeping future use options open by not 
destroying a thing (for example, the undiscovered uses of existing species). 
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developed countries have prompted timber trade associations to develop 
sustainabi lity criteria and audit systems which enable 'eco-labell ing' of timber. 
Yet the prospect of these measures taking hold has provided landowners with a 
perverse incentive to harvest their forests as quickly as possible in order to beat 
the Year 2000 deadline. 
Where global interests in  maintaining PNG's  forests fai l to establish real 
markets for landowners, the state may need to intervene to protect the national 
interest insofar as it is al igned with these global interests. The nation may have 
an interest in honouring commitments under environmental conventions, 
avoiding the consequences of global warming, and capturing donor funding 
which is conditional on forest conservation efforts. 
Reconciling Local, Future, National, and Global Interests 
While a strong argument can been made that custom should define the local 
public interest, non-local interests which are external to the market require 
protection through state intervention. The state could intervene uni laterally as a 
regulator (for example, through mechanisms such as the National Forest Plan, 
provincial harvest l imits, and statutory revenue system).  Alternatively it could 
seek to negotiate contract-based outcomes with the other stakeholders (for 
example, through Forest Management Agreements with landowners, and project 
agreements with landowner and logging companies). 
Under the latter approach, the state could retain its monopoly power to 
make Forest Management Agreements with landowners as its negotiating base . 
Landowners would also negotiate from a position of strength due to their 
property-based veto over logging. Where agreement is not reached, no logging 
could proceed. The state' s  fragile rule over remote areas would serve as a 
pressure against its adoption of bel l igerent negotiating positions. The alternative 
of restricting landowners with detailed regulations and nationwide plans is 
flawed by the state ' s  inflexibil ity and poor enforcement capacity. Customary 
autonomy and resource rights would face the threat of creeping regulation, with 
landowners having no comeback other than to defy the imposed rules. 
Protection of the right of landowners to bargain in their own interest is 
particularly important, given the government' s  l imited accountabi lity to the 
electorate. In PNG, pol itical success depends primarily on maintaining support 
in the local electorate, and has l ittle dependence on party pol itics. Pol iticians, 
including ministers of state, derive personal legitimacy from del ivering goods 
and services to their electorates, and have l ittle interest in the wider legitimacy 
of government (Jackson 1 992 : 82 ;  Oh 1 995 : 1 0) .  The Westminster systems of 
executive responsibil ity and parliamentary democracy are thus less able to check 
government actions . Landowners need property rights derived from custom as a 
means of checking the government where the ballot box fails to do so. 
Whereas regulations tend to be inflexible and insensitive to local 
circumstances, negotiation can be a 'quick, flexible and less adversarial means'  
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of managing land-use conflicts (COA 1 993 : 1 02). The conflict generated by the 
state' s  proposal to impose a statutory revenue system i llustrates this point. Had 
the state and the PNGFROA (or indiv idual landowner companies) sought to 
negotiate new revenue arrangements, they might have found an acceptable 
compromise on the issue of landowner company accountabi lity, whi le advancing 
their mutual interest in extracting a higher share of rent from the logging 
companies (see S impson, this volume) . 
A negotiation process could help landowners to acquire pol itical, 
administrative, and technical ski l ls .  Landowners should also have better 
awareness of environmental safeguards and enforcement rights if they have had 
to negotiate for them. 
In a contractual framework, landowners would also negotiate with logging 
companies.23 Yet past experience confirms the vulnerabi l ity of landowners in 
dealing with logging companies. By playing a prominent role in setting up 
landowner companies, foreign logging interests were able to ' instal l '  
sympathetic directors and clan agents (see Wood, this volume) . They used 
various inducements and advances to compromise the abi l ity of landowner 
representatives to negotiate at arm ' s  length . They were able to exploit the 
volati l ity of local politics to push quick agreements with landowner leaders who 
were keen to entrench their prominence while they had the chance. Some 
landowner representatives were i l l iterate, many had no business experience, and 
nearly all had very limited knowledge of the logging industry and the 
complexities of legal contracts. 
To avoid these problems, the state could take steps to improve the 
bargaining strength of landowners, without attempting to bargain on their behalf. 
Measures to strengthen landowner negotiation capacity could include : 
• publ ication of model contract provisions; 
• legislation providing for court review of manifestly unfair contracts; 
• redirection of government planning and enforcement resources to landowner 
capacity strengthening; 
• finance arrangements where landowners can borrow against future income to 
pay for preliminary investigations and professional advice; and 
• founding a non-government negotiation service for landowners (perhaps 
funded by international donors).24 
However, in any system where the use and management of forest resources 
is resolved through negotiation, landowners will ultimately have to look after 
23 Under the current Forestry Act, Forest Management Agreements can be crafted to give 
landowners the right to hold equity in the operating entity or a say in the selection of a contractor. 
24 Some steps in this direction have recently been taken by the GTZ-funded Landowner 
Awareness Project, which is part of the National Forestry and Conservation Action Programme. 
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themselves . In the end, they will be negotiating against the state. The state ' s  
recent moves to  raise export tax without rais ing royalties shows very clearly that 
it is a competing stakeholder, not a benefactor. As Wolfers ( 1 992 :244) notes, 
' interests which [rural landowners] m ight wish to oppose have l ittle reason to 
help them to express or organise themselves ' .  
Conclusion 
Proposed PNG timber industry reforms have faltered over the issue of control of 
forest resources on customary land. The state has shied away from 
implementing reforms that chal lenge the right of landowners and landowner 
companies to manage and exploit these resources as they see fit. This paper 
questions whether the reforms were justified in any event. 
Where custom can d ivine the local publ ic interest, it displaces the need for 
state intervention . Given custom 's  res i l ience and pervasive influence, the state 
should be cautious in assuming its demise. Emerging institutions such as 
landowner companies should not be dismissed as aberrations of custom simply 
because they are not egal itarian, whether judged against fantasies of how custom 
once operated or against introduced ideals of participatory democracy. Where 
custom seems to be fai l ing, the state should not presume that it can do what 
custom cannot. The state ' s  inabi l ity to del iver services and leadership to remote 
forest areas is what sparked the rise of landowner companies in the first place. 
In addressing local resource management issues, the state might achieve 
more by supporting customary authority rather than usurping its role. The 
stal led forestry reforms are a failed attempt to do the latter. 
The state can legitimately c laim a role in balancing local interests with the 
national interest, although the forestry experience suggests that it lacks the 
pol itical confidence and enforcement capacity to impose its wil l  over customary 
land. Negotiated resolution of national and local interests would seem to be a 
more real istic and sensitive approach. Only through negotiation, with all its 
peri ls to novice participants in the timber industry, can landowners hope to 
achieve the capacity to protect their interests in the long term. The alternative of 
uni lateral state regulation leaves landowners exposed to the dictates of ministers 
who lack accountabi l ity beyond their own electorates, and urban bureaucrats 
who tend to favour national or provincial concerns over local ones. 
These conclusions suggest that the state should abandon nationwide land­
use zoning through forest classification, statements of provincial allowable cut, 
and inflexible statutory controls over distribution and investment of the 
landowners' share of logging revenues .  These reforms are all based on the 
flawed assumptions that the state is the best judge of the publ ic good and can 
readi ly enforce its wi l l .  Environmental protection, sustained yield, and revenue 
distribution objectives should, instead, be balanced against conflicting interests 
through project-specific negotiation. For new projects, the state, landowners, 
and logging companies could rely on forest management and project agreements 
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to set the terms on which logging is conducted. If the state is less absorbed in 
nationwide plann ing and pol icing work, it should be more able to resource the 
conduct of development options studies and scrutiny of environmental plans, 
such that they serve as useful components of the negotiation process. For 
existing agreements, the parties can rely on periodic review clauses and the 
transitional review power in the Forestry Act (Section 1 3 7) to negotiate project 
reforms. The code of logging practice wil l  serve as a useful standard for 
incorporation in new or revised agreements . 
The role of the state would thus change from that of a regulator to that of a 
stakeholder. The state could offer extension services to ensure that landowners 
are sufficiently organised and informed to participate effectively in project 
negotiation and enforcement, again deploying resources formerly -al located to its 
regulatory function. Yet, given the state' s  conflicting interests, landowners 
could not count on such assistance, or accept it without question. 
CHAPTER 12 
SMALL-SCALE COMMUNITY-BASED FORESTRY: 
Introduction 
ISSUES IN THE CONSERVATION OF 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA'S BIODIVERSITY 
RoN MARTIN 
This chapter sets out some of the issues involved in smal l-scale, community­
based, environmentally sensitive timber extraction from natural forests. Any 
discussion of the sustainabi l ity of community-based forestry businesses must 
take cognisance of the widest sense of the term ' sustainabi l ity' - that is, 
encompass its ecological, economic, and social parameters. This discussion 
examines those parameters in  a general way in an attempt to place ecotimber1 
extraction in the context of biodiversity conservation in Papua New Guinea 
(PNG), in order to outline a direction which the fledgl ing industry might take, 
and to point out some of the impl ications for planners in this area. The 
comments made here reflect the author' s  observations and experience which are, 
in the main, confined to Morobe Province. 
The idea of operating a small business, owned by oneself, in which the 
rewards come from one ' s  personal endeavours is well-establ ished in Western 
societies. It has found a place in Papua New Guinean societies in the towns and, 
to a lesser degree, in rural communities. The trade stores of the v i l lages, PMV2 
services on both land and water, small coffee, cocoa and betelnut plantations, 
and fami ly fishing ventures all bear testimony to rural Papua New Guineans ' 
interest in establ ishing such small businesses to capture the cash which they feel 
they need. 
Small-scale forestry businesses, owned and managed by Papua New 
Guineans, are a relatively new phenomenon, driven by a multitude of forces, 
many of which differ from those that have given rise to other forms of small 
business. The nature of the chain from production to market, the capital cost of 
the production equipment, the lack of prior s imi lar experience, and a need for 
operating capital and outside extension services, together render the problems to 
be faced of a different order to those faced by the other types of small business 
previously mentioned . 
l The term 'ecotimber' wi l l  be used throughout this chapter to mean timber extracted from natural 
forest with one goal being the maintenance of the ecological integrity of that forest. 
2 Public motor vehicle. 
270 The Political Economy of Forest Management in Papua New Guinea 
Nevertheless, many small sawmi l ls have been introduced to the forests of 
PNG. This number is certainly in excess of 700 (Henderson l 994b: 1 0) and 
perhaps as high as 2,000 (Bun 1 996 : 5 ), of which less than half are intermittently 
producing at any one time (Arentz and Holzknecht 1 99 1 ;  Mamun and Konabe 
1 992; Senn 1 993 ). The vast majority of these sawmil ls are not individual ly 
owned but are the property of church organisations, or v i llage or clan groups. 
In recent years, small numbers of smal l-scale, community-based sawmi l lers 
have formed the nucleus of an attempt to model, in conjunction with other 
income-producing ideas, a way of providing development options that al low the 
ecological integrity of PNG's  forests to be retained. Small-scale forestry, 
indigenously owned and managed, offers a theoretical potential for diverse 
interest groups to real ise their objectives in cooperation with each other. The 
motivations of these interest groups are partly economic and partly social, and 
are directed both to conservation and self-fulfilment. If a self-sustaining small­
scale forestry industry is to eventuate, the positive conjunction of these 
motivating factors is required, and that requirement, in turn, has s ignificant 
plann ing implications. 
A Short History of Small-Scale Forestry in Papua New Guinea 
Small-scale timber harvesting operations using low-cost portable mil ls have a 
short history in PNG. From initially fulfi l l ing the function of providing sawn 
timber to m issions and plantations in remote areas, they have recently been 
adopted as community projects by local vi l lages or clan groups. 
Small-scale production of sawn timber was original ly introduced to PNG by 
church and mission groups that were seeking to provide bui lding materials in 
places of d ifficult accessibi l ity. The lumber that has been produced has mostly 
been for community projects in which labour has been donated as a community 
service (sweat equity), or cash payments have been of a minimal nature. The 
trees used have not been harvested with the ecological integrity of the forest in 
m ind. Rather, they have been the by-product of garden clearance, or have been 
chosen for other pragmatic reasons such as proximity to the s ite of appl ication . 
Mechanisation, in the form of portable or transportable, low-production and low 
capital-cost mi l ls, only began in the m id- l 970s with the importation of this type 
of mil l  from Germany, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States 
(Henderson l 994b: 1 0) .  
The ownership of portable sawmi l ls which are capable of reasonably 
accurate d imensioning of timber was opened up to a wider group with the 
beginning of local production of the 'Wokabout Somi l '  by Natequip (or rather 
its predecessor) in Lae in 1 986. Th is machine was much cheaper than imported 
models, and in several ways simpler in design, and thus more suitable to PNG 
operating conditions. Concern that the ski l ls required to operate the machines 
were l imited, and that the potential existed for destructive forestry techniques to 
be used, induced the directors of Natequip to decide to sel l  training along with 
their machines. They employed Sasa Zibe Kokino, a forester with a strong 
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conviction in favour of retaining the forest resource base, to carry out this work. 
However, many people who bought Wokabout Somils did not purchase the 
train ing package along with the machine. Later, Sasa Zibe establ ished the 
Vil lage Development Trust which, although separate from Natequip, continued 
to carry out its training programme, but also involved itself in awareness raising 
activities in an effort to contain the activities of industrial logging companies, 
especially in Morobe Province.3 
Other embryonic attempts at influencing the harvesting practices and 
general forestry behaviour of smal l-scale sawmi l lers appeared in the early 1 990.s. 
In Milne Bay Province, a number of people using chainsaw mi l ls were organised 
to supply a cooperative which was attempting to export to 'green' consumer 
markets on the western coast of the United States. In East New Britain Province, 
a private initiative by a plantation manager, Max Henderson, to diversify into 
smal l-scale forestry led to the establ ishment of a community-based 
'ecoforestry'4 project by the Bainings people. Later again, the Pacific Heritage 
Foundation was created, with Max Henderson as its Executive Director. The 
Foundation is involving itself in awareness raising campaigns in several parts of 
PNG, assisting with the establ ishment of smal l-scale forestry programmes with 
low ecological impacts, and progressively improving the operations of existing 
smal l sawmi l l  operations, with a view to having them certified under Forest 
Stewardship Council (FSC) guidel ines. The last two years have seen other non­
government organisations (NGOs) supplement the provis ion of education or 
awareness about the conduct of ecologically sensitive forestry, with the 
establ ishment of forest management plans which are designed to preserve the 
general structure of the forests being worked in the long term (with 30-40 year 
rotations), and to make the business ventures economically self-sustaining.s 
The shift to a self-sustaining commercial orientation for ecotimber 
production has coincided with changes in the technology of portable sawmi l ls 
which have brought greater accuracy, better portabi l ity, and higher rates of 
production with lower labour requirements. 
Accommodating Ecological Sustainability 
Donor organ isations are beginning to apply pressure for ecological 
accountabi l ity, and the documentation of management plans and monitoring 
3 Awareness raising campaigns aim to raise the consciousness of rural v i l lagers to the long-term 
unsustainabi l ity of industrial logging operations and the short-term nature of the benefits returned 
from entering into partnerships with logging companies. Small-scale ecoforestry is offered as an 
alternative. 
4 The term 'ecoforesty' refers to any collection of human uses of natural forest which have, as 
one of the goals, the preservation the ecological integrity of that forest. In the context of this 
chapter, one of those uses is the production of ecotimber. 
5 These initiatives have included those of the Vi l lage Development Trust in Lae, the World Wide 
Fund for Nature in Kikori, and the Foundation for Peoples of the South Pacific in the Sepik region. 
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techn iques is gathering pace. A few small-scale sawmi l l  businesses are working 
to management plans which can be considered ecological ly sensitive. Their 
managers, operators, and the NGOs assisting them are gaining experience with 
time, but they lack proven knowledge and harvesting techniques which can 
guarantee that the ecological systems of the forests in which they work wil l  
remain intact. However, their forestry practices are aimed at l imiting damage 
and leav ing the forest ecosystems unchanged if possible. From a biodiversity 
conservation viewpoint, this is preferable to other forms of forestry being 
practised in PNG, given the dearth of scientific knowledge avai lable. 
Ecotimber Production in Context 
Of the smal l-scale portable sawmi l ls currently operating, only a small 
percentage are working to wel l-defined forest management plans that focus on 
harvesting timber in ecological ly sensitive ways. Senn ( 1 993) has referred to 
thirty-eight m il ls which are practising some kind of sustainable yield forestry 
management. Sustainable yield is not necessarily ecological ly sensitive forestry 
that has been designed to conserve biodiversity. The author of this paper 
believes that this was an overestimate, given his knowledge of the operations 
referred to by Senn . Those which are able to meet the criterion of following 
management plans with an ecological conservation focus may wel l  be less than 
half his estimate. What can be said is that the intermittent nature of individual 
operators' work schedules has meant that the impact of small-scale sawmi l l ing, 
in the majority of cases, has been sl ight when viewed in the context of the 
damage being done by large industrial logging operations, and the size of PNG's  
remaining primary forest. 
At this point in time, the author is aware of eleven smal l sawmi l l  operations 
that could reasonably lay claim to detai led forest management plans which have 
been designed to cater for the long-term ecological sustainabi l ity of the forest. 
Of these, only one project in the Bainings area, consisting of three portable and 
one transportable mi l l , has had its operation tested under Forest Stewardship 
Counci l  guidel ines (personal communication, Wesley Watt,6 29 October 1 996). 
However, there are quite a number of other groups with portable mi l ls, or on the 
point of obtaining them, which are in various stages of developing management 
plans that purport to allow for the long-term viabi l ity of forest ecosystems. 
These include mil ls in West New Britain that are funded by the European Union, 
and some twenty mi l ls to be introduced in the Huon Peninsula by the Lutheran 
Development Serv ice and funded by a German donor. 
The Precautionary Principle 
Conserving biodiversity requires the integrity of ecological systems to be 
sustained. This can only be guaranteed if tropical rainforest ecosystems are not 
subjected to the pressures of increasing human intrusion, or of those 
6 Wesley Watt is a forester with the Pacific Heritage Foundation. 
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environmental changes which are external to the forest but are part of larger 
systems which incorporate the forest ecosystem . The scientific evidence simply 
does not exist to quantify what levels of human impact, or other forms of impact 
for that matter, the b iodiversity of the forest can sustain while remaining intact, 
or at what new b iodiversity levels the systems wil l  stabil ise, given certain forms 
of intrusion (Louman and Nicholls 1 994 : 1 5 5 ,  1 62, 1 65) .  While considerable 
research is being done in tropical forests to determine growth rates of 
commercial trees and the structure of the forest for future commercial timber 
extraction following industrial logging of whatever type (selective, clear-fell, 
shelterwood, and so on), there is l ittle evidence of significant research into the 
ecological changes wrought by this exploitation (ibid: 1 65) .  
The precautionary principle, given such a context, would dictate that the 
forests be left alone unti l  the necessary scientific knowledge has been 
accumulated. This is impractical in PNG, given the aspirations of rural resource 
owners for cash and 'development ' ,  government demands for revenue to meet 
social and pol itical objectives, and external pressures such as the ' need ' for 
foreign exchange. The lack of central control over the forest resource, and the 
fragmented nature of land and resource ownership, which is constitutionally 
guaranteed, is without precedent elsewhere in the world, and means that new 
solutions have to be sought. 
Accountability 
Small-scale forestry ventures, using low-cost portable or transportable m i lls, 
have offered those whose primary objective has been the conservation of 
rainforest ecosystems a possible alternative in their battle against the destructive 
practices of large-scale logging. In the past, the output of around 0 .5  m3 per day 
per mi l l  has meant that the impact on the forest at large is extremely l imited, yet 
the potential income to rural v i llagers holds out the hope that their aspirations 
for cash can be met, and that some forests at least might thus be denied to 
industrial logging companies. A consequence of this has been that donor 
agencies with conservation or social agendas, or both, have been prepared to 
fund a considerable number of these small-scale ventures by direct donation or 
revolvirig loans. The anxiety of such agencies to prevent the rapid loss of 
representative examples of unique ecosystems, or to capture a reasonable portion 
of the value of the forest for the indigenous resource owners, has meant that the 
actual nature of the smal l-scale forest harvesting has been only superficial ly 
dealt with . The provision of a m il l ,  along with appropriate training in technique, 
and sometimes awareness education in conservation needs, has not previously 
been accompanied by definitive forest management plans or any checks and 
balances on the type of forestry being practised. 
The exposure of PNG's  forests to industrial logging has continued apace. 
Small areas of forest ( insignificant in the larger national context) have been 
temporarily ' saved ' from large-scale logging by the provision of portable mi l ls  
to some communities. The need to bui ld markets, produce commercially viable 
businesses, and convince donors that their money is not going into a bottomless 
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pit, and that rainforest ecosystems are indeed being preserved, has led to 
pressure for more accountabi l ity, and thus for the production of forest 
management plans and an examination of ways of monitoring compl iance. 
Compromise with Social and Economic Realities 
Changes in harvesting practices, and forest management practices in general, are 
discernible as commercial and social real ities impinge on conservation criteria. 
In essence, early attempts at management plans sought to m inimise openings in 
the forest canopy, avoid compaction of the soi l ,  avoid residual damage to 
surrounding trees, and regenerate species in ways which maintained the original 
species structure of the forest. This included cutting trees in rough proportion to 
their distribution in the forest . An example of a set of guidel ines for the 
production of management plans can be found in joint proposals by the 
Rainforest Information Centre and the Vil lage Development Trust to the 
Australian International Development Assistance Bureau (RIC 1 99 1  ). 
A comparison of actual practice with these guidel ines reveals a number of 
differences and reflects certain social, economic, and educational real ities. In 
one area, where a sawmi l l  had been operating for some years, there were 
instances of only rosewood being harvested in some extensive sections of forest. 
The elements of the ecoforestry harvesting plan were being adhered to, except 
for cutting in proportion to the species m ix in the forest (author' s  observation 
near the Waria River). This was a reflection of the lack of infrastructure to shift 
lower valued timbers to Lae and sti l l  make a profit, and to the lack of a local 
market for lower valued timbers . In another instance, a mersawa tree had been 
cut only fifteen metres from the bank of a river. In addition, vines had not been 
cut prior to the tree being felled, with the result that two other quite large trees 
had been brought down with the fell ing, thus opening up an unacceptably large 
gap in the forest canopy (author' s  observation, central southeast Morobe coast). 
When this was pointed out to the sawmil l  operators, there was consternation as 
to what their trainer from the Vil lage Development Trust would say when he 
discovered it. In fact, education had been provided on areas to avoid and on 
proper preparation by el iminating larger vines prior to a fel l ing, but it had not 
been effective in this case . Other fell ings in the area had met the guidelines in 
the 'Trainer's Manual ' provided by the Vil lage Development Trust. In training 
smal l-scale operators, mistakes l ike this are bound to be made. However, it does 
emphasise the need for a lengthy period of extension training and regular 
monitoring. 
Another aspect that impinges on the conservation of the forest relates to 
compaction of the soi l and damage to res idual trees. The smal l-scale harvesting 
guidel ines referred to here required the sawn lumber to be carried out of the 
forest on the workers' shoulders . In this way, compaction of soi l  and damage to 
residuals is sl ight. However, this has proven too difficult to achieve. Vil lagers 
have been unwil l ing to carry the lumber more than short distances (generally 
less than 1 . 5 kilometres in the author' s experience, and more often only a few 
hundred metres), and human carrying capacity has l imited the dimensions of the 
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lumber that can be cut. This latter s ituation has meant that market requirements 
and production real ities do not always complement each other. 
The Bainings Ecotimber Group in East New Britain Province did not start 
with such rigorous criteria. Transportable mi l ls (carried on the back of, or towed 
behind, a truck) and snigging trai ls were used initial ly. The mi l l  was located in 
one position for several months, a smal l bul ldozer was used to construct tracks, 
and a tractor and j inker used to transport logs to the mi l l .  After operations in an 
area are completed, the tracks are replanted (the author noted good regeneration 
of forest at the mi l l ing sites and snigging trai ls, but not on the access track 
constructed to service the mi l l ing sites) . Henderson estimates that compaction 
and damage to residuals is l im ited to 9 percent of the area worked, while in the 
average export logging operation 'up to 70% of the ground area is trashed by 
machinery' (Henderson l 994b :20). The Pacific Heritage Foundation is now 
recommending much l ighter and more portable saws, so it may be possible for 
them to reduce the area of damage to be low 9 percent in the future. 
Experiment and Experience 
The Vil lage Development Trust has been very reluctant to move to 
mechanisation to overcome the problem of removing timber from the bush. It 
has been experimenting with the use of water buffaloes, 7 pull ing either a small 
sled or trai ler. Whi le th is experiment is in its early stages, the response of one. 
' ecoforester' interviewed by the author has not been promising for the use of 
such animals. This small-scale forester is working an area that contains some 
swamp forest and h i l lside forest. He finds that neither is suitable for the buffalo 
and is reluctant to use his employees to regularly work the animal (personal 
communication, Ki l iki Asunu,8 1 4  October 1 996). Buffaloes must be worked 
almost dai ly if they are to retain their training, and thus their efficiency. They 
also need to be rested for several hours during the hottest part of the day. The 
owner-manager of this operation was anxious to dispose of the buffalo, and 
indicated that he needed a smal l tractor and perm ission to construct some trai ls 
in his h i l l  areas if his transport problems were to be overcome. The forest 
management plan for th is area already makes allowance for some roading into 
the h i l l  area (VDT l 996a: 1 2) .  
The remaining significant problem with ecological sustainabi l ity relates to 
the period of rotation. In the case of operations sponsored by the Vil lage 
Development Trust, th is has been set at 30-40 years. The two management plans 
examined by the author (Puseka Logging Area and Masing Logging Area) 
provide 800 hectares and 1 ,000 hectares respectively of commercial forest area, 
with the latter being worked by two portable m i l ls .  Although there is 
considerable variation in the topography and in the vegetation from hectare to 
7 These animals are bred in Madang, provided with training, and the castrated animals then sent 
to the field sites. 
8 General Manager of KON Enterprises. 
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hectare, the yearly worked area wil l  be approximately 20-25 hectares under a 
'cut and leave for 30-40 years ' regime. The minimum harvest to make the 
business commercially viable is of the order of 20 m3 of sawn lumber per month 
(personal communication, B i l l  Girard,9 2 October 1 996). This translates to 240 
m3 per year for the Puseka management area, and slightly more for the Masin� 
management area. 1 0  This would suggest a recoverable harvest of at least I 0 m 
per hectare. It seems to the author that this is at the h igh end of the scale, given 
a recovery rate of 40 percent, and can lead to fairly large gaps being created in 
the canopy, given the nature of the forestry to be practised. There are different 
cutting regimes that may reduce this problem, although it can, over time, lead to 
an overall change in the density of very large trees in the forest. 
The Solomon Western Islands Fair Trade (SWIFT) project uses a system 
whereby forest is c lassified into nine categories depending on the number of 
large trees greater than 60cm dbh 1 1  per hectare and the number in the range 30-
59cm dbh per hectare. 1 2  Each class has a maximum number of trees greater than 
60cm dbh per hectare which can be cut in any five-year period. As trees are cut, 
a hectare plot may move 'down ' in the class hierarchy, giving rise to a lower 
al lowable cut in the next five-year period. This can continue until a point is  
reached where the forest is at Class 9, in which cutting of further trees is 
disal lowed. The harvest is  thus spread out, and depends on the state (or health) 
of the forest in any five-year period. Th is method has resulted in resource 
·owners continuing to show a strong interest in one-hectare blocks over time, 
regularly inspecting them and measuring the growth rates of trees. Thus it is 
proving of educational value in improving resource owners ' knowledge of the 
dynamics of their forest (personal communication, Wil lem Quist, 1 3 29 October 
1 996). 
The point made in the two previous paragraphs brings discussion back to 
the question of the knowledge base from which these 'ecoforestry' groups are 
working. Insufficient knowledge exists on the structure of forests, their 
regeneration, and the effects of various forms of timber harvesting, including 
those practised by groups marketing their product as ecotimber. Both the 
Village Development Trust and the Pacific Heritage Foundation, as examples of 
NGOs promoting forestry of this sort, have included record-keeping practices in 
9 Director, Planning and Development, of the Vil lage Development Trust. 
I O The primary mil ls in both areas are new Lewi saws, while the second mi l l  in the Masing area is  
a reconditioned Wokabout Sami i  previously owned by the clan working the area. 
1 1  Diameter at breast height. 
1 2  In this scheme, Class I forest has more than 35  trees >60cm dbh/ha, and trees in the range 30-
59cm dbh are not counted ( 4 trees per hectare >60 cm dbh can be cut in a five-year period). Class 
5 forest has 20-24 trees >60cm dbh/ha and less than 1 5  trees in the range 30-59cm dbh (2 trees per 
hectare >60cm dbh can be cut in a five-year period). Class 9 forest has < 1 5  trees >60cm dbh/ha 
and < 1 5 trees in the range 30-59cm dbh. No cutting is al lowed in this class. 
13 Senior forestry officer of SWIFT. 
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their management plans, with the intention of bui lding a database which can act 
as an indicator of change in the forest over time, and sampling plots which will 
be measured and evaluated annually to determine forest growth rates and, 
hopeful ly, any ecological changes occurring (PHF 1 993 : 1 2 ; VDT l 996b:7, 1 4) .  
Despite working on the establ ishment of smal l-scale, environmental ly 
sensitive forestry for several years, relevant NGOs, their donor organisations, 
and community-based groups with sawmil ls are short on experience and 
knowledge in the techniques best suited to achieving their goal of conserving the 
forest resource, and the criteria to be assessed in determining their degree of 
success. 
Accommodating Economic Sustainability 
Even with the assistance of NGOs, community-based ecotimber producers have 
only been establ ished in places where competition from large-scale logging 
companies has been non-existent or m inimal .  Nevertheless, their commercial 
viabi l ity requires that costs of production are met, and that there is sufficient 
profit to cover rural v i l lagers ' aspirations for cash . NGOs are following a 
strategy of reducing costs through ach ieving economies of scale and some 
reprocessing of lumber, along with improvements in productivity and qual ity 
control .  The attitudes generated in cash-poor but time-rich societies are an 
obstacle for developing the Western business-centred approach that is impl ied 
by the strategy, and demanded by the size of the loans needed to purchase 
modern equipment. 
Refocussing Goals 
Without its commercial v iabi l ity being successfully tested, this type of forestry 
cannot be a positive contributor to the preservation of the ecological systems of 
PNG's  rainforests. Commercial viabi l ity requires the cost of operations to be 
met, along with the aspirations of the resource owners for an improved qual ity of 
l ife. Much has been written about the short-term nature of those aspirations (see 
Brooks 1 996). The attitudes encompassing them are open invitations to the large 
industrial logging companies to meet their immediate concerns in the Asian 
marketplace, and reinforce short-term profit-taking endeavours at the expense of 
long-term goals that are more suitable to the preservation of natural forest 
ecosystems. 
The biggest task facing the NGOs, in the short term, is to demonstrate that 
their rhetoric can be real ised in a practical way by meeting rural vi l lagers ' 
aspirations. Part of that task is to refocus those aspirations on medium- to long­
term goals. This is not proving easy. Wherever smal l-scale forestry has been 
offered as an alternative to income generated by large-scale logging, the latter 
has been preferred. This has been true, even when large sums of money have 
been spent on promoting alternatives, and when that alternative has been 
medium-scale, reduced- impact logging rather than smal l-scale logging, as for 
example in the Lak Integrated Conservation and Development (ICAD) project in 
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New Ireland Province (McCallum and Sekhran 1 996 :6) .  The greater s ize of the 
return in the short term, the abi lity to d istribute some of the returns across a 
community, and the lack of any need for physical labour to extract that return, 
have been far more attractive than the work required to service a loan for a 
portable m ill ,  the business of arranging to market a product, and the prospect of 
d isputes arising from the lack of any means to redistribute the resulting income 
with some degree of equity around the community. 
How the refocussing is to be achieved is sti l l very much an open question 
and the subject of some current debate (see Orsak 1 996c ). Part of that process is  
itself long-term, in that it involves the improvement of general education levels 
in rural communities. Another part involves the establ ishment of successful 
alternative models. There are plenty of examples of the lack of benefits which 
rural communities derive from entering into partnerships with the large logging 
companies, and these can be the subject of awareness ' tours' which form part of 
a re-education process. However, this raises other perceptual problems, such as 
when a rusting steel roof atop a frame of offcuts from a large sawmil l  nearby 
somehow equates with ' progress' . Some reasons for optimism may be found in 
the smal l proportion of the young educated el ite who are choosing to return to 
vi llage l ife and form the focal point for information dissemination and resistance 
to short-term solutions to the problems of cash-poor societies, as in the Maisin 
community of Collingwood Bay in Oro Province (personal communication, 
Larry Orsak, 1 4 14 September 1 996). 
Opportunities for Establishing Ecotimber Businesses 
Where small-scale operations have been set up, they have often been in 
conjunction with large-scale logging, such as when the smal l-scale sawmi l lers 
use logs that have been d iscarded by the logging company because of defects, or 
simply because they were overlooked. In other cases, the operations are in areas 
that are under l ittle or no pressure from logging concerns. These areas may have 
been logged in the past but only specific species taken (as at Puseka); or else a 
physical impediment has raised the cost of extraction by large-scale logging 
methods (as at Masing); or the species structure of the forest has simply made 
other areas far more attractive (as at Kam iali) .  The point here is that smal l-scale, 
community-based ecotimber projects are general ly found in areas where other 
opportunities to generate cash income are rare. 
This scenario may be starting to change slowly, as evidence of the short­
term duration of income provided by large-scale logging, and the lack of change 
in peoples l ives over the medium to long term, becomes transparent. This 
appears to be the case on the southeast Morobe coast, where responses to the 
author' s questions in Kamiali were heavi ly laced with descriptions of what the 
people to the south of them had not ach ieved after twenty-one years of logging 
(eighteen years by South Pacific Timbers and three years by Timber Products 
1 4 Director of the Christensen Research Institute in Madang. 
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Marketing Corporation). For instance, it was difficult to see any gains of 
s ignificance in the vi l lage of Kui, in whose forests a logging company had 
operated for only three years before depleting the resource and moving on. 
There is some evidence that more garden land was opened up along the logging 
road which was rapidly deteriorating (author' s observation, March 1 996). 
However, from a biodiversity point of view, this is hardly a gain. 
Becoming Cost Effective 
Whatever the impediments to large-scale logging, which have led to some 
vi l lages or clans seeking the support of NGOs to start smal l-scale forestry 
programmes, there is sti l l  a need to demonstrate some measure of short-term 
economic return from the ecologically sensitive harvesting methods being 
proposed, as compared to the benefits of extracting timber in non-sustainable 
processes. This has led to attempts by the Pacific Heritage Foundation and the 
Vil lage Development Trust to secure some advantages of scale, and seek to 
guarantee producers some returns on a wide range of species through the 
development of central buying centres, a local market, and an export market. 
Part of an examination of the commercial aspects of a sustainable 
ecoforestry industry has involved looking at the strategy adopted by the Vil lage 
Development Trust in developing a cooperative of smal l-scale ecotimber 
producers in Lae. This NGO is attempting to reach a situation in which full  
account is taken of the costs of the smal l-scale operator. These costs include 
burdens not previously borne by those who have operated mil ls in the past. In 
the past, there has been plenty of donor funding to cover the cost of extension 
services, and these have been suppl ied by Vil lage Development Trust foresters 
free of charge. It is planned for the services of Vil lage Development Trust staff 
to be gradual ly incorporated into the cost structure. Ten percent of the sale price 
to the buying centre is to be put aside for these purposes . Initial ly, while the 
number of sawmil lers in the cooperative remains small, th is I 0 percent 
surcharge does not cover the costs of the services being provided. The Village 
Development Trust estimates the break-even point at about s ix mi l lers. When 
the number of mi l lers is more than six, the intention is to refund the difference 
between the charge and the cost back to the sawmil lers . At this stage, the actual 
costs cannot be determined with sufficient accuracy to make predictions and set 
firm values into the future. For instance, it is expected that the costs of carrying 
out inventories of commercial tree species in the forests will fal l with experience 
and as techniques of accurate sampl ing are developed . As a greater pool of 
trained operators becomes available, the time which foresters spend on training 
may also decline. However, it is too early to predict what manpower wil l  be 
necessary, and at what rate these costs wi ll fall .  
The Value of Time and the Value of Cash 
At this early stage, the embryonic cooperative is extremely vulnerable to a wide 
range of competing interests . One of the attractive aspects of the strategy is the 
creation of a central buying point which guarantees to take all the timber 
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produced by the cooperative' s  mi l lers . Timber derived from a wide variety of 
species is bought in three grades at a fixed price for each grade - K l  80/m3, 
K250/m3 and K350/m3 . Higher prices can be obtained by sawmil lers for a few 
selected species of furniture grade timbers (up to K450/m3) by dealing directly 
with furniture manufacturers, and occasional ly for construction timbers as wel l .  
This requires the sawmi l l  operator to spend t ime searching around for a buyer. 
If the search is successful, a h igher price is obtained, but if the few buyers in the 
market already have sufficient stocks of timber, then the mi l ler is  left with 
lumber on his  hands and must wait unti l  demand picks up again. More often 
than not, the actual m i l l ing ceases whi le the owner/manager seeks a market for 
the timber, and if it is not immediately found, then the operation remains closed 
down unti l stocks are sold .  This shutdown is often necessitated by the lack of 
sufficient cash to pay the workers. 
The theory upon which the Vil lage Development Trust is basing its 
organisation is that consistent production, promoted by a guaranteed market for 
the product at a timber yard, wi l l  produce, over time, a h igher cash return than 
intermittent production for which h igher prices are paid. This is not proving an 
easy concept for sawmil l  managers to understand or come to grips with . Their 
experience is generally l imited to cash-poor communities, in which the marginal 
value of cash is h igher than the marginal value of the time put in to obtain that 
cash; that is, where there is a shortage of cash but no shortage of time, then time 
will be expended freely in order to obtain extra cash . An example of a distorted 
version of thi s  notion in the smal l-scale forestry sector came to the author' s 
attention recently, when an operator in Madanf found that he could obtain 
K400/m3 for his  kwi la in Lae, but only K300/m in Madang. The timber was 
then trucked to Lae at a price in excess of K50/m3, but in the meantime, the 
operator' s mi l l  lay idle whi le he made the arrangements and located a buyer. A 
greater profit per unit ohime was avai lable if the mi l l  had kept operating and the 
timber had been sold at K300/m3, even if a greater profit per cubic metre was 
available by trucking it to Lae. The total amount of cash generated within the 
community would clearly be greater in the first instance, as the workmen would 
stil l  be receiving wages, and it is  questionable whether the owner/operator was 
financially better off, given the lost production. At the v i l lage level, examples 
abound of time sacrificed for a larger cash return. In these cases, though, the 
time sacrificed would either have been spent on the production of subsistence 
goods, social activity or sindaun nating ( ' sitting around doing nothing'), and not 
in alternative cash-generating activities. For example, in the v i llage of Kamial i ,  
the fresh fish project periodically col lapses as the costs outweigh the returns 
because of the inconsistent amounts of time spent on fishing. One of the 
contributing reasons for this is that dried fish bring slightly h igher prices in the 
Lae market than fresh fish bring at the buying point in Kamial i .  No account is 
taken of the fact that much more time is spent in drying fish, taking it to market 
and sell ing it, than would be spent on catching and sel l ing fresh fish. 
The capacity to have a longer-term perspective of a business operation 
seems l imited at present, and wil l  only be overcome with education gained 
through experience. A chal lenge for the Village Development Trust is  to hold its 
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cooperative together long enough for this experience to be gained, and for some 
economies of scale to enter the equation . One operator, with a h istory of several 
years of production resulting in sales of the order of K40,000 to K70,000 a year, 
said that he was thinking of getting a bank loan to pay off his loan from the 
Vil lage Development Trust and then going it alone. Two reasons were 
m�ntioned - the I 0 percent levy to cover the services of the NGO, and the 
prospect of obtaining higher prices e lsewhere . 
The h igher prices are generally obtained for a l im ited range of species. 
This may encourage the overharvesting of such species in certain areas of forest 
and thus change its character to a greater extent than allowed under the forest 
management plans, whose aim of preserving the species constitution of the 
original forest depends on a wide range of species being selectively harvested 
over a fixed area. 
In l ight of comments made to the author by rural v i l lagers who are engaged 
in smal l-scale ecoforestry, the local commitment to sustainable forestry, in an 
ecological sense, must be questioned; or perhaps one might say that an 
internal ised understanding of what forestry practices are necessary to achieve a 
s ituation approaching ecological sustainabi l ity must be questioned. For the 
NGOs involved, the pressures to compromise ecological standards in order to 
meet economic and social real ities are ever-present. 
Changing the Orientation of Community Ecotimber Groups 
The establ ishment of a sawmil lers ' cooperative supplying timber to a central 
buying/processing centre has a number of objectives, but these are ultimately 
dependent on the commercial viabi l ity of the operators and the timber yard. Part 
of this v iabi l ity involves becoming competitive in the local market, and this 
requires economies of scale to reduce costs. Production of timber in ways which 
can be described as ecologically sensitive (or sustainable) incorporates direct 
costs which are external ities for the large logging companies, and consequently 
do not show on their balance sheets. Part of that difference can be accounted for 
by el iminating profits going overseas, whi le part can be found through 
government intervention in the market which gives preference to indigenous 
smal l-scale operators (though past h istory suggests that this is unl ikely in the 
short to medium term).  The remainder must be made up by the owner/operators 
reducing their own costs. 
In order to reduce these costs, the small-scale sawmi l l  operators need to 
move much closer in their orientation to Western business practices, and their 
adoption of a long-term perspective, than has been the case in the past. Past 
practices have been directed at meeting relatively short-term goals, even for 
those purporting to operate on a commercial basis . Cash generated by the 
business has tended to be spent in the short term, both for necessary consumer 
items and for the creation and maintenance of social networks .  As a 
consequence, there has often been insufficient operating capital or monies set 
aside for investment in new equipment, even where the original equipment was 
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largely donated by external sources. Loan repayments have frequently not been 
met, which has led to a reluctance by banks to finance smal l-scale operations 
generally (Farley, Gladman and Martin 1 993 : 5 8) . The value of the business is 
often not recognised, only the cash left in the pocket after the direct costs of 
wages, fuel, and so on. As a consequence, the physical assets of the business are 
often not maintained with a long-term operation in m ind. 
The idea of only working for cash when you need it (a practice that is well­
established in rural PNG) does not s it wel l  with the maintenance of an effective 
business . It is conceivable that a s ituation could exist where a large number of 
sawmi llers, each producing intermittently, could provide the economies of scale 
required for a small-scale industry to develop, especial ly if the cost of the 
production equipment was not too h igh in relation to wages and the return on the 
timber. In the past, this was the case with early models of the 'wokabout somi l '  
and chainsaw m il ls .  It may sti l l  be  the case with chainsaw mi lls .  However, the 
need for qual ity in the export grades, in particular, has meant that a new 
generation of portable circular m il ls offering greater accuracy, speed, and lower 
manpower needs has made an appearance. A substantial increase in price has 
accompanied the introduction of these new machines. Whi le K4,000 to KS,000 
was requ ired to set up a Wokabout Somi l  operation only a few years ago, the 
price is now around K30,000 for a machine (such as a Lewisaw) and its 
accompanying equipment, and another K6,000 to Kl 0,000 in operating capital, a 
total approaching K40,000. The proportion of the production costs that must be 
allocated to serv ic ing the loan has risen, and a consistent and appreciable 
quantity of timber must be produced. 
Accommodating Social Sustainability 
As the preceding two sections i l lustrate, it is impossible to consider the 
components of sustainabi l ity in isolation from one another. Many socially 
relevant issues are raised in those sections, and complement some of the 
following discussion . 
Two groups, with differing characteristics, form the basis of a future 
ecotimber production industry. The point at which the two groups separate is in 
relation to the infrastructure that is  avai lable for the marketing of their product, 
and in the orientation of their producers to consistency of supply. One of these 
groups will ,  for some time into the future, produce intermittently, with its 
operators heavi ly engaged in the subsistence activities of their communities. 
The part-time nature of their contribution wil l  warrant a different approach in the 
provision of NGO support than wil l  that of the ful l-time producers with modern 
equipment and 'modern ' loans to serv ice . This latter group faces problems in 
adapting to practices consistent with full-time production, and with putting 
together extractive areas of sufficient s ize to guarantee the ecological 
functioning of the forests. Communities are not being prepared for the rapid 
social changes resulting from sudden and relatively large inflows of cash . 
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Part-Time Ecotimber Producers 
In an examination of five portable sawmil l  operations that are claiming 
ecoforestry status in southeast Morobe, it was clear that the mi l ls  were used to 
service local community needs such as the construction of community buildings, 
churches, school guesthouses, and so on. They operated only when materials 
were required. They were not commercial ventures, and were not organised in a 
way which would make them commercial ly viable in the future. One mi l l  was 
generating cash income on occasions by m il l ing high value timber, such as 
rosewood, and sel l ing it in Lae for K450/m3 • The profits were used to cover the 
costs of a club which, on occasion, visited festival s ites around the country to put 
on performances . The young men who were members of the club gave their 
sawmil l  services free in order to raise the money to attend these festivals and 
perform . Resource owners were paid in timber, not cash, for lumber extracted 
from their land. 
The use of sawmil ls  only when there is a definite need for cash or materials 
in a community is a common story. It is  made possible by the initial donation of 
capital costs, which removes the necessity to undertake consistent production to 
service a loan. Because the cash costs are relatively smal l ,  labour is donated, 
and access to markets is l im ited or information on marketing unavai lable, such 
operations are not seen by the vi l lagers themselves as an alternative to the 
income that is generated when their timber resource is sold to large-scale 
logging companies. This  is the case even though the mi l l s  may have originally 
been donated as an incentive to refuse the offers of logging companies. 
In a rural community, the demands on people's time for subsistence needs 
and for social activity within the community are h igh, irregular, and in many 
cases immediate - such as a death in the vi l lage, the destruction of pig fences, 
the arrival of schools of fish, and so on. Even though many vi l lagers have 
experienced the time demands and constraints of wage labour whi le working in 
the towns, the social and subsistence demands in the vi l lage place such labour in 
a quite different context. Nevertheless, there is considerable potential for the 
many 'o lder' portable sawmi l ls in these vi l lages to become cash-generating 
options, and thus acceptable alternatives to large-scale logging, if they could be 
brought into the commercial strategy in some form. The point to be made is that 
this type of production is l ikely to remain intermittent because of the social 
context in which the producers operate and the nature of the sawmi l l ' s  history. 
Full-Time Ecotimber Producers 
The need for those groups using modern equipment, and with ready access to a 
major centre, to produce consistently has been canvassed in the section on 
economic sustainabi l ity. There is another question about the abi l ity of producer 
groups to obtain the rights to sufficiently large sections of forest to operate in an 
ecologically sustainable fashion. In the two examples given earl ier (Puseka and 
Masing Management Areas), the production forests were at the very bottom of 
the s ize range for ecological sustainabil ity, given the harvest demands placed on 
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them . In one of these, the usage rights were dependent, to a significant extent, 
on the standing of the manager in the community, his past contributions to the 
community, and his donation of one day's  sawmil l  production per week to the 
community (personal communication, Kil iki Asunu, 1 4  October 1 996). In the 
other, the usage rights were more firm ly held by the clan owning and operating 
the sawmil l ,  yet there was sti l l  an unresolved land dispute on one boundary of 
the extractive area (personal communication, Bi l l  Girard, 2 October 1 996). In 
both of these cases, expansion of the business depended on making arrangements 
with adjoining landowner groups to use the resources on their land, and reaching 
an agreement on royalty payments or the sharing of profits. From an ecological 
perspective, the larger the units that can be put together, the greater the chances 
of retaining the area' s  biological divers ity. However, the incorporation of 
sections of land owned by different groups under one sustainable management 
plan poses a whole range of problems and future uncertainties. 
The problem of interruptions to production, due to social obl igations or the 
demands of famil ies for help in subsistence activities, is a major problem for the 
full-time producers . There are expectations of, and strong pressures on, a 
manager to employ workers from amongst his or her own fami ly or clan group. 
Meeting these pressures exacerbates the production problems because death, 
marriage, or festivals can result in the related group all attending, and production 
ceasing for lengthy periods of time. In the Puseka Management Area, the 
manager has overcome these problems to a large extent by employing workers 
from a number of clan groups. In thi s  way, he hopes to avoid interruptions but, 
initially at least, seems to have paid a price for th is by having an oversized 
labour force for his  mi l l . 1 5 He has been using two teams of six men and a 
female book-keeper, but is currently trying to reduce th is number. The tree­
felling, the operation of the Lewisaw, and the stacking of timber can be 
adequately handled by three or four men per team. 
Social Accounting 
The introduction of a smal l-scale forestry business, especially one which is 
producing consistently, can mean a relatively large increase in cash flow from 
wages and profit when compared to the previous experience of a rural vi l lage 
community. This increase may in fact double the income of a vi l lage and bring 
with it the same sorts of problems and social dislocations that are observable in 
vi l lages absorbing the income derived from large-scale logging. Whi le the 
increased cash may spawn new businesses in the vi l lage, and thus lead to further 
redistribution of the wealth created, it is inevitably an uneven redistribution. 
The community is faced with rapid changes in income differentials between 
fami l ies, and with changes to its soc ial structure. These are changes that are 
unexpected, and the vi l lagers generally lack the means for dealing with them . 
The preparation of vi l lagers for a sudden shift from a largely subsistence 
economy to a m ixed subsistence and cash economy is not being addressed any 
l 5 This solution to the problem is unique in the experience of the author. 
Small-Scale Community-Based Forestry 285 
better in ecoforestry initiatives than i t  has been in areas where there has been an 
introduction of income from large-scale logging. The NGOs involved in 
promoting smal l-scale, community-based ecoforestry need to put more of their 
resources into preparing vi l lage communities for change in their societies in 
order to alleviate the need to deal with unforeseen consequences .  
Directions for an 'Ecoforestry' Industry 
The general strategy for the development of an ecotimber industry involves the 
development of markets and the creation of central buying and processing 
centres which are able to guarantee the purchase of al l the timber that is  
produced by community-based groups. The central buying centres and the 
actions of overseas 'green '  consumers are controll ing agents for adherence to 
forest management plans .  Certification of ecotimber seems to be a direction to 
pursue, but there are many problems to be overcome and a need to deal with 
future uncertainties created by changing attitudes and involvement of the regular 
timber trade. 
The two distinct groups of ecotimber producers identified here have to be 
incorporated into the commercial strategy of NGOs that are involved in this 
business, and the fledgl ing ecotimber industry has yet to see itself in a wider 
context where it is integrated with other small-scale, community-based or 
regional ly-based income producing activities. 
Strategies for Developing a 'Cottage ' Industry 
A direction is being set for the future development of a small-scale sawmi l l ing 
industry with a charter that includes the conservation of primary forest 
biodiversity. This direction is being shaped by forces both within and outside 
the country. It is by no means certain that it will survive with its charter intact. 
Also, it is important to recognise that it is a minuscule industry in comparison 
with the large-scale logging ventures which are currently being undertaken in the 
country, and that it is very much an experimental industry, with a multitude of 
problems yet to be solved in each of the three relevant areas of sustainabi l ity -
ecological, economic, and social . 
The general strategy of the main players is to create markets which can 
guarantee the purchase of all the timber being produced by smal l-scale mi l lers, 
and to make the sale of the timber to central buying points attractive enough to 
act as a controll ing factor in the type of forestry being practised. The initial 
development of a local market is to be followed by the development of an export 
market to 'green ' consumers in the 'overdeve loped' countries such as Austral ia, 
the United States, and those in Europe. The export market is to apply pressure 
for adherence to ecological ly sensitive harvesting practices and to reduce the 
vulnerabi l ity of the industry local ly to attempts by large-scale competitors to 
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flood the market with cheap sawn timber. 1 6  It is also necessary to create a 
diverse export market, because the small-scale ecoforesters will be able to 
produce more than the local market requires in the short term, if current plans by 
the NGOs assisting in the creation of cooperatives and the central buying centres 
are reali sed. 
Markets 
At present, the only markets that are will ing and able to take a wide range of 
grades are those in Europe, where there is a clearly defined and sizeable ' green ' 
consumer segment of the market, and construction grade timbers have 
considerable value. Other markets exist, but they tend to be far more selective 
because the ' green' consumer group is less developed, or because there is a 
plentiful supply of construction grade t imbers at low prices. Whi le there may be 
a small premium for ecotimber, it is not large enough to make anything other 
than furniture grade timbers competitive in Australia, where there is a good 
market which is wil l ing to take certain species in small quantities because of the 
nature of the furniture trade (Martin 1 996:9- 1 1 ) . The west coast of the United 
States also seems to fit this latter category. 
In the medium to long term, markets in Asia need to be developed for 
ecotimber. The potential there is unknown, as l ittle in the way of market 
research has been carried out, and the voice of 'green ' consumer groups is 
muted. Some recognition of the need to address the potential of this area for 
ecotimber was evident at the 'Consultative Meeting on Sustainable Timber' in 
Rabaul in September 1 996 . Given the focus of th is meeting on the European 
market, and the Netherlands in particular, practical ways of addressing the issue 
were not developed. 
Certification 
Timber merchants in both the United Kingdom and the Netherlands who have 
been dealing with sustainably produced timber, such as the Ecological Trading 
Company in the UK and Swift Hout in the Netherlands, have been struggl ing to 
make themselves viable businesses. However, the interest of the general timber 
traders has been increasingly focussed by the notion of certification, l 7 and the 
demands of an increasing percentage of their clients for timber sourced from 
well-managed forests. These merchants are also preparing to import large 
quantities of certified timbers . For example, one timber merchant in the 
Netherlands intends to import several thousand cubic metres a year from a 
certified timber operation in Brazil , which is large-scale and has considerable 
1 6 At present, the ecoforestry industry is small enough to be ignored, but this may not always be 
the case. 
1 7 'Certification' refers to an auditing and monitoring system that assures buyers of the timber 
carrying the certificate that they are getting what they pay for in terms of it coming from well­
managed ' sustainable' forests. 
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investment in m il ls using laser technology (personal communication, Igor 
Mousasticoshvi ly, 1 8  25 September 1 996). Certification would appear to be a 
d irection in which the fledgling ecoforestry industry in PNG must go. At 
present, th is matter is compl icated by a number of competing certifiers and 
certification schemes, by the power of the large producers, merchants, and 
retailers to contain their costs and their markets, and by the appreciable cost of 
the certification and monitoring process itself. At present, the cost of obtaining 
certification under FSC principles is  prohibitive, except for large cooperatives. 
Current certification carried out in the Solomon Islands and in PNG has, to date, 
been accomplished with the generous help of international donors . 
Accommodating Part-Time and Full-Time Producers 
Whi le the organising NGOs concentrate on assisting a group of small-scale 
sawmil lers to reach standards of consistency and qual ity which ensure that the 
requirements of the various markets are met, and the loans on new generation 
mil ls  are serv iced, there remains a large number of sawmi llers, mostly in areas 
remote from the large towns and ports and easy means of access to these, who 
want to work their forests to capture some cash income. These sawmi l lers, who 
obtained their equipment some time ago, do not have the loan obligations of the 
former group. Due to circumstance and social organisation, they are not able or 
wil l ing to produce large quantities of lumber consistently, but they sti l l  require 
extension services and help in constructing management plans in accordance 
with the long-term preservation of their forests . As a group, they give rise to a 
different set of problems from the sawmil lers working their machines and forests 
in a ful l-time manner, and thus require different approaches to the solution of 
those problems. 
A major problem l ies in transporting sawn timber, in excess of local 
community needs, to the central buying points and reprocessing plants . The 
southeast Morobe coast provides an example where a number of community 
owned and operated sawmil ls  are producing intermittently, but in excess of 
vi l lage requirements . The owners of the m i l ls have focussed on finding ways of 
transporting their product to Lae. In one case, the subclan that is  managing the 
mi l l  is attempting to bui ld a mon - a large coastal canoe capable of carrying up 
to five cubic metres of sawn timber. 1 9 Another case which i l lustrates the 
situation can be found in the v icinity of the Waria River, where a manager has to 
wait for an indeterminate time unti l a suitable ship is in the area (on another 
purpose) to carry several cubic metres of t imber to Lae. 
A solution would seem to l ie in convincing these intermittent producers to 
bui ld local drying yards for their product, and in arranging for them to accept 
payment for their timber at fixed points in the year, when a single ship can be 
1 8  Forest economist at the Instituto Socioambiental, Brazi l .  
1 9 I n  this case, the vi l lagers have shown considerable initiative in attempting this solution to  their 
problems, as the construction represents new technology and new techniques to be learned. 
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sent to service al l  the local drying and storage yards in a section of the coast. In 
short, the ful l-time sawmi llers would supply the central timber yard and 
reprocessing plant with the certainty of meeting orders and del ivery dates 
demanded by the export market and some larger local users of the timber, whi le 
the intermittent producers could contribute to the remaining sales. 
Small-scale, Community-Based Forestry in Context 
Given a history of commercial uti l isation of forests by large logging 
companies,20 it comes as no surprise to find smal l-scale ecoforestry being 
defined rather narrowly, in the m inds of the stakeholders, as the production of 
sawn timber. Even where there are other income-producing forest activities 
being conducted in the same general area as ecotimber production, the mind-set 
is one which views them in isolation. The areas set aside for different activities 
may even be geographical ly separated, without an accompanying economic 
rationale, although there may be social reasons based on the existence of 
subclans and their differential land ownership or usage rights . 
Whi le the term ' integration ' in the concept of Integrated Conservation and 
Development (ICAD) is generally understood by community members as a 
l inkage between conservation and development (even if they do not internal ise 
it), it is not so wel l  appreciated when it comes to integrating the returns from 
various forest activities into a s ingle concept of benefit. This is particularly true 
of ecotimber production outs ide of ICAD projects .  Being community-based and 
operated means that ecotimber production has to be linked into other serv ices 
which are avai lable in the community, and that some of the costs of production, 
which cannot be captured local ly in the case of industrial logging operations, 
will circulate as cash in the vi l lage communities. Mutual benefits from the 
integration of forest activities, leading to a conservation of labour and material 
costs, are also possible. A maxim isation of the integrated benefit to the 
community, and an accurate and comprehensible estimate of its value, offers a 
more attractive comparison with returns from the industrial logging of the forest 
than what appears to be the piecemeal approach taken at present. The author' s 
observation is that ' projects ' are initiated by, or proposed to, communities in 
isolation from each other, without the interactions and l inkages elaborated, and 
often in a generally ad hoe way which helps underscore the tendency to assess 
their value in isolation from each other. 
This approach reinforces the perception that the immediate quantity of cash 
generated, or the provision of a physical asset, should be the measure of a 
project 's  worth, instead of the project or activity being seen in the context of the 
opportunities it creates for other business activity and cash flow through a 
community. An example of this was recently demonstrated in the Kamial i 
community's  dismay at finding that they did not 'own ' the training centre being 
20 The activity of these companies is confined to the extraction of logs and, in some cases, their 
processing into sawn timber or woodchips. 
Small-Scale Community-Based Forestry 289 
bui lt (with portable sawmi l l  timber) on a leased section of their land. Only with 
considerable difficulty was the idea conveyed that benefits could flow from its 
presence in the area. Even then, one v i llage delegate to a meeting, which was 
trying to resolve the community ' s  closure of the construction s ite, expressed his  
bel ief that wages earned at the s ite were not a benefit because they had to be 
worked for (author' s  journal, 1 1  October 1 996). 
A chal lenge exists for the NGOs that are conducting awareness and 
education campaigns, which are designed to convince rural communities to 
develop their resources themselves in environmentally sensitive ways, rather 
than hand their resources over to large multinational companies, to incorporate a 
consciousness of the wider or more ' integrated'  benefit of their own init iative. 
Planning Implications 
There are four groups to consider at this point in time: 
• the communities making the choice to follow a l ine of development that 
includes 'ecoforestry' ; 
• the NGOs providing information, education, and ski l ls that are lacking in the 
communities (and for the time being acting as m iddlemen between the 
producers and the timber merchants who are supplying the markets); 
• the international donors; and 
• the PNG government at its various levels .  
Up to the present, the government and the commercial timber industry have 
largely ignored smal l-scale, community-based ecoforestry. It has not proven to 
be a serious competitor for the resources sought by the large logging companies, 
s ince its production levels have made it uneconomical for the trade to take much 
notice of, or for the government to become concerned with, its revenue-making 
potential . Nevertheless, the rising demand for certification of the production 
h istory of timber imported to 'overdeveloped' countries, the continued interest 
of international institutions concerned with quality of l ife issues for rural Papua 
New Guineans or the preservation of the biodiversity of tropical forests in 
funding new ecotimber extraction operations, and the improving organisation 
and scale of the cooperative ventures promoted by national NGOs, may change 
this s ituation. 
Governments 
Governments and their relevant departments need to address small-scale portable 
sawmi l l ing general ly, but especial ly the activities of those groups lying outside 
the umbrella of the few NGOs that are promoting ecological ly sensitive 
management plans. S ince these mi l ls allow landowners to harvest pockets of 
forest left beh ind by other timber extraction operations, or to work terrain that is  
too difficult for the large-scale logging companies, the potential exists for them 
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to add to the damage done by the earlier industrial logging. Current legislat ion 
allows small timber operations, which are producing less than 500 m3 of sawn 
timber for non-commercial use, to work without any permit, authority, or l icence 
(Van Heiden 1 996 :97). While trees are rarely cut on steep-sloping land, there 
are plenty of instances of portable m i lls operating in swamp forest, close to 
rivers, and in a follow-up to large-scale loggers. 
There i s  also a need for the government to take a more contextual view of 
the benefits to be obtained from various forms of log or timber extraction from 
forests. The relative benefits of the sort of large-scale logging which is 
promoted at government levels, and that of less ecologically intrusive forms, 
need to be rigorously compared and critically assessed in their social, economic, 
and temporal dimensions, including the sort of attitudes to self-fulfilment which 
the nation wants to inculcate in its people, before one sort of timber industry is 
promoted at the expense of another. 
Meeting the nation' s  goals for intergenerational equity, as outl ined in its 
Constitution, also warrants government intervention to ensure that representative 
and v iable examples of the nation' s  ecological systems are preserved. The 
ach ievement of this goal would seem to suggest, in the opinion of the author, a 
need for the government to smooth the road for those activities which positively 
reinforce b iodiversity conservation . In the context of PNG, where the locking up 
of large tracts of forest is  difficult, if not impossible, this would suggest that 
ecoforestry should be considered as one of those activities. While this does not 
mean giving preferential treatment, it may mean taking account of the 
externalities that give an advantage to the large company sawmil ls in the 
domestic scene. It may also mean providing protection to ecotimber producers, 
if the large company sawmi l ls decide to saturate the market with cheaper 
timbers. 
Donor Institutions 
Most international donors, whether government or non-government, have sti l l to 
come to grips with the commercial realities of the long-term viabi l ity of an 
ecotimber industry. There appear to be significant amounts of money available 
for building the capacity of national NGOs, for training purposes, and for 
hardware such as portable sawmil ls, in cases where there is not an obvious 
commerc ial component. Whi le this assistance is helpful at the production stage, 
it is the putting together of a viable marketing chain that wil l  produce the 
successful models which are l ikely to be followed by others . While attempts 
have been made in the past to demonstrate that a marketing chain real ly can be 
put together, these have been restricted by the lack of economies of scale, by a 
general unwil l ingness of the commercial trade to take the risks inherent in 
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becoming involved, and by the inexperience and non-commercial orientation of 
the NGOs, both national and internationaI .2 1  
A consultative meeting on sustainable timber, held i n  Rabaul i n  September 
1 996, and funded by the Interchurch Organisation for Development Cooperation, 
attempted to address the issues involved in setting up such a marketing chain. It 
is the author' s  considered view that there was a gap between the producer and 
the importer which is at present enthusiastically but inadequately fil led by the 
NGOs which are mainly involved in developing the production end of the chain.  
The presence and input of commercially oriented middlemen with a sound 
knowledge of Melanesian social organisation and the realities of marketing, both 
locally and internationally, seems to be needed at this point in time. 
National Non-Government Organisations 
Whi le scale and consistency of supply remain the biggest hurdles to overcome, 
the strategy of the national NGOs, such as the Pacific Heritage Foundation and 
the Vil lage Development Trust, in developing central buying and processing 
points, seems sound. Financial support from donor organisations for these 
centres in the short term, in order for them to develop their potential as 
commercially viable operations, is warranted. Commercial viabi lity means costs 
being met, and so the support, wherever possible, should be in the form of loans 
rather than gifts in order to encourage efficiency leading to self-sustainabi l ity. 
This same argument appl ies to the provis ion of finance for the purchase of the 
means of production in vi l lage communities. The planning of support for 
ecoforestry ventures should also include a rigorous accountabi l ity component. 
An efficient ecotimber industry needs not only training in the ski l ls  of smal l 
business operation, but the experience of having to plan to meet future 
contingencies and costs. It is with monotonous regularity that one finds small 
business groups in rural v i l lages, whether engaged in forestry or other ventures, 
seeking repeated ' start-up' funding for the continuation of their businesses. 
Community Ecoforestry Groups and Communities 
Whi le the rais ing of community awareness about the impl ications of various 
income-producing activities, including ecoforestry, are questions of planning for 
'outside ' groups, local communities also need to prepare for the changes in their 
l ives that will be brought about by the introduction of these activities. There is a 
need for community members to clearly define the objectives behind an 
increasing cash flow, and to decide what aspects of their traditional l ives they 
want preserved or isolated from the effects of the shift to a m ixed subsistence 
and cash economy. The question of unequal income distribution, and the ways 
in which redistribution wil l  occur in the vi l lage, are examples of issues for which 
preparatory thought needs to be given at the local level .  Planning for change and 
2 l For a description of an attempt to build a marketing chain to Australia, see Farley, Gladman 
and Martin ( 1 993) .  
292 The Political Economy of Forest Management in Papua New Guinea 
the m itigation of undesirable aspects is an important element of preparation, if 
there is anything to be learned from the lessons of disrupted social l ife in the 
industrial logging areas . 
Conclusion 
The government has largely ignored smal l-scale, community-based forestry to 
this point in time. However, the numbers of portable mi l ls that are operating, 
and their potential for environmental damage, suggest that regulation in 
warranted. The achievement of constitutional goals for intergenerational equity 
and the redistributive and self-fulfilment aspects of ecotimber production are 
issues for the government to consider in depth . 
Donor agencies and institutions need to take on board the viabi l ity of the 
marketing chain from producer to consumer if they are to meet their objectives. 
The manner in which funds are suppl ied is also relevant in developing a 
commercially viable industry. 
NGOs that are working for development of the industry need to rigorously 
account for their expenditure of donor funds in terms of outcomes, and to make 
the costs of production transparent, if they are to shift smal l-scale producers to a 
commercially competitive position. 
Finally, v i l lage communities that are embarking on ecoforestry ventures 
need to prepare for the social changes inherent in the choice which they have 
made, and to plan to m itigate any undesirable consequences. 
CHAPTER 13 
THE POLITICS OF LARGE-SCALE 
TIMBER CONSUMPTION IN JAPAN 
ANJA LIGHT 
'I don 't want to live in comfort while others suffer at my 
expense. We Japanese are being made to live barbarously 
without even knowing it. I hope that you, as the leader of Japan, 
will be the first to realise this. ' (Message from a Japanese 
citizen to the Prime Minister of Japan as part of the Japanese 
tropical timber campaign.) 
Introduction 
The fate of Papua New Guinea's  (PNG' s) forests and people l ies not only in the 
hands of decision makers in PNG (whether they be in the vi llage or the national 
parl iament), but in the hands of pol icy makers, corporation bosses, and average 
citizens in timber consuming countries. 
No country consumes more imported tropical timber than Japan. Effecting 
change in Japanese national politics or in the practices of multinational 
corporations to ensure their support of ecologically sustainable and social ly 
equitable forest management has been extremely difficult. What has been more 
productive to date is the growing grassroots movement to effect a change in 
Japan 's  timber 'over-consumption' habit . A reduction in demand for tropical 
t imber and an increase in demand for domestic sources in Japan can only have 
positive effects on the world' s  forests, increasing their economic value and 
recognising their priceless value in sustaining l ife. 
A chal lenge to those of us on the 'outside' of Japan is to try to understand 
Japanese culture before hoping to change the practices of the Japanese 
government and corporations through international pressure. Japan has risen 
from complete mi l itary defeat four decades ago to become the world' s  most 
economically powerful nation. S ix of the world' s  ten largest multinational 
corporations, as measured in terms of sales, are Japanese . The powerful sago 
shosha ( 'general trading companies') deal in almost every commodity in almost 
every country. Japanese government pol icies support processes of industrial 
expansion and resource development that are very often carried out by these 
sago shosha. 
But, as we are all aware, material wealth does not always bring wel l-being. 
Japan ' s  own people have l ittle choice in what these multinational corporations 
do; rather, they are almost completely dominated by them . It comes as a 
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surprise to many that the decl ine of Japan' s  own plantation timber industry has 
caused hardship to local communities in Japan, and that continuing exploitation 
of Japan' s  scarce remaining primary forests is strongly opposed by the 
indigenous people of Japan, the Ainu. 
In the first part of this chapter, I shal l look at the current trading trends and 
the h istory of tropical timber consumption in Japan, with a focus on PNG. The 
second part introduces Japan ' s  domestic forest situation and its relation to timber 
imports, and studies the stages and impacts of grassroots campaigns to reduce 
consumption and waste of tropical timber. In the final, part I discuss the tactics 
that local campaigners have used to influence local government policies, and 
give some examples of typical responses from the national government of Japan. 
The information presented is drawn largely from the research of Japanese 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), in particular the Sarawak Campaign 
Committee (SCC) and the Japan Tropical Forest Action Network (JA TAN), in 
addition to my own personal experience in seven years of forest campaigning in 
Japan. 
Consuming Passions 
Tropical Timber Imports 
With only 2 percent of the world' s population, Japan is the world ' s  largest 
consumer of tropical timber, accounting for some 30-40 percent of the world's 
trade (see Table 1 3 . 1 ) . Imports account for 75 percent of Japan 's  overal l timber 
consumption of 1 1 0 mi ll ion cubic metres per year. 1 There are two major 
reasons why the Japanese are the biggest consumers of tropical timbers . Firstly, 
the wasteful use of timber and timber products, excisable waste, and a 
throwaway mentality that seems an inexorable part of any economic boom, 
perpetuate the seemingly insatiable demand for more logs . Secondly, the 
structure of the Japanese economy makes the exploitation of domestic timber 
sources more expensive than imports. 
1 Taiga Rescue Network, 1 995, 'The Taiga Trade' 
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Table 13. 1 :  World trade in tropical hardwood logs, 1 99 1 .  
Importing countries % share Exporting countries % share 
Japan 39 Malaysia 74 
China (incl .  Taiwan) 1 8  Papua New Guinea 5 
South Korea 1 4  Gabon 4 
Thai land 5 Cameroon 3 
France 3 Burma 3 
India 3 Liberia 3 
Hong Kong 2 
Other 1 6  Other 8 
Source: F AO Yearbook 1 99 1 ,  reprinted in SCC 1 994. 
Papua New Guinea exported 1 . 5 mil l ion cubic metres of logs to Japan in 
1 995 .  They were used, l ike most of the tropical timber which Japan imports, 
largely as a sort of waste product. More than 75 percent of tropical logs are 
converted to plywood, of which half is used in the construction industry (see 
Table 1 3 .2). Around 20 percent of plywood is used as mouldings for concrete 
formwork, and used only once or twice before being thrown away. Other uses 
for tropical plywood include cheap furniture (called 'colour boxes' )  and packing 
crates. It is common to see plywood used to 'protect' other materials - l ike 
concrete walkways or the interiors of l ifts - whi le construction work is taking 
place. Another Japanese phenomenon is the use of plywood boards during 
elections to d isplay the posters of the various parties. During the national 
election for the House of Counci l lors in the summer of 1 992, poster boards were 
set up in 343 ,000 locations nationwide. The amount of plywood needed for this, 
if stacked vertical ly, would have made a pi le 1 4  ki lometres h igh. It was reported 
that 80 percent of the poster display boards remained empty the day after the 
election period started.2 
Table 13.2 : Consumption of tropical timber in Japan. 
Form Constr'n Furniture Packaging Flooring Other Total 
Plywood 39% 27% 8% 3% 75% 
Sawn wood 1 1 % 6% 4% 4% 24% 
Woodchips 1 %  1 %  
TOTAL 50% 33% 12% 4% 4% 1 00% 
Source : SCC 1 994 . 
Compounding the consumption problem is the short lifespan of 
constructions in Japan. Japanese houses and bui ldings are torn down and rebuilt 
after an average of 20-30 years, resulting in tremendous overconsumption and 
waste, not only of tropical t imber, but of many other resources. Housing starts 
averaged 1 .6 1  mi l l ion during 1 987- 1 99 1 ,  exceeding those of the United States 
2 Yomiuri Shimbun (Japan), July 1 992, in Mori No Koe, March 1 996. 
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every year during this period, even though Japan' s  population is only half that of 
the USA.3 Japanese rainforest groups rightly point out that promoting 
alternatives to tropical timber without addressing these examples of planned 
obsolescence wil l  merely transfer the problem of unsustainable resource 
management to other timber-supplying countries. 
There are two common m isconceptions about Japan 's  role in forest 
destruction. One is that the use of d isposable chopsticks is a major cause of 
tropical forest destruction . Whi le disposable chopsticks do represent a 
conspicuously wasteful use of timber in Japan, they account for less than one 
percent of Japan ' s  overal l timber consumption and are not primari ly sourced 
from tropical hardwoods .  The second misconception is that Japan purposefully 
protects its own forests whi le overexploiting overseas forest resources. In fact, 
large imports of cheap timber have been d isastrous for Japan ' s  forests. Japan ' s  
own forest industry, a s  a result, is  i n  financial strife. This means that jobs are 
lost and plantations cannot be properly maintained, so there is a decl ine in the 
quality of the timber they supply. According to Professor Minori Kumazaki, 
who teaches forest management at Tsukuba University in Tokyo, domestic 
plantation forests can provide enough timber for Japan ' s  needs but they cannot 
compete economically with the cheaper imports.4 
Campaigns to reduce tropical timber waste in Japan have been effective, 
both in real terms and in rais ing general awareness about forest issues. At the 
same time, organisations in Japan point out that much more needs to be done to 
ensure that: 
• Japan 's  own plantations are sustainably uti l ised as a timber source; 
• pol icies to reduce timber waste are vigorously adopted; 
• research into, and adoption of, ecological ly sustainable alternatives to 
tropical timber are both increased; and 
• any imports are sourced from independently monitored sustainable forestry 
operations. 
Basic Trading Trends 
Japan' s  1 995 tropical timber imports total led 1 1 ,695 ,000 cubic metres (see Table 
1 3 .3) .  Over the past few years there have been increases in imports of tropical 
plywood, particularly from Malaysia, whi le there has been a gradual reduction in 
hardwood log imports. Since the 1 980s, there has been a general downward 
trend in tropical timber imports . What is not so clear is the extent to which this 
3 Kazuko Matsue, Report to Conference on Sustainable Forestry, New Delhi, April 1 994. 
4 Email conferences, 1 995, 'Environment-Japan: Wood Imports Soar as Local Forests Flourish ' ,  
by Suvendrini Kakuchi .  
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i s  due to a reduction in supply, a reduction in overall demand, or increasing 
substitution of temperate timbers . 
Table 13.3 : Japan ' s  tropical t imber imports, 1 988- 1 995 (in mi l l ions of cubic 
metres). 
Form 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Raw logs a 1 1 .7 1 2 .6  1 1 . 1  1 0 . 1  9 .9 7 .4 6.8 6 .5 
Sawn woodb 1 .2 1 . 7 1 .3 1 .2 1 .2 1 .4 1 .3 1 .3 
Plywoodc 1 . 8 3 .0 2 . 8  2 .9 2 .8 3 .8 3 . 7  4 .0 
TOTAL 1 4 .7  1 7 .3 1 5 . 1  1 4 .2 1 3 .9 1 2 .6 1 1 .8 1 1 .7 
= RWEc:1 1 7 .9 22.6 1 9 .8  1 8 .9 1 8 . 5  1 8 .6 1 7 .8  1 7 .9 
Notes : 
a Tropical hardwood log import data prior to 1 995 do not include statistics from Africa. 
b Data for 1 995 tropical sawn wood imports are totals for January-November 1 995 from 
Nihon Nanyozai Kyogikai (Japan South Seas Timber Council) January 1 996 statistics. 
Data for other years are for the full year and are from Nikkan Mokuzai Shimbun. 
c Tropical plywood import data for 1 988- 1 992 are for imports from Indonesia only 
(which constituted more than 95 percent of the total), whereas data for 1 993- 1 995 are for 
imports from Indonesia and Malaysia. 
d Roundwood Equivalent (RWE) is a measure of the 'underbark' log volume which 
would have been necessary to obtain one unit of volume of the processed product. 
Statistics for roundwood (volume) equivalents have been calculated on the basis of the 
conversion coefficients ( 1 .82 for hardwood sawn wood, and 2 .3 for plywood) used by the 
FAQ ( 1 99 1 ). 
Source: Compiled by SCC from the Nikkan Mokuzai Shimbun, 25 and 27 March 1 993 ; 
26 May 1 994; 6 February and 8 March 1 995; 1 5  February and 1 March 1 996; and Japan 
Lumber Reports, 2 April 1 995 . RWE statistics calculated by SCC. 
Log imports from PNG increased by 1 0 . 1  percent to 1 .9 mil l ion cubic 
metres in 1 994, but then decreased by 1 7 .9 percent to 1 .6 mil l ion cubic metres in 
1 995, whi le imports from the Solomon Islands increased by 1 2 . 8  percent to 
33 8,000 cubic metres in that same year (see Table 1 3 .4). s 
5 Mori No Koe, publication of the Sarawak Campaign Committee, Issue No. 8, March 1 996. 
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Table 13.4: Sources of Japan' s  tropical hardwood log imports, 1 992- 1 995 (in 
thousands of cubic metres). 
Source 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Sarawak 6,363 4,922 4,463 3 ,902 
Sa bah 2,064 293 0 6 
Papua New Guinea 1 ,  1 6 1  1 ,754 1 ,932 1 ,5 86 
Solomon Islands 309 346 338  3 8 1  
Laos 1 3  1 3  40 30 
Burma 1 3  76 22 1 7  
Africa 0 0 0 53 1 
Other 46 30 5 0 
TOTAL 9,969 7,43 8 6,802 6,455 
Source: As for Table 13  .3 . 
The History of Japan 's Tropical Timber Trade in Asia and Papua New 
Guinea 
Japanese trade in tropical timber dates back to the second decade of this century. 
Many Japanese companies were already involved in logging operations in the 
Phi lippines in the 1 930s .  There was a h iatus after the Second World War, but 
from 1 950, the trade resumed in earnest, far surpassing pre-war import levels .  
By 1 960, imports had reached 4.5 mi l l ion cubic metres, and this amount had 
more than doubled by 1 966.  Japan 's  own forests were severely depleted during 
the war effort and imports were an essential factor in the country's  
reconstruction. Tropical timber was one of the fuels  of the post-war recovery, 
and then of the rapid economic growth of the 1 960s. However, during these 
processes, intensive logging in the Phi l ippines, which was the main source at 
this time, put that country' s  forests almost beyond recovery, and many F i l ipinos 
were marginalised through the loss of their traditional land.6 
The Japanese timber industry foresaw that log suppl ies from the Phi l ippines 
would soon run out and, using resource development funds from the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry, as wel l  as other sources of finance, they 
targeted Kalimantan and Sumatra for future timber supplies. 
The forests of the Phi l ippines were virtual ly logged out in the 1 960s and 
Japanese trading companies moved on to Indonesia through the 1 970s and early 
1 980s (see Table 1 3  . 5 ) .  An Indonesian ban on log exports from 1 980 to 1 985 
forced Japan to seek new sources and it set its sights on the dense dipterocarp 
forests in the Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak. Sabah instituted a simi lar 
ban on log exports in 1 993 , and since that time, the major suppl iers of logs have 
been Sarawak, PNG, and the Solomon Islands. 
6 Yoichi Kuroda, cited in Mori No Koe, April 1 993 . 
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Table 13.5: Japanese imports of logs from tropical timber producing countries, 
1 950- 1 989 (in thousands of cubic metres). 
Year Philippines Malaysia Indonesia Other Total 
1 950 1 1 1  8 0 1 1 1 9 
1 955  1 ,846 1 60 1 8  0 2,024 
1 960 3 ,475 1 ,  1 45 1 7  3 4,682 
1 965 5 ,632 3 ,47 1 1 04 99 9,306 
1 970 7,542 6,020 6,09 1 585 20,23 8 
1 975 2,853 6,660 7,298 522 1 7,333  
1 980 1 ,073 8 ,580 8,639 663 1 8,955 
1 985 5 1 0  1 1 ,293 1 3 8 1 ,00 1 1 3 ,00 1 
1 988 33 1 0,62 1 0 1 ,00 1 1 1 ,655  
1 989 52 1 1 ,323 0 1 , 1 84 1 2,650 
Note : 'Other' refers to PNG, the Solomon Islands, and so on . 
Sources : Statistics for the period 1 950-65 and 1 988- 1 989 are from 'A History of Timber 
from the South Seas ' (Japan South Sea Lumber conference), and those for 1 970- 1 985 are 
courtesy of the Japan Plywood Manufacturers Association. 
Sabah ' s ban on log · exports, and a one-month moratorium on logging in 
Sarawak (the largest suppl ier of tropical logs) in December 1 992, have both 
shown that supply restrictions can result in increased prices. The price of 
meranti logs from Sarawak jumped from US$ l 72- l 80/m3 in October 1 992 to 
US$400-430/m3 in March 1 993 . 7  This may be important to note when assessing 
the impact of any restrictions on the export of PNG timber to the international 
market. 
The general attitude of Japanese traders, when faced with dwindl ing 
suppl ies from any one source, is summed up in comments made by the head of 
Mitsubishi ' s  Environmental Affairs Department. When asked what would 
happen after his company's  Malaysian concession ran out of logs, he said: 
'Probably we would l ike to seek another source ' (EIA 1 996). 
In recent years, Japanese companies have increased their imports of 
temperate timbers and have set up operations in Siberia and North America. 
However, it is  l ikely that they will continue to purchase tropical timbers from 
Malaysian transnational logging companies who have recently been expanding 
their operations into Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Zaire, Cameroon, Guyana, 
Surinam, and Brazil , as wel l  as the Pacific region. 
The impact of large-scale industrial logging in the countries which have 
supplied Japan ' s  tropical timber habit to date have been devastating. The 
Phi l ippines has experienced major floods which have ki l led thousands of people 
and devastated their farmlands. Disruption of weather patterns has affected 
traditional planting of crops and compounded the destructive effect of wild fires 
7 Gekkan Mokuzai Joho, April 93 . 
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in Kalimantan . Losses of b iodiversity are incalculable, and the impact on the 
role of forests as a carbon s ink wi l l  have global implications. More than five 
hundred tribal people in Sarawak have been arrested since the late 1 980s for 
erecting peaceful blockades on logging roads in attempts to prevent their lands 
from being logged. 
Japanese Logging Companies in PNG 
Japanese logging companies featured prominently in the Barnett inquiry into 
logging in PNG. Some companies have since pul led out of PNG. However, 
Japanese corporations are sti l l  buying timber produced by companies highl ighted 
in the report for their unsustainable and corrupt practices. The corporations take 
l ittle responsib i l ity for ensuring that the timber they buy is sourced from a 
sustainable logging operation. 
Japanese companies were among those which Justice Barnett found to be 
ignoring measures to lessen the impact of logging. Gaisho, for example, ignored 
every one of the environmental clauses of its permits, causing rivers and streams 
to become blocked or s i lted with eroded soi l  (see Barnett l 989b). Mitsubishi  
also featured through United Timber, a front company created entirely through 
its loans .  Mitsubishi had concealed profits of US$ l .5 mi l l ion through 
undervalued purchases from United Timber (Barnett l 989c ). This company has 
recently pul led out of PNG. Stettin Bay Lumber Company, a subsidiary of 
Nissho lwai, c laimed in 1 994 to be a ' model company' ,  but, according to PNG's 
National Al l iance of Non-Government Organisations (NANGO), i t  is  causing 
serious environmental and social problems.8 Representatives from NANGO and 
the Solomon Islands-based Development Services Exchange met with Nissho 
lwai on 1 March 1 994 in what was described as a 'very heated' discussion .9 
Case Study: Jant and Action in Japan 
The most infamous Japanese operation in PNG is undoubtedly the Japan and 
New Guinea Timber Company (JANT), which is control led by the Honshu Paper 
Company. It operates in the Gogol-Naru area in Madang Province, PNG. For 
over seventeen years it has been logging and chipping virgin rainforest to make 
cardboard boxes. The local people claim they have been paid only K 1 .25 per 
person per year in royalties .  
Jant 's  operations began in Madang in 1 973 on a 67,000 hectare concession . 
P lans to replant the area covered only 6 percent of the area which had been 
clear-cut and entai led a monocrop of eucalyptus (see Montagu, this volume). 
The company is al leged to have conducted a number of i l legal activities in PNG, 
8 These problems were raised in an open letter from NANGO to Japanese trading, p lywood, 
construction and housing and furniture companies which import or use tropical logs from PNG 
and/or the Solomon Islands. 
9 Trip Report, Visit to Japan in March 1 994 by Environmental NGOs from PNG and the Solomon 
Islands, Chronology of Activities, JATAN. 
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including continuing to log after its contract expired i n  August 1 99 1 ,  cutting on 
areas with slopes steeper than 30 degrees, and fell ing trees within 50 metres of a 
nver. 
In 1 990, more than 2,500 of the 3 ,000 vi l lagers living in the Gogol-Naru 
area signed a petition addressed to the Jant company and the PNG government, 
stating that their 'sacred grounds are no longer visible [,] . . .  the top layer of the 
soi l  is beyond repair [and] . . .  fresh meat for the daily d iet is a luxury that is now 
no longer entertained in the huts of the Gogol-Naru peoples . . .  ' .  When their pleas 
for compensation for the damage to their lands were ignored, local landowners 
took to blockading Jant' s  operations for five days in November 1 990. They 
ceased their blockade in good faith, on the understanding that the company 
would keep to its newly made promises for compensation. However, the 
company stalfed and delayed any action on these promises, and was accused of 
using bribery and threats to wear down the resolve of the people. 1 0 
In May 1 99 1 ,  the people of Gogol-Naru took their case directly to the 
Honshu headquarters in Tokyo, Japan. James Jogamup, representing the people 
of Gogol-Naru, joined members of the Rainforest Information Centre and 
JATAN outside Honshu's  head office in a colourful demonstration . James 
Jogamup toppled a three metre high tower of cardboard boxes bearing Honshu's 
name in Japanese and Engl ish .  The delegation also presented the company with 
2,500 signatures as evidence of the people ' s  dissatisfaction with the company's  
operations. After in itial ly refusing to  speak with Jogamup and h i s  col leagues, 
four executives of Honshu Paper final ly agreed to meet. The discussion was 
disappointing - the executives refused to offer any compensation, and 
maintained that the demands by the Madang landowners were unreasonable. 
With respect to consumer awareness and pol itical pressure on Japan 's  
international forest policy, the action contributed greatly to  knowledge of PNG's  
forest situation and the role of  Japanese logging companies. Some fifty Japanese 
people joined the demonstration - the biggest ever in Japan on this issue . The 
story was covered by e leven national and international te levision stations. 
Jogamup's  comment after pushing over the mountain of cardboard was: 'These 
boxes come from my people ' s  forests, what an incredible waste ! ' l 1 This was 
heard by mi l l ions of people around the world. 
Forest Politics 
'As NGOs we are to keep a watch on government and industry whi le being a 
voice for the citizens and environmental v ictims. . . .  The ideology behind the 
concept of sustainable development impl ies the use of non-violent, conservation 
1 O Asp Jes Madang Press Release, 1 2  May 1 99 1 .  
1 1 PNG Post-Courier, 20 May 1 99 1 .  
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oriented techniques of using resources and producing goods on the one hand and 
restrictions on wasteful  consumption on the other. ' 1 2  
Forests in Japan 
Forestry in Japan is in trouble in many ways - financially, social ly and 
ecologically - according to the Sarawak Campaign Committee, Consumers 
Union of Japan, Friends of the Earth (Japan), and other Japanese citizens' 
groups. These groups issued a joint statement in response to the comments of 
the Director-General of the Japanese Forestry Agency, Takahisa Tsukamoto, at 
the Fifteenth Session of the International Tropical Timber Counci l .  He had 
stated that ' the Japanese government has continuously carried out sustainable 
management of Japan ' s  forests ' .  The truth, according to the above-mentioned 
groups, is  that Japan ' s  Forestry Agency is fighting a snowbal l ing US$24 bi l l ion 
debt that grew by US$ l .5 bi l l ion in 1 992. The government is drastically cutting 
workers to reduce this deficit, with their workforce of 72,000 people in 1 973 
dropping to just 20,000 in 1 994. Without enough labour input, the plantations 
are not being managed properly, and the timber they produce is poor in qual ity. 
At present, only 25 percent of Japan 's  forest stock is cut each year. 
Two-thirds of Japan is covered by forests. Fifty percent of these are 
plantations of Japanese cedar or cypress. Despite this, Japan ' s  scarce remaining 
primary forests are sti l l  targeted as a timber and pulp supply. It is estimated that 
70 percent of Japan ' s  terrain has been damaged by logging or other human 
activities. 
Table 13.6: Japanese consumption, production and trade in industrial wood, 
1 888- 1 985 (in mi l l ions of cubic metres). 
Year Consumption Production Exports Imports 
1 888-92 6.4 6.4 0.0 0.0 
1 903-07 1 1 .6 1 2 . 1  0 .6 0 . 1 
1 9 1 8-22 1 7 .3 1 6 . 8  0 .6 1 . 1  
1 933 -47 24 .2 22.0 1 . 1 3 .4 
1 948-52 37 . 8  3 7.7  0.2 0.2 
1 960 54 .8  49.0 1 . 8 7 .5  
1 970 I 0 1 .6 46.2 1 . 1  56 .4 
1 980 1 08 . 1 34 .6 0 .8  74.4 
1 985 92 . 5  33 . 1  0 .4 59.8 
Source: Abstract prepared by the SCC, from a paper prepared by Dr Minoru Kumazaki 
(Professor of Forestry, Tsukuba University), published in Mori No Koe (SCC newsletter), 
1 993 . 
1 2  Statement from the second Asia-Pacific NGO Environmental Conference, Seoul, 28 March 
1 993. 
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It is Japan' s  primary forests that provide the main wildlife habitat. 
Exploitation has decimated populations of species such as the Tsukinowa bear, 
and very l ittle of what remains is protected. Out of 7 .62 mil l ion hectares of 
national forest, a mere 1 .43 mil l ion hectares (3 .8  percent of Japan 's  land area) is 
off-l imits to logging. While national parks cover 1 4 . 1 percent of Japan' s  land 
area, logging is sti l l  al lowed in all but 5 . 1 2  percent . The few remaining islands 
of natural forest are already fragmented by roads, railways, towns, tree 
plantations, and golf courses. 1 3 
Indigenous people in Japan are sti l l  fighting to protect the remaining 
primary forests in Japan 's north . The Ainu, who have demonstrated the 
sustainable use of their forests for thousands of years, are sti l l  struggl ing to be 
recognised as a distinct people in Japan . Oj i Paper, l inked to the Honshu parent 
company of Jant and the giant Mitsui corporation, have ravaged huge tracks of 
forest in Hokkaido. The Ainu people, represented by Tadashi Kaizawa, have 
appealed to the Mitsui Corporation to return the mountain forests in the area of 
Nibutani to the Ainu people. 1 4 
The harvesting of primary forests is something l ike a mining operation . In  
the first extraction, you can easily make quick profits . If you have to  spend time 
and money maintaining a plantation or regrowth, with thinning and proper 
management and long-term planning, the profit margin decreases. Around the 
world, v irgin, old-growth forests are the preferred source for trading companies 
because their product is usual ly cheaper. 
Forest Campaigns in Japan 
In September 1 986, at the world 's  first international NGO meeting on the crisis 
of tropical forest destruction, l 5 Japanese representatives revealed the extent of 
Japan ' s  involvement in the destructive tropical timber trade. In 1 989, Nectoux 
and Kuroda published their book, Timber from the South Seas: An Analysis of 
Japan 's Tropical Timber Trade and Its Environmental Impact, which further 
informed the world about Japan 's  complicit role in global forest destruction. 
The Japan Tropical Forest Action Network (JATAN) was formed out of the 
Japanese branch of Friends of the Earth in Tokyo. Its aim was to raise 
awareness on global tropical forest issues, put pressure on Japanese corporations 
involved in the timber trade, and provide information about Japan 's  role in 
global forest exploitation to the rest of the world .  
Since that time, other groups have formed, including the Sarawak 
Campaign Committee (SCC), which focuses on campaigns to lower 
consumption of tropical timbers . The Japan Catholic Commission on Peace and 
l 3 Kengou Furubayashi, Tokyo University of Agriculture and Industry, cited in SCC's  Mori No 
Koe, March 1 996. 
1 4 Takeda Shigenori, Green Earth Network, Shisamu Tsushin, Vol. 32. 
1 5 'Tropical Forest Crisis in the Third World' ,  held in Malaysia. 
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Justice has been active on issues specifical ly relating to the situation of PNG and 
the Solomon Islands . One way that they have raised awareness to influence 
policy in Japan is by inviting representatives from affected areas to bring their 
message directly to the people of Japan. In March 1 994, Marius Soiat, the 
Environment Committee Chairman of NAN GO, and Moses Sylvester Bariri, the 
Environment Training Officer of Development Services Exchange (DSE) of the 
Solomon Islands, were invited to tour Japan by JATAN and the Japan Catholic 
Commission on Peace and Justice . They met with their Japanese NGO 
counterparts, Japanese government officials, and Japanese companies which are 
importing or using timber from PNG or the Solomon Islands . They also 
conducted a number of lectures in Japan to inform citizens of the situation facing 
their forests. During their meetings, it became apparent that there was a very 
low level of awareness about PNG and Solomon Islands forestry issues. At one 
meeting, with the Japan Department Stores Association (which sel ls furniture 
made from tropical timber), executives stated that they were not aware of the 
problems in PNG and the Solomon Islands, they did not know the origin of the 
wood in the furniture which they sel l ,  nor that forestry is an important industry 
for tropical countries. 1 6  
Trading Houses 
Japanese companies are mutually l inked through complex corporate structures, 
known as keiretsu. At the core of these industrial groupings is usual ly a bank 
and an insurance company. They operate at al l levels of the international trade 
in tropical timbers. They supply the logging companies with machinery to build 
roads and bridges and to cut and transport trees. They also sh ip logs and process 
them. Others provide engineering and business expertise on various aspects of 
the logging industry. For instance, Sumitomo Forestry and Marubeni have 
invested in joint ventures with Malaysian firms to establish plywood factories in 
Sarawak. 
Early campaigns in Japan boldly confronted major corporations involved in 
the logging and importation of tropical timber, using street theatre and other 
colourful actions . These demonstrations were wel l  covered by the Japanese 
media, and brought information to the general public. In one action, the 
President of Marubeni was lured to the front entrance of his corporation ' s  
building to  collect an  award from the Japan Tropical Forest Action Network. 
The award turned out to be a giant chainsaw marking his company as Japan 's  
principal destroyer of tropical forests . In 1 99 1 ,  a 20-metre long 'Godzil la' , 
emblazoned with the corporate logos of the ten largest tropical timber traders, 
wove its way through the streets of Tokyo. It stopped at the head offices of each 
of these corporations, spitting out pieces of tropical plywood with messages to 
end the unsustainable trade. 
1 6  Open letter from NANGO (PNG) to Japanese trading, plywood, construction, housing and 
furniture companies which import or use tropical logs from PNG or the Solomon Islands. 
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In the late 1 980s, international organisations around the world initiated a 
campaign which focussed on Japan ' s  major timber trading houses. Soon after, 
almost every major corporation set up its own environment department. The 
US-based Rainforest Action Network stil l  runs a 'Boycott Mitsubishi '  campaign 
- exposing Mitsubish i '  s involvement in temperate, as wel l  as tropical, forest 
d�struction . Unfortunately, major corporations have, in the main, responded to 
international concern through extravagant 'greenwashing' techniques and by 
taking steps to try to hide their trai l of destruction. In a classic case of corporate 
propaganda, Mitsubishi produced their own comic book in 1 99 1  and distributed 
it free of charge to every school in Japan. It erroneously portrayed tribal people 
as the major rainforest destroyers through their traditional swidden farming 
techniques, whi le Mitsubishi (a major importer of Sarawak logs) was shown to 
be helping protect the forests through rep lanting schemes (later revealed to be 
entirely inadequate) .  The Sarawak Campaign Committee immediately launched 
a successful campaign to recall the comic books from schools. 
Some campaign efforts in Japan have focussed on forcing major 
corporations and aid agencies to make their activities transparent and open to 
public scrutiny, as the government of Japan claims that it does not have any real 
control over the activities of these corporations. In recent years, Japanese 
corporations have withdrawn their own logging companies from many countries, 
including PNG, Sarawak, the Phil ippines, and Russia, but continue to buy their 
timber. One could speculate that th is has been in response to the international 
spotlight on their activities. It appears that Malaysian logging companies have 
taken their place, expanding their operations to many countries and maintaining 
the supply of timber to these Japanese trading companies. 
In 1 992, campaigners took to the streets hoping to encourage the Marubeni 
Corporation to disclose the detai ls of its tropical timber imports from Sarawak. 
After a hunger strike and a nine-day vigi l by ten people outside their head office 
in downtown Tokyo, Marubeni finally released their import figures. Other 
major corporations soon followed suit. Some of the hunger strikers managed to 
meet with executives from the timber trading department. Their general 
response to our concerns (about their buying massive volumes of timber from 
sources known to be causing suffering to indigenous people and destroying 
irreplaceable forests) were typical of other corporation ' s  positions: 
What can we do? Japanese people want to buy the timber and we, as 
good corporate c itizens, are making a product available to them. If 
people want to buy it ,  then we have a duty to supply it. It is up to the 
country to manage its resources. 
Bringing the message about why rainforests are being destroyed directly to 
the people of Japan, and asking them to reduce their personal consumption of 
tropical timber products, has been an ongoing activity of JA TAN and the SCC. 
Indigenous representatives from affected areas have visited various cities in 
Japan on many occasions .  Volunteers from the Australian based Rainforest 
Information Centre (RIC) have helped carry out two nationwide multi-media 
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'Rainforest Roadshows' to raise awareness and, in particular, to encourage the 
formation of rainforest action groups to work local ly for a reduction in tropical 
timber consumption. 
Local Government Campaigns 
In 1 994, there were over sixty groups or individuals throughout Japan working 
to protect tropical forests. Since 1 99 1 ,  they have been meeting on a biannual 
basis to exchange information and discuss future actions. Most of them have 
actively lobbied their local governments for a reduction in the use of tropical 
timber in publ ic works. Sarawak government officials have complained that 
these campaigns have contributed to a reduction in demand for Sarawak timber. 
Some of the highl ights of the ongoing efforts to lobby local governments to 
reduce tropical timber use include : 
• January 1 994 : The Japanese Ministry of Construction publ ished a paper 
outlining guidel ines for addressing environmental concerns. For the first 
time ever, the Ministry clearly stated that reduction in the use of tropical 
timber was a pol icy objective and cal led for the adoption of expl icit reduction 
goals .  
• July 1 994 : The SCC sent a questionnaire regarding tropical forest protection 
to all 76 1 Japanese Diet (Parl iament) members. As of 20 September 1 994, 
1 70 had responded, of whom 85 .3 percent said they ' intended to take action 
for tropical forest conservation ' .  
• August 1 994: The SCC met with the Environmental Conservation Bureau of 
the Tokyo Government to discuss progress in the implementation of the 
tropical timber use reduction policy adopted by Tokyo in June 1 993, which 
cal led for reduction of tropical timber use to 50 percent of 1 993 levels by 
1 996 and to 30 percent by 1 998 .  The Bureau informed SCC that 52 .5  percent 
of the plywood panels used for moulding concrete in Tokyo's  publ ic 
constructions were made of nothing but tropical timber and that these panels 
were used an average of 1 . 8 times. 
• Apri l 1 995 : The citizens'  group JATAN-Ehime mai led letters of appeal for 
tropical forest conservation to seventy local governments in Ehime 
prefecture. As of September 1 995 ,  seventeen had responded, and five said 
that they were making efforts to reduce tropical timber use . 
• October 1 995 : The Housing Bureau of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government 
announced that it would make efforts to reduce the use of tropical timber, not 
only for kon pane (concrete formwork panels), but also for interior finish 
work. 1 7 
1 7 See Mori No Koe, Issue No. 8, March 1 996. 
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The experiences of a local network of rainforest groups in the Kansai area 
h ighl ight the chal lenges inherent in changing pol icy in Japan, yet also indicate 
the success that can result through persistence. Osaka city in the Kansai area 
followed Tokyo' s  lead back in 1 99 1 ,  when Tokyo first announced that it would 
reduce tropical t imber use. As of February 1 994, a total of seventeen out of 
forty-five local governments in Osaka Prefecture had begun some kind of effort 
to accomplish this goal . The group known as 'Hutan' had also initial ly targetted 
the major trading companies with vis iting delegations of indigenous people from 
Sarawak, writing letters and making other attempts to negotiate - all to no avai l .  
They consequently shifted their focus to targeting local governments with the 
rationale that they were more accessible to the average citizen and that this type 
of campaign had been effective in Western countries. Reactions from local 
governments ranged from claims that they had no knowledge about tropical 
forests, that diminished use of tropical timber would put people out work, that 
the forest grows back quickly after harvesting, and that slash-and-bum farming 
is destroying tropical forests. Later, officials began to say that they would 
follow the lead of the national government if the latter made guidel ines first. 
Final ly, the mayor of Osaka responded to a letter from the mayor of Osaka's  
sister city, San Francisco, cal ling for a halt to  tropical timber use . In January 
1 992, the mayor of Osaka announced a reduction policy to the media 
( incidental ly without having informed the ' Hutan ' group). 
Yoshio Nish ioka of 'Hutan ' says that there is a kind of peer group pressure 
to which governments react: after a number of pol icies have been passed, it 
seems that local governments start to worry about being ' left behind. He l ists 
some lessons about lobbying local governments in Japan : 
• when approaching assembl ies, it is important to try to get widespread support 
and not become too dependent on particular assembly members; 
• technical constraints make a total ban on tropical timber highly unl ikely - it 
is much easier for local governments to take action to reduce use; 
• instead of just criticis ing, present alternatives; 
• it is best to target prefectural (state) governments first, and if you are 
successful, municipal ities wil l  follow suit; 
• if you h it a wal l ,  use the external pressure of letters from sister cities overseas 
and the internal pressure of letters and requests for negotiations; 
• get information to the media, pol itic ians, and so forth; 
• provide officials with data; 
• once reduction efforts are started, push for clear reduction goals and 
requirements in specifications; and above al l 
• NEVER GIVE UP! 
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One of the main arguments that the groups use when convincing local 
governments to implement tropical timber pol icies is the availabi lity of 
alternatives, particularly in the case of the concrete formwork panels which 
make up around 20 percent of the tropical timber use in Japan . They are 
commonly used only once or twice before being thrown away. A study group 
was formed in Tokyo that includes the expertise of architects and others 
involved in the construction industry. There are a range of options which can be 
used instead of tropical plywood for concrete form work panels, including the use 
of pre-formed concrete made with steel forms which can be used indefinitely, 
the use of plantation softwood species for plywood, and painting the surface of 
the timber so that the forms can be used many times over. 
Responses of the Central Government 
When the then Prime Minister of Japan, Mr Muruyama, was asked at the G7 
meeting in 1 992 about Japan 's  implementation of its obl igations for tropical 
forest protection following the Rio Earth Summit, he responded with the fact 
that Japan was a s ignatory to the International Tropical Timber Agreement 
(ITTA), and that, through this forum, Japan was helping developing countries to 
achieve their goals for sustainable forest management. 1 8  In the meantime, the 
policies of the International Tropical Timber Organisation (which was the 
organisation formed from the ITT A) have been repeatedly and soundly criticised 
by international NGOs. 
In 1 993 , members of the Rainforest Information Centre and the SCC met 
with representatives of the Japanese Forestry Agency to discuss the 
government 's  response to the demands of a petition entitled: 'Petition for the 
Protection of Tropical Forests and the Human Rights of Indigenous Peoples ' .  
The first demand was to establ ish an immediate moratorium on importation of 
tropical timber from Sarawak, Malaysia, and other regions where sustainable 
forestry management has not been achieved and logging has resulted in severe 
human rights violations against indigenous peoples. The Forest Agency position 
( in brief) was as follows: 
• Both conservation and sustainable uti l isation are needed to realise the 
maximum potential of tropical forests as an economic and environmental 
resource. 
• Japan is working towards achievement of the ITTO's  goal to l imit the 
tropical timber trade to timber from sustainable sources by the year 2000. 
• The Japanese government must respect Malaysia's sovereignty. 
• The Japanese government wil l  have to wait for the formation of an 
international consensus to judge whether human rights violations and 
1 8  Personal question to the Prime Minister asked at a press conference at the G7 summit in 
Munich. 
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environmental destruction can be considered sufficient to warrant measures 
that overstep Sarawak' s  sovereignty. 
• The Sarawak government is carrying out logging in a systematic manner on 
the basis of its forestry plans. 
In August 1 993, another series of meetings was held with government officials 
from the Forestry Agency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Environment 
Agency. There was l ittle change in their response. The SCC, which organised 
the meetings, reported that it was unable to persuade the government to take any 
concrete measures on tropical forest issues. 
The government of Japan is extremely reluctant to take any action which 
may disrupt a profitable trade in tropical timber or in their international relations 
with trading partners . The overall policy is to stick with the process of the 
ITTO. The ITTO is a commodity agreement between forty-three nations which 
jointly control the vast bulk of the tropical timber trade.  Voting power within 
the ITTO is proportional to the country's  level of production or consumption of 
tropical timber. Therefore, most power is held by Japan (as the major tropical 
timber consumer) and by Malaysia and Indonesia (as the largest producers). 
When the ITTA came into force on 1 Apri l 1 985 ,  Japanese and international 
NGOs were cautiously optim istic and sent representatives to observe meetings. 
By 1 995,  they had almost completely abandoned the process and called for an 
end to its existence, since it was proving to be 'worse than useless' in protecting 
tropical forests . It is hard to bel ieve that an organisation dominated by the 
countries with most profit to gain from the timber trade wi l l  ever sincerely 
implement practices that may restrict logging rates. 
The ITTO has made much of its claim to meet a deadl ine for sustainable 
forestry in the year 2000. ITTO's  own 1 995 mid-term review revealed that only 
Malaysia, Indonesia, and Ghana were l ikely to meet this target. Most 
international NGOs would hotly contest the view that any of these countries are 
on the path to sustainabi l ity. 
Most NGOs have transferred their efforts back to campaigns for lowering 
timber consumption. In addition, they have supported steps for the independent 
monitoring and certification of logging practices through organisations such as 
the Forest Stewardship Council, and have supported smal l-scale community 
forestry projects as models for future forestry practices. 
It appears that Japan is not playing a prominent role in discussions on 
timber certification, despite the fact that, as the largest importer, it should be 
making the greatest effort to be able to reassure its citizens that its imports are 
sustainable. A representative of the Forest Ministry of Japan at the International 
Conference on Certification in Brisbane, Austral ia, in May 1 996, had l ittle to say 
about his country's  involvement or interest in this issue. It appears that the main 
impetus on this front is coming from European countries. 
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Conclusion 
In the words of Yoichi Kuroda of JATAN: 'By altering business and trade 
policies, passing legislation and informing the general public, the Japanese wil l  
be accepting the responsib i l ity that an economic power of its s ize must bear. ' l 9 
However, actually convincing the government of Japan and Japanese trading 
companies to take responsibi l ity is a mammoth task. If  they can be persuaded to 
shift the ir enormous economic power from destructive trade practices to sincere 
efforts to sustain not only the timber 'resource' ,  but its myriad of other 
functions, it wil l  be one of the best hopes for the forests and people of PNG. 
I have attempted to present some of the campaign methods that have been 
employed by groups in Japan to effect change in policies regarding the tropical 
timber trade, but there are, no doubt, many which I have m issed. It can only be 
hoped that further momentum wil l  be added to their progress, and that there wil l  
be more creative ideas to influence pol icy and stronger l inks between NGOs and 
indigenous peoples in Japan and PNG. 
This movement in Japan would not exist if  it were not for a handful of 
exceptionally dedicated, talented, and courageous individuals working in 
m in imally funded non-government organisations. I bel ieve that one of the best 
ways in which this policy debate can move forward is to support their efforts in 
any way possible. 
Let me conclude with part of a message del ivered to the Prime Minister of 
Japan as part of the Japanese tropical timber campaign : 'The age of thinking 
only about oneself is  over. It is  important to think about where something has 
come from before one buys it. If  the forests disappear, the people making a 
profit from logging wil l  not be able to l ive either. ' 
l 9 Paper from the Biennial Conference on the Fate and Hope of the Earth, Nicaragua, June 1 989. 
CHAPTER 14 
THE ECONOMICS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
JOHN MILLETT 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the economics of sustainable development in Papua New 
Guinea (PNG) forestry. It investigates the concept of ' sustainable development' 
itself and such associated concepts as 'constant capital stock' ,  ' irreversibi l ity' 
and 'the precautionary principle ' . The remainder of this section introduces the 
principal stakeholders in the enterprise of sustainable development and the 
principal activities in that enterprise. A simple descriptive social system model 
is then outlined and sustainable forestry positioned within it. Next, relevant 
aspects of the global environmental debate are canvassed briefly, as is forest 
policy in PNG, before consideration is given to the economics of sustainable 
development. 
In PNG the forests are owned by the people. Owing to the country's  late 
entry into the modern era - some centuries later than its Southeast Asian 
neighbours - it has a smal l ,  scattered population, and ten times the land area per 
capita (70 percent of it sti l l  forested) than neighbouring Asian countries which 
are also home to substantial tracts of moist tropical rainforest. 
Particularly s ince the Rio Earth Summit in 1 992, moist tropical rainforests 
have become a major subject of interest to international environmental 
movements concerned with global warming and biodiversity issues. The 
Government of Papua New Guinea d ischarges its international responsibi l ity and 
authority with respect to environmental management and resource development 
in the context of private customary ownership of the resource. Just one and a 
half m i ll ion hectares of a total forested area of 36  mi l l ion hectares have been 
logged. For many landowners the forest is an obstacle, and its exploitation a 
quick method of access, to development. Their needs are s imple, modest and 
consistent - roads, schools, health centres and economic opportunities to earn 
money which retains its purchasing power over time. Government failure to 
del iver related services has led them to exploit their forests to meet these needs. 
Forest owners in PNG and international environmental non-governmental 
organisations are thus very differently motivated. 
In this triangle of stakeholders, the national government sides with the 
resource owners for fiscal as wel l  as pol itical reasons .  Reflecting the nation 's  
economic youth, the demand for infrastructure, health and education services far 
exceeds government 's  capacity to finance their del ivery. Real ising the economic 
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rent potential of the forest is a quick way to amel iorate the chronic fiscal 
deficit. 1 
Resource owners wil l  look beyond timber values, to the alternatives 
advocated by environmentalists, for ways to benefit from their forest only when 
the alternatives are put to them in comparable financial terms.  But markets for 
non-timber forest values are not well formed, particularly in the case of 
conservation for biodiversity or recreational uses. Conservation strategies imply 
a non-production subsidy and hence raise the question of who pays - producing 
resource owners, PNG' s  taxpayers, or the international community (see Taylor et 
al . 1 994 : 1 5 )? Furthermore, eco-forestry (see Martin, this volume) has yet to 
demonstrate its financial v iabi l ity, while downstream processing on a large 
scale, as a substitute for raw log exports, has the same drawback despite its 
popular appeal . In any event, export logging wil l  be the opportunity benchmark 
for evaluating alternative strategies. 
Social Systems and Forestry 
Society is served by four types of organisations: productive (or economic) 
organisations, maintenance organisations, adaptive organisations, and 
managerial-pol itical organisations (Katz and Kahn 1 966). Productive 
organisations are concerned with providing goods and services, and include 
producers in the m in ing, farming, forestry, manufacturing, transportation and 
communication sectors. Maintenance organisations are concerned with the 
socialisation and training of people for roles in other organisations and in the 
society at large. Schools  and churches are the major examples of maintenance 
organisations. Adaptive organisations are intended to create new knowledge and 
innovative solutions to problems. The research laboratory is the prototype of 
such organisations, and universities (as research organisations rather than 
teaching organisations) would also belong in this category. Managerial-pol itical 
organisations have to do with the coordination and control of people and 
resources, and with adjudicating among competing groups . The national state 
and the agencies of government at local and provincial levels provide the major 
examples of this category, although community groups, labour unions, business 
groups, and other special interests would also be classified as managerial­
political organisations. 
The boundaries between the four systems are sometimes blurred. For 
example, education is increasingly seen as the formation of human capital, an 
activity analogous to the way the productive system forms physical capital . 
Both forms of capital are essential for development; and without either of them, 
natural resources wil l  not del iver development. This point is particularly 
relevant to a ' late starter' l ike PNG.  The country's  endowment of natural 
resources is always and often remarked upon by leaders and pol icy analysts 
alike. But only rarely and reluctantly do they recognise that half the nation' s  
1 See Fi ler (this volume) fo r  comparison with the fiscal potential o f  the non-renewable resource 
sector. 
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primary school age children are not in school. This apparent confusion of cause 
and effect in the process of development may explain much of the pervasive 
disappointment with the rate of development. Natural resources are created 
rather than given - a point taken up later, in some detai l ,  in the case of forestry. 
The productive system must put out more than it takes in. The surplus is 
necessary for the operation of the maintenance and adaptive systems on which 
the productive system itself depends. The managerial-pol itical system allocates 
the nation' s  resources among these systems, including some to itself. How wel l  
does i t  allocate the nation ' s  resources? Does i t  absorb too much of  them itself? 
These are not trivial questions. On the contrary, it is fashionable today to talk 
about governance as a resource. Good government is as important to a country's 
socio-economic success as are its natural resource endowment and the 
productivity of its economic organisations. PNG' s  productive system is 
operating far below potential, and its managerial-pol itical system is absorbing 
much of its output. Together, these weaknesses have put pressure on the forestry 
sector to expand, raising questions about sustainabi lity. The opportunity to 
expand has come from increased export demand for logs as other countries in the 
region have banned log exports. 
· 
Harvesting old growth forest yields an economic rent. S ince nature itself 
cannot collect the rent, the managerial-pol itical system must do so, and then 
distribute it amongst the stakeholders, including nature. This attracts pol iticians, 
as wel l  as businessmen and professional advisers, to the opportunities for 
immediate gain, thereby expanding the number and range of stakeholders 
beyond the primary three : resource owners, loggers and the state. Some of these 
extra stakeholders have a global perspective .  
The Global Context 
The world is not about to run out of wood, although a few low-income countries 
do face shortages of wood which they use for fuel and shelter. Forests stil l  cover 
three and half times as much of the earth ' s  surface as cropland (Cairncross 
1 99 1 : 1 2) .  Four-fifths of the forests that existed at the dawn of the industrial era 
remain today. The losses occurred mainly in the temperate forests of Europe 
and North America. However, as a consequence of the passing of the steam age, 
there are more trees in these parts of the world now than there were a century 
ago. 
Today's deforestation occurs in tropical countries. According to Vincent 
and Binkley ( 1 99 1  :99), for example, 62 percent of Peninsular Malaysia was 
forested in 1 972, and 58 percent of the forest was old-growth. By 1 982, both 
proportions had decl ined to 52 percent. Over this period old-growth forest was 
depleted at the rate of 2 .8  percent per year. 
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Rich Man 's Lament 
Rich countries worry about tropical deforestation because it raises the world ' s  
temperature and lowers its biodiversity. For the poor countries who own the 
forest, deforestation is a way of converting natural physical capital into human 
capital and human-made capital and, hence, into rising l iving standards .  But, 
say the mainly rich-country conservationists, preserving forests guarantees a 
better l iv ing than converting them. 
Why? Because, according to the conservationists, poor-country 
governments typically exaggerate the economic gains from conversion and 
ignore the costs of it. They exaggerate the gains by not capturing for their 
countries enough of the economic rent derived from logging for export. They 
ignore the costs by not enforcing good practice and by al lowing fragile soils to 
be exposed to erosion which has the effect of si lting up waterways, mangrove 
swamps, and coral reefs .  They ignore the opportunity costs of conversion by not 
knowing the economic values derivable from intact forest. 
PNG has some basis to claim at least partial exclusion from this stereotype. 
With its resolve stiffened by the assistance of the World Bank and the donor 
community, the government' s  new forest revenue system of progressive export 
taxes and royalties captures a fair proportion of the economic rent (see Fi ler, this 
volume). Furthermore, in 1 996, the industry adopted a new Logging Code of 
Practice, though it is too early to say how wel l  it is being complied with . 
Is the World Really Warming Up? 
Whom should we believe - the 2,000 scientists who make up the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Cl imate Change (IPCC) or the twenty-four scientific 
dissenters whose book, The Global Warming Debate, finds fault with the IPCC 's  
work?2 Does i t  make sense, ask the dissenters, to  measure global temperatures 
with mainly land-based thermometers when oceans make up two thirds of the 
earth ' s  surface? Which are right - terrestrial thermometers which record rising 
temperatures since 1 979 or satel l ite thermometers which show no warming 
trend? 
Even if the world is warming, is man responsible or are sunspots? Carbon 
dioxide and methane gases trap the heat the earth receives from the sun, but 
otherwise would reflect, preventing the earth from freezing l ike its neighbour 
Mars - a natural greenhouse effect. Modell ing th is effect with predictive 
accuracy has proved difficult. Like these gases, sulphates are also released into 
the atmosphere by burning fossil fuels, but as aerosols with the opposite effect -
reflecting incoming radiation and cool ing the earth . Including this 
countervai l ing effect has wrought a better fit between the IPCC model and 
reality. Yet the dissenters say it is a fudge. Other scientists say that this 
2 See the debate in The Economist, March 23-29, 1 996, page 9 1 .  
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century's shortening of sunspot cycles, which have been tracked s ince the 
s ixteenth century, is what has warmed up the planet. 
Even if the world is warming and man is responsible, putting an end to the 
logging of moist tropical rainforests would not make it cooler. The best that a 
halt to tropical logging in poorer countries could achieve would be to slow the 
warming rate . Growing more trees in the richer countries with temperate 
climates would achieve the same result. Offsetting the warming effects of 
emissions from fossi l  fuels would require continual additions to the forest stock 
- a practical impossibi l ity (World Bank 1 992 : 1 63) .  
A Not-So-Fragile Environment 
In contrast to the conventional bel ief that l iv ing matter is passive in the face of 
threats to its existence, James Lovelock ( 1 995 :9) explores the theory that the 
earth ' s  air, oceans, and land surfaces form a complex system which has the 
capacity to keep Earth a fit place for l ife. 
Life first appeared on the Earth about 3 ,500 million years ago. From 
that time until now, the presence of fossils shows that the Earth ' s  
climate has changed very little. Yet the output of  heat from the sun, the 
surface properties of the Earth, and the composition of the atmosphere 
have almost certainly varied greatly over the same period. 
The chemical composition of the atmosphere bears no relation to the 
expectations of steady-state chemical equilibrium. The presence of 
methane, nitrous oxide, and even nitrogen in our present oxidising 
atmosphere represents violation of the rules of chemistry to be 
measured in tens of orders of magnitude. Disequilibria on this scale 
suggest that the atmosphere is not merely a biological product, but 
more probably a biological construction : not living, but like a cat 's  fur, 
a bird 's  feathers, or the paper of a wasp' s  nest, an extension of a living 
system designed to maintain a chosen environment. Thus the 
atmospheric concentration of gases such as oxygen and ammonia is 
found to be kept at an optimum value from which even small 
departures could have disastrous consequences for life. 
The climate and the chemical properties of the Earth now and 
throughout its history seem always to have been optimal for life. For 
this to have happened by chance is as unlikely as to survive unscathed 
a drive blindfold through rush-hour traffic. 
How Much Biodiversity Does the World Need? 
The econom ist Malthus, writing at the end of the e ighteenth century, warned that 
it was man ' s  destiny to starve s ince he would run out of land to feed h imself. 
Almost two centuries later, in 1 972, the world ' s  population having trebled and 
average l iv ing standards having increased five-fold in the interim (UNDP 
1 996: 1 2), the Club of Rome proclaimed that the world would run out of essential 
commodities within a hundred years . But the prices of these commodities 
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continue to fall ,  signal l ing relative abundance, not scarcity. The concern most 
often expressed now is not with the p lanet 's  capacity to provide human beings 
with raw materials but its capacity to absorb their waste and maintain its own 
biodiversity. 
B iodiversity is good for humanity. It is the source of the wild strains that 
plant breeders introduce into domesticated crops as insurance against the pests 
and diseases which are encouraged by genetic uniformity. It is also the source of 
some l ife-enhancing medicines and drugs. But how much of it does the world 
need? The low price that rich countries are presently prepared to pay poor ones 
to preserve the biodiversity values in their moist tropical rainforests suggests 
that the world has more than it needs. Perhaps humanity does not yet understand 
the true value of b iodiversity. Perhaps this ignorance presents a marketing 
opportunity for PNG to raise biodiversity awareness and the non-timber value of 
its forests. Current pol icy, however, is geared almost exclusively to real is ing 
timber values; and, on the basis of th is brief canvassing of relevant aspects of the 
environmental debate, properly so. 
Policy Overview 
PNG forestry pursued a processing policy unti l  1 979. A very large increase in 
statutory m in imum wages between 1 972 and 1 975 reduced industry 
competitiveness. Faced with a shrinking industry, government changed its 
policy to promote landowner participation in log exports. The Barnett Inquiry in 
1 988 and 1 989 revealed an industry in a policy vacuum with corrupt 
interventions, operating to poor environmental and financial standards. 
As a result of this inquiry, the government placed a moratorium on the issue 
of timber permits and once again adopted a processing policy. Government also 
breached the moratorium on several occasions, most notably just prior to the 
1 992 elections. Consequently, the permitted cut is  far in excess of the 
sustainable cut. In 1 993 , assisted by sharply rising prices, the actual cut also 
exceeded the sustainable cut. At the same time, however, the National Forestry 
and Conservation Action Plan (NFCAP), a K50 m il l ion multi-donor aid 
programme, was helping PNG to regain control of its forestry sector. NFCAP's  
major and most urgent chal lenge is to  reduce the permitted cut to  the sustainable 
level and raise operational standards to best practice (Taylor et al . 1 994 : 1 3 ) .  
Under a structural adjustment programme and economic recovery loan 
coordinated by the World Bank, the PNG Code of Logging Practice was adopted 
in 1 996, whi le a new revenue system was adopted in two stages - a progressive 
export tax in November 1 995 and a progressive royalty in July 1 996. The 
industry claimed incapacity to pay the extra royalty. 
The forest revenue system in PNG comprises royalties, export taxes, 
specific-purpose levies and contract-specific premiums. Unti l  November 1 995 ,  
royalties and export taxes varied with species groups. Royalties were charged 
on volume and export taxes on value. Stimulated by rising log prices and fiscal 
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pressures, export tax rates which were 1 0  percent, 20 percent and 30 percent in 
1 992, had risen, by March 1 994, to 26 percent, 36 percent and 46 percent 
respectively. The second and largest of the two incremental increases occurred 
after prices had peaked and were declin ing. The 1 996 budget changed the 
royalty and export tax schedules to a progressive ad valorem basis applying to 
all species (see Fi ler, this volume) . 
Two other revenue systems have been suggested for PNG - stumpage and 
auction . The stumpage system was proposed by the National Forest Authority 
but never accepted by the National Executive Counci l .  Gi l l is ( 1 992: 1 44) 
considers that the conditions necessary for feasible auctions prevail in few 
countries with sizeable tropical forests, and that many of the benefits of annual 
auctions may be secured without auctions. Duncan ( 1 994 : 5) describes the 
annual auction system as superior to al l the others, mainly because it provides an 
incentive, lacking in other systems, for loggers to compete amongst themselves 
on cost, maximise log prices and hedge price risk, and because it could also help 
to break down the h igh degree of concentration of ownership of logging activity 
evident in PNG. The putative disadvantages of the export tax are that: it forces 
an income transfer from landowners to domestic users of logs or to government; 
it devalues trees, and therefore forest conservation, in the eyes of the landowner; 
and it encourages landowners and loggers to col lude in i l legally shipping logs 
(AusAID 1 995 :40). 
Sustainable Development 
How wel l  are PNG' s  forest policies geared towards sustainabil ity? Let us begin 
by considering the pursuit of ' integral human development ' ,  the first of the 
National Goals and Directive Principles enshrined in the Constitution . Though 
complex, this is held to embrace, at least, material l iving standards rising above 
the level of mere subsistence - the stable state that has existed for 1 0,000 years. 
Sustainably rising l iv ing standards or consumption levels require some 
investment - that is, foregoing some current consumption. Government is 
required to undertake the leading investment, for example, in physical 
infrastructure and in human capital formation. 
PNG's  fourth national goal deals specifical ly with the environment and 
places a constraint on development : 
We declare our fourth goal to be for Papua New Guinea's  natural 
resources and environment to be conserved and used for the collective 
benefit of us all, and to be replenished for the benefit of future 
generations. 
Analysis across countries and over time reveals that development is 
characterised by pervasive structural change in the economy and society . 
Among the more important trends are the transitions from rural to urban and 
from agricultural to industrial society, and from an economy dominated by the 
self-employed to one in which employee status dominates . Second, only a smal l 
portion of the growth in per capita output may be explained by the growth in per 
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capita inputs. Third, trade is not the main engine of growth, although it is  
important. Fourth, the fundamental engines of growth appear to be 
technological and institutional change - that is ,  the capabi lity to derive more 
than ever before from the resources at hand. The generation and productive use 
of new technologies and new institutional arrangements are both intimately 
related to investments in the capabi l ities of human agents - the process of human 
capital formation. By their nature, technological and institutional changes are 
unlikely to proceed incrementally but in quantum jumps. 
The environmental load generated by development comes from increasing 
numbers of people, rising consumption per person, and the cost per unit of 
consumption of using the environment as a raw material source and a waste sink. 
Environmentalists worry that the global environmental load will soon exceed its 
capacity. Do they worry unnecessarily? Consider plausible trends in the three 
components of the environmental load. First, developed world population is 
projected to stabi lise around the middle of the next century, global population a 
century later. Second, there are biological and psychological reasons for 
bel ieving that mankind's  material needs are entirely satiable. Third, technology 
tends to reduce the environmental load due to a unit of consumption . These 
three trends together imply that the global environmental load wil l  stop growing 
at some time and then decl ine . The sustainabil ity question is whether 
environmental capacity wil l  al low the peak to be reached or whether global 
development needs to be truncated. If the world does face truncated 
development, enforced by an environmental constraint, questions of 
distributional equity across nations and between generations arise. 
The degree of truncation would depend on the nature of the constraint. 
Beckerman ( 1 995 : 1 28) notes ' strong' and 'weak' concepts of sustainabil ity in 
the l iterature. The strong environmental constraint is enshrined in the 1 987 
Brundtland report: 
The loss of plant and animal species can greatly limit the options of 
future generations; so sustainable development requires the 
conservation of plant and animal species. 
According to Beckerman, keeping open future options in this way, at the 
expense of alleviating acute poverty today, is 'morally repugnant, as wel l  as 
totally impracticable ' .  The weak concept of sustainabil ity allows for the running 
down of natural resources to be compensated by the bui lding up of other 
resources, including man-made capital . Because the acceptabi l ity of the 
substitution is judged in terms of sustaining human welfare, Beckerman finds 
that 'weak sustainabi l ity' is no different from the economist 's  concept of 
optimising welfare. 
Both of these constraints are, in fact, man-made ones, and are not imposed 
by the l imits of environmental capacity to either supply man's  material needs or 
dispose of his waste. 
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A stable world population and per capita consumption - that is, zero growth 
of global consumption - would require the environment to yield raw materials 
and dispose of waste at constant rates .  This holds out the theoretical prospect 
that, as a waste sink, environmental capacity need not truncate human 
development. Recycling technologies, which act to reduce both these rates, 
enhance that prospect. Recycled materials, instead of adding to the disposal 
load, reduce the raw material load . But, unless recycl ing technology can achieve 
I 00 percent efficiency, the environment would have to yield a positive flow of 
raw materials, even at a constant rate of global consumption - something which 
a finite planet could not sustain in perpetuity. However, truncating development 
by achieving zero global consumption growth at a lower level of global 
consumption would not change this condition - it would merely lengthen 
inescapably finite l ife. Nor is there an obvious moral basis for favouring 
longevity over quality of l ife. 
One 's  preference between conventional goods and services, on the one 
hand, and environmental qual ity, on the other, depends also on how much of 
each one has . Poorer people's incentive is to favour more goods and services 
over the environment in general . In the same way, poor countries would be 
foolish to sacrifice economic progress in the longer-term interests even of their 
own environment, let alone of the world in general . Nor does it make sense for 
the developed countries to grow more slowly in order to leave resources 
avai lable for the growth of the developing countries. Their growth is essential to 
provide the expanding markets for the exports of the primary producers . 
As people get richer, as their basic needs for food, water, clothing and 
shelter are satisfied, they attach importance to other ingredients in total welfare, 
including the environment. Accordingly, communities wil l  be more wil l ing and 
able to allocate resources to this purpose . The changing pattern of output in 
advanced countries reduces the relative burden on the environment. At higher 
levels of income, industry accounts for a smaller share of GDP, whereas 
relatively non-polluting services increase their share. Industry itself experiences 
a shift away from highly pol luting heavy industries towards those which employ 
relatively more skilled human capital and use relatively less energy or raw 
materials. Policies to combat pol lution have been introduced mainly in richer 
countries, since they have the resources to implement their shift in priorities. 
Consequently, higher incomes are clearly associated with environmental 
abatement. 
Even if the developing countries themselves do not see the threat of climate 
change as warranting the cost of reducing their emissions of 'greenhouse gases ' ,  
the greatest potential to  do so rests with them . This i s  because of their high 
population growth and low, but rising, levels of per capita energy consumption 
compared to the developed countries. By contrast, the developed countries have 
the resources to take effective action to moderate global warming, but less 
incentive to do so, given the small share of agriculture in their national products. 
A global solution to the problem, if indeed it is one, would require a transfer 
from the developed countries to the developing ones . 
320 The Political Economy of Forest Management in Papua New Guinea 
Economic Concepts of Sustainability 
Economic concepts of sustainabi l ity cannot be divorced entirely from other 
concepts of it, such as social and ecological ones . The wel l-being of a society 
depends on more than the consumption, production and investment activities of 
households and businesses. The good society is concerned not only with the 
aggregate of material wel l-being that a sustainable economic system may bring, 
but also with how it is  distributed amongst its members. It is  concerned, 
particularly, with alleviating poverty amongst those of its numbers who are 
unable to participate ful ly in the economic system . This is not to suggest, 
however, that economics concerns itself only with growth and efficiency, and 
not with equity. Economics is driven by both of these principles, and by the 
interaction between them. Growth provides a better basis than non-growth for 
equitable distribution of both the inputs and the outputs of the economic system, 
while equitable distribution in turn provides positive feedback for sustainable 
growth. 
Just as the good society is concerned with the social impact of a strong 
economy, so it is concerned with its ecological impact as wel l .  The economic 
system takes raw materials from its bio-physical environment and puts back 
waste. At different times, economists have worried about the capacity of the 
biosphere to yield the quantities of raw materials needed for the economic 
system to maintain the l iving standards of a rapidly growing population. Today 
the concern is more with its capacity to absorb waste from the rising l iving 
standards of a growing population without threatening its own health and 
sustainabi l ity . It would be wrong-headed, however, to associate environmental 
damage only with h igh-technology modern industrial economies. It is rather the 
case that technology twice blesses society. First it enhances the capacity of the 
environment to supply raw materials to the economic system; second it cleans 
the waste that the economic system disposes to the environment. Nor are 
subsistence economic systems, at the other end of the technological spectrum, 
ecologically neutral .  Instead, they are often the chief cause of deforestation. 
Econom ic growth and development in such societies, which requires capital 
formation, can reduce their demands on the forest. 
Constant Capital Stock 
Three economic concepts are particularly relevant to the idea of sustainabi l ity: 
constant capital stock, irreversibil ity and the precautionary principle. 
Maintaining constant capital stock is a l im iting case of the general condition in 
capital ist economies of accumulating capital stock. Only when populations stop 
growing and reach a steady state, and all needs are being met, may the capital 
stock also stop growing. Although no economy has yet reached this stage, it is a 
plausible global condition . 
The law partial ly protects the capital stock owned by corporations from 
diminution. For example, company directors may normal ly distribute to 
shareholders only profits made after providing for replacement of the capital 
The Economics of Sustainable Development 32 1 
stock used up in producing the output and associated profit. Simi larly, the 
authorities may levy income tax only on such profits. In order to maintain 
constant capital stock, the company must replace consumed capital . In order to 
accumulate capital stock, directors normally distribute as dividends only part of 
the profit, retaining the remainder in the company to finance future capital 
formation. 
Whereas the law protects the capital stock from diminution through income 
tax, it does not do so with respect to other forms of taxation . For example, 
royalty and export tax constitute input costs to the logging industry, not 
contingent taxes on profit. It is conceivable, therefore, that particular 
combinations of market prices and input costs could result in negative profit, 
hence a diminution of the capital stock of the logging industry - a condition 
which is currently said to exist by the industry in PNG. 
Such an unsustainable and unstable condition may be remedied only by the 
loggers reducing the costs over which they have control, or by the resource 
owners and government reducing the costs over which they have control, or 
both. The currently situation in PNG is that the loggers are doing al l of the cost 
reduction . Inevitably, they claim, part of this reduction wil l  be in the capital 
stock, which means less royalties to resource owners and less taxes to 
government in the future . Log export volumes in 1 995 were 1 5  percent down on 
the previous year; but for the first three quarters of 1 996, they were 4 percent up 
on the same period in 1 995 .  It is not easy to tel l  the extent to which these 
changes in output were due to weather conditions, to landowner disputes holding 
up operations, or to withdrawal of capacity from areas made unprofitable by 
excessive tax rates .  
Whereas the law and economic managers pay close attention to what 
happens to the man-made capital stock, they are less concerned about the natural 
capital stock - a form of myopia of great concern to environmentalists. In old­
growth forest, in which mortality equals net photosynthetic activity, any harvest 
rate wil l  exceed growth, and the timber stock wil l  decline. To see that this is so, 
imagine clear-fell ing a long strip of uniform width in an extensive forest. If the 
harvest rate in the old-growth forest equals the growth rate of secondary forest, 
then, when the first of the secondary forest is reaching old-growth density, the 
average timber stock in the strip, now al l secondary forest, is approximately half 
the original old-growth stock, in quantity if not in qual ity or value . It is 
important, therefore, that the financial proceeds from l iquidation of natural 
physical capital such as old-growth forest is used to finance the accumulation of 
man-made capital - physical infrastructure, directly productive assets, and 
human capital - as the means for raising standards of l iving for society. 
Measuring the capital stock and how it changes over time is a necessary starting 
point. 
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Stocks and Flows 
A man-made asset is valued in two ways: first, at the cost of creating it or, more 
correctly, of replacing it; and second, at the present value of the future periodic 
income flows that it generates. 
The first method is the more certain one, simply because it rel ies on more 
rel iable past or present information, whereas the other rel ies on less rel iable 
present information about the future . But it is also the less relevant one, because 
the principal reason for creating an asset is to enjoy the future flow of benefits it 
generates .  This is why value is said to rest in the eye of the beholder. Some 
beholders deal with uncertainty by varying the discount rate that l inks future 
income flow value with present asset stock value. Others vary the value of the 
income flow. The second way is the more rational one, because it is the flow 
whose measure is uncertain, not the discount rate . It is also a less risky way, 
because a negative flow value, which we might wish to avoid, would not escape 
detection, whereas it m ight do so if uncertainty were dealt with by varying the 
discount rate. Today's  forecast measurement of a future economic variable is 
more properly represented, not by a single number, but by a probabi l ity 
distribution of numbers . The distribution, at a minimum, would be specified by 
a measure of central tendency and another of dispersion. Negative values which 
would be revealed in the measures of dispersion could be concealed in the 
measure of central tendency and cause unwanted future surprises . 
Discounting the Future 
Individuals general ly would rather receive a benefit now than in the future. 
Conversely, they would rather face a cost in the future than now. The more 
time-distant the benefit or the cost, the less its significance to the individual 
now. This behaviour may simply reflect impatience or, to use the more 
scholarly term, 'time preference ' .  It may also reveal the understanding that 
capital is productive; that a benefit received and invested today wil l  generate 
increasing benefit in the future. Both behaviours discount the future. The rates 
at which they do so influence the al location of resources in an economy. 
Theoretical ly, for an individual, the two rates are identical ,  but taxes and 
imperfect markets make them different in practice . Furthermore, they would 
vary from one individual to another. Smil ( 1 996:  1 6) cites a pol l  of 2,600 people 
which revealed impl ied d iscount rates of 7.4 percent per year over 25 years 
reducing to 4 percent over 1 00 years . The government uses a 1 0  percent 
discount rate in evaluating its public investments. 
Economic growth raises the discount rate. The more an individual expects 
to have in the future, the less wi l l ing wi l l  he be to make sacrifices today in order 
to obtain even more at a later date. But poverty also raises the discount rate. 
The satisfaction of immediate needs for food is more compel l ing than the 
assurance of long-term food security. Much of the l iterature argues that high 
discount rates work against the environment: they lead to faster depletion of 
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exhaustible resources and more intense harvesting of renewable ones (but see 
Pearce, Markandya and Barbier 1 99 1 : 1 43 ) .  
In the Eye of the Beholder 
PNG's forests are vastly more difficult to value than any of its man-made 
physical assets. On one hand, using the cost approach to asset valuation, it 
m ight be argued that, since the forest cost PNG nothing to create, it has no value . 
It could also be said that this is the main explanation for the unsustainable 
harvesting observed in parts of the country. On the other hand, the prices 
loggers pay in royalties, levies and export taxes puts a value on the forest. In 
recent years, government has raised those prices and that value. Loggers claim 
government has made some forests so 'valuable' that it is too costly to harvest 
them . If loggers are efficient and their claim is true, then such forests would 
have no timber value because they would generate no future timber incomes. 
Value increases until it crashes to zero ! 
When man arrived on the part of the earth ' s  crust which has been called 
Papua New Guinea s ince 1 975,  the forest was already here, and perhaps in much 
the same condition as it is now. The forest yielded food, shelter and fuel to the 
hunter-gatherer, and also some spiritual and aesthetic values. In time, the 
hunter-gatherer learned how to be a farmer of plants and animals, and thus to be 
a more efficient economic unit. This transition reduced the value of the forest, 
and increased that of the soi l , to its human occupants. As population increased, 
cropland displaced forests . 
Recently, the autarchic farmer became the trader engaged with the rest of 
the world .  This engagement created potential values for both competing forest 
and cropland. The rest of the world wants wood, biodiversity, eco- leisure, a 
carbon s ink. Does the change from a closed economy to an open one therefore 
warrant a world market valuation of PNG's  forests at K76 bi l l ion (Sekhran 
1 994b:34) or K l OO b i l l ion (Henderson 1 996a: 1 3 1 )? Clearly not. The rest of the 
world has to pay for these th ings before value is created.  An income value to 
PNG of K3 bi l l ion is more relevant and real istic, as detai led later. 
Diversity is not only characteristic of PNG's  forest ecology, but also of the 
analyst 's assessment of the sustainable rate of harvest, and hence of the value of 
the productive forest. At one stage, the World Bank (IBRD 1 965 : 1 43)  reckoned 
that about a quarter of the forest (some 1 0  mi l l ion hectares) had commercial 
potential . It cal led for the annual log harvest to increase from 200,000 cubic 
metres in 1 962-63 to 750,000 cubic metres in 1 969-70. At a later date, the 
World Bank ( 1 989 :2 1 )  estimated the sustainable harvest at 3 .6 mi l l ion cubic 
metres annual ly from six mi l l ion hectares of net uti l isable forest. The Australian 
government (PNGADCP 1 993 : 1 )  has estimated an annual sustainable harvest of 
three mi l l ion cubic metres from three mi l l ion hectares, after al lowing for 
conservation and agricultural conversion.3 Interestingly, the most recent of 
3 Before these allowances the sustainable cut would be 6.4 mil l ion cubic metres. 
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these estimates comes close to the 2 .6  mi ll ion hectares assessed as far back as 
1 970 by Mcintosh and Granger for a viable processing industry (World Bank 
1 989: 1 6) .  
The World Bank' s later estimates were based on natural regenerative 
growth of 0 .75 centimetres per year in stem diameter at breast height (dbh) and a 
mean annual increment of 0 .6  cubic metres per hectare. White ( 1 976 :9) 
provides sample survey data on five forests. These data and the natural dbh 
growth rate imply annual merchantable volume growth (stems 50 cm dbh and 
larger) of 2 .3 percent. Nadarajah ( 1 993 : 3 8), citing data provided by the PNG 
Forest Authority, reveals that a grand total of 4 .76 mi l l ion hectares have been 
allocated for harvest at approximately 25 cubic metres of merchantable logs per 
hectare . 
Of the total area al located, about 60 percent remains unlogged, provid ing, at 
current harvest rates, a further 20 to 25  years of old-growth logging. Prov inces 
such as West New Britain, where harvesting rates far exceed the average, face 
much shorter logging l ives. The process of al locating the remaining 20 percent 
of the productive forest began with the government's simultaneous cal l  for 
expressions of interest in six new areas .4 Upon allocation of the total productive 
forest, an annual harvest of more than 3 . 5 mi l lion cubic metres would exceed the 
natural regenerative growth rate. 
Currently the rest of the world is paying about K450 mi l l ion f.o .b .  per year 
for PNG's  logs . Sales value exceeds natural capital value by the cost of 
generating sales. These costs include operating costs, consumption of the man­
made capital employed, and normal profit on that capital . Natural capital value 
comprises royalty, export tax, other charges by the state and resource owners, 
and profits in excess of normal profit. The industry says there are no excess 
profits . Royalty, export tax, and other charges would account for approximately 
one half of sales value. Sixty percent of the allocated portion remains to be 
logged and 20 percent of the estate remains to be allocated. The current harvest 
rate is 2 . 5  percent per year of the allocated area, implying a weighted average 
remaining life of 27 years of old-growth merchantable stock. At an 8 percent 
discount rate, this would be valued at K3 bil l ion, equivalent to annual per capita 
income of K70. 
The very large difference between this value and the larger ones cited 
earlier is explained as fol lows. The largest one is the current purchaser' s  value 
to an overseas processor or, equivalently, the sales value to a foreign logger in 
PNG of the entire stock in 1 5  mi l l ion hectares of operable forest carrying 32 
cubic metres per hectare of merchantable stems. This approach assumes, 
impractical ly, either instantaneous l iquidation of the entire stock or a zero 
interest rate . Thus the higher value relative to the lower one will be 3 .  7 times on 
4 This was done in the week after Parliament gave effective control of the National Forest Board 
to the Minister, thus breaching a position agreed with the World Bank under the economic reform 
programme - a decision which has since been reversed. 
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account of area, 1 .3 times on account of stocking rate, 2 .0 times on account of 
price, and 3 .6 times on account of timing. 
Wil l  nature replenish the K3 bi l l ion of merchantable wood stock? 
Selective Logging 's Broken Promise 
Photosynthesis makes wood grow, driven by the sun ' s  radiation. Wood is 
estimated to grow in the moist tropics at a rate up to 1 . 5 cubic metres per hectare 
per year. Harvesting of mature trees at no greater rate would leave the stock of 
wood per hectare unchanged - constant working capital stock in perpetuity !  
This is  the al luring idea behind sustained selective logging. Yet practical ly 
nowhere does it work in practice . 
The International Tropical Timber Organisation (ITTO) reckons that only 
about one-tenth of one percent of tropical logging is conducted on a sustainable 
basis . Fraser ( 1 982 : 75 )  reports on Thailand : a teak forest, inventoried in the 
early 1 920s and harvested according to a management plan, was re- inventoried 
at twenty-year intervals; each measurement showed a 20 percent reduction in 
stock and a steady reduction in mean diameter. 
Sustainable selective logging might work if it could be done with the 
precision of the surgeon 's  scalpel .  But it wi l l  not work when heavy equipment, 
incompletely ski l led operators, and weak regulatory enforcement leave 70 
percent of stems mortal ly wounded and unable to survive the ensuing ten years 
(Cameron and Vigus 1 993 , cited in Sehkran et al . 1 995 : 1 63) .  Vigus 
recommends in PNG that not more than 25 percent of the canopy be open, and 
that any opening be no more than 300 square metres in area. 
Tropical forest is the most species-diverse ecosystem in the world, making 
it hard to use for both timber and non-timber products. This is one of the 
reasons why people want to cut it down and replace it with a s ingle-species 
ecosystem (Prance 1 994 : 1 79). S ingle-species plantations may yield ten times as 
much wood as the natural forest, but they may also take 30-50 years to achieve 
such yields. More than 1 0  percent of the forest would therefore have to be 
replaced by plantations to sustain, say, a twenty-year cutting cycle. Fraser 
( 1 982 : 56) reports for Solomon Islands that conversion of 45 percent of the 
natural forest to plantations of native species would be necessary to replace 
volume and (because of lesser mean diameters) 65 percent to replace value . 
The failure to real ise selective logging 's  promise of sustainabil ity stems 
from collateral damage more than from excessive harvest rates . This means that 
there are three remedial options: 
• invest in the human ski l l s  that wi l l  el im inate collateral damage; 
• adopt a harvesting technology that won 't cause the collateral damage; or 
• replace parts of the natural forest with plantations, thereby increasing the 
capital stock. 
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It would seem that investment in human capital formation would yield a very 
h igh return, and would serve to advance the other options as wel l .  Alternative 
logging technologies such as aerial ropeways and helicopters do not appear to 
have been widely adopted .  The higher productivity of plantations may be 
appealing but, being a very long term investment, it requires land tenure rights 
which have proven difficult to secure under customary law. This raises the 
crucial point about forestry in PNG: the central issue is not the question of 
whether the logging rate is sustainable; it is the absence of a clear land use 
strategy. The economic concept of irreversibil ity is relevant to choices about 
land use. 
Irreversibility 
Faced with the combination of commitment (or irreversibil ity) and uncertainty, 
the business executive may wel l  feel the need to keep his options open. This 
common concept is the basis for elaborations of two fundamental 
m icroeconomic principles: operational ly, expand production unti l marginal cost 
equals price; and in capital formation, invest where the present value of the 
future benefit flows exceeds that of costs, where both future flow streams are 
discounted by the cost of capital . 
A price-taking firm that could produce and sell an extra widget at a cost 
which is less than the price of widgets, would sensibly produce and sell it. If the 
firm reckoned that next year widget prices would rise, it would not postpone 
some current production unti l next year, when higher profits could be avai lable; 
it would maximise profit this year and next year as wel l .  If the firm reckoned 
that widgets were being replaced by thingummies in consumers'  preferences, it 
would begin reshaping its capital stock to produce thingummies. During the 
product transition, it would produce each product to the quantity which equated 
price and marginal cost. There is nothing in the theory of the firm which says 
that you should put off until tomorrow production that can be sold profitably 
today. 
Replace widgets with trees in the moist tropical rainforest of PNG. What 
differences between a tree and a widget would make the logger behave 
differently to the widget-maker? The empirical evidence says that old-growth 
forest is non-renewable under existing production technology and practice . That 
is to say, a particular forest has a finite l ife as a source of old-growth wood. But, 
just as the thingummy may replace the widget as a value to mankind, another 
form of valuable land use, perhaps a wood plantation, may replace the trees (but 
not the biodiversity) of old-growth forest. 
In this sense, logging the old-growth forest is in itself a mining activity. 
The difference between logging and mining is that the logger' s capital stock may 
be replaced in situ, in value though not in physical qual ity, whereas the miner 
has to find another existing ore body in another location . Policy in PNG, 
however, has made loggers more l ike miners because it cannot give them tenure 
over the land and, therefore, after logging out one forest they move onto another. 
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Confronted in this way with a finite resource, the logger knows that the last 
tree felled today wil l  not be there to be felled tomorrow. If tomorrow's  prices 
wi l l  be h igher than today's, would it pay the logger to leave the tree standing 
until tomorrow? Yes, if the rate of price increase exceeded the interest rate. 
This means that the marginal cost, in the textbook rule which says 'expand 
production until marginal cost equals price ' ,  should include the opportunity cost 
of foregone profit as wel l  as direct cost (Salant 1 995 :95) The higher the interest 
rate, the lower the opportunity cost of foregone profit, and the more l ikely that 
the logger wil l  fel l  the tree today. 
The weights of irreversibil ity and uncertainty are greater in making 
decisions about investment than about production. Once the capital stock is 
instal led, it cannot be put to new uses without incurring a substantial economic 
cost. For example, dedicating a forest to timber production in practice virtually 
precludes the opportunity to use it for its biodiversity values. These values, 
being uncertain, create value in delaying the commitment to logging or, in other 
words, keeping the logging investment option open, or creating a ' logging option 
value ' .  Therefore the decision to  commit to  logging would be  taken when 
benefits exceeded costs, including the option value . This point is central to the 
issue of downstream processing. 
Adding Value? 
Many people say that PNG should not permit the export of logs, only processed 
timber. But it is not possible to assert, a priori, that this would be good for the 
forest or the people .  On the contrary, l imiting the range of markets for a product 
would tend to reduce its price. Opting out of the log export market and into the 
processed timber export market, hypothesising that this would generate h igher 
incomes, could in practice reduce the value of the forest. It would also probably 
increase the rate of harvest, and hence the rate of damage to the forest or 
deforestation. This condition stems from the relatively higher level of 
investment required to generate a unit of output in processing than in logging. 
It is straightforward in principle to test the hypothesis that timber generates 
higher incomes than logs do. It would entail comparing two operations with 
identical logging capacity and operating conditions. One operator hauls the log 
harvest to an export ramp and bulk log ship, and pays wages to Papua New 
Guinean workers, royalties ( including reforestation and development levies) to 
the resource owners, and export taxes and company taxes to the national 
government. The other operator hauls the logs to a sawmil l  and produces sawn 
timber or plywood which is then hauled to a conventional wharf for sale 
domestically or overseas . It makes the same range of payments as the log 
exporter. The operation generating the higher sum of these payments would be 
the one producing greater benefit for the economy. 
Finding two such operations for direct comparison could be difficult. 
Summing the payments for a sample of operations in each sector, and computing 
the amount per unit volume of log harvest, would be easier in practice. Whereas 
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direct comparisons of payments for royalties and for taxes can be made between 
the two sectors, employment comparisons are more compl icated.  Processing 
seems l ikely to generate both more employment directly, and a higher 
employment multiplier, than log exporting. However, there are reasons to 
bel ieve that the higher payrol l  generated by processing would come at the 
expense of lower royalties to resource owners and taxes to the state; and that 
total national income per unit of log harvest would be lower under processing. 
This condition stems from the less integrated nature of the PNG economy as 
compared to those of Japan and Korea, our principal markets. A sawmi l l  or a 
p lymi l l  in these countries i s  able to sell into secondary markets a significant 
proportion of a log for which a mi l l  in PNG would have to incur the cost of 
disposal in an environmental ly sound way. 
The result of such a test is not obvious a priori. The presumption in favour 
of processing is based on a different comparison, namely that of unit sales value, 
not income per unit of log harvest. A feasibil ity study to be carried out as part of 
the current structural adjustment programme should reveal the best strategy for 
PNG to follow in developing its wood resource. 
Precautionary Conclusion 
Sound scientific doubts remain about whether the world is warming up and 
about whether, if it is, man can prevent it rising further by switching to new 
technology. What counsel does the precautionary principle offer the world' s  
politicians i n  this c ircumstance? First, i t  would say that the issue here i s  the risk 
of world catastrophe, and that scientists can say neither what the level of risk is, 
nor whether the proposed course of action to reduce the risk wil l  succeed. 
Second, it would say that action should nevertheless be taken. 
This sti l l  leaves some flexibi l ity on the method of switching technologies. 
First the new technology, though less environmental ly expensive than the old 
one it is  replacing, will reduce existing l iv ing standards .  Second, reducing l iv ing 
standards hurts poor people more than it does rich people; and there are more 
poor people in poor countries than in rich ones. These two points suggest that 
the developed economies should lead the way, allowing less developed 
countries, by delaying the switch, to reduce the income gap between themselves 
and the richer countries. But reducing the income gap requires developed 
economies to continue to grow and generate demand for poorer countries' 
exports . Delaying the switch in developed countries would be sensible, too, if 
the cost of the new technology were responsive to research and development 
expenditure . 
Globally, the precautionary principle would seem to favour increasing 
technological research and development over reducing economic growth as the 
appropriate response to the global warming concern. How PNG develops its 
forest resource has very l ittle bearing on this matter. 
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The precautionary principle carries a message for Papua New Guinean 
leaders, just as it does for world leaders. As they create a vision to motivate and 
guide the country's  development into the new century, they might ponder on 
what the forest would be l ike in the year 2020 under a continuation of existing 
practice. Forests would sti l l  cover much of the land surface. But none of the 
valuable select species of today would be in them. These would have been 
harvested (or destroyed as a result of harvesting), and exported either as logs or 
as sawn timber or plywood if government decides to subsidise large-scale 
industrial processing. Very l ittle of the K3 bi l l ion of l iquidated forest value 
would have been transformed into other forms of capital . The nation would have 
experienced a significant diminution in its capital stock. 
To avoid this outcome, PNG badly needs a land use strategy which will 
create man-made capital, for example tree crop farms including wood as a crop, 
as the natural forest stock is depleted. B iodiversity need not be a v ictim if 
arrangements can be agreed with the developed countries for conservation of 
part of the forest estate . 

PART THREE 
CONSERVATION AND 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
IN PRACTICE 

CHAPTER 15  
BIOPHYSICAL PARAMETERS FOR SUSTAINABLE 
UTILISATION OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA' S  FORESTS 
BAS LOUMAN 
Introduction 
During the 1 992 UNCED Conference in Rio de Janeiro, many organisations 
expressed their concerns for the continued existence of forests and the negative 
impact which their disappearance may have on local communities, watersheds, 
coastal areas, future development, and the global environment. The resulting 
agreements stimulated governments al l over the world to develop principles, 
criteria, and indicators of sustainable forest management as tools for the 
planning and evaluation of forestry operations. Thus evolved the Helsinki 
process in Europe and Russia, the Montreal process for North America and parts 
of the South Pacific, the Tarapoto process involving the Amazon basin countries, 
and the Lepaterique process in Central America. These processes attempt to 
standardise the definition and evaluation of sustainable forest management 
practices on a regional and national scale, leaving sufficient space for national 
adaptations of these criteria and indicators. 
During preparations for the Rio Conference, a working group was formed to 
develop a 'blueprint' for sustainable use of Papua New Guinea' s (PNG' s) forests 
(henceforth cal led the PNG Blueprint) . The working group developed a set of 
criteria and indicators of sustainabil ity of forest use in PNG. These criteria and 
indicators are based on the assumption that sustainable uti l isation requires us to : 
• understand and maintain ecological processes and functions within the 
forests; 
• maintain species and genetic diversity; 
• maintain aesthetic and cultural values; 
• ensure that resources are appropriately managed m order to provide both 
market and non-market benefits; 
• maintain the productive potential of renewable resources; and 
• contribute positively to global environmental qual ity and ecosystem 
functioning (CSIRO 1 992 : 7) .  
The requirements are sti l l  under review (Unua 1 995) .  
Parallel to these processes, the Forest Stewartship Council (FSC) also 
developed a set of principles and criteria, which are basically meant to guide the 
334 The Political Economy of Forest Management in Papua New Guinea 
process of certification of forestry operations in natural forests and plantations 
(FSC 1 995) .  So far, the FSC is the only acknowledged accreditor of certification 
processes. In 1 996, the FSC asked representatives of stakeholder groups in the 
PNG forestry sector to look at a set of international ly acceptable principles, 
criteria, and indicators for PNG's  forest use, based on the general principles and 
criteria developed by the FSC. 
The principles, criteria, and indicators are meant to assist in the evaluation 
and monitoring of current forest policies and practices . As such, they wil l  play 
an important role in determining whether such pol icies work for forests and 
people. To be able to function as intended, parameters should exist which 
describe them, and which are easily detected, recorded, and interpreted (CIFOR 
1 995) .  
This paper focusses on the biophysical parameters that can be used to 
describe the criteria and indicators of the PNG Blueprint (CSIRO 1 992). 
Parameters are understood to be the value of the indicators and/or verifiers 
which are characteristic of a population (in this case the forest ecosystem) in a 
certain condition at a specific time. An overview of commonly used parameters 
is followed by a brief discussion of what we do and do not know about these 
parameters, based on the avai labil ity of data in the environmental plans of 
forestry projects. Some suggestions are given on which parameters are easi ly 
detected, recorded, and interpreted, and on what needs to be done in the short 
term and the long term to make effective use of the PNG indicators relating to 
biophysical aspects of forest management, be it those already developed in the 
PNG Blueprint or those developed in its revision. 
Criteria and Indicators Proposed in the 'Blueprint' 
The criteria and indicators developed by the working group mentioned 
previously have been directly derived from PNG's  constitutional goals and 
d irective principles. They also take into consideration the principles of 
sustainable forest management outl ined by the International Tropical Timber 
Organisation (ITTO). The most relevant criteria and indicators for current 
purposes are: 
1 .  The general criterion of environmental quality, whose indicators are: 
• decl ining population pressure on forests; 
• improved or stable water quality and soi l condition; and 
• status of APEX indicator species . 
2 .  Arrangements to enhance conservation practices, whose relevant indicators 
are: 
• publication of a national conservation strategy that includes criteria for the 
selection of different classes of conservation areas; 
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• an increase i n  the area of  land defined as a Biosphere Reserve, World 
Heritage Area, national park or simi lar area; 
• increased data on the distribution and density of PNG flora and fauna; 
• an increase in activities which monitor the impacts of logging on forest 
systems; and 
• information on wildl ife use, including the extent of i l legal exports. 
3 .  Research efforts to assist in development of the economic, ecological, and 
social sustainabi lity of tropical rainforest use, whose relevant indicator is an 
improvement in the database on forest ecological production and socio­
economic information . 
Biophysical Parameters Relevant for Evaluating Sustainability 
Observations of scale and sampling method and design should always be 
considered in selecting the parameters to be measured in investigating whether 
the different forests in PNG maintain their environmental quality. In this 
section, I shal l discuss the importance of scale and sampling method and design 
for the interpretation of data before entering into an overview of potential 
parameters for each of the relevant criteria of the PNG Blueprint. 
The Importance of Scale 
In contrast to most of the parameters of socio-economic and pol icy criteria and 
indicators, those used to evaluate biophysical impacts can readi ly be used at 
different levels of administration . In the first instance, they may be evaluated at 
the local level, after which the results of such evaluations in different locations 
can be combined for use in the assessment of impacts on a regional, national, or 
even international level .  
It is at the local level that we col lect most or a l l  of our data. We match 
these to regional , national, or even international criteria to see whether these 
criteria are met. When they are met, we consider the environment to be 
'healthy' .  When they are not met, we try to restore the environment to a 
'healthier' state. As long as such discrepancies between the value of the 
indicators and the regional , national , or international guide values occur at the 
local level, we may be able to restore the local ecosystem. If they happen on a 
larger scale, recovery wil l  be slower (Kel ly and Harwel l  1 990), and above the 
regional level, changes may very wel l  be irreversible : the change over larger 
surfaces is greater than the sum of the changes at a local scale .  
If, for example, we clear a patch of forest for traditional farming, the values 
of the parameters commonly used to describe the forest (such as basal area) 
immediately decline. Once the garden is abandoned, however, trees wil l  grow 
back because of the seeds in the soil, resprouting of stumps, and seeds naturally 
entering the garden area from adjacent forest patches. If we do the same for an 
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area of several thousand hectares, recovery wil l  be slower. This is not only 
because the greater d istance of the source for new entries makes it harder for all 
species originally removed to re-enter the area, but also because of the changed 
micro-cl imate, with an increased exposure to sun, wind, and rainfall ,  and thus a 
less favourable environment for the establishment of new plants. 
In ideal cases, where much of the information is gathered in detail at the 
forest management unit level, scale does not influence the type of parameter we 
need to monitor, but rather changes the interpretation of the results that have 
been obtained from monitoring these parameters. 
In PNG, however, this situation does not exist, and only few data have been 
gathered that can be used for rel iable local interpretation. On a larger scale, data 
collected through remote sensing techniques and interpretation of aerial 
photographs, for example, in combination with field validation of the data, can 
wel l  be used as guidel ines for national and provincial planning purposes. The 
PNG Resoruce Information System (PNGRIS), and more recently the Forest 
Inventory Mapping System (FIMS), are based on this type of information 
(personal communication, John McAlpine, 1 997). While these are currently the 
best (and perhaps the only) available tools to assist planning at the forest 
management unit level ,  extreme care should be taken with their extrapolation to 
smaller scales, since local variations are rarely shown, and some of the 
information is based on outdated maps and photographs .  
The discussion in this paper, while recognising the importance of the 
PNGRIS and FIMS, is directed towards improving the currently existing 
database to the point where it can later be used for local- level planning, as wel l  
as to update and improve the information that forms the basis for these other 
information systems .  
Sampling 
Sampling method, intensity, and design influence the value of the data collected. 
To obtain valuable results from monitoring activities, we need to adjust the 
characteristics of sampl ing to the objectives of the monitoring activities and to 
the parameters being measured. 
In smal l-scale, local studies of easy accessible forests, random samples wil l  
give more representative results than systematic sampling, without increasing 
the costs of sampl ing due to the time that one needs to spend locating the sample 
plots . Randomness in the timing of sampling may be very effective in the 
monitoring of water qual ity near polluting plants, although a form of 
stratification may be necessary because of the seasonal ity of weather conditions .  
Sampling the vast PNG natural forest areas is a different matter. First, one 
needs to consider the different types of forest. The PNGRIS recognises over one 
hundred different types. Even then, one deals with very large areas, usual ly of 
difficult or extremely difficult access. Locating oneself in such forests is very 
difficult, thus making random sampling a lengthy exercise with almost 
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prohibitive costs . In areas that do not have the infrastructure to faci litate access, 
or at least geographic positioning, systematic sampling is common. Statistical ly, 
this would make it very difficult to calculate the sampl ing error, because the 
method does not fulfi l l  the requirements for correct calculation. In practice, 
however, the difference between systematic and random sampl ing in forest 
inventories is not sign ificant (Ferreira 1 994, cited in Carrera 1 996), so that the 
advantages of systematic sampling become determinant - less manpower is 
required, and it is easier to perform on a long-term basis because of ease of 
location, as wel l  as the usefulness of systematic designs for mapping purposes. 
Most monitoring work in forests with difficult access is systematic rather than 
random (Lamprecht 1 990). The construction of systematic, as opposed to 
random, samples places a greater demand on prior knowledge of the topography, 
hydrography, forest types, and other special characteristics of the landscape of 
the area being investigated, which themselves may have a systematic occurrence 
and need to be considered in the layout of systematic samples. 
Sample and Plot S ize 
The design of the sampl ing plots (size, shape, orientation, and so on) usual ly 
involves finding the right balance between efficiency and accuracy, and depends 
very much on the objectives of the monitoring exercise. To monitor changes in 
the forest biomass of a relatively homogeneous forest, as measured by the basal 
area, for example, many smal l (say 0.25 hectare) plots wi l l  usual ly give 
statistical ly robust data on general forest growth. Once we start measuring 
larger and/or less homogeneous forest areas, the sample size (that is, number of 
plots) or plot s ize wi l l  have to increase in relation to the statistical variation 
between the plots, expressed as a percentage of the average parameter values 
(the coefficient of variation). 
On the other hand, if we want to monitor changes in biodiversity, say by 
counting the number of d ifferent plant or animal species in a large natural forest 
area, the s ize of the plots should depend on local species-area curves. In Central 
America, for example, it was found that the species-area curves for trees became 
strongly asymptotic with plot s izes greater than one hectare: one-hectare plots 
contained about 94 percent of the species encountered in two-hectare plots . For 
forest biomass assessments in simi lar forests, using the coefficient of variance as 
the measure of variabi l ity, optimum plot sizes of 0 .6 hectares were found 
(Carrera 1 996). 
Marmi l lod ( 1 982) studied a species-rich Peruvian Amazon forest area in 
order to determine the optimum sample s ize for different parameters. The 
objective of this study was principally to compare different forest sites. He 
found that for species counts of trees from 1 0-60 centimetres diameter at breast 
height (dbh), one-hectare plots were sufficient, but for trees with a dbh greater 
than 60 centimetres, one would need at least five-hectare plots. To determine 
proper local species-area curves on which to base adequate sample size, one 
should enumerate the species in an area of fifty hectares. Synnott ( 1 980) 
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suggests that, in general, one-hectares plots are the most practical for studying 
the effects of si lvicultural treatments. 
Parameters relating to the dynamics of the forest (such as changes in 
frequency distribution per diameter class after disturbances) should be studied in 
small plots, each representing specific development stages of the forest. 
Marmi l lod ( 1 982) suggests that this should be done by studying larger areas in 
great detai l, after which the forest can be subdivided into units in different 
phases of development. These phases are determined by average height (classes 
from zero to six metres) and dbh (for species with a total height above six 
metres). Unit sizes are determined by canopy openings after tree fall .  
Marmi llod found them to  average about 200 square metres in  size. Ground 
cover for smal ler plants, and basal area and frequency per species for plants 
above six metres, should be studied in each of the recognised development units . 
Because of the dynamic nature of the humid tropical forest, and the 
presence of many phases of development in adjacent areas, it is necessary to 
establ ish plot sizes which average out the influence of individual development 
phases, if one intends to describe (changes in) the status of the forest. For the 
humid tropical forest in Peru, Marmi l lod ( 1 982) suggests that plots should be at 
least one hectare in size. With increased size in regeneration areas, however, 
plot s izes may decrease. For statistical comparison of the units in the humid 
forest, one would need at least 3-5 units of each phase per sample, resulting in 
sample sizes of 3-5 hectares. 
In general, plot size wil l  also vary according to the size of the plants to be 
investigated : for herbs plots, they may be much smal ler (four square metres is 
common), while for trees of commercial sizes, plots will have to be greater. In 
PNG forest inventories, plot sizes are usual ly 0.2 hectares for trees greater than 
40 centimetres dbh, and 0 . 1 hectares for trees from 1 0  or 20 centimetres dbh to 
40 centimetres dbh. These sizes give better statistical results, but require careful 
sampling design and layout, with a relatively dense network of sampl ing l ines, to 
ensure that the data are representative of the forests, and that the sampling error 
remains at acceptable levels .  However, forest inventories are directed at giving 
a static picture of the currently harvestable trees in the forest. Data obtained 
from such inventories in tropical countries are usual ly insufficient to determine 
the dynamics and health status of the forest. 
Marmil lod (ibid.) indicated that tree height should be added to dbh as a 
factor influencing plot size. In order to get a fair impression of the vertical 
structure of the forest, he suggests that we need a minimum of 0.25 hectares for 
plants with a total height below 1 5  metres, and two hectares for plants up to 38  
metres i n  height. 
Plot Design 
Circular plots restrict the outside influence on the plots, and restrict the area to 
be allocated as border areas or buffer zones - they have a smal ler periphery than 
rectangular plots. However, in the tropical rainforest, it is a major problem to 
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identify the exact boundaries of  circular plots. In addition, since circular plots 
usually have only one permanent mark in the centre of the plot (which is clearly 
an economic advantage), it has been difficult to relocate the plots for subsequent 
measurements . Rectangular plots with four corner marks are more easi ly 
relocated. 1 
Parameters that Indicate Environmental Quality 
For the first criterion of the PNG Blueprint, environmental qual ity, and its 
indicator of population pressure on the forest, relevant biophysical parameters 
are firstly the size, type, and class of the forest areas, and secondly those 
parameters that help to establ ish changes in the qual ity of the ecosystems, such 
as number of species (flora and fauna), distribution of these species (flora and 
fauna), size distribution per species and for all species (flora), and age 
distribution (fauna). In forest ecosystems, the quality of the system depends 
very much on the health status of the forest. The following discussion therefore 
deals in more detail with parameters that describe forest health . 
Conventional Parameters to Describe Forest Health 
In relation to forest health, McKenzie et al . ( 1 992) have briefly reviewed the tree 
parameters required to monitor forest health in their book on ecological 
indicators. Conventional indices are the correlation between tree age and size 
(height and diameter), indicating how size changes with time and how wel l  the 
forest grows. Development of basal area over time is also an important indicator 
of forest health . For even-aged forests, plotting basal area per unit area against 
time would normally give us an S-shaped growth curve up to the maturity of the 
stand, after which point in time the basal area per hectare (ba/ha) wil l  decline. A 
decl ine in ba/ha before maturity is an indication either of human intervention 
(thinning, for example) or of health problems. 
However, the forests of PNG are mainly natural, uneven-aged forests. If 
these have not yet been interfered with, they can be considered as mature forests, 
and if healthy, should not show any basal area decl ine . An increase in the ba/ha 
of such forests usual ly is an indication of past human or natural interventions. 
For this parameter, in particular, scale is important. A mature, healthy 
natural forest is a mosaic of smaller units, each of which may be in a different 
phase of development because of local and natural disturbances . If we measure 
a decl ine of the ba/ha value in one hectare, then we know something has 
happened in that hectare. Unless this is also recorded in many other parts of the 
same forest, such a decline need not ind icate an unhealthy forest. 
The conventional parameters used in forest health monitoring, as previously 
mentioned, are based on changes over time.  This may be a serious constraint to 
1 This is one of the reasons why the PNG Forest Research Institute, for example, has recently 
changed from a circular to a rectangular plot design for the continuous forest inventory in its newly 
established permanent sample plots (personal communication, Forova Oavika). 
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monitoring the forests of PNG, where we do not have the infrastructure to 
implement regular, widespread monitoring of the forest. Nor do we have 
adequate data from the past which would enable us to objectively measure the 
incidence or extent of any changes that may have occurred in the forest. 
New Tree-Based Parameters to Describe Forest Health 
New parameters developed are, for example, the amount of leaf area, tree growth 
efficiency (amount of stemwood produced per unit of foliage area), and root 
biomass (which is difficult to measure) (McKenzie et al . 1 992). 
The previously described conventional parameters used to describe forest 
health can also be used to derive parameters to describe the diversity of a forest, 
which, in itself, is an indicator of forest health (see Debinski and Brussard 
1 992). The advantage of diversity, as an indicator of forest health, is that it is an 
index, summarising the relation between two or more conventional parameters. 
Holdridge ( 1 965, cited in Lamprecht 1 990:49) developed an index of complexity 
(IC) which should be roughly constant across forests in the same ecological l ife 
zone.2 The index is particularly helpful in comparing forests of known health 
status with unknown forests whose health status has yet to be determined. 
Lamprecht warns, however, that the size of the plots used to calculate the IC is 
relatively small ,  and that the indicator multipl ies different units of measurement. 
It may, therefore, give inaccurate results (Lamprecht 1 990). 
Other parameters related to diversity are based on the concept of dominance 
- the relative space that certain species or families take up in the forest. The 
occurrence of h ighly dominant species usual ly indicates low diversity, and vice 
versa. Balslev et al . ( 1 987) followed Curtis and Mcintosh ( 1 95 1 )  in using a 
number of related indicators to determine the ecological importance of species: 
1 .  relative density (that is, number per species over total number of sample); 
2. relative dominance (that is, basal area of species over basal area of sample); 
3 .  relative frequency (that is, number of sampling units containing a species 
over the sum of all frequencies); 
4. relative diversity (that is, number of species in a family over total number of 
species); and 
5. an Importance Values Index (IVI) for each species (the sum of lndices 1 ,  2, 
and 3) and a separate index of Family Importance Values (FIV) (the sum of 
Indices 1 ,  2 for family, and 4). 
They argued that stands in which specific indicator species had the same 
ecological importance could be considered as closely positioned to each other in 
2 JC = 1 0·3 * hbds, where IC is the index of complexity, h is the mean height of the forest, b is the 
basal area of al l trees with a dbh greater than 1 0  cm, d is the number of trees measured, and s is the 
number of tree species. 
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what Curtis and Mcintosh ( ibid.) called a 'vegetation continuum ' - a series of 
vegetation units adapted to sl ightly different environmental conditions and 
without clear boundaries between them . Of the indices l isted here, ( 1  ), (3 ), and 
(4) can readi ly be used for both timber and non-timber plant species, while for 
(2) and (5), a different measure of dominance than basal area needs to be 
establ ished in order to make the indices applicable to plant species other than 
trees. For herbs, ground cover could be such a parameter. Marmil lod ' s  remarks 
on plot size are important here, since he found that the Peruvian tropical humid 
forest which he studied needs at least one hectare to develop a spatial 
distribution characteristic of the site, determining the ecological importance of 
the different forest components (Marmi l lod 1 982). In addition, the disadvantage 
of the Holdridge formula (multiplying apples and pears) also applies to this 
method. 
Other tree-based parameters to measure forest health are crown depth, 
crown diameter, and exposure of the crown to direct sunlight to determine 
(potential) vigour. In particular, the latter is relatively easi ly detected and 
recorded, and should be (Lamprecht 1 990), and has been (Hutchinson 1 993) 
incorporated into standard forest assessments. Visible signs of plant 
deterioration can also give useful information on the health of the forest, and is 
usual ly used when assessing forests for damage due to air pol lution. 
Non-Tree-Based Parameters 
S ince trees are general ly the dominant plants of the forest ecosystem, they 
feature prominently in most forest ecosystem status assessments. Yet they may 
not always be the most appropriate indicators of how healthy the environment is .  
Their disappearance always means change, usual ly for the worse, but once 
ecosystem imbalances cause forest degradation and/or deforestation on a larger, 
easi ly noticeable scale, it may be too late to intervene and restore the health of 
the ecosystem. It is therefore necessary to be able to monitor ecosystem health 
by monitoring ecosystem components that are susceptible to change. These 
could indeed be (certain species of) trees, especial ly because these are usual ly 
easy to monitor - they do not fly or run away when people approach, are usual ly 
widely distributed, and can readi ly be measured and identified. However, there 
are other reasons to avoid the use of tree species for this purpose : 
• Many spec ies of trees are quite tolerant of variations in soil and cl imatic 
conditions (for example, the range of sites in which Pometia occurs). 
• They are often exploited by people, so their abundance is l ikely to be 
influenced by human activity. 
• They have long generation times, which may postpone the recognition of 
environmental changes that have negative effects on their offspring, such as 
the genetic degradation which fol lows from cutting the best trees and leaving 
the s ick and slow-growing trees for future generations. 
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• One tree often grows through a wide range of habitats, from subsoi l  through 
soi l ,  herb layer, shrub layer, and subcanopy to canopy and, at times, 
emergence. As a result, the health of the whole tree wi l l  not always be 
affected by changes in one of these habitats. 
It is therefore imperative that we identify some other indicator species or species 
groups that are easy to monitor, have a wide distribution, and can be easi ly 
measured and identified. Debinski and Brussard ( 1 992) found that small birds 
and butterflies were useful species groups in assessing ecosystem health, through 
biodiversity assessment in a national park in the USA. In many sites covering a 
range of habitats, they only measured species occurrence, since this allowed 
them to sample more s ites per unit of time, gave them a good indication of 
qualitative differences in the species composition of the sites, and is a parameter 
whose measurements can be obtained with greater objectivity than others (such 
as the relative abundance of the species). 
Researchers from the Dutch Research Institute for Forests and Nature (IBN­
DLO) have been able to establ ish a relationship between the occurrence of a 
certain group of b ird species and other measurable characteristics of the forest, 
of which the most important were tree diameter distribution, the number of dead 
stems per hectare, the presence of different forest development phases, the 
presence of native tree species, and the development of the bush layer (Hekhuis, 
de Molenaar and Jonkers 1 994). Research undertaken in PNG, following the 
methods of Debinski and Brussard ( 1 992), could establ ish simi lar relationships. 
Whi le this would not directly help in monitoring forest activities, such 
relationships would definitely faci l itate the planning and management of forest 
use . 
The composite non-tree parameters which may be used as indirect measures 
of forest health include indicators of chemical change and the monitoring of 
associated resources (such as stream chemistry, water qual ity, soi l  conditions) 
which are influenced by forest health . In particular, the nitrogen cycle and its 
' leaks' appear to be greatly influenced by forest health, and vice versa. Ulrich 
and Bredemeier ( 1 992) indicate that one of the main driving forces beh ind 
changes in the chemical state of aerated soi l s  is  a depletion of stored soi l  
n itrogen through the leaching of  n itrate. Other cations usual ly leach out of  the 
soi l  with the nitrate, causing chemical changes that lead to impoverishment and 
acidification of the soi l .  Logging activities in the forest often increase the 
leaching of n itrate . The n itrogen status of the biomass and soi l ,  or the amount of 
n itrogen leaching out, may therefore be good indicators of forest health . The 
same authors also indicate that, in temperate forests, the ratio between the 
concentration of nutrient cations and the presence of acidic and/or phytotoxic 
species has proven to be an ecological indicator with respect to the functioning 
of the root systems. 
Ulrich and Bredemeier' s article is  of particular relevance to us because it 
shows that an ecosystem is not just a function of the current, easi ly measurable 
status of the system, but also of the processes, such as nitrogen leach ing, that 
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occur within the system . Unfortunately, we sti l l  do not know enough about the 
natural forests to come up with one or a few easily measurable parameters that 
reflect such processes. 
Parameters to Measure Water Qual ity and Soil Conditions 
Some parameters to measure water quality are turbidity, dissolved oxygen 
content, eutrofication (N and P content), and drinkabil ity (especially col iform 
content). However, the monitoring of these physico-chemical parameters of 
river qual ity may not adequately guarantee the health of the forest ecosystem . 
Biological processes and aquatic organisms also play an important role in water 
quality, and may be seen as giving an indication of the sum of the physico­
chemical components. They may also be better indicators of those temporary 
changes in water qual ity which might not occur at the time of sampling, and 
which can hardly be detected by conventional sampling methods. The size of 
certain aquatic populations, for example, may have been influenced by the 
occasional drainage of foreign matter into a river (Seager, Milne and Crane 
1 992). 
In addition, chemical concentrations may measure up to human standards, 
but may not be appl icable to water organisms, especially if they occur for long 
periods of time. Such concentrations may cause biological changes with grave 
future consequences, without being detected in analyses of the chemical 
composition of water (ibid . ) .  The same authors used a combination of 
monitoring of stress reactions of fish (gi l l  venti lation), macro-invertebrate 
community status indices, and conventional monitoring methods while 
investigating water qual ity. They found strong relationships between different 
ways of monitoring the qual ity of river water, and equally strong relationships 
between different methods appl ied in the laboratory. The incidence and 
significance of causal relationships need further study. 
For soil conditions, we need to measure parameters such as soil ferti l ity 
(content of macro- and micro-elements, carbon-nitrogen ratio, cation-exchange 
capacity, base saturation, soil acidity), soil water absorption capacity, water 
infiltration rate, erodibil ity, and erosivity (s lope gradient, length of slope, aspect 
of slope, structure and texture of soi l, and amount, distribution, and intensity of 
rainfal l) .  
APEX Indicator Species 
Of particular relevance for this indicator are data on population size, population 
distribution {spatial and per age class), movements, feeding habits, mating 
patterns and frequencies, and household size. Of these data, population 
distribution is probably the easiest to measure for non-plant species. The other 
parameters wil l  increase in uti l ity and importance with diminution in the scale to 
which monitoring is applied. It is known, for example, that many bird species 
move from one place to another as a result of changes in weather patterns and 
the related avai labi l ity of food sources. If, through the conversion of forests into 
other vegetation types, one or more food sources disappears from the chain, this 
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may mean the extinction of the bird species. The smal ler the study site, the more 
l ikely it is that the species being studied depends on food sources or breeding 
p laces outside the area of study. Restricting the study to certain parameters, 
such as species numbers within the study site, wil l not necessarily give an 
adequate picture of the sign ificance of the site for the survival of the observed 
species. 
Parameters that Indicate Arrangements to Enhance Conservation 
Practices 
For the second criterion of the PNG Blueprint, arrangements to enhance 
conservation practices, biophysical parameters are essential to determine the 
size, shape, and type of a conservation area. Such parameters would include 
data relating to the population sizes, movements, and social behaviour of 
existing species. In addition, resource inventories that record information on the 
biophysical parameters which have already been discussed in relation to the 
criterion of environmental qual ity, describing site and forest health, wil l be 
required in order to establish the value of potential conservation areas. Of 
particular relevance may be data on basal area per hectare, the size distribution 
of the tree species, the number of dead trees per hectare, species counts of small 
birds and butterflies, and changes in these parameters over time. 
To select relevant areas for the establishment of Biosphere Reserves, World 
Heritage Areas, national parks, or other conservation areas, we need data on 
biodiversity, preferably per geological or resource map unit. As wel l  as data on 
the parameters already mentioned (relative density, relative dominance, relative 
frequency, relative diversity, and Importance Value Indices) at the species level, 
data would also need to be collected on ecosystem diversity and genetic 
diversity - the origin of, and relation between, species and individuals .  
Parameters that Indicate Research Efforts to Assist Development of 
EESSTR U 
For the third criterion of the PNG Blueprint, research efforts to assist in 
development of the economic, ecological and social sustainabil ity of rainforest 
use (EESSTRU), it is the availability of values for the biophysical parameters, 
rather than the actual values themselves, which is indicative of the level of 
achievement. 
Parameters that Can be Used to Determine the Values of Other Criteria 
and Indicators of the PNG Blueprint 
A number of criteria and indicators do not directly require biophysical 
parameters for their assessment, but such parameters may sti l l  be necessary for 
the identification of forest areas and their primary functions, in order to 
formulate management plans and monitor forestry operations, and to improve 
education and training. More specifical ly, these parameters can be used to 
Biophysical Parameters for Sustainable Utilisation 345 
evaluate the impact of various activities on the forest environment, and the scope 
for continuing the same type of forest use. 
The parameters which are especially relevant for planning purposes are 
those which al low us to calculate the growth of trees as a source of timber ( dbh, 
height, volume, or basal area per hectare) or of plants which are a source of non­
timber products (for example, fruit production, fruiting frequency, latex 
production) . These parameters help us to determine the sustainable level of 
periodic harvests . Data on forest structure are also relevant - both those which 
relate to the horizontal structure (species composition, diameter distribution, and 
development class) and those which relate to vertical structure (vertical 
distribution of species and development classes). The continued occurrence of 
indicator species, or species with special commercial, cultural, rel igious, or 
aesthetic value, should also be recorded. For determination of future land and 
forest use, it is also important to record climatic data (rainfall, temperature, 
evaporation, relative humidity, and extreme weather conditions) and their 
regular and irregular changes, as wel l  as data on the soil condition in the area 
(drainage, ferti l ity, slope, and erodibil ity). For PNG, many of these data are 
currently available at the Resource Mapping Unit level within the PNGRIS.  
However, the scale at which the information i s  presented may not be adequate 
for effective use of the data in monitoring environmental impacts at the level of 
the project or management unit. 
The State of Knowledge on Relevant Parameters in PNG 
The tool for environmental management and monitoring in PNG at present is the 
environmental plan .  These plans should ideal ly provide the resource or 
environmental manager or management team with sufficient biophysical 
parameters for the purpose of comparing the situation before, during, and after 
the operations. 
Table 1 5  . 1  shows the extent to which environmental plans have done this in 
the past. It compares a selection of nine recent environmental plans of timber 
concessions, from different parts of PNG, in respect of several biophysical 
parameters whose values should be known before the commencement of tree 
harvesting operations, if the impact of the operations on the forest environment 
is to be monitored effectively. It should be noted that most of the information 
indicated as being (partial ly) avai lable in these environmental plans is in the 
form of l ists, but without any clear indication of how these lists have been 
compiled, or to what extent they actually are appl icable to the project under 
investigation. Thus 'avai labi l ity' need not imply relevance (selection of 
sampling sites) or rel iabil ity (sampling method, intensity, and size). For most 
environmental plans, these are unknown. In this respect, it would be timely to 
start formulating guidel ines for the preparation of environmental plans which not 
only indicate the required content of each plan, but also the methods of data 
collection required under different circumstances, as wel l  as the degree of 
relevance and reliability expected of the data. 
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From Table 1 5 . 1 ,  we can derive a number specific topics under which more 
data need to be collected in order to be able to use the previously mentioned 
parameters to monitor the sustainable use of PNG's  forest. 
Table 15. 1 :  Biophysical parameters that have been measured as part of nine 
recent environmental p lans for tree harvesting projects in different parts of 
PNG.3 
GENERAL FEATURES OF PLAN 
Scale of investigations 
Sample : 
method 
intensity 
size 
shape 
BIOPHYSICAL PARAMETERS 
Biomass: 
basal area/ha* 
volume/ha* 
Complexity:  
size distribution per species* 
number of species per hectare* 
number of famil ies per hectare 
species distribution 
forest typology 
age class d istribution (fauna) 
Forest health : 
forest growth: 
- height growth 
- dbh growth 
- basal area growth 
- volume growth 
leaf area 
tree growth efficiency 
root biomass 
Project: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
a 
p p p p p p p p p 
a 
p 
p 
p p p 
a a a a a a a a a 
p p p p p p p p p 
p p p p p p p p p 
3 These were environmental plans for projects in the following provinces: ( I )  East New Britain, 
(2) Oro, (3 ) Morobe, (4) Madang, (5) New Ireland, (6) Milne Bay, (7) Gulf, (8) Western, and (9) 
Milne Bay. 
Biophysical Parameters for Sustainable Utilisation 347 
Table 15.1  (continued). 
diversity: 
- relative density 
- relative dominance 
- relative frequency 
- relative diversity 
- Importance Value Index 
(potential) vigour: 
- crown depth 
- crown diameter 
- crown exposure 
visible signs of plant deterioration 
indicator species or species groups p p p p p p p p p 
N-cycle or other processes 
physico-chem. water qual . parameters* p 
biological water quality parameters 
soi l  fertil ity parameters p p p p p p p p p 
erodibi l ity parameters p p p p p p p p p 
erosivity parameters p p p p p p p p p 
APEX indicator species: 
population size 
population distribution 
population movements 
feeding habits 
mating patterns and frequencies 
household size 
Ecosystem diversity : 
ecosystem types* p p p p p p p p p 
Genetic diversity: 
origin of species 
Non timber forest products: 
presence p p p p p p p p p 
production 
Notes: a = data available� p = data partially available (often based on literature rather 
than field research); * = enough data exist elsewhere in PNG to start using these 
parameters for monitoring purposes. 
Source : PNG Department of Environment and Conservation. 
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The Scope for Using Biophysical Parameters for Monitoring 
Sustainable Utilisation of Forests in PNG 
Table 1 5 . 1  c learly shows that, although some data are avai lable to the resource 
or environmental manager, most of these are related to the existence of species 
rather than the qual ity and quantity of that existence, whi le parameters directly 
relating to forest health, APEX indicator species, genetic d iversity, non-timber 
forest products, water qual ity, and soi l  conditions are hardly touched upon at al l 
in the environmental plans currently being drawn up for forestry projects. 
This does not necessarily mean that policies aimed at maintaining or 
improving variables such as water qual ity wil l  not work. We know very well ,  
for example, how to minimise the impact of road construction on water courses, 
and can monitor this achievement by setting road construction standards, as is  
currently happening through the development of a logging code in PNG 
(PNGFA/DEC 1 995) .  Furthermore, we already know enough to be able to 
adhere to the establ ished international (general) criteria and indicators of bodies 
such as the Forest Stewardship Counci l  (FSC). 
On the other hand, it does mean that it will not be possible to establ ish 
real istic costs of non-adherence to such guidel ines, nor shal l we be able to tel l  
how much tolerance aquatic ecosystems  have for disturbances, and at what point 
irreversible damage occurs . The possible result is that governments and 
environmental agencies wi l l  put as much effort into monitoring water qual ity, 
soi l  conditions, and b iodiversity as appears to be justified by their own 
subjective perceptions of the cost of environmental degradation. This may be 
too much effort, where the actual impacts of operations are perceived to be much 
h igher than they are in reality, or too l ittle in those cases where the full  extent of 
environmental damage is not real ised . 
It is therefore imperative, if environmental management and monitoring is 
to become more effective, that serious efforts are devoted to the col lection of the 
values of at least the most relevant b iophysical parameters. For the moment, 
these wil l  have to be the more conventional parameters described earl ier, despite 
their shortcomings. The costs of this data col lection should be borne by those 
who, in the long term, wi l l  benefit most - the government, as the party primari ly 
responsible for the management of the environment, the project implementers, as 
the party responsible for the impacts and therefore l iable for future 
compensation claims, and also the local people, as those directly affected by 
potentially hazardous environmental changes. 
At the same time, studies should be in itiated in  order to investigate the 
values of the other parameters mentioned in our discussion, and their sensitiv ity 
to different forest uses and environmental changes. Such data wil l  help us to 
ach ieve a better understanding of the forest, and they can also be used to identify 
those parameters which wi l l  give us an earl ier warning of impending changes, 
other than the one which we obtain by measuring losses in forest growth and 
composition. 
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Before embarking on a biophysical parameter crusade, however, it is 
necessary to identify more accurately the parameters that can effectively 
contribute to our store of knowledge about the environment. 
Essential Biophysical Parameters 
Looking at the FSC principles and criteria (FSC 1 995), we see that those related 
to 'environmental impact' (Principle 6), 'management plans' (Principle 7), and 
'monitoring and assessment' (Principle 8) contain important biophysical 
components . Of these, Principle 6 covers the criterion of 'environmental 
qual ity' in the PNG Blueprint, adding to it guidelines for the use of chemicals 
and exotic plant and animal species. In addition, it stresses the need for 
guidel ines that aim at controll ing erosion, minimising forest damage during 
harvesting, road construction� and all other mechanical disturbances, and 
protecting water resources. Principles 7 and 8 provide guidelines for the 
planning, implementation, and monitoring of forest management. 
The Centre for International Forestry Research study mentioned in the 
introduction (CIFOR 1 995) was aimed at formulating a minimum list of criteria 
and indicators of sustainable forest use in several countries, considering their 
relevance to the local situation, their ambiguity, their reproducibil ity, and their 
ease of detection, recording, and interpretation . The preliminary result of their 
study, based on a project in Indonesia, came up with a list of three criteria - the 
resil ience of the forest ecosystem is maintained, the structure and diversity of 
forest ecosystems resembles those of the original forest, and ecosystem function 
is maintained. They also produced thirteen indicators directly related to the 
biophysical components of forest management (the principle of maintaining 
ecosystem integrity), and a number of indicators for the (sub)principle of 
' sustainable yield and qual ity of forest goods and services ' ,  with criteria which 
they listed as 'avai labi l ity of comprehensive forest management plans, effective 
implementation and control of forest management, and secure continuity of 
resource flow' ,  al l of which also require biophysical parameters for their 
assessment. 
The CIFOR criteria and indicators are directed, not so much towards 
assessment of the forest, as towards assessment of the measures taken to prevent 
damage to the forest. As such, they only require the measurement of a few 
biophysical parameters - number of species, frequency per species, 
age/development stage of trees, occurrence of specific (indicator) species, basal 
area per hectare, and canopy surface (which is a function of crown diameter and 
competition). While these criteria and indicators wil l  help to reduce the negative 
impact of harvesting on the forest ecosystem, and are based on what we already 
know of the forest and its reaction to human interference, they do not give us an 
idea of whether the forest ecosystem is actual ly maintaining itself, and whether 
our activities are sustainable. For that, we would need to investigate an 
additional range of variables relating to forest health (such as diversity and 
actual growth), as wel l  as water and soil qual ity. 
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Comparison of the FSC principles and criteria, the CIFOR study, and the 
criteria and indicators of the PNG B lueprint does not yield any biophysical 
parameters beyond those which have been listed in Table 1 5 . 1 .  Nor is it 
possible, at this stage, to strike out any of the biophysical parameters as being of 
minor relevance, because we do not have enough information to assess the 
respective roles of these parameters in forest ecosystem assessment. 
Those parameters marked with an asterisk in Table 1 5  . 1  are those for which 
records already exist in PNG (in environmental plans of mining operations, in 
some forest management plans, or from FRI studies), for some of which norms 
could be established, and which could therefore be used for monitoring purposes 
without further delay, even if additional information needs to be col lected in 
order to improve on the relevance and accuracy of these norms. Records for the 
other parameters are totally inadequate for immediate use in the monitoring and 
assessment of sustainabi lity. 
For the time being, indirect methods of assessment will need to be used, as 
when we assess the damage caused by mechanical operations, such as harvesting 
and reading, by looking at the extent to which standards and codes are being 
implemented, this postponing the assessment of the relevance and correctness of 
these standards and codes under variable local conditions unti l better data are 
available. 
Conclusions 
While many studies need to be done to improve our knowledge of the forest 
ecosystems in PNG (see Table 1 5 . 1  ), we can already use the knowledge we have 
to carry out basic monitoring programmes that meet the general criteria and 
indicators of the FSC and CIFOR, and focus on monitoring or mitigating 
measures rather than measuring impacts directly. In  these programmes, the 
PNGRIS and the FIMS can be used to classify relevant physical resource 
parameters for each forested area (such as s lope, flooding, soi l  depth, and so on) 
in terms of l ikely constraints on sustainable production (personal 
communication, John McAlpine, 1 997). This exercise can then be followed by 
an evaluation of the degree to which these factors have been taken into account 
in the forestry activities. In this process, it is necessary to keep in mind the scale 
at which the data were col lected and their reliabi l ity. Additional knowledge of 
biophysical parameters is especially relevant for the task of improving the 
current database, and for making direct assessments of the status of the forest 
ecosystem, and thus for deciding whether we have taken sufficient measures to 
mitigate the negative impacts on that ecosystem . 
The environmental plans of forestry operations, considered as depositories 
of biophysical parameters, have not served that purpose in the past. They are 
almost completely inadequate as a basis for timely assessment of actual changes 
in the forest environment. Monitoring of environmental impacts wi l l  require 
more detailed environmental plans, the costs of which should be carried by all 
potential beneficiaries. 
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In col lecting field data for the specific parameters, the objective and scale 
of the use of the parameters should be kept in m ind, and sampling method and 
design should be formulated accordingly. More specific guidel ines or standards 
for data col lection need to be developed in order to improve the usefulness of the 
environmental plans .  
In environmental p lanning and monitoring activities, special attention 
should now be paid to the production of systematic species counts of both flora 
and fauna, identifying species per habitat and species distribution. It is already 
possible to incorporate adequate physico-chemical water quality data and make a 
start with biological quality assessments, while soi l  descriptions could and 
should be given in more detail .  Finally, we ought to start looking at the 
interactions and processes that take place in the forest. 
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Postscript: Comment by John McAlpine4 
The discussion in Chapter 1 5  is based on a ' blueprint for the sustainable use of 
PNG's  forests ' ,  and an assessment of those biophysical parameters relevant to 
such use . The conversion of the PNG Blueprint to an operationally useful body 
of knowledge would entail a costly and difficult research exercise which, by its 
nature, could not produce results for a number of years. 
Given the current rate of logging and conversion of forest areas to other 
forms of land use, it is essential to develop an immediately avai lable tool to 
assess the l ikely environmental consequences of significant logging operations, 
especial ly in terms of regrowth and sustainabil ity. 
A system has been developed, using the physical resource inventory 
in(ormation held in the PNG Resource Information System (PNGRIS) to classify 
relevant physical resource parameters (such as slope, flooding, soil depth, soil 
drainage, and soil fertil ity) for each forested area, insofar as these constitute 
l ikely constraints to sustainable production. The necessary data are avai lable for 
the whole country, and the assessments, being computer based, can be rapidly 
adjusted to take account of changing intensities and practices in logging 
operations. The assessments, when l inked to the Forest Inventory Mapping 
System (see Filer, this volume), provide the National Forest Service with a 
means of indicating, to resource owners and the forest industry, the l ikely 
outcome of forestry operations in specific areas with regard to long-term 
sustainabi lity. 
At the time of writing (March 1 997), the assessment procedures are being 
extended to include biological data. In particular, these will include forest types 
in special need of preservation. The PNGRIS already contains al l of the 
Conservation Needs Assessment material developed by the Department of 
Environment and Conservation (see Alcorn and Beehler 1 993). 
Perhaps the best way to explain the use of the system is by example. The 
assessment of the physical resource parameters associated with the Gogol Val ley 
forest indicated significant areas of drainage constraint if the forest was to be 
removed - that is, the areas would no longer be part of a wel l-drained al luvial 
plain, but would become a swamp. This assessment could have alerted 
managers to the need for caution or, in the event that the forest was stil l  being 
felled, of the need for reforestation to take account of this fact in the process of 
selecting the species to be replanted. A simi lar assessment of the dry evergreen 
forests of Western Province would indicate that logging of this forest type would 
probably result in permanent conversion to grassland and loss of wildl ife habitat. 
Conversely, an assessment of the physical conditions in areas of forest growing 
on deep volcanic-alluvial plains indicates that this environment is robust, and is 
probably able to withstand intensive logging operations. 
4 Team Leader, Forest Inventory Mapping System project. 
CHAPTER 16 
GOVERNANCE, LAW, AND SOVEREIGNTY: 
ENFORCING ENVIRONMENTAL OBJECTIVES 
IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
KATHY WHIMP 
Background 
In a democratic state, environment protection objectives are achieved by 
balancing public and private interests through land and resource management 
regimes . Although the sanctity of private ownership of land is a cardinal 
principle in democratic systems (Sackvi l le and Neave 1 975 : 1 8), it is also 
accepted that the state is entitled to interfere with those private rights for the 
common good. 
A resource management regime consists of legal and pol itical relationships, 
laws, practices, and understandings shared by participants in the system, which 
allow the state to regulate the exercise of private property rights in the public 
interest. In recent times, this public interest imperative has expanded beyond the 
borders of individual nations. There is now an expectation that state stewardship 
of natural heritage wi l l  take into account the global interest in sustainable use of 
a country's  resources and maintenance of its biodiversity. As a result, regulation 
of private property rights in most Western countries has increased sign ificantly 
during the last two decades .  
Much of Papua New Guinea's land and resource management regime has 
been inherited from its former colonial administrator, Austral ia. 1 While there 
have been recent reforms in forestry, fishing, m ining, petroleum, and physical 
planning laws, the legal and social concepts which underpin the legislation are 
sti l l  founded in the system of Westminster government which Australia 
inherited, in turn, from the power which colonised it, Britain . 
Resource and Land Use Management in Australia 
In Australia (as in most developed democracies), regimes for the control of land 
and resource use have evolved over several decades. In the last decade, as 
consciousness of environmental issues in the international community has 
increased, there has been growing pressure on all countries to ensure that 
1 The Constitution provides that the underlying law of Papua New Guinea (PNG) is based on the 
English common law as it was on the date of Independence. However, in practice, many of the 
statutes stil l  in force in PNG were based on Queensland and Commonwealth statutes which were 
used as models for pre-independence ordinances and some post-independence laws. 
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resources are used responsibly. The Australian land and resource management 
regime is now a relatively complex scheme of laws and administrative 
arrangements incorporating the following elements : 
• land use p lanning at state and local government levels, with enforcement 
through zoning and development permiss ion requirements; 
• processes for p lanning the use of Crown (government-owned) land; 
• environmental impact assessment at state and federal levels for major 
projects; 
• works approval and emission l icensing at state level ;  
• industry codes and emiss ion standards at state and federal levels; 
• catchment management for important catchments such as the Murray-Darling 
Basin, and sensitive environments such as coastal areas and the Great Barrier 
Reef; 
• water use management, including regulation of riparian rights; 
• government ownership of subsurface minerals and petroleum, and l icensing 
of exploration and extraction; 
• government ownership of a large proportion of natural forest, and control of 
harvesting through planning, l icensing, and codes of practice; 
• protection of natural and cultural heritage, including Aboriginal heritage; 
• protection of b iodiversity through control of native vegetation clearance, and 
regulating dealings with endangered species; and 
• establ ishment of reserves and control of activities within reserves. 
Over the past two decades, Austral ian state and federal governments have 
sought to better integrate planning, development, and environmental · approval 
mechanisms. Nevertheless, there are many different rules which substantial ly 
restrict the use of private land, and detai led procedures for obtaining approval 
for activities as simple as bui ld ing a garden shed on a suburban block. These 
rules are generally followed, despite the relatively small amount of enforcement 
activity. In other words, there is a general acceptance in the community of the 
state' s  right to interfere in private land use in this way. 
Land Use and Resource Management in Papua New Guinea 
A large number of laws comprise the Papua New Guinea (PNG) land 
management regime. They can be loosely categorised under the following 
policy areas: 
• disposition and use of land (Land Act and associated legislation, Physical 
Planning Act); 
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• regulation of the use of particular resources (Mining Act and associated 
legislation, Petroleum Act and associated legislation, Forestry Act, Crocodile 
Trade Protection Act, and Fisheries Act); 
• regulation or protection of the use of the environment generally ( Water 
Resources Act, Environmental Planning Act, Environmental Contaminants 
Act, Prevention of Pollution of the Sea Act, Dumping of Wastes at Sea Act, 
Public Health Act, Quarantine Act, Animal Disease and Control Act, and 
Plant Disease and Control Act); and 
• conservation of particular environmental resources or specific areas (Fauna 
(Protection and Control) Act, National Parks Act, and Conservation Areas 
Act). 
Whi le PNG has many of the same laws as those which form the basis of the 
Australian land and resource management regime, they are not nearly so wel l  
entrenched. Many development activities in both urban and rural areas appear to 
ignore planning, development approval, and environmental control 
requirements, and there is virtual ly no enforcement activity. As Taylor notes 
elsewhere in this volume, the state has failed, at least in the forestry sector, to 
impose its reform agenda on dissenting customary landowners . The community 
in PNG appears general ly to accept the legitimacy of protests, often violent, by 
which landowners regularly defy the wishes of the state in relation to the use of 
their land. 
This paper suggests that PNG' s  land use history forms a large part of the 
explanation for the state ' s  failure to achieve its conservation objectives. Land 
use and resource management laws in PNG have been drawn from a very 
different social context in which the role of the state is wel l  establ ished. In 
particular, they fail to properly accommodate the very different nature of 
customary land ownership. The ineffectiveness of these laws is compounded by 
the relative incapacity of the state to assert its wil l  through conventional 
bureaucratic means. These observations have relevance for any future efforts to 
secure a priority for protection of the environment in the development of PNG's  
rich and largely undeveloped natural heritage. 
The Role of the State in Resource and Land Use Management 
Australian land and resource management laws are based on the English system 
of property law, which was incorporated into the law of the Australian colonies 
at settlement. Since the Norman conquest, it has been a basic tenet of Engl ish 
property law that the Crown (the state) is the ultimate owner of al l land within 
the geographic boundaries of any nation over which it is sovereign. Subjects of 
the Crown (state) hold their title to land as tenants, but they do not own the 
physical substance of the land; rather they own a bundle of rights known as an 
'estate ' ,  which itself comprises a property right. In the case of an estate in fee 
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simple (the primary land estate under English law), the ownership is for all 
practical purposes the same as ownership of the land itself.2 
The underlying ownership - the Crown' s  radical title - provides the basis 
for the state' s  alienation of interests in the land, for example by compulsory 
acquisition, by reservation of sub-surface rights to the Crown, or by 
extinguishment through subsequent grants of other titles, in the case of the 
original native title of original inhabitants. 
The sovereignty of the state over the land within its domain provided the 
historical basis for state intervention in land and resource management. 
Originally, the state took on the role of adjudicating disputes between 
landowners arising from activities conducted by one landowner which affected 
another 's  enjoyment of her or his land. Gradually, statutory control of land use 
activities in the public interest has replaced the more parochial interests 
protected by common law actions for negligence.3 
The state is itself also a landowner with significant power. Much of 
Australia is sti l l  Crown land, leased for specific uses to pastoralists, farmers, and 
m iners. Resources beneath the surface of privately owned land have generally 
been treated as publ ic property. The state l icenses the extraction of these 
resources in return for a resource rent usual ly known as a ' royalty' . Water is 
also treated as a publicly-owned resource, subject to the riparian rights of 
riverside landowners (Bates 1 992 : 1 54 ). 
In PNG, land has a very different character. Ownership is defined 
according to custom, which may differ from group to group, and disputes about 
land ownership can be the cause of ongoing conflict between different tribal 
groups .  James ( 1 985 : 1 83)  describes traditional land laws as being concerned 
partly with defining and maintaining the rights of group members, and partly 
with working out the relationship of the landowning group and outsiders .  Land 
ownership transcends the purely legal and economic arrangements which 
characterise Western relations with land. According to Burton-Bradley, land in 
PNG is, at a psychological level ,  ' an extension of the concept of self (cited in 
James, ibid.) .  
The prominence of the social, rather than the economic, significan�e of land 
is also emphasised by Power ( 1 994 :3), who argues that landholding groups form 
the basic social unit across PNG. His views are given weight by the findings of 
the Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters (PNGDOL 1 974), on whose · 
recommendations the Land Groups Incorporation Act was based. The Fifth 
National Goal set out in the Preamble to the Constitution cal ls for the 
2 Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] [ 1 99 1 -92] 1 75 CLR 1 at page 80, judgement of Justices Deane and 
Gaudron. 
3 Note, however, that the common law does not only protect private interests. The law of public 
nuisance aims to maintain a balance between competing interests in land use and development 
(Bates 1 992 :37). 
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maintenance of  traditional vi l lages and communities as viable units of  the 
national society. Unl ike many other colonies in Africa or Central and South 
America, colonisation generally did not disturb traditional tenure. Customary 
land sti l l  accounts for over 97 percent of PNG's  land mass . 
Customary Ownership and State Sovereignty 
State sovereignty is a social and political artefact of modern society, as wel l  as a 
legal one.  Owners of private property in Western countries have, for a long 
time, accepted the ' imagined communities' (Anderson 1 99 1 )  of which they are 
members, and the role of the state in arbitrating conflicts between individuals 
and exerting its power over private citizens. 
In contrast, customary society is stateless; it cannot be described as a single, 
unified body pol itic (Berndt and Lawrence 1 97 1  : 3 ). Rather, individual groups 
see themselves as sovereign in their own right. Traditional socio-pol itical 
systems in PNG continue to function and regulate most aspects of everyday l ife, 
and indeed exert considerable influence in national life (ibid:27-9). Many 
vi llagers probably find it difficult to accord any legitimacy to the new 
institutions of the state, particularly if it has l ittle impact other than the 
intermittent provis ion of goods and services. In these circumstances, it is 
difficult for the state to find a basis on which to establish its right to interfere in 
the exercise of customary land rights. 
Indeed, the h istory of state intervention in PNG may give many landowners 
cause to doubt whether the state is real ly acting in their interests (see 
Holzknecht, this volume). The pre-Independence administration afforded l ittle 
opportunity for customary landowners to participate in economic exploitation of 
their land. 
Under the 1 973 Forestry Act and its predecessor, the Forestry Ordinance, 
the state purchased the right to harvest timber from landowners for a minor 
proportion of the royalties to be paid by the harvester. Even in 1 976, the now 
independent state continued to presume its entitlement to receive most of the 
resource rent from forestry by legislating to transfer timber royalties to 
provincial governments.4 
Early mining agreements made provision for payment of compensation to 
landowners, but only for disturbance to subsistence activities and for occupation 
of land. Water resources legislation sti l l  forms the main legal avenue to pursue 
claims for compensation for environmental damage from mining.s Unti l  
4 See the Organic Law on Provincial Government, Section 67. 
5 Section 1 6  of the Water Resources Act empowers the Minister to determine compensation 
payments for deprivation of the use and enjoyment of land or water rights and damage to the 
surface of land, in consequence of the exercise of rights under a water use permit. This provision 
originates from provisions in Australian legislation under which landowners affected by mining 
can seek compensation for the disturbance to their enjoyment of land. It is suggested here that they 
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recently, mining agreements general ly did not provide for landowners to share 
the royalty payments received by government for the minerals extracted 
(Connel l  1 992:3 7). Unti l  1 989, landowners had no direct role in the negotiation 
of major resource development projects (Jackson 1 99 1 : 1 9) .  
The national government' s  failure to adequately respond to landowners' 
demands for a share of the wealth of their land erupted in civil unrest in 
Bougainvi l le in late 1 988 .  Its inabi lity to resolve the resulting seven-year 
conflict demonstrates the fragi l ity of the state' s  grip on the maintenance of a 
unified polity. S ince the mid- l 980s, landowners have increasing challenged the 
state to accord them a greater role in resource development projects and to 
renegotiate revenue and compensation packages in their favour (see Simpson, 
this volume). The state has proved itself unable or unwil l ing to quel l  violent 
social protests over resource developments, particularly at the frontiers of 
capitalist penetration where these projects are located. 
A key issue in landowner disputes with the national government is the 
contest over ownership of natural resources. The newly-formed state based its 
right to receive the bulk of resource rent on its assertion of ownership of natural 
resources. As already noted, it even treated timber in this way, probably because 
forestry legislation had bl indly followed the pre-Independence Australian model .  
Calls for the government to  return natural resources to  their rightful owners have 
increased along with landowner demands for increased revenue returns from 
resource exploitation. A prominent Papua New Guinean lawyer, Peter Donigi (a 
former President of the Law Society), has argued forcefully that the alienation of 
subsurface minerals to the state in PNG is unconstitutional (Donigi 1 994) . 
Speakers at a conference on constitutional issues in early 1 996, including a 
former ministerial aide, echoed his views (Post-Courier, 6 January 1 996). The 
issue here is not to decide whether they are correct, but rather to show that 
challenges to the state' s power of interference in private property rights 
increasingly come from those quarters where the state would general ly expect to 
find support for its position. 
Papua New Guineans now increas ingly question whether the state is acting 
on behalf of the people (Wolfers 1 992 :253) and whether it has any legitimate 
claim to share in the economic benefits of resource development (Parkop 
1 995 : 1 1 8) .  In the face of growing and substantial opposition, the question of 
how the state can enforce its will over its citizens, particularly in remote areas, 
becomes critical .  In Western countries, where the role of the state is accepted, 
this question does not even arise. 
were never intended to provide an avenue for multi-mil lion dol lar claims of the kind now made 
under the Water Resources Act. 
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Conservation and Development on Customary Land under Existing 
Laws 
Controls on development are unlikely to be achieved without state intervention. 
While local interests may be adequately protected at the local level with proper 
gdvice (see Taylor, this volume}, it is unlikely that other interests (including 
those of residents in affected catchments, as wel l  as the national and global 
interests) wil l  be properly protected unless the state intervenes . Furthermore, 
conservation objectives generally fare poorly when offered as alternatives to 
development, because they do not offer an obvious immediate economic benefit 
to the local area. It is unlikely that conservation will be achieved unless the state 
promotes or enforces it. 
State intervention might promote environmental protection objectives in 
two ways. Firstly, it might set aside areas to be protected from development, or 
in which only certain kinds of development might occur. Secondly, it m ight 
secure conditions for development which ensure that the environment is 
adequately protected to whatever extent can be reasonably achieved, and which 
prevent risky developments from proceeding. 
Protected Areas 
PNG has three laws which might provide a basis for establ ishing protected areas 
for conservation purposes. The National Parks Act provides for the 
establishment of conventional state-managed reserves . Parks can only be 
established on al ienated (non-customary) land, and it is in any case an 
inappropriate model for conservation on customary land because it offers no role 
for traditional owners in management decision making. 
The Fauna (Protection and Control) Act allows the establ ishment of 
local ly-managed Wild l ife Management Areas (WMAs ), and has been 
successful ly implemented in a number of areas. However, its purposes and 
limitations are not wel l  understood. Activities within a WMA can be control led 
only for the purpose of protecting fauna in the area. The Act has a strong focus 
on local management, and enforcement powers under the Act are weak; the 
maximum penalty for breaching a WMA rule is K20 (Section 1 7(5)) .  
The Conservation Areas Act, enacted in 1 978, is a more likely vehicle for 
the establishment of significant protected areas on customary land. However, it 
has never been implemented, and there are a number of potential problems with 
its implementation which have not been ful ly explored. 
To begin with, the Act is framed on the assumption that local landowners 
wil l  seek a means to control and regulate development in their area. 
Conservation Areas are established under the control of a ministerially­
appointed local Management Committee. There is no provision for the state to 
set up a Conservation Area without local consent and active participation. In 
l ight of the foregoing discussion, this may be appropriate, since it is unl ikely that 
the state could force a Conservation Area into existence against the wishes of 
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landowners. However, it offers l ittle comfort where an environmental resource 
of national or global significance is threatened and local landowners do not share 
the state' s  concerns about its preservation. 
Secondly, considerable resources are needed to establ ish the infrastructure 
which is necessary to manage a Conservation Area under the model envisaged 
by the Act. The boundaries of the area must be surveyed. A committee of 
management must be selected. The committee manages in accordance with a 
Management Plan developed by them and approved by the Minister. Local 
landowners must be mobil ised to understand the kinds of decisions involved in 
drawing up a management plan, and to make those decisions in an informed 
way. Their capacity to manage the area on an ongoing basis must be developed. 
Third ly, the establishment of a body that is recognised by the state, and 
which has the power to control activ ities on customary land, is fraught with 
problems at a local political level .  The powers of the Management Committee 
are l ikely to bring it into conflict with incorporated land groups, landowner 
companies, and local government in the area. It is not clear how these conflicts 
can be avoided or resolved, and they have the potential to deflect energy away 
from the business of managing outside development pressures and inwards on 
the local community. This has already been the experience of landowner 
companies in some parts of PNG. 
Finally, the Act gives the Minister power to override the Management Plan .  
As is usual in  PNG legislation, the Act does not specify any constraints on the 
Minister' s powers. It would seem to be impl icit that the Minister should only 
exercise this power in the public interest, but fears have been expressed that he 
may be compel led to exercise his powers for much less significant reasons .  In 
these circumstances, the local Management Committee would be powerless. 
Environmental Approvals for Development 
In the case of most development activities, approvals are required under more 
than one regulatory system. These systems have quite different objectives .  
Mining, forestry, and fisheries projects require approval under industry-specific 
legislation aimed at ensuring the sustainable use of the resource and providing a 
mechanism for the state to col lect resource rent based on the volume of resource 
extracted.  Agricultural projects, however, are not subject to any kind of 
industry-specific approval as there is no l icensing scheme for this kind of 
project. 
More general approval is required under planning and environmental laws. 
Development activities within town areas (generally industrial development) 
require planning approval, broadly intended to preserve the amenity of urban 
areas and prevent publ ic health risks. Outside urban (physical planning) areas, 
no plann ing approval is required. 
In addition to planning approval, environmental approvals are required 
under the Environmental Planning Act for projects of a kind for which 
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guidelines have been issued.6 The Act establ ishes a comprehensive procedure 
for public scrutiny of environmental plans, and decisions by the National 
Executive Counci l  (Cabinet) as to whether or not a project should go ahead. 
This procedure has never been formally invoked, apparently because it is 
considered too time-consuming and costly.7 Instead, use is made of a 'fast-track 
mechanism ' which culminates in ministerial approval . Environmental plans 
(particularly for forestry and controversial agricultural projects) are regularly 
lodged after pol itical approval for the project has already been given, and 
sometimes after work at the site has already begun. 
The Environmental Contaminants Act requires the l icensing of all 
discharge, deposit, or emission of environmental contaminants . In 1 988, 
regulations were passed to enable pesticide use to be l icensed, but no other types 
of contaminants are currently subject to l icensing. Despite cross-referencing 
between this Act and the Environmental Planning Act, suggesting that projects 
with approved environmental plans sti l l  require a contaminants l icence, 
contaminants l icences are not issued in these circumstances. 
Lack of a National Planning Framework 
In modern states, land use decisions - concerning the establishment of protected 
areas and the conditions under which development wil l  be allowed to occur - are 
usually taken in the context of a wider range of issues than those which bear 
directly on the area or development in question . Planning (the process by which 
these wider issues are systematically considered as part of decision making) is 
therefore central to effective management of natural resources. Notwithstanding 
the plethora of legislation which offers avenues for environmental protection, 
PNG lacks a framework for integrated and comprehensive land and resource 
management planning. 
There is no centralised land use planning in PNG outside town areas 
declared as physical planning areas under the Physical Planning Act. Instead, 
sector-by-sector planning results in ad hoe outcomes. The Kikori Basin area in 
Gulf Province provides a case in point. During late 1 994, a number of interest 
groups sought to establish priority for different land uses in the area. These 
included conservation interests as wel l  as prospective forestry and agricultural 
developers. It was suspected that the agricultural proposal (for establishment of 
a large oil palm plantation) represented a backdoor means to clear-fell ing the 
valuable timber resource . In the absence of a structured mechanism to resolve 
these competing claims, the National Forest Authority succeeded in quarantining 
the area from other development options by signing up landowners in the area to 
6 So far, only guidelines for selective logging projects have been issued, and they have not yet 
been enforced in relation to environmental plans lodged for the same projects. 
7 In at least one recent large mining project, the proponent insisted that the ful l  public scrutiny 
procedure should be followed, even though the environmental p lan had not been formally 
requisitioned. 
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a Forest Management Agreement. By ' getting in first ' ,  it prevented the other 
land use proposals from proceeding. 8 
Integrated p lanning requires a multi-disciplinary and multi-sectoral 
approach to be effective. Generally, legislation wil l  prescribe a process where 
different agencies of government contribute to the decision-making process and 
some, safeguarding particularly important interests, may be given the right to 
veto a project. Fi ler and Taylor have described the process for preparation of the 
National Forest Plan elsewhere in this volume. At the time of writing, a 
National Forest Plan had finally been prepared under threat of invalidation of 
newly issued timber permits . Although it involved consultation with provincial 
governments, it is not at all c lear that the interests of other sectors were properly 
taken into account. So long as planning sti l l  occurs only at a single-agency 
level, it is not surprising that there wil l  continue to be conflicts over land use, 
and the outcome of these conflicts wil l  be resolved in the pol itical arena rather 
than through more del iberative and inclusive pol icy processes. 
Enforcement of Development Controls 
The enforcement of development controls, especially l icence and permit 
conditions and environmental approvals, increasingly brings the state into 
competition with landowners and developers. Sometimes landowners request 
assistance from the state to enforce conditions; sometimes they are all ied with 
the developer in seeking to undermine them. In either case, the state ' s  inabi lity 
to enforce the regulations it has laid down undermines its capacity to do so in the 
future . 
The reasons for poor enforcement are complex and interrelated. To begin 
with, the bureaucracy has l ittle or no experience of prosecuting regulatory 
offences. There is no pre-Independence legacy of knowledge about how to 
prosecute for breach of environmental plan conditions .  Indeed, the state appears 
to have some difficulty securing convictions in relation to criminal matters, in 
relation to which it has considerable experience. Problems with prosecutions 
include lack of adequate records to establish proof of facts on which the 
conviction would be based, lack of expert evidence, and lack of detail in the 
legislation about how, by whom, and in what court prosecutions should be 
commenced. 
Regulatory systems are also inadequately entrenched. Inadequate 
monitoring, poor record keeping, tolerance of breaches, and confusion about 
what the conditions actually are have contributed to bureaucratic inertia, so that 
it is difficult to determine which breaches are most serious, and whom to 
prosecute first. Much of the administrative resource available is absorbed in 
maintenance of the regulatory system itself - answering correspondence from 
8 Under the 1 99 1  Forestry Act, clear-felling cannot take place inside a Forest Management 
Agreement area, so the agricultural project was effectively prevented. Arguments stil l  continue 
about whether conservation objectives can be achieved concurrently with timber extraction. 
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approval holders and reviewing new appl ications for approval - rather than in 
monitoring and enforcement activities. 
Enforcement in most regulatory systems depends largely on the wil lingness 
of those to whom laws app ly to obey those laws. In the case of large 
multinational foreign companies, there are usually considerable persuasive 
influences for them to submit to the regulatory system. The risk of adverse 
publ icity outside PNG is too great to engage in outright disobedience of 
environmental conditions. 
However, where the rules of behaviour are i l l-defined or ambiguous, there 
is often room for manoeuvre or renegotiation of the conditions of environmental 
approval . In the case of companies which are not vulnerable to publ ic censure at 
home, confusion and overlap between different development approvals can 
provide large loopholes. Conflicts between the conditions of a logging permit 
and those of the environmental p lan approval relating to the width of riparian 
buffers, for example, provide a company with a basis for defending an incursion 
into a buffer specified in an environmental plan approval. Officials sometime 
purport to relax conditions of ministerial approvals by letter, and companies rely 
upon these to justify non-compliance. While the government may wel l  succeed 
in any action to enforce those conditions (on the basis that the official acted 
outside his power), the company only needs to arm itself with the basis for a 
half-credible argument justifying their default in order to fend off local criticism. 
If the threat of prosecution for non-compliance were a real one, permit­
holders and approval-holders might take more care to ensure that they were 
legally, and not just apparently, acting in compliance with conditions. But, as 
there has never been a successful prosecution under the Environmental Planning 
Act, they can assume that they are unlike ly to be prosecuted as long as the breach 
is not outrageously flagrant. 
Political Forces 
A discussion of policy processes in PNG would not be complete without 
mention of the pol itical activity which characterises many pol icy decisions. It is 
incorrect to suggest that the socio-pol itical processes by which controversial 
land use decisions are made in PNG are not consensual . In many respects, those 
'at the grass roots level ' have a greater say in pol itical decision making than do 
ordinary community members in many other countries. 
However, the processes by which the views of some, and not others, 
achieve recognition in the pol itical process serves to . i l lustrate the lack of power 
of the state in ensuring that its own interests ( in safeguarding the long-term 
national interest) are represented. The continued influence of traditional 
political forces - the power of the big men and their abil ity to manipulate 
decision making in order to promote the economic and social advancement of 
their l ine - appear to weaken the power of the state to advance the interests of 
the nation general ly. 
364 The Political Economy of Forest Management in Papua New Guinea 
Alternatives to Command and Control 
Lar-.k of bureaucratic infrastructure, the absence of pol icy cohesiveness which 
would lend strategic purpose to environmental decision making, and 
vulnerabi lity to the political wi l l  of landowners combine to weaken the power of 
the state to impose its wi l l  by force in the face of opposition. 
In these circumstances, what options are open to the state to assert national 
and global interests in environmental protection objectives? Both Taylor and 
Simpson (this volume) have suggested that negotiated, contract-based outcomes 
are a more v iable alternative to the imposition of regulatory mechanisms by the 
state . However, as Wolfers ( 1 992 :243) has observed, conflict is  often the only 
means by which some people can make themselves heard. Even if negotiated 
outcomes are reached, there can be no certainty that they wil l  be sustainable. 
Where restrictions on development wil l  result in reduced income to the local 
area, there wil l  always be ongoing pressure to renegotiate another, more 
favourable outcome. 
The proposal that agreements about policy objectives should be enforced by 
contract raises interesting questions about the capacity of the state to enforce 
contracts entered into with groups of landowners. Legal conflict in 
contemporary Western legal systems is highly individual ised (Black 1 989). In 
general, the law refuses to deal with groups of people unless they have formal ly 
adopted an incorporated structure such as a partnership, association or company. 
Once that structure has been adopted, the law treats the structure as having the 
legal personality of an individual for the purpose of involving it in legal 
decisions. Decisions are binding on members of the incorporated group, but 
only so far as they are members . 
An issue which reverberates through al l resource development projects on 
customary land is the means by which the true wishes of landowners should be 
ascertained. On the one hand, principles of self-determination suggest that 
landowners should be able to decide that for themselves. On the other hand, an 
agreement entered into today by landowner representatives might tomorrow be 
challenged as being unrepresentative of the true wishes of the people. Such an 
uncertain foundation provides no basis for the investment of capital in a project 
- whether it involves conservation or exploitation. 
S ince it is unlike ly that all landowners will agree, how should the conflicts 
be interpreted by outsiders? It is not clear that Western notions of democracy 
are appropriate yardsticks of 'proper' and 'fair' decision making, nor that the 
complaints of some members of the group about the outcome are any indication 
that the decision-making process was improper. In the final analysis, the state is 
probably unable to make the judgement that a decision-making process 
undertaken by a landowner group has taken place within customary confines. 
It may be that some requirement for a formal structure with accountabi l ity 
outside its membership (as wel l  as internal ly) is the only means by which the 
state can assure itself that its deal ings are with a legal entity which represents all 
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landowners. The cloak of incorpm ation demanded by the Western legal system 
then provides the state with some protection against the conflicts thrown up by 
dissenting members, who can be directed back to the representative structure to 
resolve these issues. 
Whi le the incorporated structure wi l l  provide some certainty for outsiders 
deal ing with a representative body, it provides no guarantee that the membership 
is representative or that decis ions have been taken in a manner which reflects 
custom. Setting guidel ines for incorporated bodies (Whimp 1 995) may provide 
some safeguards, but it also risks an outside intervention with custom which is 
more harmful than helpful .  
Enforcement of Contractual Obligations 
In the final analysis, the existence of an incorporated body, or a contract to 
which it is a party, is no guarantee that the agreement reached wil l  be honoured 
by the members of a customary group. Enforcement of contracts poses the same 
problems as enforcement of laws. Is there any reason to suppose that voluntary 
compl iance wi l l  be greater where the desired outcomes have been negotiated 
rather than imposed? 
The foregoing discussion has focussed particularly on the powerlessness of 
the state to impose its wi l l .  However, pol itical theories also emphasise the 
concept of exchange in social relations, drawing paral lels with contracts and 
agreements which form an essential part of the exchange model of economics, 
and positioning the concept of exchange as diametrical ly opposed to the concept 
of power (Hyden 1 992 :9) . While power involves the probabi l ity that the wi l l  of 
one person wi l l  prevai l  over the wi l l  of others, exchange assumes a relationship 
in which the actors are on an equal footing. 
Taylor' s proposal (this volume) that resource development outcomes be 
secured by contract with local landowners fits squarely within this theoretical 
framework. Instead of occupying an authoritarian position in relation to the 
local community, the state descends into the arena and assumes a position equal 
to that of landowners, and then bargains an outcome in which al l are winners and 
there are no losers . 
In a forestry project, it would at first blush appear to be a relatively simple 
matter to achieve a situation in which all parties are winners. The state takes a 
revenue cut and secures undertakings about the way logging wi l l  be carried out, 
whi le the landowners receive cash benefits from real ising the economic potential 
of their forest. 
However, the position is compl icated when one considers the amorphous 
nature of the body pol itic which represents the landowners as one party to the 
agreement. In order for a forestry project to be undertaken in a sustainable but 
economical ly v iable manner, it is usual ly considered necessary to guarantee a 
wood flow over a long period of time. Wi l l  landowners who have long since 
received immediate cash benefits from the trees on their land (or their chi ldren) 
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continue to honour their obl igation to permit the project to operate unimpeded, 
when they continue to suffer the environmental effects and social disruption it 
causes? 
It is l ike ly that ongoing compl iance with contract obligations wil l  ultimately 
depend more on the relations between landowners and government than it does 
on maintain ing a situation in which landowners continue to perceive that the 
greater benefits l ie in adhering to the terms of the contract. Hyden ' s theory of 
governance in developing states proposes that the intermediate concepts of 
authority and rec iprocity provides a fruitful way to examine the interaction of 
state and society, whi le sti l l  drawing on classic ideas about power and exchange. 
He suggests that the improvement of pol itical conditions in developing countries 
is to be sought in the realm of governance - the way in which government and 
the governed relate to each other. 
At the core of Hyden ' s concept of governance, relations between state and 
society are characterised by reciprocity. Reciprocity is an ongoing relationship, 
whereas exchange is d iscrete and immediate . In a reciprocal relationship, each 
contributes to the welfare of others with an expectation that the others will do 
likewise (Hyden 1 992). To establ ish a reciprocal relationship, actors must share 
a fundamental understanding about the unwritten norms on which their 
expectations of each others ' behaviour are based .  Such a relationship has much 
in common with the horizontal relationships in society - reciprocity is the 
predominant social logic in poor communities, where people must rely upon 
each other for survival (Hyden 1 990). 
The concept of rec iprocity provides a way of understanding how the state in 
PNG might exercise a form of authority over the behaviour of its citizens which 
is not based on force. However, as previously noted, there appears to be a 
decline in the political authority of the state in PNG, marked by an increase in 
citizen non-compl iance with the government 's  laws and policies. The failure of 
the state ' s  authority suggests that it has already breached the fundamental 
conditions of the reciprocal relationship.  As Bratton and Rothchi ld ( 1 992 :272) 
observe in relation to Africa, political leaders entered into a social compact with 
the ir fol lowers at the time of independence. In return for obedience, they 
promised an increase in mass l iving standards. Instead, elites violated 
reciprocal norms by taking arbitrary decisions, by failing to deliver goods and 
services, and by diverting public resources to private ends .  The response of 
citizens was non-compl iance, first by disengaging and retreating into informal 
activities, and then by re-engaging in pol itical dialogue through social protest. 
If the state has already violated the norms of its relationship with its 
citizens, can there be any basis for assuming that a contract-based agreement is 
more l ikely to be obeyed than a law? Perhaps, finally, the effectiveness of a 
contract in securing environmental protection objectives is more l ikely to rest on 
the abi l ity of the state to call to account outside parties, such as logging 
contractors, who rely on the contract to justify their own activities. Foreign 
companies are compel led by different forces to abide by the authority of the 
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state, even when there is widespread civ i lian non-compliance. U ltimately, it is 
these companies which provide resource owners with access to the means of 
economic exploitation - capital, equipment, technical knowledge, and access to 
overseas markets. Regulation of their activities may be a far more effective way 
of enforcing the state' s  interest in a contract. 
Conclusion 
In summary, it is apparent that the reasons for lack of state authority in PNG are 
structural and fundamental . The state wil l  not increase its abi lity to impose its 
wil l on citizens overnight, by appointing more pol ice officers or reorganising 
departmental structures. Rather, a much longer process of development is 
required in which citizens come to accept the legitimacy of the state and its right 
to control various aspects of the way they l ive. Indeed, the major issue may be 
to ensure that the state does in fact pursue that path, instead of short-term 
strategies which may have the effect of widening the gulf between state and 
society, and ultimately hastening the breakdown of democratic institutions. 
Central to this pursuit is the state' s  recognition that its authority rests on the wil l  
of its people. 
The preceding discussion has perhaps not done justice to Taylor' s proposals 
about the role of the state as a stakeholder in negotiated outcomes for forestry 
projects .  His suggestion that the state should offer extension services to ensure 
that landowners are sufficiently organised and informed to engage in a 
negotiation process might be said to offer only a new form of patronage or 
paternalism rather than a bargain ing process between equal participants. On the 
other hand, the restoration of reciprocal relations between the state and its 
citizens seems to be implicit in his argument. 
At a practical level, the lessening of the state' s  reach into civil society has 
diminished both its abi l ity to act responsively to the needs of citizens and its 
relevance in their l ives. By re-engaging with its citizens through active 
involvement in a process of identifying and securing specific objectives through 
overt agreement, the state may succeed in regaining the ground it has apparently 
lost. In this way, it m ight legitimate its role in safeguarding larger national 
interests, and secure the consent of its citizens to govern them accordingly. 
CHAPTER 1 7  
PRO BONO PUBLICO? 
CONSERVATION AND APPROPRIATE RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA* 
HARTMUT HOLZKNECHT 
Introduction 
The title of this chapter - Pro Bono Publico? ( 'For the Publ ic Good?' )  - is 
intended to indicate that a focus on conservation and related matters necessarily 
has to be seen within the broader context of resource management, because 
conservation is only one of a number of val id resource management strategies. 
Given the inherent customary resource tenure and resource use systems 
actively in place over almost all land and other resources in Papua New Guinea 
(PNG) (Crocombe and Hide 1 987; Ward 1 997), such resource management must 
necessarily be activated by, and active at, the community level .  Because of this, 
it must also be related specifically to a particular community or resource owner 
grouping. Such a context must be pro bona publico, for the public good, and yet 
questions inevitably arise concerning the levels at which such 'public good ' 
should be defined and sought. Should it only be at the level of the resource 
owner and the resource owner group, or are there other levels at which this 
' publ ic good' may claim equal priority? Discussion will return to this question . 
This chapter has been guided by several assumptions about PNG societies 
and their members' general attitudes to, and exploitation of, natural resources .  
Some of these assumptions have necessari ly had to be general ised for this 
presentation, so that there may be some specific cases which do not conform to 
all of them. Nevertheless, I bel ieve they have a broad val idity. 
Assumption One is that the current customary resource tenure and use 
systems, operating differentially and local ly across PNG, will continue for the 
foreseeable future . Some 97 percent of the country's  land mass currently comes 
under one or other of these customary systems which · are supported and 
protected by the National Constitution . The state therefore has no control over, 
and l ittle to say about, these systems. However, it is quite possible that some 
changes may take place, in the future, in the frameworks within which these 
systems operate and in the ways in which they interrelate with the modern world 
and its activities. 
• The views expressed in this paper are my own. In particular, I wish to thank Nikhi l  Sekhran for 
detailed feedback on an earlier draft of this paper. 
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Assumption Two notes that, in the Melanesian world, there are no areas of 
the kind which are termed 'wi ldlands' in the North American context. PNG 
resource owners would state definitively that there is no area of their land which 
is not owned, which is off l imits to everyone, or which does not have a purpose 
or cannot be exploited in some way. Although some areas may be remote from 
centres of habitation and may be visited only a few times a year, nevertheless 
they are neither ownerless nor 'wild'  in the Western and modern sense of the 
word. If this term is defined differently then it may be acceptable in the 
Melanesian context. 
Assumption Three suggests that, in the PNG context, there is no 
conservation, if conservation means preservation for its own sake. It is evident 
from the reasons given by various groups of resource owners, when, for 
example, they apply to government to set up Wildl ife Management Areas around 
the country, that their intention is not preservation as such, but better and more 
control led management of their resources, and usually quite specific resources, 
within a particular area. In a customary context, this can also be achieved by 
general or specific ' taboos' being placed on such areas, sometimes on particular 
species or for certain periods of time. The more specific objective is also 
real ised to a certain extent - in areas where these bel ief systems apply - by 
restrictions placed on an individual person' s  or a clan 's  'totem ' species. 
Another point to note in respect of thi s  assumption is that uti l itarian forest 
management, as locally practised, wil l  almost inevitably conflict with a more 
general approach to biodiversity conservation, s ince on ly a small proportion of 
species within any given ecosystem wil l  have a use, and therefore a value, to the 
human beings within that ecosystem. Any long-term emphasis on, and 
maximisation of, uti l ity wil l  tend to lead to the loss of biodiversity (personal 
communication, Nikh i l  Sekhran). 
Assumptions One, Two and Three lead to Assumption Four: that current 
resource owners, whether individual ly or in their customary groups, are seeking 
meaningful ways to re-establ ish and reinforce management regimes for their 
resources which everyone with rights to those resources wi l l  support, to which 
they wil l  adhere, and from which they wil l  all benefit. I In order to be successful 
and effective, such a search for re-empowerment depends on three additional 
factors: 
• effective structures built upon old and known customary structures and 
systems; 
• a community re-establ ishing its responsibi l ities and rights over resources to 
which customary groups have held and exercised a range of customary rights 
1 Assumption Four may be seen by some readers as a leap of faith. However, finding, adapting, 
and applying appropriate resource management strategies - including conservation - in the PNG 
c<mtext requires not just incremental steps but also leaps, lateral or otherwise, which are based on 
facts - on knowledge of past and present systems as wel l  as on l ikely possibil ities for the future. 
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from precontact times, and have continued to do so down to the present day; 
and 
• access to relevant information on resource management and a capacity to 
integrate this information with a community's priority needs in order to 
develop and implement action plans.  
This process necessari ly implies that a community can not only establ ish its 
goals, but also develop uti l itarian and sustainable activity programmes and 
associated projects by which to achieve those goals .  Assumption Three impl ies 
the probabi lity of conflicts between this approach and the more general pursuit 
of biodiversity conservation. These matters will be discussed at greater length 
below, along with the formulation of effective strategies for working towards 
conservation and appropriate resource management. There is no single approach 
which, if properly appl ied, wil l ' do the trick ' . Ideally, a number of different but 
overlapping approaches need to be used in concert in any one location . 
For community- level resource management - and especial ly for 
conservation in the modem and Western sense - to be effective in PNG, durable 
l inkages have to be found between : 
• social or customary interests and personal or entrepreneurial interests; and 
• an improvement in community welfare or general l iving standards and the 
pursuit of personal prestige or monetary gain. 
It is only in this way that a trade-off between short-term development objectives 
and long-term, sustainable development objectives can be properly considered 
and developed. 
With this preamble in m ind, I shal l first present some relevant background 
information, then make a brief comment about theory and practice, and then 
present two contrasting approaches to planning and implementation. A 
subsequent discussion of institutional bases and appropriate structures leads into 
longer discussions of the incorporated land group process and community 
resource management strategies. Support mechanisms for community resource 
management are presented under four separate headings before I tum to specific 
discussion of the relationship between these management strategies and 
approaches to conservation in PNG. The final section attempts to bring together 
strategies and processes in community resource management, and provides some 
indications of what might be an acceptable and workable practice in the PNG 
context. 
Background 
A range of detai led background data on resources and their commercial 
exploitation in PNG is avai lable in various publications for sectors such as 
mining, forestry, fisheries, agriculture and land (see Denoon and Snowden 1 98 1 ;  
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Connel l  and Howitt 1 99 1 ;  Henningham and May 1 992; Sekhran and Miller 
1 995;  Howitt, Connel l  and Hirsch 1 996; Ward and Kingdon 1 996). 
Customary resource tenure and resource use systems are widely known 
through the writings of human geographers and social anthropologists too 
numerous to l ist here . Such publications refer to many communities and wider 
entities across PNG.2 Although the processes which l ink these customary 
systems with large-scale commercial resource exploitation projects are not so 
wel l  understood, nor clearly described at present, an understanding of at least 
some of these processes is critical as we work towards successful and 
appropriate resource management strategies and, through them, begin to address 
the problems of biodiversity and its conservation in PNG. 
Major aspects of customary resource tenure are set out e lsewhere 
(Crocombe and Hide 1 987; Holzknecht 1 994b; Ward and Kingdon 1 996). 
People l iv ing in any one local ity will use and manage their resources, in most 
instances, according to those customary practices prevai l ing there, with these 
resources and their uses being viewed in integrated, holistic ways. Al l  residents 
in a community use forested land to some degree, for example, for house 
construction timbers, bamboo for wal ls, flooring and many other uses, roofing 
materials, hunting of game, collection of wild foods, herbs and medicines of 
various kinds, and food gardens in areas of cleared forest. 
In any community, one person, some, or many people will also, to some 
degree, be involved in cash cropping. Depending on the altitude of the local ity, 
this may mean the cultivation or production of copra, cocoa, or coffee. These 
two systems can generally coexist quite wel l in most parts of PNG, unless very 
large areas of land held under custom are taken over for cash crop production 
and are therefore no longer available for inclusion in a fallow cycle and 
subsequent re-use for customary purposes. Another factor mitigating against 
this coexistence is a high rate of population growth, which means increasing 
population pressure on all resources. Such impacts vary a great deal across 
PNG. 
A major current threat to biodiversity and conservation in PNG is the high 
rate of commercial forest exploitation . This threat is exagerrated by the kinds of 
commercial forest exploitation which are practised by foreign loggers, and by 
the resulting environmental and social impacts of these practices. Another threat 
results from the alienation of younger generations from traditional value 
systems, which is itself partly due to economic pressures from the inexorable 
penetration of the cash economy into every corner of PNG. 
2 Much of this work is neither transparent in style nor in vocabulary because it has been written in 
jargon for a professional peer group and is therefore hard to use for practical purposes. 
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Levels of Theory and Practice 
In the PNG context, the issues of local community participation, self-rel iance, 
and collective responsibil ity for a wide range of activities are of critical 
importance precisely because resource ownership and systems of resource use 
are not only locally based but also locally initiated, control led, and practised. It 
is therefore at the local level that appropriate resource management strategies 
must be developed and implemented, and this is also the level at which major 
responsibi l ities for resource management and community development need to 
be accepted and addressed. 
In theory, the combination of customary resource ownership and the 
autonomy of local societies means that these responsibil ities are already 
addressed by local custom. In practice, however, despite the legitimation of 
customary resource ownership by the National Constitution, the capacity to do 
so has been affected by a number of long-term forms of disempowerment which 
can partly be ascribed to the alienation and marginal isation of subject peoples by 
colonial authority. 
In response to colonialism, self-government, and independence, groups and 
individuals in PNG began to rearticulate their social, pol itical, economic, and 
rel igious systems with each other and with the external forces of modernity 
(Carrier and Carrier 1 99 1 ;  Carrier 1 992). Some groups and individuals 
responded to new opportunities much more quickly than others. In every PNG 
society, there is an inherent tension between community and individual interests, 
and the dimensions of this tension change over time. So the customary resource 
ownership and resource use systems currently operate quite wel l  at some levels, 
but not at others. Some types of leaders, most especially the elected leadership, 
have exploited gaps left by the overlapping of different economic and pol itical 
systems, and have thus bypassed the customary limitations on the control and 
use of some resources. In addition, as these customary systems are affected by 
the high rate of population growth, which in some areas threatens to overwhelm 
the regenerative capacities of natural ecosystems, so the general response has 
been to tighten up on the categories of persons who are given temporary access 
to a range of resources (Meggitt 1 965) .  
In practice, while there are a number of unifying factors at the local level, 
there are currently also a number of differentiated interests which work 
themselves out in a number of ways (some of which overlap) - through 
leadership contests, competition between customary groups for pol itical 
ascendancy, and the breakdown of customary consultation practices. 
Planning and Implementation Approaches 
Many pol itical and economic systems have developed what is basical ly a 'top­
down' approach to planning and the implementation of planning decisions. PNG 
has adopted this kind of approach since gaining independence in 1 975 .  A great 
deal of planning work has been done at the centre, and plans and reports have 
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been produced in great numbers, but somehow the implementation phase has not 
worked wel l  or has not worked at al l .  When the provincial government s'ystem 
was introduced after 1 977, a range of planning activities was gradually taken 
over by each of the n ineteen provincial governments, but these activities and 
their implementation phases most often exhibited the same kinds of problems as 
were evident at the national level . 
At both national and provincial levels, the assumption of a close articulation 
of systems which support both planning and implementation processes is clearly 
inval id .  One of the major reasons for this false assumption is that only a very 
small proportion of land and resource ownersh ip - perhaps 3 percent of the land 
area - l ies within the control of the state, while the remainder continues to be in 
the hands of many small and autonomous resource-owning customary groups. 
Very l ittle, if any, of the planning effort undertaken over the years s ince 
independence has involved any of the actual resource owners at any level or in 
any major way. Indeed, most planned programmes involving natural resources 
and geared towards economic development have depended to a large extent on 
legal avenues and extraordinary methods of subverting customary systems of 
resource tenure and use. Therefore, the programmes have often contradicted the 
systems which have existed s ince pre-contact times and which operate in the 
best interests of the majority of people holding rights to those resources. These 
programmes, impl icitly at least, also often seek to regularise local practice under 
modern legal instruments (such as land leases or lease-leaseback arrangements) 
which are control led by the state and therefore taken out of the hands of 
customary owners (see Lakau 1 995) .  In such ways, foreign investors and local 
entrepreneurs have striven to acquire commercial and personal security over 
against the majority of customary resource owners. 
This type of conventional or ' top-down ' planning, sometimes also cal led 
the 'blueprint approach' (Eyben 1 99 1 ), can be summarised in the following brief 
points : 
• It is control led by a state institution, in line with state priorities, and that is  
why it  is a ' top-down' or ' blueprint' approach . 
• It is initiated, p lanned and implemented external ly, and often faci l itated 
locally by one or a few individuals .  
• It is  non-participatory - the subject or target population of the plan is not 
involved in the process, but nevertheless is often required to approve the 
plan .  
• It involves a very circumscribed (if any) acceptance of a community's views 
and inputs, and so l ittle local confidence in the plan is generated. 
• The main priority is to produce the plan and keep it going for the plan period. 
• This approach does not, by itself, enhance the capacity of local institutions to 
build other structures, create new programmes themselves, or maintain those 
structures or programmes which a blueprint approach bui lds. 
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One observer (Standish 1 996) notes that this approach has been largely 
responsible for destroying the democratic basis of customary PNG societies and 
has made them much more dependent on state handouts and top-down state 
direction. 
This may be contrasted with a more appropriate planning and 
implementation process, sometimes called ' action planning' or the 'process 
approach' (Eyben 1 99 1  ). This approach bui lds upon existing local structures 
and strengths, local knowledge, and strong local participation and involvement. 
This approach, which can cover a wide range of activities, may be characterised 
as follows: 
• The process is ' bottom-up ' ,  and may best be seen as an evolving expression 
of a community ' s  needs and aspirations. 
• It is initiated and conducted by the people themselves, and therefore 
encourages self-rel iance, according a central role to local institutions and 
populations. 
• This process is a participatory process between outsiders (who act as 
faci litators) and insiders (people from the community itself). 
• The approach supports, indeed encourages, ' empowerment' - giving people 
confidence in their own authority and the capacity to wield it in responsible 
ways. 
• The planning process in this approach is more important than the plan itself. 
A number of spin-off benefits from the process include leadership skil ls, 
increasing self-confidence, analytical and decision-making ski l ls, and better 
ways to gain access to information . 
Progressively since independence, and especial ly in the last ten years or so, 
resource owners3 - particularly those l iving in rural areas - have expressed an 
escalating dissatisfaction with the increasing exclusion of themselves as 
individuals, groups, and communities from consultation and development 
processes within the country at both provincial and local levels .  They feel that 
there are too many legal and administrative loopholes through which particular 
individuals are able to manipulate and cheat the majority of their people for their 
own individual benefit, using what are essential ly group resources. A typical 
acerbic comment from one community representative is the following: 'The 
developers are foreigners and the State is only a concept. It is us, the 
landowners who represent real l ife and people' (quoted in Fi ler 1 995 : 68). 
3 I have used the term 'resource owner' in virtually all my writings on these issues as a 
descriptive and relatively neutral term (for example, Holzknecht n .d .  a) . The other term often used 
in this context, ' l andowner' ,  besides being an inaccurate descriptive term (people as individuals or 
as a group or category own particular rights to land and other resources) also carries with it a 
multiplicity of levels of meaning which are used in the context of political and other current 
discourses (see Fi ler l 997a). 
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Some practical methodologies, which are appl icable to conservation and 
other appropriate resource management strategies, and which are based on the 
latter local- level method of participatory p lanning and development, are set out 
and briefly d iscussed in the following section. 
Customary Institutional Bases and Appropriate Structures 
Let us briefly consider the ways in which customary institutions approach the 
problem of resource management in PNG (see Holzknecht 1 994b, 1 996a). In 
most PNG societies, a person is born into a clan (patri l ineal or matril ineal, 
depending on the practice of following a male l ine or a female l ine) or a cognatic 
system in which each individual has his or her own kinship network. In most 
cases, this is the grouping with which people are primarily identified throughout 
their l ives, yet there is sti l l  a great deal of flexibil ity and variabi l ity in the choice 
of one 's  place of residence and personal associates, in the distribution of 
loyalties, and in the manipulation of personal relationships for one' s  personal 
benefit. 
Being a member of a clan or other customary social group confers a number 
of actual or potential rights to different resources in a variety of contexts. In 
return, a person accepts the obligations or responsibi l ities which are l inked with 
those rights. In customary practice, such an exchange does not produce 
complete and exclusive individual rights to a particular resource forever. One 
typically plants a garden and, when it has been harvested, this land returns to the 
general resource pool of the group. Social group membership is usual ly 
governed by descent from a particular ancestral l ine or, much less frequently, by 
some method of incorporating outsiders into a group. These members have what 
may be termed 'permanent' rights over a range of resources, and they pass these 
rights on to their descendants . Permanent rights to land can only be alienated in 
exceptional circumstances .  
A significant number of other people also make use of various resources 
belonging to any social group, but this access is most usually mediated through 
the holders of 'permanent rights ' .  Such ' temporary' use rights are usual ly 
l imited to one particular resource, and may involve a single use of that resource 
or may last for the duration of a single ' season ' .  These temporary rights are 
usual ly not transferable to other individuals, and certainly not without the 
approval of the permanent owners . 
It should be noted here that, in some parts of the country, significantly 
higher rates of population increase (compared to precontact days) have affected 
the fallowing and regeneration cycle of natural resources, and therefore the 
sustainabil ity of a subsistence way of l ife. Higher population densities mean that 
fallowing periods become shorter and shorter, and forest regrowth and the 
regeneration of soil fertility are dramatical ly affected. Many PNG societies have 
reacted to such a developing situation by imposing greater restrictions on the 
access rights of temporary users. 
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At present, and even under the very best circumstances, it would be very 
difficult, if not impossible, to record and codify every detail and variation of 
every right to every kind of resource for every individual in just one social 
group' s  domain, let alone cover the many thousands of patril ineal and 
matril ineal clans and cognatic networks across the whole country in a simi lar 
fashion. Nor are there valid reasons for undertaking such an all- inclusive 
exercise, s ince customary practice is quite capable, in virtual ly all situations, of 
taking care of such matters as they arise . The distinction between permanent 
and temporary right-holders is the main criterion by which group membership is 
determined, s ince the permanent right-holders are able to make major decisions 
about resource use and resource management without reference to one or more 
other persons. This distinction is neatly captured in an innovative Act of 
Parliament, the Land Groups Incorporation Act of 1 974. This is an Act which 
can be used to assist the pursuit of appropriate resource management strategies 
by developing new institutions - ' Incorporated Land Groups' (ILGs) - which are 
sti l l  grounded in customary practice. 
No c laim is made here that ILGs are the most important, let alone the only, 
answer to local resource management problems. But because rights to resources 
are owned, controlled, and managed local ly, ILGs should normal ly be seen as a 
major part of any strategy which uses a number of different but complementary 
approaches to these problems.  S ince ' land groups' have not been much used by 
the state or developers in the context of local resource management until quite 
recently, and largely in a restricted way, I shal l describe this approach at some 
length here. 
The Land Groups Incorporation Act 1974 
In a modem PNG context, customary resource ownership and resource use 
systems have some weaknesses. These include the following: 
• Customary social groups have no automatic recognition under modem PNG 
law, and therefore cannot represent themselves as they are. 
• They have also been excluded from modem business activities (such as 
forestry), but often find that their resources have been signed away by one 
person or a few indiv iduals purportedly acting on behalf of al l members. In 
other words, modem business activities have raised some very serious issues 
of leadership and representation which involve the transparency of deal ings 
and the long-term stewardship of a group' s  natural resources. 
• There is widespread publ ic determination that customary resource ownership 
and use systems in PNG must not become codified and commoditised 
because of the fear that each group' s  viabil ity and l inks to ancestral lands and 
other resources might thus be frittered away or sold to the highest bidder. 
The Land Groups Incorporation Act came about as a result of a 
Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters (PNGDOL 1 973) and builds on a 
knowledge of the ways that PNG social groups operate. These groups have 
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multiple roles and operate at different levels - individual, family, l ineage, 
subclan and clan - al l of which have their different but overlapping functions. 
One or other of these levels  has the function of control l ing the major rights to 
land and other resources - effectively constituting the ' land group' .  A land 
group is that customary group of people who, by traditional right, can make 
fundamental decisions about their land and other resources without reference to, 
or approval from, any other group (Power 1 994 ). The ideas of unity and 
sovereignty underlying this level of grouping are very powerful and are an 
important basis for bui lding new structures. 
The Act itself builds on these strong customary groups because it gives 
them standing under PNG state law. This recognition is subject to certain 
conditions which involve the methods of incorporating, registering, and 
operating ILGs, and transparent decision-making, reporting and consultation 
practices. In particular, major decisions are val id only if they are made by 
meetings of group members and recorded as such. An ILG can govern as much 
or as l ittle as a customary group wishes it to do, by specifying the subject matter 
and the level of detai l which are inserted into the group's  constitution. ILGs 
appear to work quite adequately in both patril ineal and matri l ineal societies.4 
This is, by any standard, an innovative piece of legislation, but one which 
has not been much used until relatively recently, when some mining companies 
have used it to assist in identification of resource owner groups with which they 
have regular deal ings, and also as a way to ensure that royalty payments reach 
all groups which have a right to them. The Act does not register customary land, 
but does recognise a land group' s  interest in 'property' . Such a recognised 
interest in the name of the land group does not restrict its use, but should rather 
make it easier for outsiders to negotiate agreements with land groups to use or 
' rent' land (or other resources) from them for particular purposes or a particular 
length of time. One l ikely outcome of the ILG process is the resolution of major 
land disputes, and this should also encourage various forms of development by 
providing greater safeguards for limited occupancy. Ultimate ownership, 
control, and management of resources sti l l  remain under customary practice or 
with the land group as part of its own 'birthright' . 
Anthropologists have long recognised the flexibil ity, variabi lity, and 
adaptabi lity of many structural principles as being characteristic of PNG social 
systems. In these quarters, there is some unease with proposals to l ist those ILG 
members who hold permanent resource rights because there is a fear that this 
would be a retrograde step which would rigidify and fossil ise these flexible 
systems. There is also some concern about mapping ' land group' boundaries, 
this being an optional attachment to an ILG constitution. There may be an 
element of truth in such concerns, 5 yet it is important to note that, in many 
4 The ways in which cognatic societies in PNG are able to make productive use of this ILG 
approach, if at all, stil l  need to be determined in detail .  
5 This concern, focussing as  i t  does on  the v iew that the mapping of  land boundaries would 
exacerbate past and present local land disputes and lead to fighting and bloodshed, expresses a 
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areas, and often in response to development proposals, local groups are adapting 
their own systems by intent and of their own free wi l l  (see Fingleton 1 985 ;  Ernst 
1 996; Filer l 997a). In many areas, some quite major aspects of resource tenure 
and use systems are becoming essentialised as groups adapt themselves - at least 
in particular situations - to what is happening around them.6 
The Act al lows a group wishing to incorporate itself as a land group to put 
as much or as l ittle detail into its constitution as it wishes. For example, if a 
minimalist approach is preferred, then most requirements, and the ways in which 
they are determined and practised, are consigned to remain within the realm of 
custom. Whatever approach is used, there wil l ,  in practice, always be a 
combination of custom and ILG constitution . The group's membership 
principles may be written into the constitution if members decide that this is 
desirable. Membership l ists can be reviewed and revised annual ly. Finally, 
membership is by mutual recognition, so the group may retain processes for the 
incorporation of outsiders and for adaptation to changing needs and 
circumstances. 
The proposals contained within this Act are certainly no worse, and are 
often much better, than any of the other planned or unplanned methods of 
dealing with th� problem at hand. Their strengths are that they build upon 
custom and need not emasculate or replace it. An alternative scenario would see 
the state legislating to take over ownership and control of al l land and other 
resources from the present customary owners. This state control could express 
itself in a variety of ways. However, this alternative would act directly against 
the provisions of the National Constitution and, in addition, would fal l foul of all 
customary resource owners in PNG. 
Community Resource Management Strategies 
Any community in PNG can resolve to adopt resource management strategies 
for its col lective benefit, as wel l  as the benefit of individual members. If the 
ILG strategy is adopted, this commits the community to a process of land group 
identification which begins with the identities of members holding permanent 
rights and with the details of a land group constitution . In addition, the 
boundaries and mutual relations of such groups are defined, a l ist is made of 
each group's  'property' and its contents checked with neighbouring groups, and 
a map may be drawn if this is desired (Holzknecht ed. 1 995) .  What is then 
required is a process which not only brings the land groups in a community 
together, but also enables them to keep working together to establish the nature 
very valid point. On the other hand, most boundaries between ' land groups' are well-known and 
respected, especially where Land Demarcation Committees were active during the last years of 
colonial administration. Where a common boundary is in dispute, this area can, by mutual 
agreement of the groups involved, be set aside for later adjudication and resolution of claims. 
Such relatively minor issues should not by themselves block implementation of strategies which 
find broad favour. 
6 For similar developments in another Melanesian context, see Hviding ( 1 993). 
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of the community's  resources, wants, and needs, and thus establ ish priorities for 
community development. With these in place, a community can then seek 
development strategies appropriate to its natural and human resource base . 
As some authors have pointed out, the choices for many rural communities 
in PNG are relatively stark and very often quite l imited (see Sekhran, this 
volume; Orsak and Sekhran n.d.) . The choice than an individual or community 
makes between moral incentives for sustainable development and material 
incentives for immediate gain is, in most cases, no contest at al l .  Rural PNG 
societies have been geared for thousands of years to seeking benefits from what 
is avai lable now and letting the future take care of itself. This opportunistic 
approach is certainly evident in the manner in which many communities have 
been drawn, by choice or circumstance, into large-scale logging developments 
across the country. 
At the same time, it is clear that circumstances in PNG are changing 
dramatically in some sectors. Population increases are impinging on the 
previously rel iable natural cycles of fallowing and resource regeneration, and 
thus on the abi lity of many communities to look after and maintain themselves at 
reasonable subsistence levels . The state has virtual ly withdrawn itself from 
many rural areas. In spite of these developing problems, however, since natural 
resources in any given area are sti l l  largely under customary ownership and 
control, a concerted publ icity and awareness campaign throughout the country 
would raise much interest in, and commitment from, communities to become 
involved in developing new approaches to these problems .  These developments 
must take place at the community level because this is the level at which these 
resources are owned and managed. 
Readers wil l  quickly point out some apparent flaws in this argument - some 
of them conceptual, and some related to practical problems of implementation. 
Some of the apparent conceptual problems have already been discussed. In the 
following discussion, I shal l consider some of the problems of implementation, 
including faci l itation processes, levels of cooperation within a community, the 
need for natural and human resource surveys as necessary starting points, and 
appropriate support systems for community resource management (CRM). 
Facilitation Training and Processes 
A number of necessary skil ls are required to support the development of 
effective CRM systems  in any community. Faci l itation ski l l s  and access to 
appropriate kinds of information and experience top this l ist. 
Environmental awareness programmes of al l kinds, which stress the 
balanced requirements for sustainabil ity, need to be developed and made 
avai lable to the general public through as many kinds of media as possible -
radio, television, newspapers, mobile theatre groups, fi lm, word of mouth, and 
speeches at public ral lies (church conferences, for example) - at local, provincial 
and national levels .  
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Following such awareness campaigns, those communities or land groups 
which want to be involved in this process should select one or more younger 
persons with certain basic requirements (such as l iteracy and numeracy, good 
character, and commitment to the community) for training as faci litators. Such a 
training programme, proceeding from province to province across PNG, and 
including supervisory assistance on a regional basis, was proposed in an AusAID 
consultant' s  report in 1 99 5 .  However, this proposal has not yet been accepted or 
funded nationally. A faci litation training programme would prepare these 
selected community representatives in land group work, in the use of tried and 
true faci litation processes, and fami liarity with frameworks within which such 
processes can be effectively implemented. Such trainee faci litators would also 
require detailed superv ision and monitoring after their training is complete and 
they are back in their communities . 
Faci litation should begin after awareness-raising measures have been 
undertaken, or after a community has requested assistance in the creation of its 
own structure and processes in relation to appropriate CRM. Facilitation begins 
with the establ ishment of ILGs (where appropriate), the conduct of natural and 
human resource surveys (and interpretation of their outcomes), and the 
formation of cooperative relationships between the constituent land groups in a 
community. It culminates in an amalgamation of the data from each group' s  
reflections on  its own resource information, needs, and priorities into a 
community resource base. This is followed by the cooperative development of 
appropriate strategies to achieve their agreed aims. 
The successful selection and implementation of such strategies is 
dependent, to a very large extent, on access to relevant data. These can assist a 
land group or community and its faci l itator by setting out the parameters within 
which a strategy can be useful - that is, the advantages and disadvantages of a 
particular approach, the implications behind it, and the various resource inputs 
which it requires (time, labour, transportation, processing, marketing, etc.) .  
Some quite specific recommendations have been made about the provision of 
such services to resource owners across PNG (see Cotter and Wescott 1 995 ; 
Holzknecht 1 995b ), but no resources have yet been made available to act on 
them. 
Access to this information should also provide further opportunities to 
obtain specialist techn ical advice on other matters - to assess the timber value of 
part of a community 's  forest resource, for example, or uti l ise niche marketing 
expertise for particular non-timber forest products. Areas and groups developing 
CRM strategies wil l  require access to financial, legal, organisational, 
conservation, and marketing special ists (see Taylor, this volume). 
It is important that trained faci litators do not work in isolation. Faci litators 
across PNG would face similar situations in their home areas and would benefit 
from regular l inks with other faci litators. They would al l need to be able to refer 
contentious matters to an advisory panel or person for advice on how to proceed 
towards acceptable resolutions. Furthermore, local faci l itators would not only 
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be answerable to their own communities, but also to a higher level of more 
experienced and technical ly capable persons operating on a regional or national 
level . 
This system of faci l itation, and the associated emergence of recognised land 
groups and CRM structures, would result in a highly decentral ised network of 
community-driven resource management groups in any one area. A l ikely point 
of contention is that such a system might be costly to administer, but this may 
arise from the assumption that such a network would require close central 
government administration and control .  Th is assumption may be inval id 
because the process itself is  l ikely to raise the energies and capacities of rural 
communities. 
Where resource development projects, for example, are already in existence 
and royalties are payable to the community, the constituent groups could agree 
to spend some part of these payments on in itiating and supporting CRM 
strategies and systems in that area. Where value is being added at the 
community level, 7 part of the additional income derived from th is process could 
also be devoted to the maintenance of such a system . Another avenue could be 
for local communities to devise pol icies and funding initiatives through the local 
government councils which are due to be strengthened as part of the current 
reforms of the provincial government system . Some creative and lateral 
thinking in each particular situation would find other such mechanisms. 
How would such a system articulate itself with existing government 
agencies and other institutions and activities? In essence, there need be no great 
confl ict of opinion or practice. Recognition of community- level resource 
management systems and their constituent elements, the ILGs (or simi lar units), 
accepts in practice what is already recognised in theory in the National 
Constitution . Insofar as the discussion relates to natural resources, then 
government agencies and other bodies, such as the proponents of resource 
exploitation or conservation, would al l need to submit their proposals through 
particular channels and agents at the local community level .  Th is would ensure 
that all those with an interest at th is level would be wel l- informed and involved 
in reaching decisions appropriate for them . The word or signature of only one or 
two people, arrived at in private and without public scrutiny, for example, would 
not be sufficient to permit commercial exploitation of a resource to proceed. 
Government agencies could obtain particular benefits from such a system. 
For example, a resource owner group could perform the function of monitoring 
logging projects on their land. In such a case, the monitors would report any 
breaches in the first instance to the PNG Forest Authority' s  local ly-based project 
officers for immediate action . Conservation projects could proceed in the same 
manner, since resource owner groups have primary say over particular areas and 
resources. Such proprietary interests should be developed and built upon . 
7 For example, where wokabaut somils (Tok Pisin, mobile sawmil ls) are operating in a 
sustainable manner. 
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The Problem of Cooperation 
It may be argued that the friction which commonly exists within a community -
for reasons of history, personal ity, or custom (amongst others) - is such that any 
proposal which depends on cooperation between its component groups is 
doomed to failure. There is no denying the existence of differentiated interests, 
at both group and indiv idual levels, in both modern and traditional contexts. On 
the other hand, there are usually very close ties of kinship and marriage between 
the clans and subclans within any one community or vi l lage, which do not 
automatically reduce the tension or conflict in any society, but which are sti l l  
one mechanism for channelling them. In a customary sense, there is usually a 
great deal of cross-cutting cooperation (as wel l  as tension) between these groups 
over a wide range of activities. 
If the groups which are involved see that it is in their separate and 
combined interests to work together for certain purposes (such as those 
discussed in this chapter), then there is no reason to suppose that such 
cooperation would not be forthcoming in the context of CRM. After al l ,  it 
would be both a recognition and a continuation of what currently occurs (in a 
customary sense in relation to resources) from place to place across PNG. The 
main difference is that this practice would now be official ly recognised, and 
could then be assisted to operate more effectively and self-sufficiently, though 
always through the CRM structure. Another difference would be that such 
cooperation would now be bui lt upon a better knowledge of the community's  
resource base and more appropriate strategies for the pursuit of collective goals 
within a sustainable development framework . 
What is required for such an arrangement to be effective is agreement 
between al l groups in any such community on the fol lowing points : 
• a framework for cooperation and coordination in resource-related activities; 
• an ongoing process of wide and regular consultation and joint decision 
making on a num her of matters; 
• a recognition by all participating groups of each other' s  equal status and each 
group' s  resource rights in that context; 
• basic agreement on the needs and priorities of the community arrived at 
through a common process; and 
• basic agreement on the strategies which need to be fol lowed to achieve those 
goals .  
Arriving at such basic agreements can be seen as a major task of the facil itation 
process that has already been discussed . 
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Natural and Human Resource Surveys 
One thing about which members of a community wil l  always know a great deal 
more than any outsider is  their own natural environment - both specific elements 
within it and the way in which it functions at a general level (see Damon, this 
volume). In addition, they also know best how their community has adapted to 
this environment and its vagaries over a very long period of time. They may not 
know everything about this environment, or about the commercial value of its 
component parts, but they wi l l  sti l l  know more about such things as the soils, the 
weather, animal and bird behaviour, and the practical uses of various raw 
materials (see Majnep and Bulmer 1 977). 
With many young people going away to school, or adults taking formal 
employment, the chains of communication which pass this customary knowledge 
from older to younger generations, and also the myths, legends and stories which 
ground a group' s  rights to land and other resources, have been damaged, if not 
broken, in many commun ities. For members of constituent groups within such a 
community, a continuing exercise to record and critically consider al l e lements 
of their environment, or at least those parts over which they have some control, 
has considerable benefits in addition to the primary search for sustainable ways 
of l ife. This exercise also l inks up with the activities involved in defining the 
boundaries within and between adjoining land groups, and thereby reinforces the 
transfer of vital customary information between the generations. 
The main aim of this survey exercise is for each land group to set out and 
consider for itself its own resources - human, natural, and supernatural ,  their 
critical interrelationships over time, and the ways in which changing human 
impacts can have dramatic and often negative effects .  A clarification and 
understanding of the p lace of each land group within the community is critical 
for the operation and adaptation of the customary resource ownership and use 
systems which are protected by the National Constitution. Equal ly important is 
a better knowledge of the human resources within each land group, such as the 
kinds and levels of school ing or training which members possess, their work 
ski l l s  and experience, or their levels of l iteracy and numeracy. Many young 
people return home with new ski l l s  after leaving school or leaving a job, and 
these ski l l s  can be put to effective use in the long-term management and 
development of the community's  resources. 
Mechanisms of Support 
In comparison with the options available to many Aboriginal communities in 
Austral ia whose members choose to manage and develop their own land and 
other resources (see Young et al . 1 99 1 ), communities in PNG do not have access 
to a wide range of support systems or management programmes, provided by the 
state, on which they can draw for guidance and financial support. 
Given this lack of balanced and neutral government assistance, 
communities in PNG have very l ittle choice but to draw on their own strengths 
and customary knowledge base as the foundations from which to fashion new 
3 84 The Political Economy of Forest Management in Papua New Guinea 
visions for themselves and search for the means of achieving that elusive 
'development' for which the whole country is searching. It is  therefore l ittle 
wonder that many rural communities have agreed to the major resource 
exploitation projects (especially timber projects) which are currently operating 
in PNG. They (or their representatives) have been operating on a very l imited 
information base and have been subject to the blandishments of companies 
whose appeal l ies partly in the gradual but inexorable withdrawal of government 
services and extension assistance. What l ittle information people in these 
communities have received has been strongly biased in favour of commercial 
logging and other such large-scale commercial operations. This approach has 
been aided and abetted by local entrepreneurs and power-brokers who have been 
intent on short-term personal gains and the maintenance of unequal patron-client 
relat ionships (Holzknecht l 996b ). 
During the colonial and early post-independence periods, the state 
developed and maintained quite extensive extension networks, with officers 
based throughout the country. Resource owners, individually or in groups, could 
seek advice on agricultural matters, forestry, fisheries, and business 
development. Expatriate officers often served in management positions in 
cooperatives, and later, for a time, became advisers to indigenous managers. 
This system became too expensive to maintain and it gradual ly collapsed. 
Various provincial governments introduced and maintained extension officers 
based in d istricts within each province, but most officers lacked the funding and 
support required to properly carry out their tasks, and these extension systems 
have been progressively pared down or d iscontinued. 8 
As already indicated, CRM is highly dependent on access to information 
and the sharing of information between communities. This does not mean that 
communities or factions within them wil l  necessarily always choose options 
which are the 'best' or most ' rational ' - these are relative and culturally­
determined terms.  Such decision making is highly contextual and depends on 
many factors, few of which may be economic. In the end, transparent decisions, 
whatever they are, made by representative bodies of resource owners and based 
on the best available informat ion, have to be respected, since the resources 
involved are theirs to control and manage, and they are the ones who must bear 
the consequences of those decisions, both positive and negative. 
Conservation and Community Resource Management 
In global terms, it is very important to find suitable and acceptable strategies to 
further the sustainable preservation of biological diversity in regions of high 
biodiversity, such as Melanesia, and in areas of special value within this region. 
In the PNG national context, the relevant departments and centres also recognise 
8 An attempt was made in 1 995, based on an earlier examination of possible mechanisms, to 
develop useful support systems to which resource owners would have access (Holzknecht l 995b ) .  
In addition, Power ( 1 994) also presents, in detail, a number of different but related management 
and organisational matters as guides specifical ly prepared for vi l lage communities. 
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the importance of this goal . Yet global and national concerns wil l  have l ittle 
impact on the prevail ing systems of resource tenure and use without effective 
and meaningful strategies for dealing with development issues at a local level .  
At this local level, any strategies designed to promote the conservation or 
preservation of biodiversity must be part of a wider repertoire of strategies 
avai lable to al l CRM decision makers . In making decisions concerning the 
resources under their control, each CRM group and its constituent land groups 
and individual members would need to work through the available knowledge of 
relevant issues and factors.9 These local- level decision-making processes are 
bound to be manipulated, to some extent, by influential local leaders of various 
kinds, but a CRM approach of the kind previously discussed would at least 
temper individual choices with a process of group consultation and decision 
making in relation to major resource matters. 
In the introduction, especial ly in Assumption Three, I indicated that there 
can be no such thing as conservation for conservation 's  sake within a customary 
PNG context. Nevertheless, changing circumstances within the country require 
that more del iberate thought be given to ways of changing this assumption and 
to the col laborative development of a new environmental ethic at both local and 
national levels. 
Such changes require awareness. Awareness, in turn, requires access to 
more broadly accessible and meaningful information for the l istener or reader. 
Awareness without any kind of back-up or follow-up information about resource 
management or development options leads to frustration and anger. Finally, 
appropriate local- level structures and processes, which have been developed 
from known customary ones, are l ikely to form the only rel iable and long-term 
basis for the design and implementation of new ways of rearticulating each 
community's  response to changing circumstances and of implementing its 
col lective decisions in respect of group resources and individual patterns of 
behaviour. After a number of these structures are established, and are hopeful ly 
l inked up at a regional level, they will develop dynamics of their own at this 
level, and eventual ly at the national level as wel l .  
If the prevailing ethic, whether or  not it is aided and abetted by the state and 
its instrumental ities, does not support environmental care and constraint, then it 
is self-evident that the evolution of a new and more positive ethic wi l l  require 
new or untried methods and approaches . Just as icebergs can, with very l ittle 
warning, suddenly turn upside down and disturb everything around them, so it is 
self-evident that neglect of the welfare and concerns of the majority of the 
population could have a similar effect in PNG.  This condition of neglect and 
despair may seem to be an unrel iable basis on which to design resource 
9 Issues and factors which are unknown to them cannot influence their decisions, even if they 
play an important part in the wider picture, especially for outside observers. Hence the importance 
placed in this chapter on access by resource owners and their groups to relevant information and 
advice. 
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management systems, but these conditions also present opportunities for lateral 
thinking to find meaningful structures and value systems on which to build more 
responsive ethical and practical systems  of natural resource management which 
also respect customary practice. 
Such a new ethic need not focus only on the contrast between uti l itarian 
forest management and biodiversity conservation, but it must come to grips with 
issues regarding the definition and appl ication of ' the public good ' .  At the same 
time, no society can be expected to adopt a single approach to the management 
and maintenance of such a complex creation as the natural environment and its 
biodiversity values. 
Rural Malaise 
One result of many years of state neglect is that a major malaise has increasingly 
become evident in PNG' s  rural communities. 1 0 Like an iceberg, this malaise 
currently manifests itself in several forms, such as the drift of population to 
urban areas, the increasing levels of crime in rural (as wel l  as urban) areas, the 
gradual withdrawal by the state of many basic services, the lack of new 
employment opportunities, tension and conflict over resource management and 
resource development issues, increasing disenchantment with current 
development initiatives, an ongoing crisis of leadership, and the rise of self­
interested el ites .  
At a local level, many people strongly bel ieve that they have been cut off 
and abandoned by the state in the race for ' development' (whatever that may 
mean in these contexts). They bel ieve that their many problems go unheeded. 
They feel that their incessant and urgent cal ls for assistance, support, advice, and 
information are studiously ignored by the state. They feel the increasing lack of 
institutional support (for finance and business advice, for example) to promote 
business activities and community development in rural areas. They see that the 
questionable activities of a small number of mostly urban-based pol itical and 
entrepreneurial leaders go unchal lenged and, in many ways, are condoned and 
supported by other members of the urban and political elites .  They can see their 
resources being sold out and removed from around them by this m inority, for 
very l ittle advantage or benefit to themselves, whether as individuals or as a 
community. On the other hand, they see that there is great benefit to the state 
itself (through forest levies, log export duties, etc.), to the foreign companies 
which have no long-term commitments to the area or its people, and final ly to 
the small number of ' local people' who profit to the detriment of the majority. 
l O Urban bias is obviously part of the rural malaise. This includes an assumption by the state that 
the majority of rural vi l lagers have been - despite much evidence to the contrary - fundamentally 
content with their subsistence way of life. This form of wishful thinking has encouraged the main 
thrust of infrastructural development, capital investment, and job creation to focus on urban areas, 
with a corresponding and increasing neglect of rural areas, especially when the state has undergone 
periodic financial difficulties. 
Conservation and Appropriate Resource Management Strategies 3 87 
Many of these visible ' iceberg' effects, and their hidden but ominous bulk, 
are themselves evidence of the long-term effects of unsuccessful top-down 
'blueprint' planning and implementation . They are also evidence of a long-term 
avoidance, by the state and other institutions, of the need to work constructively 
with existing customary cultural, social, and economic structures and 
institutions . 
In contrast to these ' head-in-the sand ' approaches, CRM systems place the 
onus for directing and control l ing a wide range of related activities squarely 
back where it properly belongs in the PNG context - in the hands of resource 
owners and their own communities. This is where customary resource rights are 
control led and exercised, and it is here that responsibilities must be taken and 
exercised. Building on known strengths and customary knowledge at this local 
level, by putting in place an active and responsible ' process' approach to 
community development and sustainable resource management, can change 
power relationships in major ways as it strengthens or activates local 
participation and involvement. 
Such an approach may appear to be too piecemeal and localised, without 
sufficient state control, but if it is actively established, maintained, and 
supported across a province or a region (and especial ly at a national level), the 
cumulative effects are l ikely to be very dramatic within a relatively short time. 
For example, it could have very positive impacts on the operation of the new 
system of local government which is currently being introduced throughout 
PNG, where the effective use of local government funds will surely depend on a 
h igh degree of community participation across a range of activities - from the 
provision of infrastructure and community services, through the distribution of 
entrepreneurial benefits, to the general form of governance at a local level .  
It is only such active processes which can bring about the elements of 
continuity, commitment, and surety which are needed in a community before 
effective long-term resource management strategies can be developed for the 
benefit of al l .  Only in this way can communities make effective long-term 
decisions about the importance of conservation, whether for its own sake or in 
the form of control led, low-key, adaptive forms of use. 
Effective Approaches 
Given the regional variation in systems of resource tenure and use across PNG, 
there can be no single approach which wil l  serve to resolve al l the various 
problems of resource management. It might be considered that this chapter has 
given undue emphasis to an approach based on ' incorporated land groups' . 
However, this approach alone, of those discussed here and elsewhere, is firmly 
based on known, preferred, and appropriate customary structures of resource 
management, even if there are bound to be some local contexts (as in cognatic 
societies) where this approach may not be applicable or effective. 
The ILG approach by itself, while subsuming a number of disparate 
elements (constitution, decision-making processes, membership criteria, 
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genealogies, ' property' l ists, land boundaries, and optional map), needs to have 
ongoing l inkages with other institutions and practices if it is to function 
effectively. There is a need for training programmes, awareness-raising 
measures, rel iable record keeping, natural and human resource surveys, and 
access to various other k inds of information and technical expertise. This 
implies the further need for a wide range of approaches which address one or 
more of these supporting elements whi le adding to the process as a whole. 
Even within the general ILG approach, there could be as many variants of a 
basic ILG constitution as there are land groups wishing to incorporate 
themselves through thi s  process. Other than a basic number of clauses, each 
group can include as much or as l ittle detail as it wishes on a range of issues, and 
those which are not included wil l  naturally remain to be arranged and resolved 
according to customary practice. Nevertheless, what such an approach does 
strongly promote is a return, under new conditions and pressures, to a more 
responsive ethic of self-governance and self-rel iance at this local level .  Such a 
new ethic would not only be responsive to the needs and demands of individual 
members, but also to the needs of community maintenance and development 
within the framework of the state. 
One form of consultation which has proved effective in the PNG mining 
and petroleum sector is that of the 'development forum' (West 1 992). This type 
of forum brings together all the ' stakeholders ' who have an interest in the 
development of a particular resource in order to negotiate a set of agreements 
relating to the development, including a 'benefit package' for resource owners 
and local communities. This approach could be modified for appl ication in other 
sectors, such as forestry, or for the development of an appropriate environmental 
ethic to deal with various forms of resource development in a s ingle catchment 
or other geograph ical area. 
Pro Bono Publico? 
The question raised in the title of thi s  chapter is partly the question of which 
'public good' should take priority in determining the approaches or strategies to 
be promoted and implemented for better resource management. At one extreme 
is the idea that the state should assume ownersh ip and control of all the relevant 
resources, and establ ish its own management and development priorities on this 
basis . At the other extreme is the idea that customary resource owner rights take 
precedence over all else, even if thi s  means that one resource owner group 
collects all the royalties from a development project on its land, so that its 
members are comparatively wealthy, whi le a neighbouring group, having no 
commercial resources, receives no such benefits. The distinction is basically 
between the interests of the state (or society) as a whole and those of each 
customary group considered as a sovereign entity. 
S ince customary practice and associated resource rights are recognised in 
PNG to the extent of covering some 97 percent of the country's  land area, and 
these customary rights are enshrined in the National Constitution, the first of 
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these .extreme cases clearly does not apply. Indeed, any attempt by the state to 
take over customary rights or move towards individual tenure systems have been 
and will be fiercely resisted . 1 1  The tendency, since independence in 1 975, has 
been to give increasing recognition to such customary rights and to bring 
resource owners, their constituent customary groups, and related commercial 
entities further into the negotiation of development projects, especially in the 
mining and petroleum sector. 
The middle ground between these two extremes, which takes account .of 
wider local, regional and national (even global) interests, remains largely 
unexplored and untried in the PNG context except ( ideally) by the state. One 
attempt was made through the Forestry Development Guidel ines, which were 
developed as part of a major restructuring of the state' s  bureaucratic control of 
the forest industry, which proposed that trust funds be set up to manage resource 
owners' financial benefits from logging projects, and so encourage prudent and 
economically productive use of such funds (PNGMOF 1 993a, 1 993b ). One 
aspect of this proposal was that part of this income should be used for the 
purposes of wider local or regional development programmes, thus ensuring that 
a wider population would benefit from a specific resource development project, 
and not only the members of one or more specific resource owner groups. 
Precedents for a simi lar approach already exist in the mining and petroleum 
sector, where the companies have recognised (perhaps reluctantly) that their 
development activities not only have an impact on communities in the 
immediate vicinity of a project, but also on communities much further away, 
especially those located downstream (for example, in the Ok Tedi and Porgera 
cases). In these cases, however, benefits to which these more remote 
communities have access are disbursed by the mining company or the state, and 
not by customary resource owners. 1 2  
'The public good' must b e  contextual ly determined and reviewed from time 
to time on a number of different levels .  A very strong argument can be 
presented, in the political, economic, and social cl imate currently prevail ing in 
PNG, l 3 for giving first priority to the establ ishment of effective local- level 
resource management structures and systems. This can also be seen as an 
important first step in the establishment of a new national environmental ethic. 
With these elements in place, and the renewed confidence and self-rel iance 
1 1  There were riots in 1 995 in a number of urban areas in response to proposals by the state (and 
supposedly by the World Bank) to explore new ways of registering customary land (see Lakau 
1 995). 
1 2  It is important to note here that most of PNG' s  mineral resources, unlike the nation 's  forest 
resources, are legal ly the property of the state, and not of customary groups, even though the state 
has increasingly recognised the existence of a ' landowner' interest in their development. 
1 3 This is marked by a dramatic fall in state-funded and state-supported services and 
infrastructural development and maintenance in most non-urban areas, and by the non­
representative ways in which individuals have been signing away resource rights to developers 
without proper consultation and approval by resource owners as a whole. 
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which wil l  be engendered in this process, the wider question of ' the public good' 
can then be tackled. A lead from the state and its instrumental ities through 
considered public stances on environmental and local development issues (and 
especially through the implementation of its notional commitment to a National 
Sustainable Development Strategy) would go a long way to providing guidance 
to local- level resource management initiatives. Since the state presently has 
control over such a smal l proportion of the resources within its boundaries, it can 
best lead by active example and persuasion. 
Conclusion 
If it is accepted that resource owners in PNG have the final say over resource 
management and development matters through their customary institutions, as 
this chapter argues is both necessary and beneficial, then resource owners must 
have the most important seat at the table in any discussions relating to 
conservation . 
The contrast between uti l itarian forest management and biodiversity 
conservation is not necessarily appropriate when the real question l ies in the 
value which resource owners place on their natural environment. The question 
must be focussed on 'their own' local environment and resources because those 
of another area belong to other people .  Although uti l itarian forest management 
may, in the long term, tend to lead to a loss of biodiversity (personal 
communication, Nikhi l  Sekhran), in the short term and in the PNG context, I 
bel ieve it would lead to an increase in the values placed on indigenous 
knowledge systems which have been passed down by word of mouth from 
generation to generation, and on the search for local ly developed ways of 
managing such resources so that benefits can be maintained over the longer 
term. In that event, the values placed on forests and their constituent species by 
resource owners wil l  also increase markedly, and there wil l  be a growing 
reluctance to sell off timber resources for large-scale commercial logging in 
return for a mere pittance. 1 4 Without such a change in local evaluations of these 
resources, there wil l  be no future for conservation or for biodiversity. 
This chapter has presented a general case for appropriate resource 
management strategies in PNG, focussing, in particular, on local-level resource 
management. By focussing on this local level and on the importance of locally 
derived, but newly amended, customary structures, the chapter has attempted to 
bring the question of resource management and evaluation of all resources, and 
the allocation of rights and responsibil ities, back to this all-important grassroots 
level, at which a new environmental eth ic must take root if it is to be effective . 
1 4 In this respect, a range of research and development activities currently taking place in 
Amazonia (Holmes 1 996a, 1 996b; Holmes and Walker 1 996; Walker 1 996a, 1 996b) may hold 
some important lessons for PNG. 
CHAPTER 18 
PROCESSES FOR EFFECTING 
COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF PROTECTED AREAS: 
A CASE STUDY OF THE CRATER MOUNTAIN 
WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT AREA* 
ARLYNE JOHNSON 
Introduction 
Community-based conservation which engages the participation of rural 
resource owners in sustainable management of their natural resources is 
presently seen as one of the most promising methods for protected area 
establishment, although l ittle systematic analysis of the methods and 
effectiveness of this approach has been conducted (Brandon and Wells 1 992; 
Western and Wright 1 994). 
Brown and Wyckoff-Baird ( 1 992 : 1 4) describe the possible participation by 
communities in protected area management as a continuum which can range 
from ' l imited input in decision-making and control, to extensive input into 
decision-making and ultimately stewardship of the resources' .  Over the past two 
decades, the real isation that community participation was a significant variable 
in determin ing the success of rural development projects (Midgley 1 986; Oakley 
1 99 1 )  has also influenced the field of natural resource management in 
developing nations. Across the world, prior to 1 970, protected areas were 
managed by national governments which denied access to traditional resource 
users, yet did not have the capacity to effectively manage the natural resources 
or, more importantly, to enforce rules to conserve the resource base (Wells and 
* I would l ike to recognise and commend the many resident field staff, researchers and volunteers 
who have contributed their respective talents to the Crater Mountain Integrated Conservation and 
Development (ICAD) Project over the years. They include Yerger Andre, David Bickford, Robert 
Bino, Steve and Kristi Booth, John Ericho, Chris Fi lardi, David Gi l l ison, Catrina and John Hi ller, 
Jamie James, Laura Johnson, Andrew Mack, Ron and Donna Merlina, Ross Sinclair, Beth Thiel, 
Douglas and Anita Weisberger, Brian Wolcott and Deb Wright. The Crater Mountain ICAD 
Project is supported by funding from the B iodiversity Support Program - a consortium of the 
World Wildlife Fund, the Nature Conservancy and the World Resources Institute - with funding 
from the United States Agency for International Development, the John T. and Katherine T. 
MacArthur Foundation, the Wildl ife Conservation Society, the Lix Claiborne and Art Ortenberg 
Foundation, the South Pacific Division of the Nature Conservancy, the GEF Smal l Grants 
Programme, the Japanese Small-Scale Grants Assistance Programme, the Pacific Area Tourism 
Association, and the British High Commission in Papua New Guinea. 
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Brandon 1 992). Today, most efforts by developing nations to manage protected 
areas make some allowance for the importance of community participation in 
protected area management (Wells and Brandon 1 993 ), but the form and 
intensity of participat ion in each case varies significantly (Midgley 1 986; Paul 
1 987; Oakley 1 99 1 ;  Wells and Brandon 1 992). 
One widely-used definition which i s  used to describe ' community 
participation' in rural development projects (Paul 1 987:2) states that it is 'an 
active process by which beneficiary/cl ient groups influence the direction and 
execution of a development project with a v iew to enhancing their wel l-being in 
terms of income, personal growth, self reliance or other values they cherish . '  
Cemea ( 1 985,  c ited in Wells and Brandon 1 992 :42), describes local participation 
in protected area management 'as empowering people to mobi lise their own 
capacities, be social actors rather than passive subjects, manage the resources, 
make decisions, and control the activities that affect their l ives' . 
The ' instruments' used to promote this participation fall into two categories 
- agents of change and institution building (Wells and Brandon 1 992). Agents 
of change are those individuals associated with external agencies or with in the 
communities whose presence catalyses local involvement in the development 
process (Paul 1 987). The strengthening of existing community institutions, or 
the development of community organisation, is seen as a means which wil l  
provide for continuity of the process that has been establ ished (Midgley 1 986; 
Furphy 1 994 ) .  
The worldwide trend from traditional state control to increased involvement 
of communities in the management of conservation areas which border on, or are 
included in, their lands has led to coining of the term 'community-based 
conservation ' . Western and Wright ( 1 994 :7) described this as an approach that 
' reverses top-down, centre-driven conservation by focusing on the people who 
bear the costs of conservation. . . . .  [C]ommunity-based conservation includes 
natural resources or b iodiversity protection by, for and with the local 
community ' .  L ittle ( 1 994 :348) adds that community-based conservation has two 
outcomes - 'the maintenance of habitats, the preservation of species, or the 
conservation of certain critical resources and .. . improvements of social and 
economic welfare ' .  It is the additional development outcome which 
distinguishes this approach from traditional protected area management. 
Projects which are designed to link biodiversity conservation in protected areas 
with socio-economic development in adjacent communities are termed 
' integrated conservation and development' (ICAD) projects (Brandon and Wells 
1 992; Brown and Wyckoff-Baird 1 992) .  
While attractive in theory, the actual mechanics of l inking b iodiversity 
conservation with rural development as well as encouraging community 
participation in the process has proven to be elusive, extremely chal lenging, and 
has yet to be realised in most cases which are characterised as community-based 
conservation projects (Brown and Wyckoff-Baird 1 992; Wells and Brandon 
1 992; Western and Wright 1 994). 
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• It is not s imply a matter of relying on the traditional conservation bel iefs of 
indigenous residents within and near protected areas. Traditional practices 
alone are often not sufficient to sustain v iable populations of flora and fauna 
under the present-day scenario of increased human population and pressure 
on the natural resource base (Brandon and Wells 1 992; Western and Wright 
1994) . 
• Community participat ion alone cannot be ideal ised as a given solution to 
conservation challenges. Midgley ( 1 986:35), in a h istorical review of 
community participation, reminds us that communities are not homogeneous 
and that they ' suffer from conflicts, rivalries, and factional ism ' .  He states 
that ' a  clearer understanding of these problems would allow a more real istic 
assessment of possibil ities and prepare workers more adequately for the 
problems they wil l  face' .  
• For many reasons, local participation is known to be time consuming and, in 
many cases, the threats to conservation of biodiversity are often imminent 
and urgent (Brandon and Wells 1 992; Little 1 994 ) . The challenge of 
providing tangible community benefits which are derived from the 
conservation of biodiversity often takes time. In the interim, community 
participation may be l imited. 
Given these considerations, it cannot be assumed that most communities 
will sustainably manage resources on their own (Little 1 994) or that natural 
resources can be managed by the state through 'proclamation alone ' (Bromley 
1 994 ) .  The art of crafting the mechanisms which will provide for biodiversity 
conservation and rural development through community participation is the 
challenge facing today's  conservation practitioners. Bromley divided the 
challenge into three parts : 
• to create the means or 'mechanisms' for discussing, reviewing and assessing 
the values of biodiversity conservation; 
• to permit those values to be expressed m policies which incorporate 
incentives for conservation; and 
• to implement enforcement procedures to provide assurance that conservation 
actual ly results . 
'A community-based conservation programme with any hope of success will 
contain all three elements ' ( ibid :345) .  
The recognition of customary land tenure in Papua New Guinea (PNG) 
provides a unique pol icy environment where some degree of participation by 
rural communities is obl igatory for the establishment and management of a 
protected area. In a survey of n inety-nine parks in thirty-e ight countries around 
the world, there were only 2 1  percent in which local people had legal title to all 
or part of the reserve (Zube and Busch 1 990). Traditional landowners in PNG 
retain guaranteed ownership of their land and maintain an unprecedented level of 
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control of the resources on their land. Successful conservation in PNG, more 
than anywhere, wil l  have to rely on landowner management. 
This paper presents an analytical framework to assess the aspects of 
community participation which have been used in the effort to establish the 
Crater Mountain Wildl ife Management Area in PNG. The results of the Crater 
Mountain case are compared to other community-based conservation initiatives. 
Lessons are drawn for conservation practitioners about the realistic use and 
constraints of community participation for establishing protected areas in l ight of 
the PNG experience . 
The Crater Mountain Wildlife Management Area 
Biological Significance 
The Crater Mountain Wild l ife Management Area (WMA) encompasses 
approximately 2, 700 square ki lometres, of which 98 percent is covered by 
primary forest ranging from the lowland rainforest of the Purari River (50 metres 
asl) on the Great Papuan Plain to montane cloud forest on the slopes of Crater 
Mountain (3 , 1 00 metres asl) .  A diverse collection of flora and fauna indicate 
that the Crater Mountain biota is very species-rich and, as such, constitutes a 
natural resource of national and global importance (Alcorn and Beehler 1 993). 
National Legislation 
Crater Mountain was gazetted as a national Wildlife Management Area on 1 4  
October 1 994. The Fauna (Protection and Control) Act o f  1 976 provides for the 
establ ishment of WMAs to be declared by the Department of Environment and 
Conservation (DEC) upon request by the customary owners of the land. The 
landowners submit to the national government a legal description of the 
boundaries of the area to be gazetted as the WMA, a l ist of the clan leaders who 
wil l  sit on the local Wild l ife Management Committees, and the rules which the 
Management Committee establishes for use of natural resources in the WMA. 
The boundaries, committees and laws are reviewed by the DEC, and if not 
conflicting with any other national laws, are gazetted by the national parliament 
and recognised as the governing body and laws of the conservation area. 
Despite their title, WMAs can be more accurately described as multiple-use 
areas whose objectives are to encourage sustainable use of subsistence resources 
by customary landholders, protect biodiversity, gain formal recognition of tenure 
and resource ownership, provide sustainable opportunities for income 
generation, protect cultural values, and provide for scientific research and 
educational opportunities (Hedemark and Sekhran 1 995) .  
Given these objectives, PNG legislation does provide a ferti le foundation 
for attaining the three elements for successful community-based conservation as 
identified by Bromley ( 1 994) . Communities can actual ly establ ish a protected 
area if they feel that the biodiversity which they own has some value to them if it 
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is conserved. Through their management committees, communities can create 
the policies which provide incentives to practise sustainable resource use, and 
they can prosecute individuals who violate the rules. However, given the 
heterogeneous nature of local communities, and the traditional lack of 
collaboration among clans over a large geographic area in PNG, how can we 
e�pect communities to be able to progress beyond the establishment of small, 
isolated protected tracts without further technical assistance? Will WMAs 
remain as 'paper parks' ,  where gazettal takes place but no mechanisms are put in 
place to realise the conservation goal? Despite the existence of favourable 
legislation, it has been found throughout the world that most communities 
cannot be left alone with the expectation that they wil l  be able to 'defend and 
conserve their resources in a sustainable fashion ' (Little 1 994 :349). 
Community Profile 
Crater Mountain WMA covers the territories of two language groups, the Gimi 
and Pawaia speakers, and parts of three provinces - Chimbu, Gulf, and Eastern 
Highlands. Approximately 3 ,000 Gimi occupy the northern half of the WMA 
area, and are concentrated in an arc that runs through the vil lages of Herowana, 
Ubaigubi and Maimafu (see Map 1 8 . 1  ). The only road access is to Ubaigubi on 
the northern boundary of the WMA, with access to the remainder of the 
communities by grass airstrips. The southern half of the WMA is inhabited by 
approximately 600 Pawaians who have settled around an airstrip to create the 
vil lage of Haia. 
Map 18. 1 :  Crater Mountain Wildlife Management Area. 
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The Gimi v i llages in this area are traditional high land ' big-man' societies . 
Each clan has one or more 'b ig-men' who maintain their positions through their 
ski l ls as politicians or fight leaders. The Gimi are subsistence farmers who 
practise shifting agriculture or swidden farming. The Pawaians are semi­
nomadic people whose primary subsistence is obtained through hunting and 
gathering with l imited short-term cropping. Pawaian society is built around the 
immediate fami ly. They are true forest-dwel l ing people, travelling around their 
land in small bands which usually number less than twenty. Crater Mountain 
landowners are responsible for their own land which may be days away from the 
airstrip where they are settled. Use of the forest is restricted to the principal 
landowner and his immediate fami ly. Others require permission before they are 
allowed to cut, hunt or trespass. As with any vi llage violations, cases are 
reviewed by a v i llage court composed of community representatives who hear 
publ ic testimony on the case, pass judgment, and verify the fines imposed on 
offenders. 
Approximately 80 percent of the men and 50 percent of the women in the 
WMA speak Tok Pis in .  Only 30  percent of the WMA residents are actually 
l iterate in Tok Pisin, and less than l percent speak English (James 1 996) . 
Government-sponsored community schools have been present in Maimafu, 
Herowana and Haia for only the last two to six years, and may offer the standard 
grades from one to six if teachers and funding are avai lable. There is a 
rudimentary aid post in each v i llage and at least one tradestore which sells basic 
suppl ies such as salt, rice, candles and canned fish. Outside of the research, eco­
tourism, and handicraft enterpri ses, cash income is earned through the sale of 
coffee or the products of hunting. 
Threats to Biodiversity 
Land use impacts on biodiversity include sago plantings, sweet potato garden 
plots, and the cutting of wood for fuel or local timber use . Hunting for 
subsistence and commercial purposes has already extirpated some species of 
game species in some regions of the WMA. Cuscus and tree kangaroo 
populations are seriously depleted. Cassowary populations are sti l l  strong, but 
the h igh rate of removal of cassowary chicks suggests a s ignificant population 
crash might occur in a few years with the death of the existing adult populations 
(personal communication, Andrew Mack, 1 995). An increasing human 
population in the region wil l  continue to have an escalating impact throughout 
the area. The delivery of community serv ices (education and health) to rural 
areas in PNG is hampered by their remoteness and the corresponding lack of 
infrastructure required for socio-economic development. One of the few options 
which seems to exist for the sat isfaction of community cash needs and the 
development of infrastructure in these areas is the sale of natural resources such 
as m inerals or t imber. Hence the need for alternative forms of cash-generating 
activity. 
PNG national government policies and rules regarding resource extraction 
in national protected areas could have a significant impact on biodiversity in the 
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area. The southern lowlands of the WMA, on the north side of the Purari River 
boundary, are included in the PNG Forest Authority' s  designation of Turama 
Extension Timber Permit TP2- 1 2A, Forest Management Area (FMA) B lock 3 .  
Logging i n  this timber permit area i s  scheduled to begin i n  the near future 
(PNGF A 1 996). In the northwestern quarter of the WMA, Exploration Licence 
1 1 1 5 is the subject of exploration work by the Australian mining company BHP 
(Post-Courier, 30 August 1 995,  1 5  February 1 996). 
Crater Mountain !CAD Project 
The Crater Mountain Integrated Conservation and Development (ICAD) 
initiative informally began in 1 982 with the first attempts to establ ish a national 
protected area whi le addressing the socio-economic aspirations of the local 
landowners through the development of environmentally sensitive enterprises. 
Since its initiation, the primary goal of the project has been the long-term 
conservation of biodiversity in the Crater Mountain area through the integration 
of conservation and development components to achieve the product of a 
functional national WMA as described under the national legislation. The 
Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), an international non-governmental 
conservation organisation within the New York Zoological Society, was the first 
conservation agency to sponsor researchers and fieldworkers in the project area 
as early as 1 975 . The WCS was also instrumental in the establishment of the 
national non-governmental organisation which is cal led the Research and 
Conservation Foundation of PNG (RCF) in 1 986, and which now functions as 
the lead agency in the Crater Mountain project. Over the years, numerous 
national and international governmental and non-governmental agencies have 
provided financial and technical assistance to the RCF and the WCS in the 
implementation of the project. 
The effort to establ ish a national WMA had very informal beginnings which 
developed from contact between expatriate scientists and the landowners in the 
area. It is important to note that these personal relationships were, for more than 
a decade, the means by which gazettal of the WMA and establishment of 
fledgling eco-enterprises in research and eco-tourism developed. It was not unti l 
1 993 , with the achievement of formal gazettal of the Gimi and Pawaian lands as 
a national WMA, that the ongoing activities took on the official title of a 
'project' with the fol lowing documented objectives (RCF/WCS 1 995) :  
• to increase the average annual per capita income of clans (landowning 
groups) from the establ ishment of local ly-owned research and eco-tourism 
enterprises in the WMA; 
• to increase the level and range of understanding and ski l ls  of community 
residents who work in the research and eco-tourism enterprises in the WMA; 
• to increase the number of decisions and actions which integrate the results of 
enterprise, biological, and socio-economic monitoring programmes in a 
WMA management plan; and 
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• to increase national involvement and human resource exchange within the 
WMA as teachers, trainers and consultants work towards conserving its 
natural resources. 
The first two objectives had been informal ly in place since the first discussions 
with the Gimi tribe in the 1 970s. The last two objectives evolved later with the 
realisation that the establ ishment of environmentally-sound and sustainable 
businesses was not possible without a process for assessment and for increased 
national involvement at all levels .  Today, the emphasis of conservation efforts 
in the Crater Mountain area is on building the capacity of local communities and 
their organisations to assume the principal role of managing the operations in the 
WMA. As such, the project is an ambitious effort to engage an extremely high 
level of community participation in management of the conservation and 
development components of the WMA. 
Agents of Change and Community Institutions in the WMA 
Field Researchers 
Expatriate scientists were among the first outsiders to spend extended periods of 
time with WMA communities. Their concern for the unique biodiversity and 
cultures of the area was the impetus for their ongoing informal dialogue with 
Crater communities about mechanisms for establ ishing and operating the WMA 
and the associated eco-enterprises. The length of stay and local impact of field 
researchers has varied over the last two decades; some have stayed on ly a few 
weeks or months, whi le others have developed long-term friendships with 
members of Crater communities, some returning for intermittent periods of up to 
twenty years. Most field researchers have shown respect for the cultures of the 
WMA and an obvious adm iration and enthusiasm for the WMA's  unique natural 
resources. Most have been d i l igent workers who have enthusiastical ly l ived and 
laboured in their fieldwork alongside residents of the WMA who were their 
assistants, guides and companions. 
A s ignificant example of such relationships is found in the involvement of 
an Austral ian photographer, David Gi l l i son, who has worked with the Gimi 
tribes since 1 973 . In the early years of his work, he returned for consecutive 
seasons to his field s ite near Ubaigubi v i l lage, where his original interest in the 
recording of Gimi ritual theatre led him to the forest with Gimi men to document 
the d isplays of the birds of paradise from which they said that the cultural theatre 
had evolved (Gi l l ison 1 983) .  These interactions sol idified a strong mutual 
respect and commitment between Gil l ison and community members, which gave 
rise to the first informal discussions with Gimi vi l lagers about the status of these 
unique birds and the mutual concern for their physical decl ine and the Joss of the 
associated traditions .  
A similar relationsh ip between community and scientist evolved in the 
southern half of the WMA, where biologists Andy Mack and Deb Wright came 
to work on Pawaian land near Haia in 1 987. In the process of bui ld ing a 
research station and conducting five years of fieldwork, they engaged in ongoing 
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dialogue with Pawaian community members about the uniqueness of Crater' s 
natural resources and the land use options which the Pawaians were considering. 
Along with Gil l ison, Mack, and Wright came numerous field assistants who later 
came back to do further studies of their own . In this way, a unique 'fami ly' of 
scientists has evolved, who l ive and work with the Gimi and Pawaia on various 
studies of natural resources in their forests. 
Fieldworkers 
From 1 984, the project began to place resident and intermittent fieldworkers as 
trainers in the WMA. They were both expatriate and national, and included 
biologists, teachers, small business development advisers, and rural community 
development workers. The focus of their work has been on providing technical 
assistance to vi l lage counterparts in business, community development and 
WMA management. Expatriates initial ly played a central role in project 
implementation at the local level ,  but as of 1 995,  they have been in volunteer 
and advisory positions only, with national staff or community counterparts 
directly responsible for field implementation . As with the scientists, most 
resident fieldworkers who have stayed for periods of two years or more have 
formed close friendships with Crater Mountain communities. 
Business trainers in the position of tourism lodge managers were first 
present in Ubaigubi from 1 983 to 1 986. In 1 990, the project began to uti l ise 
United States Peace Corps (USPC) rural community development volunteers as 
field trainers. The USPC programme requires that the vil lage provide bush 
material housing for the volunteer in return for the technical assistance which 
they receive. The volunteer is initiated into a development philosophy wherein 
his or her role is to train and support vi l lage counterparts, and not to lead and do 
work for the community that it does not want to do for itself. S ince 1 990, seven 
USPC couples have served in WMA communities, and volunteers are sti l l  
working with the project in three of the five WMA vil lages. 
In 1 993, the WCS placed the first resident field coordinators and scientists 
on the project staff in the WMA. While the USPC volunteers continued to work 
with small business and community service committees, the field coordinators 
were assigned to strengthen and assist the clan leaders who sat on the newly­
formed WMA management committees. The coordinators also l ive in vi l lage 
housing and spend much of their time in community meetings, as well as on the 
trai ls of the WMA. As the first field coordinator, Jam ie James became known 
and admired by the communities for his capacity to briskly patrol the rugged 
country between all five WMA vil lages. James was fol lowed by two national 
biologists, John Ericho and Robert Bino, who have been equal ly well received 
and respected as mentors to Crater Mountain communities. 
Community Committees/Institutions and Vil lage Coordinators 
Community committees are composed of clan representatives whose selection 
and responsibi lities vary with the function of the committee. The institution 
which governs the general operation of the WMA, and also the research and/or 
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eco-tourism business in each community, is known as the 'management 
committee ' of that community. It is responsible for composing the laws of the 
WMA, enforc ing the rules and assessing land use practices. The institution 
which governs operation of the handicraft businesses in Herowana and Ubaigubi 
is called the ' handicrafts business committee' .  In some cases, community 
workers called 'v i llage coordinators' or ' station managers' have been selected 
from or by the comm ittees to carry out specified duties. These individuals are 
often community leaders who have originally volunteered for a leadership role 
or have previously worked with field researchers at the s ite. 
Methods for Assessing Processes and Outcomes of Community 
Participation in the Crater Mountain WMA 
In this section, I shall briefly describe the processes that have been used for 
engaging community participation and the resulting extent of participation which 
has been ach ieved in the Crater Mountain ICAD project from its informal 
inception in 1 982 up to the present. To assist in this assessment, an analytical 
framework was developed (see Table 1 8 . l  ) .  It is modelled after Shripton ( 1 989, 
cited in Oakley 1 99 1 ), who used the method to assess the community 
participation aspects of health care and nutrition projects . The framework 
identifies seven indicators which represent aspects of community participation 
which must be present to some degree in order to establ ish a functional protected 
area which is actually managed by the landowner communities. These are: 
• Needs assessment and action choice, which indicates the extent of 
community involvement in determining the need for, and the choice of, an 
action in some aspect of the operation of the WMA. 
• Training and agents of change, which indicates the extent of techn ical and 
management training which the community is receiving in order to bui ld a 
capacity to operate some aspect of the WMA. Agents of change may include 
any external fieldworkers from an agency associated with the project area or 
community members from within the WMA who have been used to influence 
the level of community participation. 
• Organisational structure and institutional presence, which indicates the 
extent of development of community organ isation and institutions involved in 
some aspect the operation of the WMA, and which also shows how wel l  the 
organisation incorporates and represents the existing power structure of the 
commun ity. 
• Leadership, which indicates the extent of community leadersh ip (ranging 
from none to a few individuals to full community representation) which is 
active in the operation of some aspect of the WMA. 
• Management, which indicates the extent of management actions (assigning 
duties or coordinating the work of others) being conducted by community 
leaders and/or institutions in the operation of some aspect of the WMA. 
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• Resource mobilisation, which indicates the extent of funds or in-kind services 
which are being contributed by the community, its leaders and/or institutions, 
to the operation of some aspect of the WMA. 
• Monitoring and evaluation, which indicates the extent of community 
involvement in the col lection, uti l isation, and dissemination of information to 
evaluate the operation of some aspect of the WMA. 
With the exception of training, which is an indicator of external input, it is felt 
that all indicators of community participation must approach Level 5 if operation 
of the WMA is to be sustained over the long term without continued external 
inputs. 1 
The framework is used to specifically assess and rank the presence and 
extent of community participation in two aspects of the operation of the WMA 
over the history of the Crater Mountain project. These two aspects are 
community involvement in: 
• WMA development, or management of the WMA itself, meaning the 
processes of establ ishing the WMA and its operating policies and procedures 
as related to natural resource use; and 
• eco-enterprise development, or management of the eco-enterprises, including 
handicrafts, research, and eco-tourism, within in the WMA, and the processes 
for starting and maintaining such economic enterprises. 
These two areas were selected for analysis as they represent the change over 
time in the level of community participation in the 'C'  (conservation) and the 
'D'  (development) components of the ICAD formula for establ ishing a 
functional WMA. A discrete analysis for WMA and eco-enterprise operations 
was conducted for each of the four principal communities in the WMA -
Ubaigubi, Herowana, Maimafu, and Haia. Each has a un ique community profile 
and history of involvement in the development and management of the WMA. 
Because of the informal beginnings of the Crater Mountain project, indicators of 
participation were not predetermined and have not been formal ly monitored over 
the entire length of the project, as recommended (Oakley 1 99 1  ). Descriptions 
and assessments of participation processes have been derived from the historical 
trail of written records, reports, minutes, and personal communication from 
community members and project staff. 
1 The conceptual framework ranks resident trainers as the most desirable (Level 5). While this is 
seen as desirable as a ' means' to community participation, it should not be viewed as the 'end ' .  As 
the community reaches high levels of participation in the other indicator areas (action choice, 
organisation, leadership, etc.), it is expected that community participation wil l  provide for 
sustainable operation of the WMA, while the need for training correspondingly declines. 
Table 18.1 : An analytical framework for judging community participation aspects of ICAD projects. � 0 N 
Indicator 1. Nothing/narrow 2. Restricted/small 3. Mean/fair 4. Open/good 5. Wide/excellent 
Needs None All done by outsiders Done by outsiders, but Assessment by Community does � � 
assessment and with no community discussed with community; outsider assessment, analysis, � 
action choice involvement community helps in analysis and and action choice c :::-: reQresentatives action choice ..... �-Train ing and Limited technical and Technical and Intermittent on-site Ongoing on-site Short local training s::i 
agents of management training management training at training and technical and courses plus regular on-
-
� change for CC and CW(s) remote institutions with management training by management train ing by site training by resident c 
l ittle on-site training visiting trainers resident trainers trainers ::::: c 
Organisational No organisational New organisational New organisational Active cooperation with Existing community � structure structure present on site structure has l imited structure has become existing comm-unity organisations involved 
to SUQQOrt activit� l inks with communit� ve!2'. active organisations in control l ing activities � 
Leadership One-sided CW(s) working indep- Organisational support CC active and taking CC fully represents � 
organisational support endently of social inter- functioning under the initatives in variety of interests in � � 
dominated by project est groups or comm- leadership of combination with community and controls t;..i ..... 
staff unit� SUQQOrt structure indeQendent CW{s} CW{s} CW{s} � Management CW(s) supervised by CC present, but any CC self-managed but CC self-managed and CW(s) responsible to, ::::: 
outsider or project staff CW(s) independent of does not supervise involved in supervision and actively supervised � 
CC, and both depend- CW(s) of CW(s) by, CC � Sf ent on Qroject staff � ::::: Resou rce No resource Funds and contribut- Funds and contribut- Funds and contribut- CC raises funds or ..... 
mobil isation contribution by ions collected, but CCs ions collected; CCs ions collected; CCs col lects contributions, s· 
community; any CW(s) have no control over have control of have control of spend- and controls allocation � 
externally funded spending, and CW(s) spending, but CW(s) ing; CW(s) voluntary or of money, including � 
externall� Qaid externall� Qaid Qartl� Qaid b� CC E!a�ment of CW{s} 
s:: s::i 
Monitoring No formal information Information collected Information col lected CC receives relevant CC disseminates � and evaluation system in place for by, or sent to, outside by CW(s) who are information from information so that � 
evaluation of experts but not fed back monitoring CW(s), and is aware of community is aware of CJ 
conservation and/or to CC conservation and/or project progress, project progress, s:: 
develoQment Qrocesses develoQment E!rocesses Qroblems, and benefits Qroblems, and benefits s· � 
Note: CC = community committee or institution identified to manage an activity in the community (e.g. protected area management, business management, 
s::i 
etc . ) ;  C W(s) = community worker(s) ( i .e .  one or more community leaders who take action on a project activity independent of, or in collaboration with, a 
community committee or institution. 
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Results : The Crater Mountain Story 
Community Participation in Development of the WMA 
In this section, the processes for engaging community participation in the 
development of the WMA are described . The extent of community participation 
achieved in each WMA community by uti l ising these processes was ranked 
according to the framework (see Table 1 8 . 1 )  and is shown in Figure 1 8 . 1 .  
Results are shown separately for each WMA vi l lage. The years of assessment 
for each community begin from the time of arrival of the first 
fieldworkers/researchers. 
Training and Agents of Change in WMA Development 
From 1 982 to 1 992, intermittent fieldworkers and researchers met with 
communities to introduce the WMA concept and assist in the establ ishment of 
WMA committees. David Gi l l ison worked closely with the Gimi communities 
in the north, whi le researchers Andy Mack and Deb Wright were engaged in 
dia logue with the Pawaians to the south. The first resident fieldworker, Jamie 
James, arrived in 1 992 to conduct ongoing on-site technical and management 
training in WMA development. In 1 995 and 1 996, the first national resident 
fieldworkers, John Ericho and Robert B ino, were placed in the WMA 
communities of Maimafu, Herowana, and Haia. Intermittent assistance from 
field researchers is sti l l  ongoing. 
Needs Assessment and Action Choice 
From 1 982 to 1 992, the process leading up to gazettal of the lands of Crater 
Mountain as a national WMA consisted of numerous meetings and conversations 
between the researchers and the landowners. For the most part, the need to 
protect the unique biodiversity of the area was an externally driven assessment 
which was discussed with local communities. The possible exception to this was 
in Ubaigubi v i l lage, where clan leaders volunteered the assessment that 
culturally important birds of paradise were decl ining because of overhunting by 
the young men. The leaders voiced thi s  concern to Gi l l ison who became 
instrumental in initiating talks with DEC and various international donors, which 
in turn led to the introduction of the WMA concept to the clan leaders . 
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Figure 18. 1 :  Crater Mountain commuJlity participation m WMA development 
from 1 993 (grey) to 1 996 (black). 
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To engage communities in the planning process for the WMA, Gil l ison 
made numerous patrols to hold informal meetings in the men ' s  houses and with 
individual fami l ies, as wel l  as formal meetings with 'big men' from several 
Gimi clans. During these forums, the idea of creating a WMA was introduced 
and discussed. The neighbouring Pawaians heard of the meetings between 
Gil lison and the Gimi, and discussed their interest in possible involvement in the 
WMA in conversations with researchers Mack and Wright. Based on the 
Pawaian interest, representatives of the RCF and the DEC made a brief 
helicopter v isit to Haia to request the names of clan leaders who would be 
interested in serving on a WMA committee. When gazettal of the WMA was 
achieved, a resident fieldworker, Jamie James, was placed in the WMA to hold 
regular meetings with the newly-formed management committees to develop the 
laws and enforcement procedures. 
The result of this process has been that community participation in the 
choice to establ ish the Crater Mountain WMA has ranged from 'fair' (Level 3)  
to 'good' (Level 4) (see Figure 1 8 . 1 ) . What began as an external assessment of 
the need to establ ish the WMA later evolved into a community action choice to 
proceed, although the communities' reasons for taking this action were different 
from those of the RCF and the WCS.  The reaction of most communities to the 
discussion about establishment of the WMA was that they hoped it would 
quickly bring development in the form of cash income, employment, and an 
improvement in serv ices (health, education, and transportation infrastructure) 
which the government had sti l l  failed to del iver to these remote areas. Gimi 
landowners, worried about the encroachments of neighbouring clans, also saw 
WMA gazettal as a means to gain formal recognition of their land ownership. 
The Pawaians, with a much lower population density and isolated from the rest 
of the country, came to fieldworkers and researchers seeking advice about how 
to deal with the rumours of all sorts of 'development' .  
During the numerous meetings between fieldworkers and clan leaders in al l 
parts of the WMA, the rhetoric from the RCF and the WCS was that they wanted 
to achieve the conservation of natural resources, but recognised the development 
needs and desires of the communities. For that reason, they proposed the 
adoption of the WMA multiple-use strategy, in which they hoped to be able to 
assist the communities to implement development activities that were also 
compatible with conservation of biodiversity. In general, there was, and 
continues to be, confusion and m isunderstanding on the part of the communities 
about the substance and method of what the WMA will actually del iver in the 
form of cash income, employment, and community development. 
Organisational Structure and Institutional Presence 
The process of establ ish ing WMA management committees began after clans 
indicated an interest in including their lands in the proposed WMA. Based on 
national legislation, a representative of each landowning clan must sit on the 
management committee . In community meetings with fieldworkers, clans were 
asked to nominate their representatives. No formal social mapping was 
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conducted by the RCF or the WCS.  Identification of clans was volunteered 
during the meetings and through the acquaintance of field researchers with clans 
based on their years of affiliation with the WMA communities. The first 
management committee, representing seven Gimi clans, was organised with the 
assistance of Gil lison in 1 986. Committees were established to represent a total 
of twenty-one clans in al l  four WMA communities in order for official gazettal 
to take place, although there was sti l l considerable confusion on the part of the 
landowners about what a WMA was, and what the role and responsibilities of 
the committee members were . It was recognised by the RCF and the WCS that a 
resident fieldworker was needed to assist the committees in their development. 
James worked with all the committees in the WMA by constantly patrol l ing 
between the communities over the next two years. The rugged terrain and lack 
of radio communication between sites meant that James could only organise 
meetings with committee members at each site once every three months. A 
significant portion of his work was done by informal ly talking with people while 
walking and l iving with them on patrol .  With the lag in time between meetings, 
James found that committees did not function well ,  and were often at a stalemate 
over any action or decis ion prior to his return visit. Based on this assessment, 
the RCF and the WCS placed four resident field staff in the WMA, one in each 
of the major vi l lages .  John Ericho and Robert Bino have brought considerable 
cultural insight to the task of developing the capacities of joint clan committees, 
and they have worked with biologists Chris Fi lardi and Ross Sinclair, who have 
provided on-site technical support in protected area planning and management. 
At present, the twenty-one clans are represented by sixty-four members in 
four communities. The Gim i representatives are the 'big men ' of each clan . 
Within clans, there are subgroups who have had to be consulted by the clan 
leader before land use decisions can be made. Original ly, these individuals also 
sat on the committees unti l the latter became too large for effective decision 
making. As an alternative, each 'big man'  selects a younger man from his clan 
to also be present at meetings . The younger man wi ll normal ly speak Tok Pisin 
as wel l  as the Gimi vernacular, and may have a wider range of experience in 
activities outside of the traditional l ife of the WMA. The Pawaians do not have 
traditional clan leaders, but elect two representatives of each landowning clan as 
voting members of the management committee. Since the Pawaians are semi­
nomadic, it often happens that the two representatives wil l  not both be in 
attendance at the same time. 
The result of this process has been that community participation in 
management committees in Crater Mountain has moved from "minimal '  to 
' restricted ' (Level 2) or even ' good ' (Level 4) in some vi J Jages (see Figure 1 8 . 1 ) . 
Only the Herowana committee could be categorised as becoming active when it 
hosted the first Annual WMA Meeting in 1 993 and began to meet regularly with 
James. With continued techn ical assistance, the Herowana committee has 
assumed a more powerful role in the community and can now be considered as 
approaching Level 4. It has incorporated two female leaders of community 
women's  groups onto the management committee and is considering inclusion 
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of representatives from community government, the school, and the health 
centre in order to strengthen connections to other community institutions. 
Other communities remain at Levels 2 and 3 in organisational development 
and continue to be quite dependent on field staff for assistance. All  committees 
are holding intermittent meetings, are involved in designing WMA rules and 
enforcement procedures, and are involved in discussions over procedures for 
deal ing with land use issues such as WMA entry fees and mineral exploration 
leases. Some have taken action to enforce WMA laws over the i l legal harvesting 
of wildl ife, access for research activity, and unauthorised mineral exploration. 
Leadership 
The process of fostering leadership in the development of the WMA was 
undertaken by field staff working with individuals who initial ly came forward 
with an expressed interest in WMA establishment. From 1 982 to 1 992, these 
were community members who had either worked for Gil l ison at his research 
site or became friends with him during his patrols to other Gim i vi l lages. In 
Haia, they were individuals who had assumed leadersh ip roles in fieldwork with 
Wright and Mack. Later, one or two from each vi l lage were jointly selected by 
the field staff and the community to officially serve as vil lage coordinators and 
work with James on committee organ isation and development after WMA 
gazettal . Initial ly, the vi l lage coordinators received a stipend from the RCF for 
this work, but they often had difficulty in securing community cooperation and 
support under this arrangement because of other people ' s  jealousy, even though 
they were elected representatives of the committees. Stipends for coordinators 
were discontinued and some individuals ceased their involvement. For those 
who remained, traditional clan loyalties have hampered their capacity to 
effectively represent and work with the many clans present in each community. 
Even for individuals who have sincerely attempted to work with al l clans, 
considerable suspicion by others in the community remains an obstacle. In 
Pawaian culture, the additional customary absence of 'big-man' leadersh ip and 
formal organisation puts considerable stress on those individuals who stand out 
from the rest of the community. 
· 
The result is that community participation in leadership in WMA 
development rel ied on the intermittent external fieldworker in the early years of 
the project (Level 1 )  (see Figure 1 8 . 1 ) . Two communities, Herowana and 
Maimafu, seem to be approaching Level 4 by having a management committee 
and a designated vi l lage coordinator who are beginning to work together in 
WMA operations. Because of cultural and historical differences, Haia and 
Ubaigubi sti l l  lack th is unified leadersh ip, and it is mainly indiv iduals who play 
a prominent role (Level 2). 
Management 
The process of building the management capacity of the management 
committees had its beginnings in 1 986, when Gill ison worked with the first 
committee of Gimi clans to define their seven operating ru les for the proposed 
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WMA. Discussion and implementation of the rules did not proceed further unti l  
the p lacement of James and the first WMA annual meeting of all twenty-one 
clans in Herowana. In the quarterly committee meetings that followed in each 
community, James would assist members with discussion about what actions 
needed to be taken by the committee on WMA laws or their enforcement, and 
with assigning the coordinator to take action on behalf of the committee. These 
procedures are revisited at each annual meeting, whose venue rotates among the 
WMA vi llages. With the placement of Ericho, B ino, Fi lardi, and Sinclair, most 
committees now meet on a monthly basis. With some assistance, minutes are 
kept and committee procedures are being practised and slowly understood by the 
members. Landowners have come up with a preliminary designation of land use 
zones for protection of biodiversity through restricted use, and for the practice of 
subsistence activities (James 1 995), but these remain to be mapped and the 
conservation implications further discussed with the assistance of field staff. 
The result is that community participation in management is as yet 
'minimal ' at most s ites (see Figure 1 8 . 1 ) . With the exception of Herowana, all 
management committees are stil l  rel iant on resident fieldworkers to advise them 
(Level 2) when they conduct meetings. The Herowana Management Committee, 
which has benefited from more experience and training, is now capable of 
holding independent meetings and directing the actions of the coordinator at 
times (Level 4). Previously, the coordinator was working independently of the 
committee, as the members were not c lear about their own roles or the means to 
direct his action. The Herowana Management Committee has collected fines 
over violations related to five of the seventeen WMA laws (see Appendix) since 
October 1 995 .  In Haia, they have col lected fines over one violation and taken 
action on two others. WMA laws remain in the early stages of development, 
they await review by the DEC, and some require modification where they violate 
existing national policies . 
Resource Mobil isation 
The process of encouraging resource mobil isation by the community for 
development of the WMA has been especial ly challenging. The costs of WMA 
operation have evolved to include stipends for coordinators and ordinary 
committee members, travel for members to conduct committee business, and the 
hosting of WMA annual meetings. Vil lage coordinators in most WMA 
communities were original ly external ly funded by the RCF and the WCS, being 
paid a wage for work with researchers which indirectly compensated for their 
involvement in development of the WMA. To reduce this dependence on 
outside support, efforts were made by the RCF and the WCS to assist 
communities to generate funds internally. Since 1 994, field staff have worked 
with management committees to develop mechanisms to col lect fees to finance 
WMA operations. Funds are now collected through a 1 0  percent surcharge on 
all expenditures made by cl ients of WMA eco-enterprises (researchers and 
tourists who pay for accommodation, guides, carriers, and research assistants), 
WMA entry fees for researchers and tourists, and fines collected for violation of 
WMA laws by WMA residents or v isitors. In addition, in-kind community 
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contributions of land, labour, or bush materials are requested before any external 
input is considered by the RCF for WMA infrastructure development. 
As a result of these mechanisms, management committees now have the 
potential to be self-supporting. The focus of training is now on guiding the 
committees in principles of financial planning and reinvestment so that all funds 
are not simply disbursed as stipends but are util ised for committee operation, 
maintenance of infrastructure, and socio-economic development in the 
community. This is being done by field staff in the regular meetings with 
committees as they discuss the impl ications and possibilities of each action and 
expenditure with the committee members . 
The result of th is process has been that community participation in resource 
mobi l isation in the form of funds or in-kind services which are being contributed 
by the community to the operation of the WMA has increased in al l communities 
(see Figure 1 8 . 1 ). This began in 1 994, when the committees began to control 
expenditures but vi l lage coordinators were sti l l  paid by external agencies (Level 
3 ). In 1 996, the coordinators can be partial ly paid by the management 
committee or they can work voluntarily, but they are not subsidised by external 
funding (Level 4). None are currently paid by their committee, although some 
coordinators are also involved in management of WMA eco-enterprises from 
which they continue to receive some wage through the business, which offsets 
their current voluntary work with the management committee. 
Monitorini and Evaluation 
The process of engaging the community in the collection, uti l isation, and 
dissemination of information to evaluate the operation of the WMA and the 
status of biodiversity conservation is sti l l  in an informal stage. Fieldworkers 
assist management committees to record minutes of each meeting. Decisions 
about WMA operations are documented and reviewed at each consecutive 
meeting. WMA laws have been translated into Tok Pisin and posted by each 
management committee to encourage review and comment. To involve 
communities in evaluation of biodiversity, resident fieldworkers and researchers 
in Haia worked with the community coordinator and community members to 
implement the beginning of the Trained Local Observer (TLO) programme. 
Landowners in the WMA can now receive certification in, and work as, 'trained 
research assistants ' {TRAs) or ' trained local observers' {TLOs ) .  The former are 
qualified to work on a research project under the supervision of a guest scientist 
or student in the WMA, while the latter have been trained to a level where they 
can independently conduct simple repetitive monitoring of selected species. 
Fifteen TLOs have received preliminary training in the monitoring of selected 
mammals, birds, plants, and amphibians. Three are now monitoring amphibian 
populations in the southern end of the WMA as an indication of ecosystem 
health. Three others are involved in an orchid inventory project with the PNG 
Forest Research Institute . None of them have yet reached the stage of formally 
feeding th is information back to the management committees, although this 
practice is expected to evolve. 
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The result of this process has been that community participation in 
evaluation of the operation of the WMA has grown from 'nothing' to 'fair' (see 
Figure 1 8 . l ). In 1 992, resident fieldworkers and researchers began to 
consistently document the conservation status and operations of the WMA, 
although there was as yet no mechanism to involve community workers in the 
documentation process (Level 2). S ince 1 995,  community members have 
become more involved in the col lection and discussion of information related to 
the operation of the WMA and the status of its natural resources through the 
processes described (Level 3 ). 
Community Participation in Enterprise Development 
In this section, I shal l describe the processes for engaging community 
participation in the development of eco-enterprises in the WMA. The extent of 
community participation achieved in each WMA community by uti l ising these 
processes has been ranked according to the framework (see Table 1 8 . l )  and is 
shown in Figures 1 8 .2 and 1 8 . 3 .  Results are shown separately for each WMA 
vil lage and each business. As in the previous section, the years of assessment 
for each community begin with the time of arrival of the first trainers. 
Figure 18.2 : Crater Mountain community participation in handicraft enterprise 
development from 1 992 (grey) to 1 996 (black). 
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Figure 18.3 : Crater Mountain community participation in tourism and research 
enterprise development from 1 992 (grey) to 1 996 (black). 
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Handicraft businesses have been establ ished in the communities of 
Ubaigubi and Herowana, beginning in 1 990 and 1 992 respectively. They 
special ise in the production of traditional New Guinea highland products, 
including fighting shields, spears, bows, stone axes, mumu bowls, bi/um string 
bags, and more .  These are marketed domestical ly and internationally through 
vi l lage stores and mail order. Research and/or eco-tourism businesses have been 
established and tested in three WMA communities. They have included the 
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Ubaigubi Eco-tourism Lodge ( 1 984- 1 986), the Ubaigubi Rutanabi Guesthouse 
( 1 995-present), the Crater Mountain Biological Research Station (CMBRS) at 
Wara Sera near Haia ( 1 989-present), and the Crater Mountain Biological 
Research Station (CMBRS) at Herowana ( 1 992-present) . All faci l ities feature 
permanent structures with cooking and accommodation for three to ten visitors. 
Research clients include scientists in the natural and social sciences, both 
expatriate and national, from student to professor. Tourism cl ients are typical ly 
bushwalkers or natural history enthusiasts, including birdwatchers and orchid 
specialists, as wel l  as generalists . Marketing is sti l l  informal and primari ly 
conducted by word of mouth from previous visitors . 
Trainini and Aients of Chaoie 
Rural community development volunteers from the United States Peace Corps 
(USPC) were engaged to conduct on-site resident training in Ubaigubi from 
1 9.90 to 1 995 . The USPC model for smal l business training was transferred to 
Herowana in 1 992 to establ ish the Herowana handicrafts business. Additional 
training workshops have been organised with the assistance of handicraft buyers 
in Port Moresby and Goroka. 
Methods of training in eco-tourism and research have been highly variable. 
In Ubaigubi, resident expatriate lodge managers initial ly provided community 
guide, cook, and manager train ing. Training ceased from 1 986 until 1 989, when 
USPC volunteers arrived to provide training for the handicrafts enterprise, some 
of which was appl icable to the potential eco-tourism business. In Herowana, 
some training was provided by the USPC volunteers, but most was dependent on 
fieldworkers assigned to other tasks, such as biological research or work with 
WMA management committees. These staff provided on-site and short local 
training courses for selected community members as eco-tourism guides and 
research assistants, and in eco-tourism product development. At the CMBRS at 
Haia, field researchers served as the resident trainers by providing Pawaians 
with experience as research assistants . Additional training workshops in the 
WMA have used Awareness Community Theatre techniques for role-playing 
tourism and research scenarios. Outside of the WMA, selected community 
members have attended workshops in eco-tourism product planning and study 
tours to guesthouses, research stations, national parks, museums, and 
herbariums. 
Needs Assessment and Action Choice 
Handicrafts. The process resulting in establ ishment of the Ubaigubi handicrafts 
business was initiated by Gi l l i son, who was seeking alternative forms of income 
generation for WMA communities after the col lapse of the eco-tourism lodge in 
Ubaigubi in 1 986. The idea was introduced by USPC volunteers Steve and 
Kristi Booth, and was embraced by a community committee which worked with 
the Booths and later volunteers to develop the business. Other WMA 
communities assessed the successful business activity in Ubaigubi and 
approached the RCF with a request for assistance to establish a simi lar venture. 
The RCF responded with the placement of USPC volunteers in Herowana in 
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1 992, and i n  Haia and Maimafu i n  1 996.  The result of this process has been that 
community participation in the choice to establish the handicrafts enterprises in 
the Crater Mountain WMA has been quite high (see Figure 1 8 .2). 
Research and eco-tourism. The process of initiating the first eco-tourism lodge 
venture in the WMA in the early 1 980s was also based on an assessment by 
Gil l ison, along with representatives from the WCS and private entrepreneurs in 
Goroka who met with community representatives to discuss plans for the 
business . In Haia, the CMBRS was established by Wright and Mack in 1 989 
with the permission of the Pawaian landowners, through external financial 
support and assessment of the need for such a station . The Pawaians were 
pleased with the employment, and requested external assistance to further 
develop the enterprise when Wright and Mack completed their studies. As with 
the handicrafts, the surrounding communities heard of the business activity and 
approached the RCF and the WCS with similar requests for more activity. In 
response, the CMBRS in Herowana was initiated in 1 992, and some 
accommodation units are in the planning stages at Maimafu. The result of this 
process has been that community participation in the choice to establish (and 
discontinue) these businesses has been quite high (see Figure 1 8 .3) .  In 
Ubaigubi, the lodge proved to be financially non-viable after three years of 
operation, as it was dependent on external marketing and management, and 
transportation was costly. Community capacity was not sufficient to maintain or 
even downsize operations when the external institutions withdrew subsidies for 
the operation in 1 986. The community elected to disassemble the lodge and 
discontinue the business despite outside advice that they should reconsider some 
aspects of the operation. 
Or�anisational Structure and Institutional Presence 
Handicrafts. The process of establishing the Handicraft Business Committees 
was undertaken by field staff who asked each clan to nominate a representative 
to serve on the committee. The committee then underwent a five-year period of 
training in which they met once each week with USPC volunteers to practise and 
design systems for obtaining and pricing products from artisans in the 
community, and to conduct bookkeeping, banking, and communications with 
clients. Volunteers were largely responsible for locating the initial markets for 
the products. As the capacity of the committee to carry out these tasks has 
increased, field staff have gradually reduced their involvement in the operations 
each year. The result has been that community participation in the committees 
has ranged from 'restricted ' (Level 2) to 'fair' (Level 3) (see Figure 1 8 .2). In 
Ubaigubi, the committee disbanded in 1 995 after internal conflict over 
misappropriation of funds by a committee member . The Herowana committee 
continues to be very active (Level 3 ). Both businesses market handicrafts from 
most households in their respective communities. Over 1 90 artisans from all 
seven clans participate. 
Research and eco-tourism. The process of establishing the institutions for 
managing eco-tourism and research businesses in the WMA began only after the 
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enterprises were operating for some time. All  were operated by fieldworkers or 
researchers unti l  1 994, when an effort was made by the RCF to begin to transfer 
management of these businesses to the WMA management committee present in 
each community. The result of th is process has been that community 
participation in an institution responsible for operating the research and eco­
tourism enterprises is sti l l  very l imited (see Figure 1 8 .3) and remains heavi ly 
dependent on external assistance. 
Leadership 
Handicrafts. The process of fostering leadersh ip in the handicrafts businesses 
was undertaken by field staff working with the community-selected committee 
to develop their col laborative capacity to operate the business. Every committee 
member was trained in al l tasks that the committee must perform, so that all 
tasks could be performed equal ly wel l  by all members of the group. When a 
dom inant clan leader on the committee m isappropriated funds from the Ubaigubi 
business, a system of checks and balances was built into the Herowana financial 
accounting system such that three or more members must be involved at some 
point in each transaction . When the procedures of the Herowana committee 
have been questioned by the community, field staff have assisted the committee 
in determining and practising appropriate responses. 
The result of this process has been that community participation has been 
good (Level 4) in Herowana where the committee members exh ibit confidence 
in their capacity to understand and operate their business systems (see Figure 
1 8 .2). In Ubaigubi, the committee has dissolved but the single manager is 
apparently competent to operate the business (Level 3). 
Research and eco-tourism. The process of developing community leadership in 
these businesses is just beginning, as management functions are transferred from 
project fieldworkers and researchers to community members. Field staff are 
now holding meetings with the management committees and their coordinators 
in each community to define and develop appropriate systems for operating the 
business. The result is that community participation remains restricted (Level 2) 
(see Figure 1 8 .3) .  Businesses that were once externally run are now run 
collaboratively with individual community leaders on the management 
committees, and only recently expanded to involve others on the management 
committee in Herowana in 1 996 (Level 4). 
Management 
Handicrafts. The process of building the management capacity here required 
that volunteers be present on s ite to provide weekly lessons in basic English and 
Tok Pisin so that orders could be read and processed, in the basic arithmetic 
required for accurate accounting, and in elementary banking procedures, letter 
writing, phone cal l ing, pricing, and product development. Additional workshops 
in pricing and qual ity control have been provided by artefact dealers from Port 
Moresby and Goroka. The result has been that management in Herowana has 
progressed from its original dependency on project fieldworkers (Level 2) to 
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primari ly self-management with intermittent assistance (Level 4) (see Figure 
1 8 .2). All external technical assistance for the Ubaigubi business was 
withdrawn in 1 995,  and the business continues to function under community­
level management. 
Research and eco-tourism. The process of bui lding the management capacity of 
community leaders or institutions in the operation of the WMA research and 
eco-tourism enterprises has involved a variety of training methods. Random 
community members have been elected to attend workshops in and outside of 
the WMA in eco-tourism product planning, and have participated in project­
sponsored study tours to guesthouses, research stations, national parks, 
museums, and herbariums. Selected individuals have also completed elementary 
courses for research ass istants and tourism guides offered by staff and 
researchers in the WMA. The management committee in each community 
governs the work of researchers in the WMA by vetting the letters of request 
from each scientist who wants to work in the WMA. The committee reviews the 
research protocol and grants permission for the selected procedures and time of 
visitation. A concerted effort is now under way to identify and strengthen the 
core group of clan representatives who are establ ishing the procedures to better 
manage the finances and logistics of th is business. The result has been that 
community participation in management remains restricted (see Figure 1 8 .3) .  
Although workers have received training, the management of the business is 
theoretical ly conducted by committees, but is actually rel iant on a single 
community worker who maintains the structure and coordinates eco-tourism 
guides, research assistants, and other vis itor services in the vi l lage . The 
community worker is often not working closely with the committee and is 
dependent on project staff for assistance (Level 2). 
Resource Mobil isation 
Handicrafts. The communities achieved an encouraging level of resource 
mobil isation without start-up funds from the RCF or the WCS.  The committees 
in itial ly worked on a voluntary basis, and proceeds from the first sales were 
sufficient to cover their subsequent costs of operation. Proceeds from sales are 
managed by the committee with the help of the volunteers, and are used to pay 
artisans, committee stipends, business expenses, and contributions to a 
community fund. Sales in Herowana have increased substantial ly, with proceeds 
in the last year equal to the total of the first three years of operation. The 
Ubaigubi handicrafts business is also self-sufficient financially. Community 
participation has been excel lent (see Figure 1 8 .2) because funds were 
immediately avai lable to compensate committee members and artisans for their 
work. 
Research and eco-tourism. In these businesses, the process of resource 
mobil isation has been more difficult since start-up and maintenance costs are 
much greater. Fees for the use of research stations and guesthouses were first 
col lected by the management committees at rates determ ined by each respective 
community. Community workers who coordinated the businesses and 
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maintained the stations were paid a wage by the RCF and the WCS. In 1 995,  
uniform pay rates and laws for eco-tourism and research activities for the entire 
WMA were ratified and documented at the WMA annual meeting by 
representatives of each management committee. The formalised protocol for 
fees and laws now provides the instruments which each committee uses to 
collaboratively govern the eco-tourism and research enterprises of the WMA. 
The subsidy for community workers by the RCF and the WCS is being 
withdrawn over a two-year period, and station and guesthouse managers will 
become volunteers or wil l  be paid by the management committee. Community 
participation in resource mobi l isation has increased as they have had funds from 
the business to do this (see Figure 1 8 .3) .  
Monjtorini and Evaluation 
Harulicrafts. The level of community participation in evaluation has been 
dependent on the capacity of the business committee' s  members to be engaged 
in the maintenance and analysis of the business records and feedback from 
buyers. Originally, record keeping was primari ly done by the volunteers, but the 
responsibility has gradually been assumed by the committee members or ( in the 
case of Ubaigubi) by the sole manager of the business. In Herowana, the records 
have been used over the last two years to respond to community criticism and 
concerns over the distribution of benefits or destination of proceeds, and 
handicraft buyers have been brought in to meet with artisans and managers. The 
result of this process has been that community participation in evaluation has 
risen from 'restricted ' (Level 2) to 'fair' (Level 3) or 'excellent ' (Level 5) (see 
Figure 1 8 .2). 
Research and eco-tourism. Community participation in evaluation of this 
business is accomplished through financial records and feedback from visitor 
evaluations. The involvement and capacity of community members to assist 
with maintenance of accurate records for this business has been l imited because 
of lack of technical assistance from field staff, which is only now beginning to 
be provided. Each tourist or scientist who visits the WMA is asked to write an 
informal evaluation of WMA facil ities and services. These are returned to the 
fieldworker at each site, who presents them for discussion at the management 
committee meeting. The result has been that community participation, originally 
dominated by external review (Level 2), has been expanding over the last two 
years to involve individuals and committees (Level 3 )  (see Figure 1 8 .3) .  
Discussion 
Action Choice 
Customary land tenure in PNG precludes the rating of the action choice indicator 
to be anything less than fair (Level 3 ) .  Some community involvement will be 
obligatory before any actions related to land use can be implemented. As shown 
at Crater Mountain, community discussion alone seems to have little bearing on 
whether an action choice initiative wi l l  flourish (as shown in the history of 
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Ubaigubi Lodge and WMA establishment in the 1 980s). We have found that the 
constraints of community conditions in Crater Mountain2 mean that 
considerable community education must take place before community 
assessment of actions, especially as related to business development, can real ly 
be practised. As in other remote sites in PNG, where limited government 
services and infrastructure are present, residents are normal ly very eager to elect 
for an action which they feel will result in socio-economic development, despite 
the fact that they probably have little understanding of the impl ications or 
requirements of the action (Sekhran 1 996). 
Congruent with the recommendations of Midgley ( 1 986), undue haste in 
constructing faci l ities for an eco-enterprise or a physical base of WMA 
operations does not guarantee further community involvement. Even though 
community representatives participated in the original discussion of the action 
choice, they have not had the technical capacity to continue their involvement in 
the subsequent steps of implementation without assistance. Not surprisingly, in 
other community-based conservation in itiatives, if the technology being uti lised 
or the maintenance demands of the initiative were beyond the capacity of the 
landowners, their participation dropped off (Little 1 994 ). The history of the 
Ubaigubi Lodge is an i l lustration of this point. Local capacity was not sufficient 
to maintain the activity at the stage when external support was withdrawn. The 
results were misunderstanding, loss of confidence, resentment, and scepticism 
on the part of the community. 
Results at Crater Mountain do suggest that an initial affirmative action 
choice on the part of the community, followed by demonstration and years of 
discussion, may be necessary to result in community understanding of the action 
choice and a possible commitment to it. Even if the demonstration was 
unsuccessful, as in the case of the Ubaigubi Lodge, follow-up discussion of its 
story and the lessons learned by the action choice have been instructive to all 
communities around Crater Mountain which contemplate similar enterprises . 
Another demonstration site, the Crater Mountain Biological Research Station at 
Haia, though managed entirely by external field researchers, was a model for 
demonstrating what a research station is and how it operates. The extremely 
positive reaction of the Haia community led to their request for more research 
business. It is unl ikely that this affirmative action choice meant that Pawaians 
then thought that they could manage the operation, but rather that they wanted 
this type of employment to go on being offered in the area. It wi ll probably take 
much more time and fieldworker presence to build the confidence and capacity 
for significant community participation in operation of the station. This is 
consistent with the results of conservation initiatives in Africa, where a lengthy 
first phase of external management was necessary in the more complex 
operation of game reserves (Kiss 1 990). 
2 That is, low to non-existent formal education and lack of experience in the modern cash 
economy outside of the WMA boundaries, resulting in ' cargo cult' tendencies and unreal istic 
expectations. 
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While the complexity of the action wi l l  dictate the length and intensity of 
external involvement, Uphoff ( 1 985)  suggests that, when working with 
commun ities which may not be accustomed to involvement in development 
programmes, as at Crater Mountain, it is  necessary not only to discuss with the 
people whether a project activity wil l  be undertaken or not, but also to engage in 
an ongoing d ialogue about the specifics of how the community envisions itself 
participating in the proposed activity. Because actions at Crater Mountain, by 
this project and others, have involved external initiation and management, and 
local people sti l l  lack significant experience, we find that people are often 
'waiting for action ' ,  and sti l l  have considerable difficulty conceptual ising their 
role in ' taking action ' .  
A potentially relevant case from E l  Salvador involved communities i n  a 
dialogue which discussed the 'rights and obligations ' of participants to prepare 
them for what to expect in the future of the project (Paul 1 987). The discussions 
covered physical, financial, social, and organisational aspects of the proposed 
project. Although this is probably sti l l  too conceptual for direct use in projects 
l ike Crater Mountain, it provides a useful framework for the ongoing dialogues 
which discuss the roles of external agencies and the WMA communities. To 
increase community capacity for understanding the complexity of action 
choices, we have found that study tours, in which landowners travel outside of 
the WMA, are very influential . Where few people have travel led beyond their 
home vi l lage, a trip to talk with landowners in another part of PNG, about land 
use or eco-enterprise development, has removed misconceptions which field 
staff say m ight otherwise have taken much longer to achieve. This type of 
hands-on experience, including internships and workshops in technical and 
management ski lls, has proved invaluable in most rural development projects 
(Midgley 1 986). 
Training 
Given the isolation and educational level of Crater Mountain communities, we 
feel that the investment we have made in training has been necessary in order to 
engage community participation as an ' end ' to ongoing sustainable operation of 
the WMA. At this stage in WMA development, the intermittent presence of 
fieldworkers has not proven sufficient to assist in the development of the 
embryonic institutions in the WMA. During the lengthy absence of a 
fieldworker from a s ite in the WMA, confusion or confl ict has arisen . The 
committees have lacked the confidence and experience to take action or to make 
rul ings on topics related to the operation of the WMA or the eco-enterprise. 
This is  complicated by the fact that collaborative management of the WMA and 
its enterprises requires cooperation between clans that may have been traditional 
enemies. A resident fieldworker must sti l l  be present to 'walk' most of the 
committees through the motions of conducting a meeting, delegating 
responsibi lity, identifying action, making a law, writing letters, or resolving 
conflict. 
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The potential impact of a resident trainer is reflected in the greater extent of 
community participation in the handicrafts enterprises as compared with the 
WMA eco-tourism and research enterprises (see Figures 1 8 .2 and 1 8 .3) .  This 
can partly be attributed to the greater complexity of these service industries 
when compared with smal l-scale manufacturing and trading, but it is also partly 
a reflection of the history of community training for each respective business. 
The ·usPC Rural Community Development model for community capacity 
bui lding was used to establ ish the handicraft businesses. A committee was 
elected specifical ly by the clans to run each business and work as counterparts to 
the USPC volunteers . They meet regularly with the volunteers who have 
assisted them in developing a specific methodology for operating the business. 
Unti l recently, there was no designated resident smal l business or development 
trainer assigned to the eco-tourism and research businesses. These businesses 
have been run on a rather ad hoe basis by the management committee, which has 
not received any specific training as a business committee, but functions more as 
a governing body for pol icy and law in the WMA. The systems for record 
keeping, marketing, and managing the enterprise have been random and 
uncoordinated. These results indicate that an appropriate fieldworker must be 
assigned to any new community institution to help the members develop their 
capacity to operate the institution . This is consistent with the findings of Paul 
( 1 987), in a survey of World Bank projects, who noted that the selection of 
appropriate fieldworkers suited for specific training tasks was instrumental in 
successful community participation initiatives . When comparing the overal l 
development of community participation in WMA operations, Herowana and 
Maimafu have made the most progress (see Figure 1 8 . l ), even though Haia and 
Ubaigubi have been ' involved ' in WMA activities for longer. The constant 
presence of resident trainers in Herowana and Maimafu in the past two to four 
years, who have been assigned to working specifical ly with the management 
committees on WMA operations, may have had this impact. 
Although it is understood that fieldworkers are present only to demonstrate 
practices and to work alongside the committees, workers must constantly guard 
against the risk of encouraging community dependence on them . As confirmed 
in most rural development work (Oakley 1 99 1 ;  Wells and Brandon 1 992; Uphoff 
1 995), this has required the presence of field staff with considerable patience, 
sensitivity, neutrality, the capacity to l isten, and to teach a task instead of doing 
it for people. As anywhere, the cooperation, trust, and respect of rural 
landowners at Crater Mountain has had to be earned through demonstrated 
commitment and long-term presence (Wright and Mack 1 993) .  This has been 
one of the strengths of the Crater Mountain project to date, where a committed 
group of associated individuals maintains contact with each other and the 
communities during, and long after, their presence in the WMA. Despite 
internal successes and fai lures, and the comings and goings of individuals, there 
has been a consistent institutional presence through an RCF and/or WCS field 
representative for the past fourteen years. This has provided the environment for 
staff to work with communities to continue the dialogue about the successes and 
failures and to learn from the mistakes. 
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Organisation 
The management and business committees are new institutions in the Gimi and 
Pawaian cultures. Although most are based on traditional clan leadership or 
representation, the necessary collaboration of a large number of traditional c lan 
enemies in the Crater Mountain WMA committees is a relatively novel and 
unprecedented phenomenon. It is only with the development of WMA airstrips 
in the last 1 0-20 years that clan groups have been clustered in such close 
proximity as to constitute vi l lages. Suspicion and fear of personal harm from 
another clan in not uncommon. Pearl ( 1 994: 2 1 3), in a review of the 
conservation efforts at Crater Mountain, aptly described the situation as ' unruly, 
contentious, rumour-filled, open-ended, and slow - but broadly consultative, 
inclusive, and potentially, uniquely effective' . 
In addition to the challenges of new levels of organisation at Crater 
Moµntain, field staff also report the breakdown of the traditional authority 
structures, as has been documented in other developing societies (Kiss 1 990; 
Bromley 1 994). The older clan leaders are not always seen as competent in the 
ways of modern society, while younger people struggle, and are restless, for 
change. In some communities, this has further weakened the power of the 
management committees which, by tradition, have been comprised of older clan 
leaders. Amongst the Pawaians, the traditional ly l imited scale of cooperation, 
due to their semi-nomadic behaviour and low population densities in large 
expanses of forest, is an inherent problem. Given these constraints, it is not 
surprising that institutional development throughout the WMA has been slow 
and uncertain. 
Although committees for community management of protected areas have 
been set up in many parts of the world, few have yet demonstrated the capacity 
to act independently of external assistance (Wells and Brandon 1 992). Whi le 
this is not particularly encouraging for projects l ike Crater, where we are in the 
very early phases of institution bui lding, it suggests that we will probably need 
to make a long-term commitment to resident assistance for the near future 
followed by intermittent field visits for a much longer period. 
Leadership 
We have seen that, as the tangible results of time invested in an institution and 
its activity materialise, the extent of community participation in the form of 
leadership does increase. Oakley ( 1 99 1  ), in a review of rural development 
projects, found that participation often evolves in this manner. Businesses or 
activities which take a long time to reach fruition, and are very hard to get 
started and maintain, wil l  require some degree of external leadership. This can 
be seen in the handicraft business, which has had the capacity to earn money 
almost immediately and where levels  of participation grew quickly, whi le in the 
tourism and research business, growth is slow and requires considerable up-front 
investment. Establishment of the latter business has required more outside 
intervention before the community has gained the abil ity or desire to take an 
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active leadership role. Equally elusive is the concept of benefits derived through 
the long-term investment in biodiversity conservation . 
The indicators of leadership show that, in many activities at Crater 
Mountain, there have been independent leaders, rather than active groups or 
committees of people who have taken leading roles in WMA establ ishment. 
Most of the independent leaders work without the support of the entire 
community, which is not surprising in l ight of clan rivalries, and appear to have 
a variety of motives. For some, the ulterior motive is financial or pol itical 
benefit, for the leader personally or for his clan, while for others it appears to be 
a sincere interest in the activity. In either case, the resulting commun.ity 
jealousy, leading to lack of involvement from other community factions or the 
dependency on just one individual to carry out any activity, has led to problems. 
In Ubaigubi, a charismatic individual was instrumental in dissolving the 
handicrafts committee, resulting in current management by a sole individual . 
While the business sti l l  functions, the reliance on a single manager places it in 
some jeopardy, as projects with single charismatic leaders are known to have a 
higher risk of fai lure (Midgley 1 986). In Haia, the traditional lack of leadership 
in the culture has led to dependence on one young man for most WMA 
operations. 
To encourage involvement from a wider spectrum of the community in 
WMA operations, field staff have attempted to widen the dissemination of 
training and information opportunities. Because communities are not 
homogeneous, and traditional Melanesian authority structures can hoard 
information as a form of power, dissemination can be a chal lenge in its own 
right (James 1 996). In Herowana, the longer and more extensive presence of 
resident staff has countered this constraint by encouraging the involvement of 
both young and old clan representatives on committees, by disseminating 
information through women's  groups and female representatives on community 
committees, and by offering repeated training sessions in different areas of the 
vil lage to provide opportunities for more clans to attend. This is consistent with 
Orsak's  ( l  996a) recommendation for 'flooding' communities with information 
to reduce the tendency to restrict information flow. Amidst this complexity, the 
challenge remains to cultivate leadership while encouraging community 
participation without provoking jealousy. 
Management 
Although most community institutions are sti l l  dependent on project staff for 
assistance in carrying out their management duties, there is now a sufficient 
number of visitors coming to the WMA (approximately 250 in the last year) to 
raise the number of issues on which the committees must act. Each transaction 
or event provides another opportunity for the committee or the designated 
coordinator to practice management ski l ls .  This involves collection and 
distribution of revenues, record keeping, work assignments, enforcement of 
rules, and col lection of fines. 
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This activity has engaged people in the practice of the WMA procedures, 
such that some are becoming famil iar with the implications of the rules they 
have made for operation, and are beginning to question some practices. The 
annual WMA meeting has proven to be an invaluable forum, where 
representatives of each community can vote on changes in the standardised 
procedures of WMA operations and enterprises. The indication that people are 
questioning existing procedures is also an indication that they are being used and 
thought about; they are not merely symbolic .  
As the value of biodiversity is real ised, the reasons and incentives for 
enforcement of management rules are becoming clearer for WMA residents. An 
example of this occurred in 1 995 in respect of a rule which was made at the 
WMA annual meeting, that no biological materials could be taken out of the 
WMA by a non-resident without permission from the management committee. 
Later that year, a new species of orchid was discovered by one of the landowners 
involved in a parabiological orchid inventory project with the Forest Research 
Institute in Lae. The orchid was named after the landowner, who was obviously 
impressed that something previously undescribed by science was found in the 
Crater Mountain forests and may have the value to attract cl ients of the research 
and tourism enterprises. A trekker was later apprehended leaving the WMA 
with orchid samples which were confiscated by the local management 
committee. It is unl ikely that landowners would previously have perceived the 
value or the threat in ways which would have resulted in discipl inary action. 
Management in the form of equal distribution of benefits such as training 
and revenue-earning possibi l ities are a constraint in all WMA procedures. 
Community institutions struggle to fairly distribute these benefits, despite the 
traditional clan nepotism which gives work and training opportunities to fellow 
clan members. Th is is sti l l  an area that requires careful external refereeing by 
the resident field staff. It may prove to be one of the biggest management 
problems for the committees, yet one that will be critical to providing 
appropriate incentives to sustain community participation if a sufficient quantity 
of land is to be involved in the establ ishment of a viable conservation area. 
The community di lemma over the distribution of benefits is not an issue 
which is unique to Crater Mountain . The revenues from community wildlife 
farms and lodges in Africa have been distributed in a number of ways, 
depending on community and enterprise profiles (Kiss 1 990; Metcalfe 1 994). 
Although the emphasis is often on equal distribution, one of the Campfire 
ventures in Zimbabwe distributed wildl ife income in accordance with land area 
enrol led in wildl ife protection. This model may have appl ication to Crater 
Mountain .  Business income is now distributed to the workers with a surcharge 
for committee managers and overhead costs. In the future, shares may be held 
by WMA residents in a community company portfolio of Crater Mountain eco­
enterprises. If eco-enterprises are dependent on the presence of biodiversity, 
should the number of shares in the Crater Mountain companies reflect the land 
area assigned to conservation, rather than to some other land use such as 
hunting, gardening, or coffee production? Because some residents (especial ly 
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the Pawaians) own larger blocks of land, these individuals would then secure a 
disproportionate share of revenues, but it is l ikely that viable populations of flora 
and fauna, and especially the seasonal movements of vertebrates, wi ll depend on 
the existence of large contiguous blocks of undisturbed forest. 
Resource Mobilisation 
All community institutions associated with WMA operations or enterprises are 
now col lecting revenues of some sort to finance their activities. The more 
complex businesses, such as the research stations, sti l l  receive subsidies from 
external agencies for manager stipends, although this practice wi l l  be 
discontinued as the income of the enterprise increases. Resource mobi l isation 
has proven to be another big challenge for the Crater Mountain project. The 
communities in the WMA have only recently acquired their present identity, and 
all individuals identify with their clan or lineage instead of the vi l lage as a 
whole. Hence there is no tradition of pool ing vi l lage resources to invest in a 
community venture. Compensation for labour, materials, or expertise is 
requested from any individual outside of the immediate family. Any favours 
granted are catalogued in a mental record of debts as favours owing. 
In th is cu ltural environment, it has been difficult for field staff to initiate 
community contributions towards a collective action without some sort of 
compensation being given to the individuals involved . For the project to directly 
employ vil lage members or provide monetary compensation for some action 
associated with WMA operations or enterprises, without any matching 
contribution from the community or the ind ividual , goes against al l mainstream 
development theory, which has shown that these actions are not sustainable, that 
they lead to dependency and tend to discourage local 'ownership' of the activity 
(McNeely 1 988;  Little 1 994). For example, the successful Annapurna project in 
Nepal has required a minimal 50 percent community contribution to any project 
activity and has refrained from any cash compensation (Wells and Brandon 
1 992). 
The earl iest research activities in the vil lages of Ubaigubi and Haia were 
conducted prior to the organisation of an ICAD project initiative . WMA 
residents were employed in what were, essential ly, externally managed 
operations. It has proved difficult to encourage community participation in 
protected area establ ishment by turning local people from labourers into 
business managers in the WMA enterprises. With the lack of experience in 
business and the cash economy, committees are not eager to part with a portion 
of their earnings on the maintenance or overhead costs of business or WMA 
operations .  On the other hand, their frugal ity does have some participation 
benefits . As external agency subsidies for community research station managers 
have decreased, management committees have had to consider their capacity and 
need to assume some of these costs. As a result, their level of participation in 
management has increased significantly as they scrutinise the work of the 
manager for the justification of his wages as a share of their potential earnings. 
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In this way, the project has made shaky progress in evolving from a 
beneficiary to a participatory system. The most successful activities are those 
which are now actively generating revenues which can readi ly be used to pay for 
labour and other costs. Constraints stil l  exist in enterprises such as eco-tourism, 
where a guesthouse must be built before revenues can be collected. Individuals 
are very reluctant to participate in construction without being paid for their 
labour, but there are insufficient funds to cover these initial costs . Contributions 
of labour are not readi ly offered, because direct returns to the individual cannot 
be seen or assured. In addition, Crater Mountain residents are sti ll dependent on 
a demanding schedule of subsistence activities. A day spent on a business 
enterprise is a day spent away from gardening. In an effort to avoid direct cash 
payments, whi le making al lowance for cultural constraints, the project must 
provide indirect incentives to break these stalemates. 3 
Monitoring and Evaluation 
The participation of local committees in monitoring their enterprises is fairly 
good, s ince all records are maintained by committee members. The handicraft 
enterprises have progressed to the stage of actua]Jy managing that data and 
util ising it to report to the larger community. Since jealousy and suspicion of 
neighbouring c lans is a common problem, evidence of income and distribution 
of benefits is important to combat m isunderstanding and misinformation. The 
records are also important because the provision of material benefits can be 
meaningless if the community fails to realise that they are growing (Midgley 
1 986). 
The presence of the research enterprise at Crater Mountain for many years 
has provided a unique potential for selected community members to be actively 
involved in the collection of data on the presence of, or change in, biodiversity 
in the WMA. The interactions of communities with scientists has been 
important in community realisation of the uniqueness of their resources. Over 
the last two years, scientists and visitors to the WMA have been asked to submit 
comments on their findings and experiences to the management committees in 
an attempt to encourage feedback to the WMA governing body. 
The Trained Local Observer (TLO) programme (Sinclair 1 995 ;  RCF 1 996) 
is  the beginning of an ambitious effort to build local capacity to conduct 
biological and socio-economic monitoring, as required, to guide the management 
committees in WMA operation. While individuals sti l l  retain significant 
information about their natural resources, the l imited level of l iteracy restricts 
the number of individuals who qualify to participate in the programme. 
Conclusion 
The Crater Mountain project is  a combination of 'top-down ' and 'bottom-up' 
initiatives (Hough and Sherpa 1 986). The early existence of external 
3 One technique is to provide rice for lunch on workdays for community structures. 
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intervention was tempered by the obligation to involve the resource owners in 
the creation of the initial demonstration sites. The lessons learned from this 
creation provide the tangible evidence and incentives that fuel the fledgling 
participation of communities in all aspects ·of the WMA operations. In PNG, 
this is a del icate balancing act whereby al l clans must take the lead and get some 
benefit in the negotiations which move them al l towards a common goal . The 
process of engaging participation wil l  necessari ly be slow. 
The presence of twenty-one clans in neighbouring communities within the 
WMA has brought some benefits, though it has also been a chal lenge. We see 
that communities, and the clans within them,  do learn from one another as they 
compete for the self-esteem which arises from improved performance. At the 
same time, through their annual meetings and collaborative training ventures, 
they are increasingly aware of their mutual dependence in the creation of a 
viable product. If cultural constraints do make themselves felt in one 
community, as they did in Ubaigubi, the project has not been obliged to 
withdraw from the area, since it can continue to provide technical assistance to a 
nearby community or clan, and wait for the invitation to return. 
Crater Mountain is a remote and far-flung site with high training needs. 
Paul ( 1 987) identifies levels of complexity in . the three components of 
community participation - intensity, agents, and objectives. Based on his three­
dimensional framework, the level of commitment required to achieve the 
complex combination of empowering communities to eventually initiate action, 
as sought after in the Crater Mountain WMA, wil l  require an extremely high 
level and lengthy commitment on the part of the external agencies involved. 
Such projects need high levels of investment in human and financial resources to 
provide the technical assistance which can facil itate community participation 
(Wells and Brandon 1 992; Sekhran 1 996). Once in place, the process requires 
commitment. ICAD projects which exist for less than five years without a 
secure source of funding, but which uti l ise taxing, innovative, and experimental 
procedures, have been shown to be ineffective in achieving their objectives 
(Wells and Brandon 1 992). Funding constraints increase the difficulty of an 
already difficult task. Whi le the government of PNG provides such unique 
legislation for the empowerment of local resource owners to establish national 
protected areas, it does not currently provide the technical assistance to 
landowners which would enable them to implement this ambitious agenda. In 
the most recent draft of the DEC Strategic Plan (PNGDEC 1 996), this task is 
assigned to non-governmental organisations operating in the country. If NGOs 
are thus assigned the chal lenging task of providing technical assistance to 
develop a system of protected areas in PNG, and have demonstrated their 
capacity to do so, they should be considered for financial or logistical support 
from the government in order to carry out the mandate . 
Communities in the Crater Mountain WMA are balancing subsistence 
living with entry into the cash economy. Time available to participate in 
training, business, and WMA management is l imited by the demands of 
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traditional subsistence and cultural obligations. The structure of businesses and 
governing institutions must take this into account. 
Community participation, as the 'means' to establ ish a protected area and 
the 'end' to sustain it, is only one facet of the challenge to achieving biodiversity 
conservation . Most protected areas, if established through community-based 
management, wil l  only persist in a conducive national policy environment that 
does not undermine community efforts by providing incentives which decrease 
biodiversity value and encourage production versus conservation (Wells and 
Brandon 1 992; Little 1 994 ). The fledgl ing laws and systems which currently 
govern the Crater Mountain WMA are only beginning to address the internal 
threats from non-sustainable subsistence practices within the WMA. They are 
certainly not at a point where they can withstand the fragmentation that would 
result from the external threats of competitive land uses, such as large-scale 
extraction of m ineral and timber resources .  It wil l  be imperative that national 
policy be aligned with the current community-based conservation initiative in 
the Crater Mountain WMA if it is to persist as a national protected area. 
This chapter comments only on the level of community participation in the 
operation of a national protected area. It does not attempt to answer the question 
of whether community participation wil l  actual ly achieve the project 's  goal of 
biodiversity conservation . It is sti l l  a theoretical process and, to date, there is no 
proof that participation wil l  enhance the achievement of conservation objectives. 
Yet in PNG, as in many other areas of the world, integration of conservation and 
development through community participation is accepted as the current means 
to protected area establishment (Brandon and Wells 1 992; Little 1 994) .  A 
monitoring and evaluation plan to col lect quantitative data on the project goal 
and each objective of the Crater Mountain ICAD project was designed in 1 995 ,  
and is currently being implemented (RCF/WCS 1 995 ; Ericho, Bino and Johnson 
1 996). When in place, the indicators wil l  provide a more systematic assessment 
to answer this question . 
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Appendix: A List of Laws passed by WMA Management Committees 
at the Third Annual Meeting, 4-6 October 1995. 
The following seventeen ' laws' were passed by local management committees 
from the v i l lages of Haia, Herowana, Maimafu, and Ubaigubi in the Crater 
Mountain WMA at a meeting held in Maimafu on 4-6 October 1 995 . The 
following rules apply to the entire area enclosed in the boundaries of the WMA 
unless otherwise stated .  
1 .  No hunting of Birds of Paradise. Few Birds of Paradise can be k i l led for 
special occasions only. Before birds are hunted permission must be granted 
by the appropriate Landowner [Management] Committee (MC). Fine for 
infringement: K40 or 2 months imprisonment. Fine is paid as follows: KIO to 
whoever reports the infringement, K3 0 to MC. 
2. The following species are unconditional ly protected from all hunting and 
k i l l ing: (i) New Guinea Harpy Eagle; ( i i )  King Bird of Paradise;  ( i i i) Ragiana 
Bird of Paradise. Fine for infringement: K40 or 2 months imprisonment. 
Fine is paid asfollows:KJO to whoever reports the infringement, K30 to MC. 
3 . No-one may enter an area set aside for conservation for the purposes of 
hunting, food col lecting, cutting, or gardening. No-one may remove plants or 
animals from these areas (except for the purposes of research and with the 
permission of the appropriate MC). No fine. 
4. No-one may enter another person 's  land for the purposes of hunting, food 
col lecting, cutting, or gardening. People who pass through the land of others 
cannot leave trai ls .  Fine for infringement: K50 or 2 months imprisonment. 
Fine is paid as follows: Kl 0 to informer, Kl 0 to MC, and K30 to landowner. 
Infringements are reported to the MC in the area it occurs. This MC writes 
to that of the infringer. It is the responsibility of the MC of the infringer to 
pursue the matter in court. 
5 .  All approaches to researchers and tourists concerning pay, conditions, fees, 
labour or any disputes must go through the appropriate coordinator. Fine for 
infringement: K5. Fine is paid as follows: K5 to MC. 
6 .  All  sales of crafts must go through the Artefacts Committee. No fine. 
7 .  No-one can steal from a researcher or tourist. Anyone caught stealing must 
return the stolen goods and pay a fine. Fine for infringement: K50 or 2 
months imprisonment. Fine is paid as follows: KIO to informer, KIO to MC, 
K3 0 to researcher/tourist. 
8 .  No-one can l ie to or mislead a researcher. Fine for infringement: K50 or 2 
months imprisonment. Fine is paid as follows: KIO to informer, KIO to MC, 
K30 to researcher/tourist. 
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9. People who are not traditional landowners in the CMWMA cannot do the 
following: ( i) buy land; ( i i )  build a house; ( i i i) begin a business; ( iv) hunt; (v) 
cut trees. 
1 0 . Al l  forms of m ineral, o i l  and timber prospecting or exploration are banned in 
the CMWMA (except for land of the Kuasa Haus lain [near Herowana ]) .  
1 1 . No-one may hunt with s l ingshots, bows and arrows or shotguns near v i llages 
in the CMWMA. Fine for infringement: landowners Kl 0, outsiders K20. 
Fine is paid as follows: K5 to informer, K5 (Kl 0) to MC, K5 to landowner 
(in the case of outsiders). 
1 2 .  No-one can hunt with a home-made or unregistered shotgun. Fine for 
infringement: Kl 00 or 6 months imprisonment. Fine is paid as follows: K30 
to informer; K70 to MC. 
1 3'. No-one can buy or sell shotgun cartridges. Fine for infringement: K20 per 
cartridge. Fine is paid as follows: KIO to informer, KIO to MC. 
1 4 .  No researcher, tourist or company may remove any forest/river/land 
resource, use any idea, technique or information from the CMWMA without 
the permission of the MC. Any profit made from any products derived from 
the above must be shared with the people of CMWMA. All researchers 
and/or companies entering the CMWMA must sign a legally binding 
document to thi s  effect.4 
1 5 .  No-one may consume, transport or grow i l l ic it drugs in the CMWMA. No 
landowner may consume, sel l  or transport alcohol .  Tourists and researchers 
may not supply alcohol to landowners and must consume alcohol in privacy. 
Fine for infringement: alcohol K20, drugs K30. Fine is paid as follows: Kl 0 
(Kl 5) to informer, Kl 0 (Kl 5) to MC. 
1 6. No playing cards for money or other gambling is allowed. Fine for 
infringement: KJO per person playing. Fine is paid as follows: K5 to 
informer; K5 to MC. 
1 7 . No wild animal products (except bits of pig) are allowed to be used in the 
manufacture of crafts for sale. 
4 This does not refer to crafts and produce sold for resale [A.J . ] .  
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BIODIVERSITY ON A TIGHTROPE: 
INCENTIVES FOR RAINFOREST CONSERVATION 
IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
NIKHIL SEKHRAN 
Introduction 
Tropical forests cover some 70 percent (or some 34 mi l l ion hectares) of the land 
area of Papua New Guinea (PNG). These forests are remarkably species rich : 
scientists claim that between 5 percent and 7 percent of the world' s  flora and 
fauna are contained in them and in the coral reefs that fringe the coastline 
(Mil ler et al . 1 994). Al l  in all, PNG may harbour as many as 20,000 species of 
ferns and flowering plants, some 1 90 species of mammals, 200,000 to 400,000 
insect species, 750-plus species of birds, and 500 species of repti les and 
amphibians (ibid.) . Many of these species are endemic to the New Guinea area, 
and many of them have a restricted distribution within it. Not surprisingly, then, 
the country's  conservation management record is a global concern. This record 
has been poor in recent years. 
Land tenure systems in PNG vest property and use rights amongst a range 
of right-holders l iving in local communities. Use allocation is dictated by the 
private interests of these communities or, more l ikely, by power-brokers within 
them. Conservation may yield wider public benefits, but is increasingly 
perceived by local communities as an activity opposed to their private interests. 
The point at issue is that b iodiversity management usually requires certain uses 
of the forest to be excluded or restricted in order to provide for the survival 
requirements of flora and fauna. However, an opportunity cost arises if 
landowners must forego the benefits of certain land uses which are incompatible 
with conservation needs. 
As PNG's  forest owners are incorporated into the cash economy, their value 
systems are shifting. Many of the benefits that forest owners do obtain from 
conservation 1 are today being discounted in these people 's  decisions because 
1 These benefits are substantial. Ecological services, conditioned by species and ecosystem 
diversity, underpin the productivity of subsistence systems. These provide for the sustenance of 
the rural populace and support the formal economy by subsidising the nutrient and energy budget 
of labour (Pernetta and Hil l  1 98 1  ) . The nation ' s  formal economy is increasingly dependent on 
forest resource extraction, particularly timber harvesting. The farm sector - PNG's  long-term 
economic backbone - is also conditioned by ecological services which have a contributory value to 
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they do not take a monetary form. Reinforced by forest owners' h igh time 
preference for current income rather than future benefits, this calculus tends to 
favour current extractive uses of forests over conservation . Economists have 
argued that this s ituation, m irrored elsewhere in the world, is unlikely to change 
unless local stakeholders begin to appropriate a greater proportion of the 
economic value of biodiversity in money terms (see Sekhran 1 994b) . 
A commonly held view in conservation circles is that property rights are 
necessary, indeed often sufficient, to provide forest owners with a conservation 
incentive. This view appears reductionist, at least when appl ied to the PNG 
situation . Here, notwithstanding surety of tenure, a conjunction of socio­
pol itical, economic, and institutional factors combine to foreclose conservation 
options. There are few workable means of regulating private land use in the 
public interest. This is compounded by the fact that the option of establishing 
National Parks on publ ic land is not available - the necessary land al ienation is 
simply an untenable prospect. Conditioned by these various factors, forest 
management has a short-term focus. The message from the field appears to be 
that property rights alone provide an insufficient incentive for biodiversity 
conservation . 
The question, therefore, is how to convert non-monetary conservation 
benefits into cash incomes for landowners . How can landowners be 
compensated for the opportunity costs associated with conservation 
management? Many conservationists and economists argue that material 
incentives are essential as a conservation tool, but what form should incentives 
take? This paper searches for answers . 
In order to locate the discussion in the appropriate pol icy context, the first 
two parts of this paper provide an overview of the threats to forest biodiversity 
and the stakeholder interests that motivate them. The third part then examines 
the leeway for arresting these trends by developing material incentives. Rather 
than weighing in with a lengthy stakeholder analysis, this chapter focuses on the 
forest owners who are the primary stakeholders. Two types of incentives are 
discussed: 
• development support through integrated conservation and development 
(ICAD) initiatives; and 
• transfer arrangements such as conservation management rental schemes. 
It is shown that a number of social, economic and pol itical factors create hurdles 
that wil l  need to be overcome if conservation objectives are to be attained using 
either of these methods. So far as conservation pol icy is  concerned, the jury is 
stil l  out in the search for workable mechanisms. 
final production (Sekhran, Hedemark et al. 1 994; Sekhran, Saulei et al. 1 994). Moreover, an 
'option ' value for species and habitats could potentially be capitalised in the future. 
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The Causes of Papua New Guinea' s  Conservation Dilemma 
The Short-Term Forest Management Focus 
Many of the processes that underpinned environmental transformation in the 
past continue today. There is a tendency, for instance, for landowners to manage 
forest resources for short-term social and economic purposes rather than for 
long-term objectives. This reflects the situation which existed in the past. As 
Bulmer ( 1 982 :63)  has argued: 
there is little evidence that Papua New Guineans were or are very 
different from the majority of humanity who have not been greatly 
concerned with the long-term conservation of their natural 
environment. What they were, and sti ll are concerned with, very 
directly . . .  are the present and immediately foreseeable yields of their 
crops and catches . and the amount of time, effort and care needed to 
produce them. To these we must now add concern for cash . 
In the pre-contact era, given that human l ifespans were short, and that 
communities lacked the technological means to control their environment, the 
focus on the short term is not surprising. S ince human population densities were 
low and technology was fairly basic, the abi l ity of communities to imprint the 
forest environment was l imited .2 Today, however, as these parameters change, 
the management of forest resources to meet short-term needs can cause a severe 
erosion in their quantity and qual ity. The new-found concern with cash and the 
subsequent commoditisation of the forest resource are having especially 
damaging results. 
Population and Subsistence 
The pol icy debate on forest management has tended to focus on the pol itical 
economy of the logging industry. There have been few efforts to address 
farming systems and subsistence - the other significant causal factor in forest 
degradation - possibly because their impacts are difficult to mitigate. 
Al len ( 1 993) has described the systemic impacts of subsistence practices on 
the forest environment. 3 In the generic model, population pressures place 
increasing demands on swidden horticultural systems, reducing fallow periods. 
This, in turn, depletes the farming system 's  nutrient base, impacting on 
vegetational succession . This causes forest conversion, first from high bush to 
2 Nonetheless, this is not to argue that there were no anthropogenic impacts. References to the 
inherent conservationist ethos of pre-contact communities are simplistic, regardless of views often 
articulated by some green groups. As Bulmer (ibid. ) attests, conservation outcomes in antiquity 
were most probably the product of circumstance (the conjunction of factors outlined above) rather 
than intention. Throughout PNG, there is considerable evidence of environmental manipulation. 
The deforestation of the central highland val leys is an obvious example (Powel l  1 982). 
3 It should be noted that the tremendous variation in subsistence systems makes generalisation 
difficult. 
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low bush, and then to tal l ,  and subsequently, in severe cases, short grass. Soil 
erosion, as the cover diminishes, begins to take a mounting tol l ,  accelerating the 
nutrient loss process and increasing the danger of irreversabi l ities. The problem 
is that the rate of agricultural innovat ion may be insufficient to compensate for 
this, leading to a v icious cycle of ecological degradation that is  difficult to stem. 
Subsistence pressures are, at least in part, fuel led by population growth. 
With an average population growth rate between 2 .2 percent and 2.3 percent, the 
PNG population wi l l  reach some e ight mi l l ion by the year 2025 .  This wil l  give a 
mean density of some seventeen people per square kilometre. Although sti l l  low 
by global standards, the pressures wi l l  not be uniform nationwide. In some 
areas, rural-urban migration wil l  continue to provide a safety valve for 
populat ions that cannot be supported by local environments. However, 
populat ion growth in marginal h ighland areas is l ikely to place additional 
pressures on the high lands fringe as people spi l l  over upland ridges to colonise 
v irgin forest. These pressures are a function of growing population densities, 
but the same effect may ari se from the concentration of population in the 
vicinity of large-scale developments such as mining projects, or along major 
highways. 
Esther Boserup ( 1 965, 1 98 1  ), in her discussion of the stages of agricultural 
development, suggests a l inkage between population growth and farming 
intensification. Her argument is that as populations grow and fixed 
environmental resources dimini sh on a per capita basis, farming intensification 
is fuel led through technological change. However, this may not hold in areas 
where v irgin forest is available for clearance. For the purposes of budgeting 
labour t ime for work, custom, and leisure, farmers may calculate that it will be 
less burdensome to continue to shift ecological frontiers rather than innovate.4 
The techniques available for farm intensification - ditching, mounding, soi l  
conservation, fencing, and mulching - are all labour demanding. As  Bulmer 
( 1 982) argues, the work effort involved in clearing new forest land for 
agriculture is substantially less than that involved in intensifying agriculture in 
grassland fallows. Farmers may deliberately opt to clear forest for gardens, even 
though they may otherwise value the forest environment. 
This does not mean that farming intensification is not occurring in PNG -
only that, in some areas, the rate of forest clearance exceeds that of innovation . 
The introduction of firearms into remote areas has increased subsistence 
pressures on native fauna (see Majnep 1 982; Filer 1 994) .  This has caused the 
extirpation of large fauna in some areas. Pressures on fauna have been 
compounded by the commercial i sation of the ruraJ economy, particularly for 
species coveted for food and/or traditional purposes . Other new technologies, 
such as chainsaws, make forest clearance less labour-intensive and less 
dangerous. As these technologies become more accessible, the abi l ity of 
communities to modify their environment increases. 
4 This is hardly unique to PNG (see Harrison 1 993). 
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Logging and Land Use Conversion to Permanent Agriculture 
Large-scale logging is a threat to biological diversity in accessible rainforest 
areas. These are mainly lowland forests, which also exhibit the greatest 
biodiversity. The problem, from a biological perspective, is that the methods of 
logging which are employed are often needlessly destructive of ecosystem 
processes. Conventional practices tend to cause unnecessary damage to residual 
trees and leave excessively large forest gaps, particularly along skid trails .  
These gaps tend to be colonised by vines which then smother regeneration. 
The biophysical factors that influence forest regeneration are rarely, if ever, 
accounted for in the decision to allocate timber permits. These include, inter 
alia, topography, temporal rainfall patterns, soil characteristics, and altitude. 
Species protection requirements are not being addressed, partly because of a lack 
of understanding of ecological needs. Without basel ine information, ongoing 
monitoring and evaluation and active species management measures, even on a 
pi lot basis, there is a considerable danger of logging contributing to the local 
extirpation of species. 5 
Agricultural conversion also contributes to permanent forest conversion. 
Pressures for conversion are often high in areas that have already been logged. 
Local communities typically receive royalty earnings from logging for only a 
short period. During this time, they may become accustomed to the windfall 
income earned and other benefits. The cessation of royalty payments tends to 
create an incentive for them to seek alternative income sources, including those 
derived from permanent agriculture. 
More recently, there has been a spurt of project proposals for the 
establishment of so cal led 'agro-forestry' projects .  These involve clear-fel l ing 
of forest lands and the establishment of tree crop plantations. Many of these 
proposals may be designed to circumvent the Forestry Act in order to gain easier 
access to timber stands .  
Summary 
The actual forest area affected by the above mentioned pressures is open to 
argument. Annual ly, more than 1 00,000 hectares are probably affected by 
logging operations, some 1 0,000 hectares cleared for agriculture, and some 
1 0,000 hectares affected by urban growth and infrastructural development. 
Additionally, perhaps 200,000 hectares ( including both primary and secondary 
forest) are affected by subsistence activities (Unisearch 1 992; Fi ler 1 994) .  
The data on subsistence pressures are especial ly questionable. Part of the 
problem is that, until recently, these data were extrapolated from a 1 96 1 -62 
study on indigenous agriculture that had never been updated (Fereday et al . 
1 994 ). The standard errors for study statistics were high - over 25 percent for 
5 For a survey of the problems associated with wildlife management in (timber) production 
forests, see Frumhoff ( 1 995). 
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estimates of land areas under cultivation . Thirty years later, these data are yet 
more suspect, particularly as farming systems are undergoing rapid 
transformations. 6 
Other problems in estimating the magnitude of the human impact on forests 
derive from the fact that the national aerial photographic record is outdated, with 
surveys last performed in the early 1 970s. F inal ly, at this time, existing forest 
concession boundaries have not been digitised on the PNG Resource Information 
System (PNGRIS) - hampering efforts to measure conservation trade-offs 
(personal communication, Mike Hedemark 7 ). 
Only 2.8 percent ( 1 3 ,000 square ki lometres) of PNG's  land mass has any 
conservation status attached to it. This comprises four national parks, four 
provincial parks, and twenty-six wildlife management areas (WMAs). Most are 
'paper parks' ,  subject to a multitude of internal and external pressures. Some 80 
percent of the total protected area network consists of three sites :  the Tonda and 
Masa WMAs in Western Province (the latter in the coastal zone), and the Crater 
Mountain WMA at the junction of the Chimbu, Eastern Highlands and Gulf 
Provinces. It is important to note here that the conservation legislation does not 
prevent logging or other ecologically exploitative options from being pursued in 
WMAs (personal communication, Kathy Whimp8 ) .  
Conservationists thus face the multiple chal lenges of expanding the 
protected area system, improving the management and protection of current 
sites, and introducing active landscape management measures to manage species 
and habitats outside protected areas. 
Social and Economic Pressures : A Brief Stakeholder Analysis 
A stakeholder analysis is useful in unravel l ing the root causes of the 
conservation problem. However, such assessments are complicated by the 
enormous local variation in cultural, social, and economic circumstances 
prevail ing in PNG. The following discussion attempts to draw conclusions from 
the overal l socio-pol itical landscape - local ly specific examples are provided 
e lsewhere in this volume. Three stakeholder groups are briefly investigated: 
landowners, the state, and the logging companies. 
Landowners: Differentiated Stakeholder Interests 
Some 97 percent of land in PNG is held by customary landowners . Their 
perceptions of proprietary rights for land holdings, their current and future 
welfare demands, and their sense of broader social responsibil ity (outside their 
kin groups) are critical to the conservation stakes. But landowners are a difficult 
stakeholder category to write about because there is enormous internal social 
6 The PNG Mapping Agricultural Systems Project is presently plugging data needs in this area. 
7 Project Biologist, PNG Biodiversity Conservation and Resource Management Programme. 
8 Legal Adviser to the AusAID-funded DEC Strengthening Project. 
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differentiation within landowner groups, and because other stakeholder groups 
with different interests (pol iticians, for example) are also landowners. There is 
an obvious danger of misconstruing landowner interests by treating them as a 
unitary category (Holzknecht 1 996a). 
How m ight we reconci le the considerable variation in custom, forms of 
tenure, and decision-making structures with the need for simplicity in 
constructing a model? In short, although there is tremendous variation in forms 
of land tenure, land is generally control led by kinship groups with membership 
determined largely through descent (Fingleton 1 993). Members are entitled to 
the use of a range of c lan resources. An individual ' s  influence over decision 
making is codified by custom and economic standing. Power is conditioned by 
custom, leadership qualities, age, and gender, but also by the abi lity of an 
individual to build strategic all iances with external players and establ ish systems 
of patronage and reciprocal obligation (see Standish 1 992; Saffu 1 996). The 
balance of power tends to be vested in a smal ler subset of the kinship group -
traditional ly the senior men. 
A key issue for conservation is the abi l ity of vested interest groups to 
dominate the local pol icy and decision-making process, wielding power to suit 
their own personal agendas . The experience in Bougainvi l le and elsewhere 
shows that this is rarely durable. In time, new interest groups tend to emerge 
and stake a claim to resources (Filer 1 990). In the immediate term, however, a 
small group of individuals can hold the balance of power and make decisions 
which are not necessari ly in the broader and longer-term social interest of the 
local community. Such 'b ig men ' may make this tenable by exercising 
customary and economic power and/or withholding information from other clan 
members. 
Landowners: Demands for Income and Services 
A key issue is that landowners' demands for income, infrastructural 
development, and services are creating enormous pressures to capital ise on 
forest resources for the purposes of generating income. The inabil ity of many 
rural communities to participate in the formal economy tends to lead to an 
enormous sense of alienation from perceived national and international 
economic processes. This leads to frustration . Many landowners have an 
oversimplified perception of development, and lack an understanding of its 
determinants. 'Development' has increasingly come to mean a capacity for 
capturing rent (or 'cargo') ,  as if it reflected an inal ienable right to goods and 
services del ivered from the outside (see Fi ler l 997a).9 Resource development 
9 Why is this a problem? One issue is that rental income is l imited; as populations grow and 
target incomes increase, this return is unl ikely to satisfy local needs. The danger is that util isation 
of the forest resource base beyond its regenerative capacity may erode future welfare potential by 
foreclosing wider sustainable uses. The forest ' s  regenerative capacity may be exceeded either by 
overharvesting a given resource beyond b iophysical sustainabi l ity thresholds or by managing it to 
sustain a single benefit flow (i .e .  timber). Landowners tend also to capture only a fraction of the 
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projects, by mak ing royalty payments to landowners, tend to reinforce this 
ideology. 
Landowners: The Pressing Challenge 
A major challenge for PNG, as a young nation, is to seek workable instruments 
to reconcile private and social cost-benefit equations for forest use. Decis ions 
on land use are being made at the local level, based on private costs and benefits, 
regardless of the external social costs . In general, landowners are appropriating 
(in money terms) only a portion of the net value of conservation. Many of the 
benefits obtained, including subsistence-related and indirect use benefits, are 
non-monetary. Given the growing demand for cash incomes, these benefits are 
being discounted. The inabi lity of forest owners to capture ( in money terms) a 
greater portion of the total economic value of the forest resource is one of the 
factors that is leading them to commit it to a s ingle use, such as logging, rather 
than broader conservation management. 
The evidence from the field is that landowners are not naive regarding the 
potential social and environmental impacts of logging (personal communication, 
Rob McCallum I O ) .  Rather, they regard this as an acceptable sacrifice in return 
for infrastructure, services, and cash incomes. 
There are few regulatory instruments currently available to del imit land use 
options on customary land and internalise the external costs of such use. The 
legitimacy of the state and its systems of governance are increasingly being 
questioned by landowners. The argument runs as follows. The state is a remote 
entity to many landowners. In isolated areas not penetrated, or already 
abandoned, by government services, it is not even particularly relevant. The 
abi lity of the state to regulate land use is constrained by both capacity-related 
and geographical factors. In the colonial era, the state ' s  authority was accepted 
by landowners in return for government services (Allen 1 993). Today, however, 
where these services are not forthcoming, or where police actions aimed at 
maintaining law and order have caused local resentment to increase, the role of 
the state is being increasingly questioned (ibid.) . The inabi l ity of government 
agencies to meet the h igh expectations of landowners (for goods and services) 
reduces the state' s  jurisdiction over land use . 
Importantly, the wil l ingness of the state to exercise whatever authority it 
can wield (by excluding areas from logging in the National Forest Plan, for 
instance) is  constrained as a result of pol itical imperatives. 
overall returns from extractive development. Owing to their l imited skil ls, experience, and 
management abi lity, current development models tend to be driven by external agents. In the 
longer term, as capacity and structural constraints are addressed, community-led development 
could potentially offer greater dividends, at the local level, than those which are being harnessed 
today. However, current resource al location is mitigating against these opportunities being 
realised. 
1 0  Conservation Area Management Adviser fo r  the Lak ICAD project, United Nations 
Development Programme. 
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It is now obvious that it is very difficult for conservation to compete with 
logging pressures in the short term. This is because the scale of landowners' 
current windfall earnings from logging is so high, even though it is sti l l  true that 
they capture only a fraction of gross timber sales. This is i l lustrated in Table 
19 . 1 ,  which compares the returns to landowners from various land uses. 
Estimates of annual income derived from sample farm budgets are given. The 
last column discounts cash flows at a rate of ten percent to derive an amount for 
net present value (NPV). 
Table 19. 1 :  Returns from various land uses per hectare, at 1 994 prices. 
Activity Volume Output Price Net Income NPV for 10 Years 
Logging 22m 3 K l 80/m3 K334 K304 
Hybrid cocoa 290kg* 90t/kg* K l  1 7* K567 
Chillies 570kg* 90t/kg* K5 1 6* K2,840 
Galip l OOkg 1 5t/kg K l 5 K90 
Note: Galip nuts are collected from the natural forest. 
Sources: Conservation Resource Centre (logging data); Kandrian-Gloucester Integrated 
Development Project (agricultural data). Statistics marked with an asterisk are to be 
taken as averages. 
An important point to note when analysing these figures is that logging, in 
contrast to the alternatives, requires landowners to make few financial and sweat 
equity inputs . Logging also involves minimal labour drudgery. It imposes few 
opportunity costs in terms of communities' time-budget allocations for leisure 
and customary purposes. However, logging income is, in effect, a 'once off 
payment, while the other activities provide an ongoing flow of income. 
The State: Treasury Needs 
Increasingly in recent years, forest pol icy has tended to be driven by fiscal 
needs. Budgetary shortfalls have prompted pol icy makers to increase the scale 
of current forest production in order to meet revenue targets. Export tax yields 
from forestry have grown substantially since 1 989, when the proportion of total 
government income earned from log exports was 1 .67 percent (K l 1 . 5 mil l ion). 
In 1 994, some K 14 7 mi l l ion was appropriated, amounting to more than 1 2  
percent of aggregate income, and in 1 995 ,  K 1 38 .2 mi l l ion was earned from this 
source (Internal Revenue Commission, unpublished statistics). 
In the 1 996 budget, the government replaced the old taxation system, which 
charged differential rates based on species, to a value-based system. The new 
tax system, imposed ad valorem, is banded, with cumulative marginal rates 
appl ied based on price. I I 
The forest industry, not surprisingly perhaps, has strongly opposed the new 
system. The high marginal tax rate appl ied on high log prices probably accounts 
1 1  There are six f.o.b. price increment bands (see F iler, this volume). 
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for much of the criticism . At a price of around K l 80 per cubic metre, the state' s  
share of  income under the new system i s  roughly equivalent to that under the old 
one. Long-term log price trends are expected to be strongly positive (Gresham 
1 995) . 1 2  In the longer term, given this prognosis, the proportion of the absolute 
rent captured by the state may be expected to rise at the expense of developers. 
Why then does the state persist in committing forests to logging at levels 
that cannot be sustained, and condone damaging logging practices that will 
probably reduce harvest opportunities in the future? The projections suggest two 
things : 
• firstly, that the state places very h igh impl icit discount rates on future income 
- opting for current harvesting at the expense of the future; and 
• secondly, that pol icy makers may lack an understanding of long-term market 
trends and determinants . 
The answer probably l ies in a combination of both these factors. 
The major concern is that, as the returns from forest depletion are not being 
capitalised in human and human-made asset formation, but rather are being 
allocated to consumption, it cannot be argued that one form of capital is  s imply 
being replaced by another. This argument is often used in Southeast Asia to 
justify unsustainable harvest levels .  Owing to the dearth of opportunities for 
diversification, PNG's  economy wil l  almost certainly continue to depend on its 
natural resource sectors, including the forestry sector. 
The State: Political Cycles 
The role of the state as a custodian of PNG's  forests, in the public interest, is 
greatly compl icated by political imperatives and cycles. Pol iticians face 
immense pressures from constituents. The large number of candidates in any 
given race tends to cause electoral promises to be inflated in the campaign 
season (see Dorney 1 990). The costs of contesting and holding a seat have 
escalated (ibid.) . In the 1 992 e lection, of 1 09 sitting candidates, 59 were not 
returned. Politicians are painful ly aware that unless they respond to demands 
from their constituents for material rewards (in return for loyalty), the chances of 
them being unseated are h igh. The conjunction of these factors provides a 
substantial incentive for current income 'maximisation '  and, in some cases, 
malfeasance. To some extent, this explains pol itical antipathy towards radical 
restructuring of the forest sector, and also towards conservation . 
Logging Companies: Rent Seeking 
Logging costs in PNG are notoriously difficult to decipher. The 1 99 1  Forest 
Revenue Study (Shedden Agribusiness 1 99 1 )  estimated that costs ranged 
1 2  Preference shifts in European and North American markets towards boreal timber sources wil l  
be strongly offset by the buoyant demand from emergent markets in the Pacific rim. 
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between K 1 6  and K60 per cubic metre, at a time when the PNG kina was 
roughly on par with the US dol lar. 1 3 Actual costs are correlated strongly with 
production efficiency, the distance of logging coupes from log ponds, and site 
topography. Given a current harvest cost of K60 per cubic metre, and ignoring 
the possibi l ity of cheating, gross returns to the industry are probably in the order 
of 25-30 percent on f.o.b. sales (see Duncan 1 994; Sekhran, Saulei et al . 1 994), 
although these statistics are hotly contested by the logging companies. 1 4 
While these margins may seem high, the very substantial risks in investing 
in PNG need to be taken on board. Frequent pol itical perturbations, abrupt 
changes in tax structures, and landowner disputes al l mitigate against the 
industry taking a long-term view of forest management. 
Final ly, Asian multinational logging companies, the main industry players, 
have l ittle reason to apply h igh environmental standards to their operations. This 
is partly because they lack an active, pol iticised conservation constituency at 
home. 
The amalgam of these factors tends to result in an impetus for short-term 
rent seeking. 
Incentive Mechanisms 
The first two parts of this paper have documented the underlying causes of 
PNG's  (forest) biodiversity conservation problems. A conjunction of interests 
and factors is responsible. These are especial ly acute for 'non-use' options, 
eliminating preservation as an option . Most conservationists accept that 
conservation in PNG must be predicated on a concept of 'use it or lose it' . 
Opportunity costs may best be addressed, they argue, by developing a 
framework of incentives. One aim would be to ensure that forest owners 
receive, in tangible terms, a greater portion of the total economic value of 
biodiversity. 1 5 
1 3  Devaluation has since caused a shift in relative prices between imported and domestic inputs. 
Because sales are for the most part dollar-denominated, the effect of the devaluation on the 
industry has probably been sl ightly positive. 
1 4 From an economic perspective, we are concerned with the costs of production of an efficient 
operator. This needs to be weighed against the industry ' s  actual costs. 
1 5 The question arises as to how to define a fair incentive. G iven that total economic value is 
largely comprised of non-monetary values, an empirical basis for defining compensation amounts 
based on economic values per se is lacking. Although a number of methods exist by which to 
uncover non-monetary benefits that derive from biodiversity, a number of factors impede their 
application in PNG (Sekhran l 994b ). In defining compensation amounts, it should also be realised 
that a bidding game is being played. Local communities capture a host of direct and indirect use 
benefits from natural environments and they are l ikely to ascribe at least a minimum value to these. 
But outside interest in conservation tends to provide an inducement for landowners to bid up the 
price for the resource (or fail to disclose their own values) in order to maximise rent capture. 
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Several potential incentive mechanisms exist. Two possible measures are 
detailed in the following d iscussion. The analysis shows that there are a number 
of hurdles, some of which have already been described in the first two parts of 
this chapter, which have to be crossed first before these measures are l ikely to 
work. 
Integrated Conservation and Development (!CAD) Projects 
The current strategic approach to the establ ishment of a protected area system in 
PNG is to promote alternative land use methods and income-generating 
opportunities over ecologically damaging options. The objective is to establ ish a 
nexus between conservation objectives and the social and economic welfare 
needs of local communities. Material incentives provided to achieve this 
objective .may include : 
• support for the development of income generation schemes consistent with 
conservation; 
• funding for social infrastructure and services; and 
• the payment of access fees (for research or tourism). 
Under this strategy, development support may be provided, as an incentive 
for conservation, through the vehicle of discrete integrated conservation and 
development (ICAD) projects. Several such projects are presently being 
implemented, supported by a range of government, non-government, and donor 
bodies . There is no single ICAD strategy, and these projects cover a wide 
spectrum of approaches to such matters as community entry, engaging 
community participation, definitions of 'development' ,  and education and 
awareness activities . Although it is sti l l  too early to draw concrete lessons from 
these implementation efforts, it is c lear that a number of factors presently appear 
to hamper the real isation of ICAD objectives. 
Landowner demands, for example, can greatly stretch l imited project 
resources, particularly in areas where alternative options, including logging, 
exist. An ICAD project in Lak, New Ireland, was chal lenged by landowners to 
match income generated from an existing logging project which the ICAD was 
attempting to replace with 'eco-development' . This was imposed as a 
precondition for their participation in the conservation effort. However, the fact 
was that 'eco-development' options, by reducing annual harvests of forest 
products to ecologically sustainable extraction thresholds, resulted in a loss of 
current income. This served as a substantial disincentive for conservation, and 
was exploited to the ful l  by the logging contractor and individuals who stood to 
lose if the logging venture was displaced. Many of these individuals based their 
decision to oppose the conservation initiative on their private cost-benefit 
calculus, ignoring broader long-term community welfare issues. The systems of 
These values need to be factored into the analysis of opportunity costs associated with 
conservation. 
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patronage established to support logging proved especially difficult to compete 
against. The message that 'eco-development' would serve to increase long-term 
income was met with short shrift (personal communication, Rob McCallum). 
A major problem is that community expectations from development, led by 
a small faction of interest groups, are very high. Perceptions of development as 
'cargo' or rent, rather than a long-term process of social change, are widely held. 
Self-help models are poorly understood and seem unattractive when compared to 
the prospect of rent capture. Expectations are being constantly driven upwards 
through exposure to outsiders, including tourists, city dwel lers, and the media. 
The welfare gap which exists between urban areas and other enclaves, including 
mining areas, and the forest hinterland is obvious to landowners, and this often 
leads to a sense of frustration on their part. The gap also serves to fuel 
development expectations, as communities strive to close it. 
Developers tend to play to the local landowner gal lery by promising 
income, employment, services, and infrastructure in return for resource access 
rights. Though these promises may often be false, they seem attractive, 
especially when immediate rewards (cash, travel perks, and other benefits) are 
provided . The structure of access agreements further reinforces incentives for 
extractive forest use by making provision for the developer to provide social and 
economic infrastructure. The effect is to perpetuate, amongst forest 
communities, a culture of dependency on outsiders . These precepts of 
development, once they have taken hold, are difficult to shift. 
ICAD projects general ly have funding to provide technical assistance, 
training, information, and other catalytic support. With this, they aim at 
catalysing community- led development, by placing the onus for development 
initiatives on local stakeholders, rather than externally motivated models. 
However, communities which are accustomed to receiving rents may expect 
ICAD projects to deliver development rather than just providing support for it. 
A substantial change in such attitudes is required if ICAD projects are to work. 
Early Rewards Schemes 
One means of addressing these pressures is to provide early rewards to 
landowners. These are tangible immediate incentives (social infrastructural 
provision and other development support) to reward 'desirable' forest uses. 
The problem is that such schemes may undermine the very long-term 
development process that ICAD projects are attempting to support. By sending 
the inadvertent signal that development is rent capture, they may work as a 
disincentive for work effort, which, in turn, is a prerequisite for successful 
community- led development. The danger is that this may set an unfortunate 
precedent for future project interventions .  Furthermore, unless ' rewards'  are 
linked to conservation outcomes, future relationships between the community 
and conservation advocates are l ikely to be damaged. 
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Buyina Time 
As already discussed, pressures that underlie habitat loss are rooted in short-term 
socio-economic and pol itical needs and demands. Long-term planning time 
horizons, essential as they are to resolve these issues, are a luxury for many 
ICAD projects which are wrestling with immediate concerns. Time is a 
commodity in short supply. 
Can the state intervene to foreclose landowners' forest use options? Given 
the dislocation of the state from civi l  society, and the consequent l imited impact 
of state decrees on land use, the answer is probably 'no' . The interests of the 
state in resource development also work against such an option. Technically, 
however, the government is able to foreclose timber extraction as a resource use 
option by insulating areas from timber production under the National Forest 
Plan.  Such zoning would not remove other pressures on the forest base, but it 
would serve the purpose of ' buying time' in order to resolve these problems. 
Hiah Costs of Social Services 
Although service provision may be considered as a form of material incentive, 
none of the existing ICAD projects are designed and capital ised to provide for 
services. The costs of providing education and health care in rural PNG are 
high. The government's  abi lity to increase service coverage is l imited by fiscal 
factors, and ICAD projects have l ittle leverage capacity to negotiate government 
service provision. Thus far, apart from basic l iteracy extension, none of the 
existing ICAD projects have included service provision in their programmes. 
Structural Constraints to Micro-Enterprise Development 
If income generation is a landowner priority, then ICAD projects will need to 
provide support for micro-enterprise establishment. A number of structural 
constraints impede viable enterprise establishment. These are reviewed in 
Sekhran ( 1 996) and are summarised here : 
• PNG's  internal markets are smal l .  This stems partly from the fact that rural 
incomes are low, and partly from the fact that minor forest produce is often 
available for consumptive purposes directly from the wild. 
• The fragmentation of internal markets affects distribution and marketing 
costs. Fragmentation occurs as a result of the spatial distribution of human 
population concentrations and the dearth of economic infrastructure to create 
or access markets. This has implications for minimum scale economies. 
• International markets have quality control requirements, professional service 
expectations and del ivery needs that are difficult to service. These require 
extensive discipline, which is difficult to achieve. The lack of understanding 
of market determinants, structural factors, costs, ski l ls, and experience with 
the workings of the formal economy are al l constraints. 
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• Information failure causes a lack of understanding amongst rural 
entrepreneurs of the determinants of markets. This is partly a consequence of 
the remoteness of markets from points of production and the lack, or poor 
functioning, of information systems. 
• High input costs, including those for electricity, distribution, marketing, 
-communications, and security, tend to reduce competitiveness and margins. 
• High rural wage rates, ski l l  shortages, and low productivity increase 
overheads and reduce business development opportunities . Successful small 
businesses often have intensive business management inputs; many employ 
expatriates (including volunteers), but this has adverse implications for 
sustainabi l ity. 
The conjunction of these factors affects the viabil ity of micro-enterprises, and 
therefore constrains the abi l ity of ICAD projects to meet their central objective . 
Though there are considerable opportunities in terms of potentially saleable 
products (see Sekhran, Saulei et al . 1 994), demand-side bottlenecks exist. This 
requires time to address. 
Work Effort Disjncentiyes 
A major factor to be considered is that community-driven smal l business 
activities require considerable work effort, labour drudgery, and opportunity 
costs in terms of time foregone for customary activities, relative to royalty­
generating options such as large-scale logging. This affects the economic 
calculus of communities and has a bearing on motivation . 
Reconci lini Custom with Enterprise Mana�ement and Capital isation Needs 
Brooks ( 1 996), in a review of lessons learned from the past history of smal l 
business development in PNG, argues that a principal reason for the failure of 
micro-enterprises is the repeated attempt to apply Western business models to 
the vi l lage economy rather than seeking an indigenous paradigm.  She makes a 
d istinction between Western l inear business models, where asset formation fuels 
long-term business growth, and cycl ical models of enterprise in Melanesia. In 
the latter case, the catalyst for community mobil isation and work effort is  a 
short-term customary objective (an example would be the need to create an 
agricultural surplus for a bride price payment). 
Brooks (ibid.) further argues that it is  critical to recognise the customary 
obl igations of communities and the need for individual members to budget time 
to meeting these. In other words, time needs to be budgeted for both customary 
activities and business needs. A related issue is the need for community 
entrepreneurs to service their multi-strand relationships with other community 
actors. Sociocultural norms in Melanesia obl ige wealth creators to distribute 
assets amongst clan members . These obligations are ignored at the peril of the 
entrepreneur. Yet there is a fundamental trade-off between the necessity of 
servicing business needs, maintaining and bui lding the capital base of the 
enterprise and investing sweat equity, and customary obl igations. Demands on 
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wealth may be based on community perceptions of wealth rather than on an 
objective basis taking account of l iquidity. 
Brooks ' review also found that, for many business projects, community 
involvement in the process of defining project objectives was limited (ibid.) .  A 
related factor is that few community members are aware of the reasons (for 
example, market factors) which explain why given decisions are made or need to 
be made. A challenge for ICAD projects is to develop methods to perform 
feasibility investigations at the v i llage level - chal lenging stakeholders to 
broaden their perspectives on the fundamentals of business management. 
The problem, of course, is that businesses, despite their customary 
demands, operate in a ' Western ' business environment that emphasises qual ity, 
rel iabi lity of delivery, and credit d iscipl ine. Brooks'  solution is to build 
community support for the objectives of micro-enterprise establ ishment through 
awareness rais ing and dedicated training programmes which aim at developing 
problem-solving, planning, and critical thinking ski l l s .  This later needs to be 
followed up with extension support at the field level .  She cautions, in the 
process of achieving this, against dissociating business development from the 
broader community development context. 
Conservation and Development Linkages 
An important point is that, ultimately, durable l inkages between development 
support and conservation need to be built. Worldwide, the performance of 
ICAD projects on this account has been poor (Wells and Brandon 1 992). The 
existing ICAD projects in PNG are all grappl ing with this chal lenge. Solutions 
are l ikely to embody a mixture of community-level checks and balances, partly 
through building and empowering local institutions to be responsible for 
conservation management. 1 6  
Other Strategies 
A major lesson is that, if community- led development is not an available option 
(for the reasons already outlined), then a strategy of attracting responsible, 
ethically guided companies to operate sustainable development enterprises for 
profit may need to be employed. These could provide a rent to local 
stakeholders. 
However, the c l imate for business investment in PNG poses challenges to 
this strategy. The returns from the business activity wil l  need to be sufficiently 
high to attract investors and cover risk premiums payable on capital markets. 
There is a problem in providing long-term surety. The interest rates applied by 
financiers to cover risk currently mitigate heavily against the future. The scale 
l 6 Holzknecht and Power suggest the establ ishment of Community Representative Management 
Committees (CRMCs) or Vi l lage Development Committees (VDCs) consisting of representatives 
of kinship groups that hold land and forest resources (see Power I 994; Holzknecht I 995a, I 996a). 
This approach aims at reconcil ing custom and tenure systems with formal management needs. 
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of operations necessitated to cover premiums would probably be h igh, and a 
large basel ine resource base is necessary to ensure that harvesting is ecologically 
sustainable at these levels .  There are thus enormous hurdles to overcome. 
There is a further caveat. The l ine between the provision of development 
support in this form and the payment of conservation transfers is blurred. One of 
the principal arguments in favour of community- led smal l  business development 
revolves around the idea that, by making sweat equity and capital investments, 
local communities wil l  have a greater responsibil ity for, and commitment to, 
productive development (as opposed to rent-seeking). The prediction is that 
conservation wil l  be ach ieved through development only if development is 
feasible. But th is requires, in addition to resolving production, marketing and 
other problems, that communities are discipl ined, make sacrifices, temper their 
expectations, and take responsibil ity for development activities. Without such 
responsibi l ity, development is unl ikely to be sustainable. 
It is unclear for now, given the pecul iar exigencies of PNG's  social, 
economic, pol itical, and institutional fabric, whether the ICAD process wi l l  
succeed i n  meeting conservation imperatives; and yet the process wil l  no  doubt 
continue to be the focus of efforts because the alternatives appear even less 
workable at this time. Notably, the alienation of land to form National Parks and 
inviolate areas is not on the agenda. It remains pol itical ly and financial ly 
untenable, especial ly given the pol itical awakening of landowners' attachments 
to land and the nature of the existing balance of power between them and the 
state. Even if smal l parcels of land are protected in this fashion, the experience 
with existing parks on state land is that the previous owners of land maintain an 
ongoing interest in the land so al ienated, failing in some cases to accept that 
property rights have been transferred . This presents the obvious danger that the 
whole process may later be re- l itigated. 
Problems with Accessing Large Areas for Conservation 
The biological sciences suggest that, in order to serve as viable species 
storehouses, protected areas need to be large (see Schafer 1 990). Beehler ( 1 993) 
argues that, in PNG, sites need to be at least 8,000 square kilometres in size. 
The problem is that no single landowner parcel is l ikely to be of sufficient size to 
meet these needs. The larger the area of interest for conservation, the greater the 
number of owner-stakeholders involved. Each of these groups wil l  have a 
bounded resource set - they wil l  seek to meet certain social and economic 
objectives within the constraints which this imposes (Sekhran 1 996). Because 
the marginal opportunity costs of foregone uses are high, individual clans may 
be wi l ling to apportion a part of their landholding to conservation, but not the 
entire parcel .  Thus we see a situation in PNG today in which a number of 
landowner groups have expressed an interest in conserving a portion of their 
landholdings, but these holdings are general ly too small to provide for long-term 
conservation . 
A zoning plan that commits land to production and strict preservation 
within a multiple-use management framework wi l l  have significant 
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distributional implications. Opportunity costs would be imposed 
disproportionately on those clan groups which have jurisdiction over inviolate 
zones, whi le the benefits would be captured by those clans which control zones 
of extraction. Landowners' perceptions of the gains and losses that apply to 
them wil l  determine the degree to which they agree to participate in 
management. 
A transfer mechanism would need to be found to ensure a spread of benefits 
within any conservation management area between al l prospective stakeholders. 
Orsak ( 1 996b) provides a strong word of caution in this context: 
Rural villagers aren't clamouring to embrace the concept of local 
taxation for the common good. Until they do, using economic benefits 
from one area or group to secure the protection of large, contiguous 
habitat areas is not going to work. . . .  Incentive sharing will have to 
wait until villagers have embraced the kind of macro land use planning 
that is essential for conservation. 
Conservation Rents 
Another option, where stakeholder demand for income is high and the ICAD 
process is unable to catalyse v iable smal l business development, is to establ ish a 
conservation interest in land through payment of a conservation management 
rent. The aim would be to create a market in the multi-functional characteristics 
of biological diversity, and thus an incentive for broader conservation. In 
essence, conservation rents may be construed as a transfer mechanism to pay 
landowners not to commit land to ecological ly destructive land use options. 
Conservation management rents may take several guises. They may take 
the form of annual cash payments, subsidies for service delivery, or a 
combination of these. Some schemes have establ ished conservation trust 
funds. 1 7 These are conservation endowments, the proceeds of which may be 
used to rent virgin forest. Funds may be generated through national government 
budget appropriations, the private sector, bi lateral and multilateral donor bodies, 
and through debt-for-nature swaps, carbon offset initiatives, or other innovative 
financing deals (see Dixon and Sherman 1 99 1  ) . Thus there is no single model, 
although the broad objectives of the various schemes are simi lar. 1 8  
Conservation rents may be calculated from estimates of the consumer 
surplus obtained by beneficiaries of biodiversity conservation who do not face 
the full  costs of provision - particularly communities in the developed world .  
Alternatively, the opportunity costs faced by local stakeholders in pursuing 
conservation management options may be used as a proxy. They may also be 
1 7 For an overview of current environmental funds, see IUCN/NC/WWF ( 1 994). 
18 Some schemes, such as the 'Buy an Acre' of rainforest scheme, aim at securing title over land 
(ownership) for conservation purposes. For obvious reasons, this is simply unworkable in PNG. 
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arbitrari ly calculated on the basis of a predefined rent. 1 9 Regardless of the 
modal ity, the key is to ensure that the l inkage between the service (conservation 
management) and the payment is transparent, and to find mechanisms to enforce 
the compact. Herein l ies the rub.  
The arguments for and against transfers have been articulated elsewhere 
(Sekhran 1 994b) and are summarised here. 
To reiterate, one factor underpinning the biodiversity management problem 
is that local resource stewards are only capturing a portion of the total economic 
value of conservation. Their economic calculus is based on a comparison of 
relative private and social costs and benefits. Cost factors, including opportunity 
costs, bear heavily in this calculus. The benefits are discounted because they are 
not captured by the community, being enjoyed by other actors or by future 
generations. They are also discounted because they are non-monetary, or 
because the systems l inkages between ecological health and human welfare are 
poorly understood. One solution to address this is to ensure that communities 
secure money values for benefits not previously capturable. 
Global communities, it could be argued, obtain conservation benefits -
including existence, recreational, and future use benefits - without facing the 
costs of provision, which instead fall disproportionately on the providers of the 
service (Wells 1 992). They thus obtain a consumer surplus for conservation 
management. The uti l ity obtained from conservation, however, would be lost if 
conservation values are eroded through ecological ly exploitative forms of 
development. This loss would be manifested through a loss of existence values, 
option use benefits, and potential adverse eco-system feedbacks. Ipso facto, 
there are substantial economic and moral justifications for th is constituency to 
pay for the provision of conservation services. 
More affluent communities are l ikely to be more concerned with future 
welfare than poorer communities, PNG's  landowners included. Transfers would 
share the burden for natural resource stewardship with those who have the abi l ity 
to pay. Questions arise, however, concerning the wil l ingness of affluent 
communities to pay un less compel led - regardless of their abi lity to pay. 
Similar uncertainty exists over the amounts that they would be wil l ing to pay. 
Ensuring that funds flow during recessions wi l l  be especial ly problematic. 
PNG concerns are l ikely to be remote from the interests of affluent 
societies. TV documentaries and other forms of mass media are l ikely to raise 
public consciousness of conservation issues, but wil l ingness to pay is probably 
subject to what we may term a diminishing cognitive effect. Wi l l ingness is 
correlated highly with perceptions of the issues at hand, and perceptions, in turn, 
are likely to become dimmer as time progresses. Conjecturally, as virgin forests 
become more scarce and the costs associated with a loss of biological diversity 
1 9 A recently negotiated compact between the government of Vanuatu and customary landowners 
in Erramango pays a standard rate of Vatu 1 00 (approximately US$ I )  per hectare per year, the set 
rate for ' unimproved ' agricultural land in Erramango (see Tacconi and Bennett 1 995). 
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become more compel l ing, wil l ingness to pay for habitat and species protection 
will rise. 
A major problem is that a poorly constructed transfers framework will 
create or reinforce a ' handout mentality' amongst local communities. This 
would serve to increase dependence on outside assistance and reinforce the 
perception that development is an external ly driven process. 
Several questions regarding the modal ity and mechanisms for the 
distribution of funds are l ikely to arise. The task of ensuring equity and 
inhibiting social stratification will pose a considerable challenge for fund 
managers. 
The greatest challenge, given the current socio-political environment, will 
be to ensure that landowners maintain their end of any compact, and do not 
renege on the deal at some indefinite future period, when other land use options 
may appear more lucrative. 
The incapacity to provide surety for conservation investments al so affects 
investment in ICAD projects. The inabi l ity to secure the given service for which 
the payment is scheduled makes investment very risky. Without surety, and 
appropriate institutions to guarantee agreements and uphold contracts, it is 
questionable whether PNG will be able to attract sufficient financial resources 
for conservation management deals .  In short, given the nature of the global 
marketplace, funds wil l  flow to those countries that can guarantee the requisite 
conservation outcome. 
Conclusions 
Despite a property rights regime for forest resources that should theoretically 
provide an incentive for conservation management, PNG faces compel l ing 
constraints to the achievement of biodiversity management aims. This paper has 
documented a plethora of contra-conservation factors. It has also shown that 
strategies to address opportunity costs are hampered by a combination of factors. 
Thus, material incentives alone, regardless of the method employed, are unl ikely 
to deliver the desired long-term conservation outcome.  
Many conservation practitioners have recognised these problems and are 
seeking to address them through a process of education and advocacy at the 
community level .  The idea is that a degree of attitudinal change is necessary at 
the local level in order for conservation to work. Th is process is deemed 
necessary prior to providing development support. 
Such a strategy would require that a relationship of trust first be established 
with local communities. Careful attention needs to be paid to community entry 
processes, conflict resolution, awareness, and advocacy. Projects must directly 
tackle the problem of high expectations and chal lenge communities to rethink 
their development strategies. The basis of responsibil ity needs to be taught and 
reinforced at the local level .  There is no short cut here. Unless communities 
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take the lead in organising themselves, and mobi lising human and financial 
resources for development, conservation is unl ikely to be achieved. 
This strategy has intuitive appeal, although the jury has yet to reach a 
verdict on its efficacy. This can only be tested by the passage of time. 
At the same time, the conjunction of contra-conservation factors impl ies 
that some areas of high biodiversity value wi l l  not be conserved using the 
vehicle of ICAD projects, but will rather be committed to extractive 
development. Social feasibil ity studies must form part and parcel of the design 
stage of conservation projects . Such studies may serve to alert conservation 
practitioners to both existing and emergent problems in the area of interest 
proposed for conservation management so that interventions may be 
appropriately designed . It makes sense to target assistance only at those areas 
and communities where the chances of successful outcomes appear l ikely. 
The problem is, however, that contra-conservation factors are often most 
compell ing in merchantable lowland tropical rainforest. One solution would be 
to recruit more ethical industry players into commercial logging ventures in such 
areas, who could then apply active species management areas in logging coupes .  
Despite their shortcomings, i t  is l ikely that, at least on an experimental 
basis, conservation management rental arrangements may need to be tried in 
selected areas as an alternative to ICAD strategies . The pol icy lesson here is that 
conservation practitioners wil l  need to be inventive in designing and applying 
interventions, and wil l  need to be open to a broader range of strategies than 
currently appears to be the case. At the same time, every effort needs to be 
made to identify the l ikely weaknesses of given strategies and devise, as far as 
practicable, appropriate mitigation measures. 
The process of effecting a given intervention, whether an ICAD project or a 
covenant agreement, wil l ,  to a large extent, define the outcome. Given the short­
term exigencies that plague conservation efforts, there is often a tendency to 
short-stop this process . This is a mistake. 
In the final analysis, the present raft of conservation in itiatives will flounder 
unless at least some of the perverse conservation incentives that currently hold 
are neutralised. Without strong support from the executive and regulatory arms 
of the state, discrete conservation-focused actions wi l l  continue to be frustrated.  
Although the compel l ing task of addressing landowners' private objectives 
remains, at least the complexity of the task of finding a mutual concession 
between stakeholders wil l  be somewhat eased. Such a strategy would, at the 
very least, buy time. 
CHAPTER 20 
NATURE CONSERVATION IN IRIAN JAY A: 
A COUNTERPOINT TO PAPUA NEW GUINEA?* 
JOHN M. LEEDOM 
Introduction 
In an assessment of conservation policy and practice in Papua New Guinea 
(PNG), it seemed timely to include a comparative chapter on the Indonesian 
province of Irian Jaya. The 1 4 1  st meridian artificially divides a single 
biogeographic and cultural region into two pol itical territories which are almost 
equivalent in s ize. 1 On either side of this border, the governments of PNG and 
Indonesia have pursued contrasting polices on the establ ishment of conservation 
areas on customary land. In PNG, the establishment of conservation areas 
legally requires the participation and consent of local landowners. In Irian Jaya, 
on the other hand, the state has the legal authority to al locate customary land to 
nature conservation regardless of the wishes of its traditional owners. Has 
nature conservation been easier to achieve in Irian Jaya because of these 
differences in national systems of land tenure? 
At first glance, it appears that it has. S ince the late 1 970s, the Indonesian 
government has legally declared twenty-three protected areas in Irian Jaya, 
covering some 63 ,000 square kilometres, or about 1 5  percent of the province 
(KLH 1 992). The PNG government, in comparison, records the existence of 
thirty-four protected areas in its territory, but they encompass a much smal ler 
area: 1 3 ,000 square kilometres, or about 2 .8  percent of its terrestrial area 
(Sekhran, this volume). On paper, then, Indonesia has dedicated about five 
* The idea to do a comparative analysis of conservation programmes in PNG and Irian Jaya arose 
out of conversations between myself and Nikhi l  Sekhran, and was encouraged by Colin Filer. The 
International Institute for Environment and Development generously funded a field v isit to Irian 
Jaya in January 1 996, enabling me to gather documents related to the planning and management of 
conservation areas and to make brief v isits to Wasur National Park and the Arfak Mountains Strict 
Nature Reserve. I am especially grateful to the staff of the WWF Irian Jaya Programme, especially 
Ron L iley and the staff of the l ibrary for providing me with documentation on conservation 
projects. I would also l ike to acknowledge the assistance of WWF staff in arranging tours of 
Wasur National Park and the Arfak Mountains Strict Nature Reserve. Terima kasih banyak. Many 
thanks are due to Megan Passey for being my pengikut in Irian Jaya and for being a constant 
source of support. Final ly, I am also extremely grateful to Peter Redfield for his editorial advice. 
The views that I express in this chapter are my own and do not necessarily express the views of 
I IED, WWF, or anyone else cited here. 
1 PNG has an area of 462,243 km2, while Irian Jaya has an area of 42 1 ,98 1 km2 (BPS 1 994 :42) . 
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times more land to nature conservation in the western part of New Guinea than 
PNG has done in the eastern part. 
On the ground, however, there is l ittle evidence that recent conservation 
initiatives in Irian Jaya have been more successful in protecting biological 
diversity than have parallel initiatives in PNG. First of al l ,  there are significant 
differences between the nature reserve system as it was designed by 
conservation biologists and the nature reserve system as it was gazetted by the 
government (FAO/UNDP 1 98 1 ;  Petocz and Raspado 1 984, 1 989). Secondly, the 
Department of Forest Protection and Nature Conservation (PHPA) is, at present, 
actively managing only four of the twenty-three legal ly protected areas. The rest 
remain essential ly unmanaged. Lastly, the logging, mining, and commercial 
fishing industries have continued to expand, while Indonesian immigrants from 
other islands have continued to arrive in the province . This increase in industry 
and population has not only made increasing demands on land and natural 
resources; it has also led to increasing conflict over access to them . 
In this chapter, then, I provide a review of the accomplishments and 
frustrations of twenty years of conservation initiatives in Irian Jaya.2 I propose 
that conservation has not been - nor will it be - any easier to achieve in Irian 
Jaya than in PNG. Rather than faci l itating the orderly establ ishment of 
conservation areas, the assertion of state control over forests and other natural 
resources has sparked competition between a variety of unequal actors - the 
state, large timber companies, Indonesian migrants, indigenous Irianese - over 
access to land and resources (Barber, Johnson and Hafild 1 994 : 1 3 ). Such 
competition (and conflict) has not only made it difficult to develop effective 
conservation institutions and management strategies in legal ly declared reserves; 
it has also led to ecological degradation outside of them. 
I begin the chapter with an overview of the national pol icy context which 
shaped conservation initiatives in Irian Jaya. I then review the history of the 
nature reserve system as it moved from the stage of intensive planning to the 
stage of implementation. In the last section, I examine how contemporary 
conservation initiatives, which adopt the model of Integrated Conservation and 
Development (ICAD) projects, have attempted to establish effective 
conservation management in five high priority reserves. To a certain extent, 
these projects are succeeding, but they leave l ittle cause to be optimistic about 
the future ecology of Irian Jaya as a whole. 
The Legal and Institutional Framework for Na tu re Conservation 
under Indonesia's New Order 
The contemporary conservation laws and institutions of Indonesia have their 
roots in the Dutch colonial period, but it has only been in the past thirty years 
2 Previous chapters in this volume (by Whimp, Johnson, and Sekhran) have already discussed the 
current status of conservation initiatives in PNG, and I do not propose to add to their discussion 
here. 
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that Indonesia has developed a comprehensive conservation policy. The Dutch 
colonial administration enacted Nature Protection Ordinances and established 
about 1 00 Nature Reserves in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
(IUCN 1 992 :49-50) .  After Indonesia attained independence in 1 949, the state 
inherited the reserve system and adopted the colonial conservation legislation . 
For the most part, however, the reserve system remained unmanaged, and the 
nature protection laws unenforced, during the years of President Sukarno's 
'Guided Democracy' (from 1 949 to 1 966). It was not unti l  after the 
consol idation of Soeharto ' s  New Order regime ( instituted in 1 967) that the state 
once again elaborated laws and institutions dedicated to nature conservation . 
Conservation Policy under the New Order 
Since the establishment of the New Order regime, pol icies affecting the 
conservation of biological diversity - especially in forests - have passed through 
three phases. 3 In the first phase, which started in the mid- l 960s, the state 
asserted its control over natural resources and used them as a low cost source of 
capital to stimulate economic growth and consolidate its pol itical base. Revenue 
from the export of oil ,  for example, was used to fund massive investments in 
infrastructure and human resources; revenue from the export of timber, 
meanwhile, helped to reduce the country' s  dependence on oil (World Bank 
1 994 :3 5) .  Whi le these pol icies helped Indonesia to attain high rates of economic 
growth in the l 970s,4 most of the benefits of this growth accrued to an urban 
elite whi le the costs have largely been borne by peasants and tribal peoples in 
the rural areas of the Outer Islands (Bresnan 1 993 :283-7; Hill 1 994; World Bank 
1 994; Barber, Affif and Purnomo 1 995 : 1 2) .  In the first phase, then, the 
government showed no overt concern for the environmental impact of its 
development projects, nor did it articulate specific conservation pol icies 
(GOI/IIED 1 985 :45 ;  Hardjono 1 99 1 ,  1 994). 
In the second phase, which started in the mid- l 970s, the government 
developed a parallel pol icy framework which emphasised the need to strike a 
balance between socio-economic development and nature conservation. In 
1 97 1 ,  the government established the Department of Nature Conservation and 
Wildlife (PPA) as a subdivision of the Department of Forests. In 1 974, it 
reached an agreement with the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United 
Nations (FAO/UNDP) to undertake a joint-review of the nation' s  conservation 
needs .  The review resulted in the publication of an eight-volume National 
Conservation Plan in 1 98 1 .  This proposed revisions and additions to the 
national system of nature reserves, identified conservation priorities, and made 
recommendations for the development of conservation management strategies 
3 I have adapted this periodisation from Barber, Affif and Purnomo ( 1 995 :  1 7); see also Barber 
( 1 989: 1 22- 1 25) .  
4 The economy grew at an annual rate of 7 percent between 1 965 and 1 980 (Bresnan 1 993 :283 ) . 
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and institutions (F AO/UNDP 1 98 1 ;  Sumardja, Harsono and MacKinnon 
1 984 :2 1 7). 5 
In the second phase, then, the focus of conservation practice lay in making a 
space for nature reserves in the large-scafe land-use planning undertaken by 
other government agencies. The ministries of Transmigration and Agriculture, 
for instance, were pressuring the Department of Forests to yield forest land for 
conversion to other uses (GOI/IIED 1 985b :3 ;  Hardjono 1 99 1  : 8-9; 
Tjondronegoro 1 99 1  :27). Conservation practice was not yet oriented towards 
the establ ishment of nature reserves on the ground, although the World Wildlife 
Fund was sponsoring projects in a number of high priority parks (Blower and 
McNeely 1 977). 
In the third phase, which started in the mid- to late 1 980s, government 
conservation pol icy came increasingly to focus on the problems of managing 
conservation areas effectively. The 1 980 World Conservation Strategy and the 
1 982 World Congress of Parks (held in Bal i) initiated a profound shift in 
thinking about conservation management in Indonesia. Whereas the approach to 
conservation management in the past had largely rel ied on protecting reserves 
from peasant encroachment, participants at the World Congress advocated a 
strategy of involving local communities in the management of conservation 
areas and assisting them in making sustainable use of natural resources at a more 
general level (McNeely and Mil ler 1 984). Over time, the ideas expressed at the 
Bal i conference were transformed into a new model of conservation 
management, generally known as ' Integrated Conservation and Development' 
(Wells and Brandon 1 992). This model called for the involvement of local 
communities in the management of protected areas instead of their exclusion 
from land which they might wel l  regard as their own. It also cal led for the 
improvement of community welfare through the promotion of new agricultural 
techniques and the development of sustainable economic activities in 'buffer 
zones' - that is, areas immediately adjacent to reserves. By pursuing these 
activities, ICAD projects aimed to reduce local dependence on land and 
resources in the reserves, and also to provide local communities with a financial 
incentive to comply with the demands of conservation management. In other 
words, they identified poverty as a major constraint to effective conservation 
management, and sought to develop interventions which addressed this 
problem.6 
5 When the F AO/UNDP project began in 1 97 4, there were about 1 60 legally established Nature 
and Game Reserves, total ling about 3 .8  mi l l ion hectares, in Indonesia (Blower and McNeely 
1 977 :89; IUCN 1 992 : 5 1 ) . By 1 982, the government had gazetted 1 33 additional reserves, bringing 
the total area under legal protection to ' 1 1 ,267,540.06 hectares' (Sumardja, Harsono and 
MacKinnon 1 984 :2 1 4  ) . Reserves which the government had recently gazetted in Irian Jaya 
accounted for about half of this increase. 
6 A recent article in the flagship magazine of the WWF Indonesia Programme defined the core 
philosophy of the ICAD approach as follows: 'The basis for effective conservation and nature 
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Since the late 1 980s, ICAD projects have become the dominant model for 
conservation management in Indonesia. Projects are now under way in a 
number of National Parks and Nature Reserves throughout the archipelago (see 
Barber, Affif and Purnomo 1 995) .  They are being supported by the Asian 
Develop,ment Bank, the World Bank, USAID, the World Wide Fund for Nature 
(WWF), Conservation International, and the Nature Conservancy (BAPPENAS 
1 993 :25) .  
Conservation-oriented Legislation 
There are two main forms of legislation in Indonesia: 
• 'basic laws ' (undang-undang), which contain general statements of principle 
on a particular subject; and 
• decrees (keputusan) or regulations (peraturan), by which particular 
government departments or agencies apply these basic laws to their 
respective areas of jursidiction. 
As a result, ' there is always an inevitable time lag before a basic law begins to 
take effect . . .  [and] the legal framework on any legal area is open and continually 
developing' (Fox 1 994: 3 ). 
For most of the period under consideration, the Basic Forestry Law of 1 967 
has provided the substantive legal framework for conservation pol icy, although 
its main intention was to open the forests of the Outer Islands to commercial 
logging. The law asserted the state' s  control over al l forests in its territory, as 
wel l  as the resources which could be found in them. It directed the Department 
of Forests, under the authority of the Minister of Agriculture, to define official 
forest areas in Indonesia and then to prepare a General Plan specifying the 
location, availab i lity, and prescribed use of these forests throughout the 
country.7 The forest estate was then to be divided into four categories of use : 
'Production Forests ' ,  'Protection Forests ' ,  'Nature Conservation Forests ' ,  and 
'Recreation Forests ' (see Table 20. 1 ) . These categories largely prescribed where 
and how forests could be used. The undocumented property rights (adat) of 
peasant and tribal communities were recognised only to the extent that they did 
not conflict with the uses mandated by the state. The law stated that ' traditional 
rights as wel l  as individual rights to obtain advantage from the forests must not 
interfere with the goals stated in this law ' .  
protection i s  n o  longer merely the management o f  nature. Instead, i t  i s  the management o f  people 
in their interactions with nature. ' (Conservation Indonesia, 8(2) :  l 0, 1 992) 
7 Article 1 defined 'forest' as 'an area grown with trees, forming one unity with nature and its 
surroundings, and determined by the Government as forest' (cited in GI/IIED 1 985). 
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Table 20. 1 :  The national system of forest classification mandated by Indonesia 's  
Basic Forestry Law of 1 967. 
Forest type 
1 .  Production Forests 
(Hut an Produks i) 
2. Protection Forests 
(Hutan Lindung) 
3 .  Nature Conservation Forests 
(Hutan Suaka Alam) 
Prescribed use 
Forest designated for the exploitation of 
forest products to meet the needs of the 
community in general, and especially 
the needs of development, industry, and 
export. 
Forest designated for the protection of 
watersheds and the prevention of soil 
erosion. 
Forest designated for the protection of 
native flora and fauna in their natural 
state. 
· · · · · · · · ·ca:)· ·stiict.Natlire .. Re.se.i-ve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . ... _ . . N.o .. mailaieilie.iit··c;f'Iiliiliail .. iilierrereilce··1h'ai·· 
( Cagar Alam) changes the character of the soil, flora, or 
fauna in any way, or affects its pristine 
condition, is permitted. Access is for 
scientific purposes only subject to written 
permission from the PHPA. · · ·· · · · · ·ciJ)'.G"ailie.'ilese·i-·ve·· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ··· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·-· ·N·a··acirvrires .. are .. p.emi.iite<l .. ii1at··aaiii·ag·e··1i1e·· · 
(Suaka Margawatwa) flora, fauna, or landscape that could detract 
from the value of the reserve. Provision is 
made, however, for hunting, subject to 
written permission from the Ministry of 
Forestry, and also for the development of 
forest-based industries, such as the 
collection of forest products, grazing of 
livestock, or fishing, subject to a permit 
issued by the provincial governor. 
4. Recreation Forests Forests for the use of domestic and 
(Hutan Wisata) foreign tourists .  
· · · · · · · · ·ca:) . . 8liil'iiili.Fo.re·s·is .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _ . .  r\:ia:iiage·a··speC'ificaiiy··ror··c;·riailise.d"tiiiili'iil·g·· · 
(Taman Buru) and fishing. · · · · · · · · ·ci1Y.ile.creailoii .. i>ari<s··· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·-· ·�J"a:1i1iaiii.eci'.ror·oii.i<loor.recrea:ir0il:··· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 
(Taman Wisata) 
Sources: GOI/llED 1 985 ;  IUCN 1 992. 
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This scheme was apparently modified by Basic Law No. 5 of 1 990, on The 
Conservation of Living Resources and Their Ecosystems, which revoked the 
Nature Protection Ordinances dating from the Dutch colonial administration and 
revised the categories of protected areas that had been established by the Basic 
Forestry Law.8 S ignificantly, the new Act defined the meaning of 
'conservation' (konservasi) largely in terms of wise management and sustainable 
use rather than protection. Article 2, for example, stated that ' conservation of 
living resources and their ecosystems shal l be based on the principle of 
harmonious and balanced sustainable uti l isation of l iving resources and their 
ecosystems' .9 
In keeping with this principle, Basic Law No. 5 revised the types of 
protected areas as they were defined by the Basic Forestry Law to al low for 
greater flexibi l ity in conservation management (see Table 20.2) .  The class of 
' Sanctuary Reserves' included the earlier categories of 'Nature Re�erves' and 
'Game Reserves' . These areas were designated for the preservation of plant and 
animal species, and prohibit any and al l  activities that would lead to a change in 
their natural integrity. The class of 'Nature Conservation Areas' ,  on the other 
hand, inc luded three types of area whose function was both 'to preserve the 
diversity of plant and animal species' and 'to provide a sustainable uti l isation of 
l iving resources and ecosystems' .  'National Parks ' ,  for example, were to be 
managed through a multi-use zoning system which comprised a ' core zone' ,  a 
'uti l isation zone' ,  and other zones as required (Article 32). 1 0 
The passage of Basic Law No. 5 marked a shift in conservation pol icy 
which reflected the shift that had been taking place in conservation practice 
since the mid- 1 980s. In the third phase, as previously described, the focus of 
conservation practice shifted from reconcil ing conservation needs with the land 
use demands of other government agencies to reconci l ing the requirements of 
conservation management with local community patterns of land and resource 
use. Basic Law No. 5, in other words, was enacted to create a legal framework 
for the establ ishment of ICAD projects. 
8 This was the second basic law to deal specifically with environmental matters. Basic Law No. 4 
of 1 982, on Basic Provisions for the Management of the Living Environment, establ ished the 
general goal of achieving a ' harmonious balance' between human beings and their natural 
environment, and called for further legislation on the protection of 'organic natural resources' (see 
Fox 1 994). 
9 Fox ( 1 994:2) notes that the new law contained a concept of ' sustainable uti l isation' 
(pemanfaatan secara lestari) which was radically different from the idea of 'util isation ' 
(pengusahaan) contained in the Basic Forestry Law. The latter was primari ly concerned with 
asserting the government' s  rights to control the commercial exploitation of the forest. 
1 O Core zones (zona inti) were defined as areas that were strictly protected, where activities which 
would modify their natural integrity were prohibited. Uti l isation zones (zona pemanfaatan) were 
defined as areas which could be developed for recreation and tourism. Other possible zones 
included wilderness zones, traditional use zones, rehabi l itation zones, and so forth. 
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Table 20.2 : Types of protected areas according to Indonesia' s Basic Law No. 5, 
1990. 
Area type 
1 .  Nature Sanctuary Areas 
(Kawasan Suaka Alam) 
Prescribed use 
A specific terrestrial or aquatic area 
having sanctuary as its main function in 
order to preserve the biological 
diversity of plants and animals as wel l  
as the ecosystem that supports them. 
· · · · · · · · ·ca:)· ·sfrict:
.
J\iailire 
. .  
R:eserve· · · · · ·· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·· · · ·-··A' · · · ··j:.fililire· · · · ·sailC:iliaiY· · · · ·wil
.
ere · · · · ·1ile· · · · · ·0i1ry· · · 
(Cagar Alam) permitted activities are research and the 
development of science, education, and 
management to protect the breeding stock. 
Management shall be by the government in 
an effort to preserve the species diversity of 
plants and animals. · · · · · · · ·ciJ) 
.. G"am:e . . R:e.serve· · · · · ·· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·· · · · ·· · · · · · · · · · ·-· ·A' ·Naiii
.
re· · ·sailc
.
iuary 
. . t:ilai 
. . 
il
.
a:s· ·a:··il·ig·il· ·5iJedes· · ·  
(Suaka Margawatwa) diversity and/or unique animal species, in 
which the habitat is managed by the 
government to ensure the continued 
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·-· ·�����.��.�� .. ?.�.�.�:.�.�.�P..��.i.��: . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . (c) Biosphere Reserve A Nature Sanctuary of native, unique, 
(Cagar Biosfer) and/or degraded ecosystems, where all 
natural components need to be protected 
and sustained for research and education. 
2. Nature Conservation Area 
(Kawasan Pelestarian Alam) 
A terrestrial or aquatic area whose main 
function is to preserve the diversity of 
plants and animals as wel l  as to provide 
a sustainable uti l isation of l iving 
resources and ecosystems. ·· · · · · · ··ca:)· ·Nati'on:a:r ·P"ark· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·-··1 •• : · · · · ··�.ra:ilire · · · · · ·c·c;ilserv·a:1¥0il · · · ·· ·A:rea· · · · · ·�ilidi· · · 
(Taman Nasional) possesses native ecosystems and which the 
government manages through a zoning 
system for research, science, supporting 
cultivation, recreation, and tourism. · · ·· · · · · ·ciJ)'
.
G'r
.
ail<l
.'Foi-.esi . . I>ai-·k· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·· ·-··A' · · ··�ra:1lire · · · ·cc;i18erv
.
at'i0·� ·· · ·A:rea·· · · ·wili'C'ii· · · · ·i5· · · 
(Taman Hulan Raya) intended to preserve a collection of a variety 
of indigenous and/or introduced plants and 
animals for research, science, education, 
breeding enhancement, recreation, and 
tourism. 
·· · · · · · · ·cc)
.
Natlir·e·R:ecreat:i'On . . P'ark· · ·· · · · · · · · ··· · ·· · · · · · · ·-··A' · · · · · ·N·a:1lii-·e · ·· · · ·c:·C>n·�:ervati·c;ri · · · · · ·a:rea: ·· · · · ·iila:r�ry· · · 
(Taman Wisata Alam) intended for the purposes of outdoor 
recreation and tourism . 
Sources : Translation of original law; IUCN 1 992. 
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A third scheme of spatial c lassification has more recently been enunciated 
in Basic Law No. 24 of 1 992, known as the Spatial Use Management Law. This 
law divides all land into two general categories - 'Protection Areas' and 'Human 
Util isation (or Cultivation) Areas' - and distinguishes four types of 'Protection 
Area' : 'Protection Forests' ,  'National Forests' ,  ' Wildl ife Sanctuaries' , and 
'Headwater Areas' .  However, the significance of this law rests primari ly in the 
classificatory powers which it grants to the governors of individual provinces, 
and the rights of consultation and compensation which it grants to local 
communities. I I 
In the remaining sections of this chapter, I suggest that the shifts in 
government policy and legislation described here are concretely reflected in the 
evolution of the conservation effort iri Irian Jaya. Whereas conservation 
practitioners once focussed on their competition with other government 
departments for control of forested land, they are now increasingly concerned 
with the competition for land and resources which is taking place within reserves 
and adjacent areas. 
A Note on Conservation Institutions 
As previously mentioned, the Indonesian government first established the 
Department of Nature Conservation and Wildlife in 1 97 1 ,  as a subdivision of the 
Department of Forests, which itself was under the authority of the Minister of 
Agriculture. In 1 983 ,  the Department of Forests was elevated to a separate 
ministry, and the Department of Nature Conservation and Wildlife was renamed 
the Department of Forest Protection and Nature Conservation (PHPA). Most, if 
not all ,  of its functions and responsibil ities remained the same. 
In the provinces, the PHP A operates through a regional structure of district 
offices cal led Balai Konservasi Sumber Daya Alam, or KSDA. KSDA officers 
in Irian Jaya are under the authority of the regional office in Ambon, and are 
assigned to one of two subregions - Jayapura and Soron g. 
The PHPA first established an office in Irian Jaya in 1 980. Since then, 
KSDA officers have devoted most of their time and energy to monitoring the 
i l legal trade in wildl ife at the airports and seaports. There are only a few who 
are assigned to posts in the field or who make regular patrols . At present, there 
are just over one hundred KSDA staff in lrian Jaya (Petocz and Raspado 1 989; 
personal communication, Ron Li ley, 1 996). 
I I According to Fox ( 1 994: 1 5), certain provisions of Basic Law No. 24 represent a potentially 
significant departure from the Basic Agrarian Law of 1 950, which has generally been taken to 
deny the val idity of customary land rights, because they allow for compensation to be paid ' not 
just for loss of land rights (hak atas tanah) but also for the loss of management rights over natural 
resources such as forest (hak pengelolaan sumber daya alam). '  
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Conservation Planning in Irian Jaya, 1976-1984: Getting the 
Government to Recognise a Boundary 
Nature conservation began on a unique footing in Irian Jaya. It did not start as a 
popular movement against the environmental excesses of industry, nor as a 
project to halt and reverse a process of ecological degradation . Instead, nature 
conservation began as a voice in government planning for the large-scale 
development of Irian Jaya's  terrestrial resources. Between 1 976 and 1 984, a 
group of conservation biologists associated with the FAO/UNDP Nature 
Conservation and Wildl ife Management Project and the WWF Indonesia 
Programme helped the government to design a system of nature reserves for 
Irian Jaya. In this role, they carried out a quiet but vigorous debate with other 
government departments over the location of large-scale development projects . 
' Irreversible decisions, ' one of the consultants wrote, 'about the location of 
reserves in unknown or poorly known terrain had to be made in the early 1 980s 
so that land not set aside for reserves could be made avai lable to timber leases 
and other development projects ' (Diamond 1 986 : 50 1  ) .  
Biological Diversity 
The conservation biologists who worked in Irian Jaya in this period were awed 
by the province' s  ecological variety and biological richness. Thomas Schultze­
Westrum, who led the first WWF mission to Irian Jaya in 1 978, described it as 
'the largest stronghold of virgin tropical rainforest in Southeast Asia [whose] 
surrounding sea harbours the richest marine l ife on earth ' ( l  978a: 86). Ronald 
Petocz, who establ ished the WWF office in Jayapura in 1 980, described Irian 
Jaya as 'one of the world ' s  last real storehouses of pristine nature' .  It was 'a  
land . . .  with a multitude of spectacular, diverse, endemic and exotic forms of 
plant and animal l ife' ( 1 982 :429). 
· The range of habitats and the diversity of plant and animal species in Irian 
Jaya - as in the rest of the New Guinea region - is indeed staggering. The island 
of New Guinea is sufficiently large and topographical ly varied to have 
functioned as a 'miniature continent' in recent evolutionary history. In Irian 
Jaya, the Central Dividing Range, which reaches altitudes high enough to 
support glaciers, carves the province into three distinct lowland districts : the 
northern coastal plains and foothi l ls, the southern coastal plains, and the western 
lowlands and mountains of the Bird ' s  Head Peninsula. Within these lowland 
districts, moreover, there are several isolated mountain ranges: the Cyclops, 
Foja, and Van Rees ranges rise out of the northern coastal plains, whi le the 
Kumawa, Fakfak, Tamrau, Arfak, and Wandamen ranges cover much of the 
Bird ' s  Head Peninsula. There are also many offshore islands, some of which are 
situated on the Sahul Shelf, and were thus connected to the New Guinea 
mainland during glacial periods, whi le others were not. Such a rugged and 
varied landscape has encouraged the speciation of plants, birds, and mammals 
entirely within its own boundaries (Gressitt 1 982; Diamond 1 986 :33 1 ) .  Out of a 
total of 643 recorded bird species in Irian Jaya, 269 are endemic to the New 
Guinea region. Simi larly, of the 1 74 mammal species which have been 
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recorded, there are 4 7 endemic marsupials and monotremes, and 53 endemic 
bats and rats (Petocz and Raspado 1 989:3 1 ) .  
The conservation biologists believed that the combination of lrian Jaya' s  
ecological richness and lack of  economic development presented them with a 
unique role to play in the future of the province. 'For once,' Ronald Petocz 
emphatical ly stated, 'conservationists are here in time to help secure this 
[biological] diversity rather than play the al l too common role of reclaiming and 
rehabi litating what is left over from exhaustive resource uti l ization ' (WWF 
1 982:429). As the same author remarked in a subsequent publ ication : 
Few places remain where a planner can select the most important 
biogeographic e lements and structure a comprehensive protected area 
design without having to compromise with the development that has 
arrived there first (Petocz 1 984 : 8) .  
If the biologists could persuade the government to set aside areas for a provincial 
system of nature reserves, they could prevent ecological degradation before it 
occurred. In so doing, they would also demonstrate the value of nature 
conservation as an alternative form of land use . If they succeeded, they felt that 
Irian Jaya could become Southeast Asia's most important arena for conservation 
initiatives (Schultze-Westrum 1 978; Petocz 1 982, 1 984a; Diamond 1 986). 
Ecology, Economy, and Demography in lrian Jaya in the 1970s 
In the early 1 970s, the biota of Irian Jaya had indeed remained intact. This was 
because population densities had remained low while the extent of the cash 
economy was sti l l  smal l and highly local ised. In 1 97 1 ,  the provincial census 
enumerated about 923 ,000 individuals. Indigenous Irianese accounted for about 
96 percent of this population, and the vast majority l ived in rural areas where 
production was oriented towards subsistence and ceremonial exchange, and 
where trade was carried out by barter. Monetised economic activity was mostly 
confined to the coastal towns and their immediate hinterlands, where recent 
Indonesian immigrants were dominant (Garnaut and Manning 1 974: 1 05-6). On 
the north coast there were three major towns :  Jayapura with a population of 
1 4,500, Manokwari with 1 1 ,500, and Sorong with 5 ,900. Of the other two major 
towns, Merauke (6, 1 00) was situated in the southeastern corner and Biak 
( 1 0,600) on the island of the same name in the northwest (ibid:64). 
Even in the towns in the early 1 970s, there were few commercial 
enterprises engaged in the export of goods. The transfer of government from the 
Netherlands to Indonesia in 1 963 had provoked the withdrawal of the major 
banking and trading companies, while the coastal shipping service ceased to 
operate effectively (ibid :32) .  The skeleton of roads, airstrips, and ports which 
the Dutch had left behind also deteriorated as a result of pilferage and removal to 
other parts of Indonesia. The decl ine in trade, capital, infrastructure, and 
transport provoked a significant drop in the smal lholder production of tropical 
tree crops by indigenous Irianese (ibid : 86). 
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Simi larly, there were only a few resource-based industries which were wel l­
establ ished in the early 1 970s. Oi l  production by Petromer Trend was taking 
place in the Manokwari-Sorong region. A handful of Japanese fishing boats, 
meanwhi le, were trawling for prawns in the Arafura Sea and fishing for tuna off 
the coast of Sarong. The only significant new development at this time was the 
Freeport copper mine, located just below the equatorial glaciers of the Carstensz 
Range. Construction of the mine, town s ite, and port faci l ities to support the 
operation began in late 1 967, while the first exports of copper concentrate took 
place in 1 972 (Wilson 1 98 1  ). The timber industry had not yet made inroads into 
the province, despite the recommendations of the United Nations Development 
Programme (Richardson 1 968; UNDP 1 968) that forestry held great promise. 
The problems posed by the d iversity of local tree species, and the continuing 
accessibi l ity of the rich d ipterocarp forests of Kalimantan, kept Indonesian 
logging companies away unti l  the mid to late 1 970s (Garnaut and Manning 
1 974 : 7 1 -8 1 ;  Manning and Rumbiak 1 989a:3 1 -3 5) .  
The late 1 970s were, however, a time of significant demographic and 
economic transit ion in Irian Jaya, stemming largely from the increasing political 
and economic integration of the province with the rest of Indonesia after the UN 
mandated Act of Free Choice took place in August of 1 969. 1 2  Irian Jaya was 
formally declared to be a province, and a governor was appointed. In 1 97 1 ,  the 
Indonesian rupiah became legal tender. The government also embarked on an 
ambitious development programme with the assistance of the United Nations 
Fund for the Development of West Irian - FUNDWI (UNDP 1 968; Garnaut and 
Manning 1 974 :20-3 1 ;  Manning and Rumbiak l 989a: 1 - 1 6) .  
The development effort initially focused on the rehabi l itation of physical 
infrastructure and telecommunications. Marine port faci l ities and airstrips were 
improved, whi le regular shipping services connecting the towns to other major 
ports in Indonesia were establ ished. The Department of Public Works and the 
mi l itary began to construct the Trans-Irian Highway and extend the road 
networks in urban areas. The government also placed a high priority on 
extending primary school ing into the rural areas, where the vast majority of 
Irianese l ived (Manning and Rumbiak l 989a: 1 0- 1 6) .  
In the late 1 970s, following this development of Irian Jaya' s physical 
infrastructure, the government became increasingly concerned to open the 
province to large-scale resource exploitation and to the resettlement of landless 
peasants, most of whom were to be brought from Java under the Transmigration 
Programme. Thus, if conservationists saw Irian Jaya as one of the world 's  last 
great wilderness areas, the Indonesian government saw the land and resources of 
the province as assets to be exploited for Indonesia' s  future economic 
development. National and provincial planners al ike saw the province as a large, 
1 2  In August 1 969, the Indonesian government organised assembl ies in each district of Irian Jaya 
and asked them to vote on the question of whether or not they wished to remain a part of 
Indonesia. Their decision was unanimous, but whether it truthfully reflected the opinion of the 
majority of the indigenous population has been a matter of significant controversy (see UN 1 969). 
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sparsely populated land mass, with extensive and largely unexploited natural 
resources, and with a great deal of vacant land which had considerable 
agricultural potential. On the one hand, its natural resources could make an 
important contribution to national economic growth; on the other hand, its 
unoccupied lands could help rel ieve overcrowding on Java and Bali (Manning 
and Rumbiak l 989a:45-6; see also PIJ 1 987). 
Planning the System of Nature Reserves 
It was in this shifting political and economic context that expatriate conservation 
biologists associated with the F AO/UNDP project and the WWF programme 
began, in 1 976, to col laborate with the Department of Nature Conservation and 
Wildlife (PPA). Their role in the government' s  larger planning effort was to 
recommend which areas of Irian Jaya should be closed to development for 
ecological reasons. Over the following eight years, they submitted a series of 
reports to the Indonesian government with detailed recommendations for the 
establishment of nature reserves in Irian Jaya. The initial proposals were vague 
and sketchy in their del ineation of boundaries, but these were gradually refined 
on the basis of new reports from field biologists and increasingly accurate maps. 
Whi le the conservation biologists submitted a number of different proposals 
over the years, they all basically built on the pioneering work of Schodde ( 1 973). 
Schodde established three important principles of reserve design through his 
analysis of the distribution of vegetation types and bird species in New Guinea. 
First, he noted that the lowland rainforests, which held the core of the island 's  
terrestrial fauna, were 'a complex of biotypes' ,  depending on the altitude of the 
forest, the age of its trees, and its structure. Second, he noted that altitudinal 
transects, from the north and south coasts into the Central Dividing Range, 
contained a much broader spectrum of plant and animal communities than 
latitudinal ones. Thirdly, he noted that there were a great number of 
biogeographical sub-communities in the isolated mountain ranges of the 
northern coast. Thus, an ecologically representative system of nature reserves 
would include cross-sections of the biotic communities on the northern and 
southern escarpment of the Central Dividing Range, and portions of the outlying 
mountain ranges and offshore islands (Schodde 1 973 : 1 42 ;  see also Diamond 
1 984; Petocz and Raspado 1 989). 
The subsequent designs for nature reserves in Irian Jaya incorporated and 
built on these insights . 1 3 In 1 977, after a brief visit to Irian Jaya, John Blower 
made the first recommendations for such designs, largely drawing on Schodde' s  
observations. Rather than proposing potential nature reserves, however, B lower 
simply recommended that eleven areas be surveyed for consideration as nature 
reserves (FAO/UNDP 1 977). The following year, the team of Van der Zorn 
(F AO) and Mulyani (PPA) surveyed two of the areas, proposed that they be 
declared as nature reserves, and recommended twelve additional areas for further 
l 3 This chronology is based principal ly on Petocz and Raspado ( 1 989:44-53) ,  and also on reports 
collected in The World Wildlife Fund Yearbook, 1 978- 1 984. 
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consideration (F AO/UNDP 1 978). A short time later, Thomas Schultze­
Westrum, acting as a consultant to the WWF Indonesia programme, presented a 
plan for a system of eighteen nature reserves, covering an area of about 48,000 
square kilometres ( l 978a, l 978b ) .  Then, in 1 980, Ronald Petocz (WWF) and 
John MacKinnon (F AO/UNDP) collaborated in the production of a plan which 
included thirty-seven protected areas with a total area of about 70,000 square 
kilometres (F AO/UNDP 1 98 1  ) .  Petocz then restudied the boundaries of the 
proposed reserves in 1 98 1  and 1 982, using aerial photographs and satel lite 
imagery. He recommended changes to the boundaries of a number of areas in a 
report on thirty-one reserves, which he submitted to the government in 1 983 
(Petocz 1 983 ) .  These proposals were then included in a comprehensive volume 
which described the biogeographical reasoning behind the reserve design and 
further recommendations for coordinating ' the integration of conservation and 
development' in Irian Jaya' s  p lanned future. The volume was publ ished in an 
English edition (Petocz and Raspado 1 984) and an Indonesian edition (Petocz 
and Raspado 1 987). The most recent nature reserve design is composed of a 
total of fifty-nine protected areas of d ifferent types and encompasses some 
82,000 square ki lometres, or about 20 percent of the land area of Irian Jaya 
(Mitchel l  1 987; Petocz and Raspado 1 989 : 5 1 ) .  
How then did the government respond to these proposals? According to 
Petocz, two documents have made a particular impact on government decisions 
(Petocz and Raspado 1 989:44-52). The first document was a map produced by 
the Department of Forests ' p lanning (bina) programme in late 1 977 and early , 
1 978.  It depicted fifteen conservation areas that were based partly on the 
recommendations of Blower (UNDP/F AO 1 977) and partly on limited fieldwork 
carried out by PPA teams. This became the key planning document from the 
perspective of the Minister, who proceeded to legal ly declare eleven out of the 
fifteen l isted areas between 1 978 and 1 982 (see Table 20. l ) . 
The second document which directly influenced government planning was a 
map which John MacKinnon and Ronald Petocz prepared in the last six months 
of 1 980 'to meet a government planning deadl ine' (ibid.). MacKinnon and 
Petocz based the plan on a reassessment of previous proposals, new reports from 
recent field surveys (Diamond 1 980, 1 98 1  ), and existing maps of Irian Jaya 
which Petocz considered to be inadequate. This plan was subsequently 
published as Volume Eight of the National Conservation Plan for Indonesia 
(FAO/UNDP 1 98 1  ). It was also incorporated into the Consensus Forestry Land 
Use Plan for lrian Jaya (TGHK). 
The TGHK maps were produced by provincial planners throughout 
Indonesia in the early 1 980s. Government Regulation Number 33 of Forestry 
Policy Planning, which was passed in 1 970, had instructed the Department of 
Forests to prepare Forest Land Use Plans in accordance with the functional 
categories mandated by the Basic Forestry Law (Barber 1 989: 1 34-6). The law 
was not immediately implemented. By the late 1 970s, however, a central 
planning document was urgently needed because of the growing competition 
between government departments for new project sites (GOl/IIED l 985b:3 ;  
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Hardjono 1 99 1  : 8-9; Tjondronegoro 1 99 1  :27). Thus, in the early 1 980s, the 
Minister of Agriculture issued instructions to provincial administrations to 
prepare Consensus Forestry Land Use Plans (TGHK), under the direction of the 
Department of Forests, in order to establ ish a standard reference point for 
government planners. 1 4 
During that period, provincial planners met to compare the land 
requirements of different government agencies. For this purpose, they drew on 
the available information, including 'very generalized topographic maps' 
(RePPProt 1 990: 1 67) and their own personal experience, to allocate forests to 
the categories of 'Nature Conservation Forest' ,  'Protection Forest' ,  'Limited 
Production Forest' ,  'Normal Production Forest' ,  and 'Conversion Forest' ) 5 
The Department of Forest Inventory and Land Use Planning (INTAG) then drew 
a series of maps, at a scale of 1 :  500,000, which depicted the distribution of forest 
types, intending that these would subsequently inform the large-scale land use 
plann ing of all government departments. By the time the planners completed 
this exercise in Jayapura, INTAG had mapped about 406,000 square kilometres 
of state forest areas in Irian Jaya. This meant that about 96 percent of its 
terrestrial area was thus placed under the legal jurisdiction of the Department of 
Forests (Barber, Johnson and Hafild 1 994) . 
By the end of 1 982, then, the Minister of Agriculture had completed 
gazettal procedures for sixteen conservation areas in Irian Jaya, with a combined 
area of 46,034 square kilometres (see Table 20.3) . 1 6  He had also approved the 
TGHK, which included an additional eighteen conservation areas with a 
combined area of 33 ,038 square ki lometres (see Table 20 .4) . 1 7 However, it is  
not clear whether the reserves included in the TGHK have any binding legal 
status. Some reserves, such as the Bintuni Bay Nature Reserve, were 
subsequently included in logging concessions granted by the Forestry 
Department. A substantial proportion of the areas listed in Tables 20.3 and 20.4 
would have to be regarded as marine parks, rather than forest parks, but existing 
legislation does not allow for effective restirctions to be placed on the 
commercial exploitation of marine resources. It should also be noted that the 
TGHK allocated most of the remaining terrestrial area of Irian Jaya (about 
322, 797 square kilometres, or 78 .6 percent of the province) to 'Conversion 
Forest' (28 .  7 percent), ' Protection Forest' (2 1 . 1  percent), 'Normal Production 
Forest' ( 1 7 .3 percent), and 'Limited Production Forest' ( 1 1 . 5 percent). 
14 For a general account of the TGHK process in Indonesia, see Ross ( 1 984). For an account of 
the TGHK process in Kal imantan, see Potter ( 1 99 1  ). 
1 5 'Limited production forests' are those in which timber production is constrained by the 
requirement to prevent erosion, and therefore represent an overlap between 'normal production 
forests' and 'protection forests ' .  'Conversion forests' are those avai lable for conversion to other 
uses. 
l 6 This figure does not include the 32 square kilometres covered by the four Taman Wisata 
('Recreation Parks'), which are not regarded here as 'conservation areas' in the strict sense. 
1 7 This total also excludes the 259 square ki lometres covered by another five Taman Wisata. 
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Table 20.3 : List of reserves in Irian Jaya gazetted by proclamation, 1 978- 1 992 . 
Name Type* Area (ha) Date 
Lorentz CA 2, 1 50,000 25 January 1 978 
Pegunungan Cyclops CA 22,500 26 January 1 978 
Wasur SM 2 1 0,000 2 May 1 978 
Rawa Biru CA 4,000 2 May 1 978 
Pulau Dolok/Kimaam SM 600,000 1 3  July 1 978 
Teluk Yotefa TW 1 ,650 1 2  August 1 978 
Nabire TW 1 00 1 1  January 1 980 
Gunung Meja TW 500 12 January 1 980 
Enarotal i  CA 300,000 1 1  February 1 980 
Pulau Sabuda/Tataruga SM 450 1 1  February 1 980 
Pulau W aigeo CA 1 53 ,000 7 May 1 98 1  
Sorong TW 945 7 May 1 98 1  
Pulau Anggremeos SM 2,500 30 June l 98 1  
Pulau Batanta Barat CA 1 0,000 30 October 1 98 1  
Jayawijaya CA 800,000 30 October 1 98 1  
Pulau Salawati Utara CA 57,000 4 January 1 982 
Wasur (extension) SM 98,000 4 January 1 982 
Pulau Biak Utara CA 1 1 ,000 8 April 1 982 
Pulau Supiori CA 42,000 2 1 July 1 982 
Pulau Yapen Tengah CA 59,000 12 October 1 982 
Pulau Misool Selatan CA 84,000 1 2  October 1 982 
W asur (status change) TN 423 ,8 1 0  24 March 1 990 
Teluk Cenderawasih TN 1 ,453 ,500 24 March 1 990 
Pegunungan Arfak CA 68,325 1 1  August 1 992 
TOTAL 6,328,280 
* CA = Cagar Alam (' Strict Nature Reserves ') ;  SM = Suaka Margasatwa ('Game 
Reserves '); TW = Taman Wisata ('Recreation Parks'); TN = Taman Nasional ('National 
Parks' ). 
t The area for Wasur is not counted twice in the total. 
Sources: Petocz 1 983 ; Petocz and Raspado 1 989; PHPA 1 995.  
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Table 20.4: Additional protected areas included in Irian Jaya' s Forestry Land 
Use Plan (TGHK), 1 982 . 
Name Type Area (ha) 
Cenderawasih SM 1 ,898 
Mamberam/ Pegunungan Foja TN 1 ,442,500 
Sungai Rouffer SM 3 1 0,000 
Pegunungan Wandamen/Wondiwoi CA 79,500 
Pegunungan. Tamrau Utara/Selatan CA 44 1 ,500 
Pegunungan Arfak CA 45,000 
Pulau Pombo CA 1 00 
Pegunungan Kumawa CA 1 1 8,000 
Pegunungan Fakfak CA 5 1 ,000 
Sungai Kais CA 1 22,000 
Danau Bian SM 50,000 
Parieri TW 2,000 
Pulau Superiori CA 44,500 
Pulau Numfor CA 1 ,500 
Pulau Turtle/Mapia/Sayang SM 1 ,547 
Raja Empat CA 2,976 
Beriat TW 1 2,3 50 
Klamono TW 1 0,000 
Teluk Bintuni CA 450,000 
Wagura-Kote CA 1 5,000 
Kumbe Merauke CA 1 26,8 1 0  
Sungai Seram TW 1 ,000 
Gunung Meja TW 500 
TOTAL 3,329,68 1 
Source: RePPProt 1 986. 
Reappraisals 
Since the gazettal of the s ixteen nature reserves and production of the Forestry 
Land Use Plan, there have been two major reviews of the protected area system 
which have revealed some fundamental flaws in the location of several reserves 
and problems in the delineation of boundaries for many of the others. The first 
was carried out by Petocz in 1 98 1  and 1 982, and the second was carried out by 
RePPProt (the Regional Physical Planning Programme for Transmigration) 
between 1 984 and 1 986. 
Petocz restudied the boundaries of thirty-one reserves on the basis of aerial 
photographs and satel l ite images which were made avai lable to him at the 
Geological Mapping Unit in Bandung. He subsequently redel ineated the 
boundaries of thirty-one reserves at a scale of 1 :250,000 and 1 : 500,000, and 
submitted them as a report (Petocz 1 983 ) . Petocz proposed major boundary 
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revisions for five of the reserves which had already been fully gazetted.  First, he 
recommended that the area of the Lorentz Strict Nature Reserve be decreased 
from 2, 1 50,000 hectares to 1 ,5 60,250 hectares. The boundaries of the reserve 
then included densely populated h ighland v i l lages and the mine, town, and other 
s ites associated with the huge Freeport copper m ine. He also recommended that 
its status be changed to that of a National Park (ibid: 1 ). Second, he suggested 
that the present Enarotal i  Strict Nature Reserve (300,000 hectares) should be 
replaced with a new reserve in the Weyland Mountains in the western extrem ity 
of the Central Divid ing Range. He pointed out that the Enarotal i Strict Nature 
Reserve had been gazetted to protect the Paniai Lakes, but they were 
subsequently found to support few, if any, endemic fish and water plant species. 
Furthermore, he argued, the area adjacent to the lakes was densely populated, 
whi le the ecology around them had been extensively modified. As a result, the 
Enarotal i  Reserve was of l ittle or no s ignificance for nature conservation 
(ibid:6). Third, he also recommended that the Pulau B iak Utara Strict Nature 
Reserve be relocated and reduced in size, from 1 1 ,000 to 6,690 hectares. The 
establ ished reserve, he noted, was ' located outside the l imits of the only primary 
forest left on B iak Island which houses a unique endemic fauna' (ibid:26). 
Fourth, he recommended that the size of the Pulau Waigeo Barat Strict Nature 
Reserve be reduced from 1 53 ,000 hectares to 1 1 6,950 hectares in order to 
exclude settlements along the coast. Final ly, he proposed that the Yapen Tengah 
Strict Nature Reserve be increased in size from 59,000 to 83 ,000 hectares to 
include coverage of lowland and coastal habitats, the latter of which included 
important leatherback turtle nesting grounds. However, the Department of 
Forests has not taken any further action since Petocz submitted these 
recommendations (PHPA 1 995) .  
The second major review of the protected area system was carried out 
between 1 984 and 1 986 by the Regional Physical Planning Programme for 
Transmigration (RePPProt) in association with advisers from the UK Overseas 
Development Administration (Petocz and Raspado 1 989: 52). RePPProt 
undertook a major study of the land resources of lrian Jaya in order to establ ish a 
firm basis for the plann ing of future transmigration s ites (RePPProt 1 986, 1 990). 
Uti l ising the most recent information from aerial photography ( 1 976, 1 977) and 
remote sensing, RePPProt produced a more accurate set of topographic base 
maps, which included v isible land use and vegetation types. 1 8  RePPProt then 
replotted the boundaries, and remeasured the areas, of the agreed forest use 
categories which had appeared on the 1 982 TGHK map, and found that the new 
sums differed from those in the original plan .  They also found that the TGHK 
had misallocated some forests to the 'Production ' ,  'Protection ' ,  and 'Limited 
Production ' categories because of incomplete and inaccurate data on rainfall ,  
slope, and soi ls .  
1 8  RePPProt reported that the maps, for the most part, 'have a planimetric accuracy not worse 
than 500 m' ( 1 986: 1 9). 
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The results of these revisions are shown in Table 20 . 5 .  The difference 
between the areas shown in the final two columns reflects the difference 
between: 
• the process of recalculating the areas enclosed within the original TGHK 
boundaries; and 
• the process of revising the 's ite index' which was used to distinguish between 
forest types, and then using the revised site index to redraw the boundaries 
themselves. 1 9 
Table 20.5: TGHK forest classification for lrian Jaya, 1 983-86. 
TGHK category 
Nature Reserves 
Protection Forests 
Limited Production Forests 
Normal Production Forests 
Conversion Forests 
Total Classified Areas 
Unclassified Areas 
Total Area of Province 
Source: RePPProt 1 986, 1 990. 
TGHK 1 983 
km2 (%) 
83, 1 1 8 (20.2) 
86,485 (2 1 . ] ) 
47,323 ( 1 1 .5) 
7 1 ,235 ( 1 7 .3 )  
1 1 7,754 (28 .7) 
405,9 1 5  (98 .8) 
4,745 ( 1 .2) 
4 1 0,660 ( 1 00.0) 
RePPProt 1 
km2 (%) 
73 ,027 ( 1 7 .6) 
1 09' 1 69 (26.3)  
45 ,893 ( 1 1 . 1 ) 
77,242 ( 1 8 .6) 
96,40 1 (23 .2) 
40 1 ,732 (96 .8) 
1 3 ,068 (3 .2) 
4 1 4,800 ( 1 00.0) 
RePPProt 2 
km2 (%) 
80,237 ( 1 9.3) 
1 56,808 (37 .8) 
20,598 (5 .0) 
60,29 1 ( 1 4 .5) 
88,63 1 (2 1 .4) 
406,565 (98 .0) 
8,235 (2.0) 
4 1 4,800 ( 1 00.0) 
The government has also failed to take action on RePPProt' s proposals for 
revision of the existing TGHK categories. Many discrepancies therefore remain 
between the protected area system as it was planned and the protected area 
system as it exists in law and on paper. 
Ecological, Economic and Demographic Change in the 1980s 
While the government only partially acted on the recommendations of its 
consultants in the early 1 980s, there have been many other processes of change 
which have profoundly affected the ecology of Irian Jaya over the same period. 
F irst of all, other government departments have proceeded with their plans to 
establ ish new projects on lands outside, and in some cases even inside, the 
nature reserve system. In 1 989, Petocz noted that eleven of the twelve approved 
logging concessions included areas which overlapped with gazetted and 
proposed reserves (Petocz and Raspado 1 989 : 77-78). Logging was also being 
undertaken in reserves which had been approved in the TGHK, such as the 
1 9 The ' site index' was a simple formula which took account of slope, rainfall intensity, and the 
porential for soi l  erosion in a given area. Thus 'production ' and 'conversion ' forest was to be 
located on land with a site index less than 1 75, while 'protection ' forest' was to be located on land 
with a site index greater than 1 75 or on slopes greater than 45 degrees (Ross 1 984). 
Conservation Planning and Practice in Irian Jaya 469 
Bintuni Bay Strict Nature Reserve.20 S imi larly, the government continued to 
grant concessions for oi l  and mineral exploration. A large part of the lowland 
area of the proposed Lorentz National Park (now a Nature Reserve) has been 
designated as avai lable for petroleum exploration, and the Phi l l ips oi l  company 
has establ ished a number of exploration camps in its southern plains and swamps 
(PHPA 1 995) .  Petroleum concessions also overlap with the proposed 
Mamberamo-Foja National Park, the Bintuni Bay Nature Reserve, and the 
Danau B ian Game Reserve. The government has also recently awarded a 26,300 
square kilometre exploration concession in the Central Dividing Range to 
Freeport Indonesia for possible extensions of its mining operations (PHPA 
1 995).2 1 Much of the concession area fall s  within the boundaries of the Lorentz 
Nature Reserve. There is also a n ickel prospect in the Cyclops Nature Reserve 
and a m in ing concession which overlaps with the Waigeo Island Nature Reserve. 
Meanwhi le, the Department of Publ ic Works has continued to plan roads that 
would traverse the proposed Lorentz and Mamberamo National Parks (Petocz 
and Raspado 1 989 : 82 ;  PIJ 1 993 : 39). There are also reports that the Research 
and Technology Minister, B .J. Habibie, has 'an ambitious plan to dam the 
Mamberamo river and create industrial areas in an enormous swath of 
swampland to the west of Jayapura' (Loveard 1 996 :45 ;  see also PIJ 1 993 : 50- 1 ). 
The demography of Irian Jaya has also changed dramatical ly since the early 
1 970s. In 1 97 1 ,  the national census enumerated about 923,000 individuals. 
Only 4 percent of these people had been born outside the province, and 84 
percent resided in the countryside (Manning and Rumbiak l 989a:24). By 1 990, 
the population had increased to about 1 ,649,000 (BPS 1 994 :4 1 ). Out of this 
population, about 2 1  percent had been born outside the province, and 25 percent 
were l iv ing in the coastal towns and their immediate hinterlands. The population 
of Irian Jaya, in other words, has become increasingly urban and increasingly 
composed of recent Indonesian immigrants. Since 1 964, the government has 
official ly settled about 1 80,000 transmigrants, mainly in close proximity to the 
towns of Merauke, Jayapura, and Manokwari (Manning and Rumbiak l 989a:54; 
BPS 1 994 : 5 1 ) .  In addition, large numbers of immigrants have come to Irian 
Jaya, under their own in itiative, from Sulawesi ,  Java, and the Moluccas. On the 
basis of the net numbers of passengers who have arrived at various ports, 
Manning and Rumbiak estimate that the number of ' spontaneous' m igrants has 
steadi ly increased during the 1 980s. In 1 980 and 1 98 1 ,  3 ,500 persons were 
arriving annually. In 1 983 and 1 984, the figure had increased to between 4,500 
and 5 ,000, and by 1 985 ,  had reached over 8,500 new arrivals per annum. In 
1 985,  the Imsini passenger l iner service establ ished a regular route from Java to 
Jayapura via Eastern Indonesia and Sorong (Manning and Rumbiak l 989b:23) .  
20 See the reports entitled 'Reveal ing Marubeni Operations in Bintuni Bay '  (Setiakwan, 3 :28-9, 
1 989) and 'The Tragedy of Bintuni Bay '  (Setiakwan, 4/5 :62-3, 1 990). 
2 1  A recent article b y  Thomas O 'Nei l l  i n  National Geographic (Vol .  1 89(2):29, 1 996) has 
reported that geologists have identified seventy-five 'target areas' for potential mine sites. 
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Government spending on the salaries of civ i l  servants and development 
projects has also spurred an extended phase of ' remarkably rapid ' economic 
growth in Irian Jaya since the early 1 970s (Manning and Rumbiak l 989a:2-7; 
PIJ 1 993).22 Both directly and indirectly, government spending has 
underwritten the growth of trade and markets in the towns, and has also 
increased employment in the construction, transportation, and service sectors. 
Migrants from other parts of Indonesia have, for the most part, monopol ised 
stalls in the urban markets, retai l  stores, and the privately owned buses which are 
the primary means of transport for most people. They have also fil led the 
majority of jobs created by the construction and service industries .  At the same 
time, the economic l inkages between the urban centres and the rural areas have 
remained weak, with subsistence production sti l l  the predominant activity of the 
vast majority of indigenous Irianese . 
F inal ly, industries focussed on the extraction of natural resources, 
especially minerals, timber, and fish, have grown tremendously in Irian Jaya 
since the mid- l 970s. The Freeport mine, for example, steadi ly increased its 
production after the slump in copper prices ended in the mid- l 970s. Between 
1 986 and 1 990, the Freeport company exported copper, gold, and si lver worth an 
average of about US$269 mi l l ion each year. In 1 995 ,  the figure reached 
US$ 1 .76 bi l l ion, approximately 1 percent of Indonesia's total GNP (Bohane 
1 996). 
The production of timber products has also rapidly risen after fal l ing off 
briefly in the mid- l 980s. Between 1 980 and 1 984, annual log production 
averaged 427,479 cubic metres; then log production dropped to 244,035 cubic 
meters per year between 1 985 and 1 989, as the Indonesian government instituted 
a ban on log exports. By 1 989, however, annual production began to increase 
again, and reached a level of 1 .2 mi l l ion cubic metres (from thirty-two active 
logging projects) in 1 99 1  (PIJ 1 993 : 1 1 4 ). The provincial Forestry Department 
has recently approved twelve more additional concessions, bringing the total 
number of concessions to forty-four, and the area committed to timber 
production to 1 07, 1 52 square kilometres, which is sl ightly more than one quarter 
of the terrestrial area of the province (YPMD 1 994 ) .  
The timber industry has also been actively gearing up to move into the 
production of finished timber products in Irian Jaya. In the early 1 990s, PT 
Kayu Lapis, one of the ten largest producers of plywood in Indonesia, 
constructed one of Asia's  largest plywood factories in Sorong with the assistance 
of loans from the Asian Development Bank and the Canadian Development 
22 The National Statistical Bureau recorded a total of 67,757 civil servants in Irian Jaya as of 
March 1 994 (BPS 1 994:79). The number of mi l itary personnel is unknown. The central 
government was able to fund development programmes and pay for a large civil service in Irian 
Jaya, in part as a result of the oi l  boom which began in other parts of Indonesia in 1 973 or 1 974 
(see Mackie and Macintyre 1 994 : 1 4) and in part by foreign aid and loans, which had reached a 
peak of 25 to 30 percent of government revenues in the late 1 960s (Hi l l  1 994:93-97). 
Conservation Planning and Practice in Irian Jaya 4 7 1  
Agency.23 The national government i s  also offering generous financial 
incentives to investors to develop an add itional ten sawmi l ls, th irteen plywood 
factories, two mangrove chip mil ls, one sago processing mil l ,  and four pulp mi l ls 
capable of producing 2 mi l l ion tonnes of pulp per year (PIJ 1 993 : 1 1 5) .  
Lastly, the scale of commercial fisheries has also increased substantially. 
Between 1 986 and 1 99 1 ,  catches of saltwater fish off the northern shore of Irian 
Jaya increased from 39,243 tonnes to 93 ,000 tonnes (PIJ 1 993 :96). Meanwhi le, 
the haul from prawn trawling in the Arafura Sea increased more modestly from 
3 , 1 1 0  tonnes in 1 986 to 3 ,470 tonnes in 1 990. 
Thus, if l ittle action has been taken since 1 983 to establ ish new protected 
areas in Irian Jaya, the general conservation situation has significantly changed. 
The growth in population and the expansion of extractive industries have begun 
to profoundly alter the landscape and ecology of the province. In addition, these 
two processes have also precipitated increasing conflicts between the state, 
indigenous Irianese, and Indonesian migrants over land and access to resources .  
So the demographic and economic context was changing rapidly as conservation 
practitioners began to formulate and implement management plans for h igh­
priority reserves in the mid- 1 980s. In the next section, I examine the way that 
conservation practitioners are grappl ing with the social and economic changes 
which have taken place in Irian Jaya over the past thirty years. 
Conservation Management, 1984-1996: Getting the Local People to 
Recognise a Boundary 
The introduction of management strategies and institutions into protected areas 
in Irian Jaya has lagged far behind the pace of natural resource exploitation, the 
establ ishment of new settlements, and the conversion of forest to agricultural 
uses. While many reserves were gazetted in the late 1 970s and early 1 980s, the 
WWF and the PHPA did not begin to establ ish permanent offices in the province 
unti l  1 980. In addition, the design and legal recognition of nature reserves had 
taken place without the knowledge and participation of most of the indigenous 
communities in the reg ion (Petocz and Raspado 1 989:43 ,57, 75) .  Thus, in many 
ways, conservation practitioners were starting from scratch in their attempts to 
bui ld up local conservation institutions and encourage conservation practices. 
23 Reported in Environesia, 4(3/4) : 1 6 . 
tble 20.6 : WWF/PHPA conservation projects in particular parts of Irian Jaya, 1 984- 1 996. 
.rea Status Key habitats 
yclops CA Rainforest, moss forest, grassland 
lountains and swamps 
rfak CA Lowland rainforest, montane moss 
lountains forest 
enderawasih NMP Exceptional coral reef systems, 
ay turtle nesting beaches, bird nesting 
islands 
fasur and TN Eucalypt grassland and savannah; 
awa Biru lowland rainforest, swamps, and 
tidal mud flats 
orentz CA Complete spectrum of habitats, from 
prop. TN alpine equatorial glaciers to coastal 
mangroves of Arafura Sea 
mraba Medi prop. CA Coastline, turtle nesting beaches 
urtle Beach 
apen Tengah CA Lowland, hi l l, and lower montane 
land rainforest 
iak Supiori & CA Lowland and hil l  rainforest 
iak Utara Is .  
urces: Petocz 1 983 ; Petocz and Raspado 1 989; WWF 1 996. 
Flagship fauna 
273 species of birds, 86 species of 
mammals 
333 bird species, incl . 5 endemics; 
69 mammalian species; birdwing 
butterflies 
Dugong, giant clams, hawksbil l  and 
green turtles, saltwater crocodi les 
400 species of birds, incl. migratory 
waders and waterfowl; large pop'ns 
of wallabies and rusa deer 
1 23 species of mammals, 4 1 1 
species of birds, including many 
endemics 
Leatherback turtles 
1 43 b ird species, incl. two endemic 
species of birds of paradise, 
leatherback turtle nesting beaches 
Unique avifauna, incl. 82 b ird 
species, with nine endemics 
� .....,) N 
Coop. inst. Year Mng. Perm. 
in it. plan post � ('\) 
PHPA, WWF, 1 985 Yes Yes � c 
YPMD, Ford ::::::--
Foundation r;· 
PHPA, WWF, 1 986 Yes Yes 
� -
YBLMD � c ::s 
PHPA, WWF, 1 986 Yes Yes c 
World Bank � 
� 
PHPA, WWF, 1 990 Yes Yes � World Bank, ""t 
local NGO ('\) t.o] -
PHPA, WWF, 1 990 No No 
� GTZ ::s 
PHPA, WWF 1 993 Yes? Yes? � ('\) 
:s ('\) 
PHPA, WWF 1 993 Yes? No ::s -
5· 
� 
PHPA, WWF 1 993 Yes? No .g � � 
� 
� 
C) � 
s· ('\) � 
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Once the overall design of the nature reserve system was completed in the 
mid- 1 980s (Petocz and Raspado 1 984), the WWF/PHPA programme in Irian 
Jaya shifted its attention to developing management strategies for a handful of 
high priority reserves.24 Table 20.6 provides a l ist of all the reserves where the 
WWF, in conjunction with the PHPA, have been active in conservation 
management. It should be noted that the nine reserves l isted in this table are the 
only ones where there has been an attempt to introduce some form of active 
protection and management. Al l  the other reserves in the protected area system 
remain essentially unmanaged . They are, in other words, paper parks.25 
In this section of the chapter, I provide brief case studies of the types of 
management strategy which conservationists have used in their attempts to 
establish nature reserves on the ground. We shal l see that conservation 
strategies have called for 'participatory' approaches to conservation 
management, and for the development of local alternative industries which are 
compatible with the goals of biodiversity conservation . In this way, 
conservation area management in Irian Jaya has been related to the increasing 
popularity of ICAD projects in international circles. 
'The Fastest Disappearing Habitat in Jrian Jaya '26 
The joint WWF /PHP A programme produced the first management plan for a 
protected area in Irian Jaya in 1 985 . It was for the Cyclops Mountains Nature 
Reserve, which was legal ly established in 1 978 (see Table 20.4). The official 
boundaries of the nature reserve encompass some 22,500 hectares of rugged 
terrain which culminate in three peaks over 1 ,500 metres in elevation just a short 
distance from the coast. As a result, the reserve includes a variety of habitats, 
from grasslands and swamps to lowland rainforest and moss forest. Biologists 
have recorded 273 species of birds and 86 species of mammals in the reserve. 
The Cyclops Mountains are the site of a wilderness area that is surrounded 
by a rapidly growing city. S ince 1 980, the population of Jayapura and its two 
suburbs, Abepura and Sentani, has increased at an annual rate of about 5 . 5 
percent, and now numbers around 200,000 (Manning and Rumbiak l 989a:22). 
While most of the increase in population can be attributed to the arrival of new 
migrants from elsewhere in Indonesia, some of it can also be attributed to 
circular migration from the central h ighlands, particularly the area around 
Sentani .  There are members of both migrant groups expanding the area under 
shifting cultivation adjacent to the reserve. Residents of the town enter the 
reserve to poach for game, to col lect firewood and rattan, to make charcoal, and 
24 In 1 986, Ronald Petocz left his post as the d irector of the programme and was replaced by 
Arthur Mitchel l .  In 1 987, the World Wide Fund for Nature inaugurated a new project, No. 3770: 
' Implementation of Conservation in Irian Jaya' . 
25 The Indonesian government itself recognises that its national system of nature reserves exists 
largely on paper. See the statements in KLH ( 1 992 :25) and BAPPENAS ( 1 993 :22). 
26 This description is based on Ratcl iffe ( 1 985); Mitchel l, de Fretes and Poffenberger ( 1 990). 
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to raise pigs .  Commercial collectors enter the reserve to gather exotic orchids 
and to net birds for the domestic and international wildlife trade. 
The goal of the management strategy was to stabil ise the boundary of the 
reserve in order to prevent any further clearance of forest from taking place. The 
plan recommended that the boundaries of the reserve be moved, increasing the 
total area to about 36,800 hectares. But it also recommended that the precise 
locations of the boundaries needed to be determined in consultation with local 
communities, especially by the traditional owners of land which had been 
enclosed by these boundaries. 
A secondary goal was to promote alternative, ecologically friendly sources 
of cash income. Thus, it prescribed the establishment of 'buffer zones' adjacent 
to the boundary of the nature reserve where tree crops, such as cocoa, could be 
cultivated more intensively for sale in town. These buffer zones were thus to act 
as a buffer between agricultural land and primary forest. 
In 1 986, the WWF/PHPA programme, in conjunction with the provincial 
Forestry Service, the Ford Foundation ' s  Social Forestry Programme, and the 
Irian Jaya Rural Development Foundation (YPMD), began implementing the 
management plan .  The project staff identified the land transfers taking place 
between customary landowners and immigrants from the highlands as the 
greatest potential threat to the reserve. They observed that, when land was sold 
to outsiders, or where a clan had sold land through unorthodox procedures, 
rightful ownership became a matter of dispute . They believed that the lack of 
clear boundaries between the land of each tribe or clan made it 'difficult to 
determine community responsibil ities for management' .  So they reasoned that 
legitimising traditional land tenure - giving 'clear title' to 'communal lands ' -
was the key to improving forest management in the areas in and near the reserve . 
The first phase of the project began when the project staff selected a ten­
member forestry field team - mainly comprised of young men - from the three 
vil lages that were chosen to participate in the pilot project. This group then 
underwent a period of train ing aimed at enabling them to act as effective 
community organisers for the social forestry project. Their training emphasised 
the use of discussion group methods and practical field exercises such as rapid 
sketch mapping techniques. After their training, the field staff returned to their 
home vi llages, where they began discussions with the leaders and clan members 
of their community about their patterns of forest use and their land requirements . 
It was expected that they would then help their communities to formulate forest 
management plans which they would subsequently formalise in consultation 
with government agencies (Mitchell , de Fretes and Poffenberger 1 990:244). 
In 1 990, Mitchell , de Fretes and Poffenberger reported that the field staff on 
the social forestry project had made substantial progress since 1 986 with 
'community organizing, nursery and agroforestry plot establ ishment, and reserve 
boundary identification ' (ibid :249). Nonetheless, they also noted that the project 
had experienced a difficult first year because 'heavy bureaucratic involvement' 
had made the task of managing the project 'cumbersome and unnecessarily 
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compl icated ' .  In addition, the lack of adequate coordinated supervision and 
follow-up training had led to apathy among their field staff. As a result of this 
experience, the social forestry programme then sought to stabi l ise the boundary 
by somewhat different methods. In the early 1 990s, conservation management 
increasingly rel ied on the direct control of encroachment, land sales, and i l legal 
hunting and logging in the reserve. 
According to Ron Li ley (personal communication, 1 996), the WWF/PHPA 
programme in the Cyclops has yet to secure the boundary of the reserve. 
Indonesian and highland m igrants continue to acquire land adjacent to the 
reserve and clear it for cultivation. Other forms of encroachment have also 
occurred. There are reports that the mi l itary has built a golf course in the 
reserve, and that i l legal logging and quarrying for rock continues to take place. 
For these reasons, Li ley also bel ieves that the Cyclops Mountains may represent 
the fastest d isappearing habitat in Irian Jaya. 
'The Most Unique Marine Area in Indonesia '2 7 
In the early 1 980s, the WWF Irian Jaya Programme proposed the southwest 
corner of Cenderawasih Bay as Irian Jaya's first marine reserve (Salm, Petocz 
and Soehartono 1 982; Petocz 1 983 ) .  The proposed reserve was to include about 
500 k i lometres of shorel ine around the Kwatisore Peninsula, 2,500 hectares of 
islands (including those in the Kepulauan Auri chain), 80,000 hectares of coral 
reef, and over I mi l l ion hectares of open ocean. 
The reefs and the is lands are the chief justification for the reserve. The 
reefs are composed of a remarkably d iverse col lection of over 1 45 species of 
coral (67 genera), where relatively abundant populations of endangered species 
such as giant clams, horse hoof clams, and Triton 's  trumpet can be found. 
Hawksbi l l  and green turtles nest on the beaches of the islands in the Kepulauan 
Auri chain, as do many species of marine birds. The surrounding marine area, 
meanwhile, supports diverse and abundant populations of estuarine, mangrove, 
reef, and pelagic fish. There are also significant areas of seagrass beds which 
are home to dugongs, and estuarine areas populated by saltwater crocodiles. 
In 1 985,  the WWF Irian Jaya programme sent two marine biologists, Lucy 
Gilkes and Eve Adipati, to the adjacent town of Nabire to design a management 
plan for the proposed marine reserve. Although the area had been approved ' in 
principle ' by the Forestry Department in the 1 982 TGHK, it had not yet been 
formally declared in the government' s gazette . It was not unti l 1 990 that the 
Minister of Forests declared the Teluk Cenderawasih National Marine Park in 
accordance with the provisions of the 1 990 Conservation Act. There remains 
some confusion, however, over the actual legal status of the Marine Park (PHPA 
1 995) .  
27 The title is taken from Petocz and Raspado ( 1 989:64). This description is based on Gi lkes and 
Adipati ( 1 987), Petocz and Raspado ( 1 989 :44), and Ron Liley (personal communication, 1 996). 
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Gilkes and Adipati framed the management strategy for Teluk 
Cenderawasih in terms of what they cal led 'community participatory resource 
management' .  In 1 986, there were about 1 0,300 people l iving alongside the 
boundaries of the reserve. The vast majority were indigenous Irianese belonging 
to three main tribal groups. The exploitation of marine resources constituted a 
vital component of the local subsistence and cash economy. Gi lkes and Adipati 
( 1 987:2) therefore proposed that the management strategy should respect their 
customary resource rights and subsistence practices, but ensure that their usage 
of marine resources remained ecological ly sustainable. 
Gilkes and Adipati identified the activities of non-local fishermen as posing 
the greatest threat to the proposed reserve. Some of them came from other 
islands in Cenderawasih Bay, such as Yapen and Serui . Most, however, were 
from Southern Sulawesi. While local people would not al low them to harvest 
resources in close proximity to their vi l lages, they were not able to exercise 
control over their activities in areas further away. Furthermore, local people 
were harvesting resources themselves in order to sell to the non-local fishermen, 
who then resold them in the market. In brief, Gi lkes and Adipati suggested, 
there was open access to the resources of Cenderawasih Bay, and in the absence 
of regulation, the resources would soon be exhausted.28 In this regard, the 
conservation situation in Teluk Cenderawasih resembled that in the Cyclops 
Mountains. 
The management p lan therefore proposed three main interventions. Firstly, 
it proposed that the state should entirely prohibit outside fishermen from 
entering the Marine Park, this being viewed as an essential first step towards 
introducing sound resource management. Secondly, it proposed that the PHPA 
develop a system of multiple use zones in the park which would regulate the 
access of local v i l lagers to marine resources. The proposed zoning system 
included a ' sanctuary' zone and a 'wilderness' zone, where access would be 
l imited to the requirements of rest and safety whi le at sea, a ' l imited-use ' zone, 
and a ' traditional-use' zone, where local vil lagers could continue to harvest 
resources in a way that complied with their ' traditional ' fishing techniques. 
Finally, it suggested that WWF/PHPA take action to increase local control over 
the sale of marine produce in the regional markets. Whi le the plan offered few 
specific suggestions about such measures, it nonetheless assumed that itinerant 
traders were promoting unsustainable rates of harvest by underpaying local 
vil lagers for fish, giant clams, sea cucumbers, and other marine produce. If the 
local communities could capture more of the actual market price for such 
produce, they would l imit their harvests to more sustainable levels. 
However, the recommendations of the management plan were not 
implemented immediately after its completion in 1 987.  Between 1 988  and 1 992, 
neither the WWF nor the PHPA maintained a presence in the area. As a result, 
28 They also noted that there was often conflict between outside fishermen and local vi l lagers 
over access to islands, reefs, and fishing areas in Cenderwasih Bay .  
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the local communities largely 'forgot' about the proposed marine reserve 
(personal communication, Gayatri Li ley, 1 996). 
In 1 992, the WWF re-establ ished an office in Nabire with a small staff. At 
that time, they attempted to start up a cooperative to market salted fish to urban 
areas in Irian Jaya as a way of cutting out the immigrant merchants. However, 
this venture failed after a short time because of poor business management and 
the return of local fisherman to the i l legal exploitation of giant clams. One 
unfortunate consequence of the failure of the cooperative is that vi l lagers in the 
area have come to bel ieve that the WWF is just another business which wants to 
profit from their resources ( ibid.) .  
In 1 993, a team of consultants visited Teluk Cenderawasih briefly to 
propose revisions to the management strategy. The consultants were part of a 
national project, financed through a loan by the World Bank, to devise twenty­
five year management plans for seven national parks in Indonesia.29 The 
consultants' plan suggested that the proposed multiple-use zoning system be 
replaced by a two-zone system : a ' sanctuary zone' running north to south down 
the middle of the bay; and a ' use zone ' near the coast for local communities to 
use for fishing. Once the plan was tabled, the PHP A asked the WWF to revise 
the plan and adjust it to a more flexible system of zones. 
In 1 995,  the WWF/PHPA secured a significant grant from the Dutch branch 
of the WWF to proceed with the implementation of the zoning system and to 
make a renewed effort to gain the support of local communities for the reserve. 
However, implementation of the zoning system proposed by the WWF continues 
to be delayed. While the national government has approved the status of Teluk 
Cenderawasih as a National Marine Park, and regards it as a high priority area 
for conservation planning and management (BAPPENAS 1 993), it has not 
formal ly recognised the legitimacy of a particular zoning system. As a result, 
conservation management was sti l l  (in January 1 996) largely confined to joint 
patrols by the PHPA and the F isheries Department to check the permits of 
vessels fishing in the park. The PHP A has the legal authority to prosecute those 
who harvest species which are either protected or not l isted on the fishing 
permit, but they do not have the authority to prosecute fishermen for fishing in 
the proposed ' sanctuary zones'  (personal communication, Gayatri Liley, 1 996). 
The gains that have been ach ieved, since 1 992, in protecting the National 
Marine Park can be attributed more to the enhancement of the PHPA's  abi l ity to 
enforce restrictions on resource use by outsiders and local vi l lagers than on the 
success of ' community participatory resource management' in winning the 
support of local vi l lagers for sustainable fish ing practices. In the case of Teluk 
Cenderawasih, unl ike the Cyclops Mountains and other reserves discussed in the 
following sections, local communities have played l ittle part in defining the 
boundaries of the marine park or its various zones. 
29 Wasur National Park was also included in the consultancy. 
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'The Place We Guard '30 
The third nature reserve in which the WWF Irian Jaya programme has been 
actively involved is the Arfak Mountains Nature Conservation Area. It is 
located in the district of Manokwari in the B ird ' s  Head region, on a rugged, 
isolated mountain block. 
The conservation area encompasses some 64,000 hectares of lowland, 
foothi l l  and lower montane forest. The highest peak in the range, Mount 
Huiembou, attains an altitude of 2,820 metres, just twelve ki lometres from the 
coast. B iologists consider the Arfak Mountains to be of exceptional 
conservation importance because of the presence of a wide variety of b ird 
species, including endemic birds of paradise and parrots, and sixty-n ine species 
of mammals. The mountains are also the centre of diversity for the giant 
birdwing butterflies (Ornithoptera spp.)  as wel l  as the s ite where the first 
zoological expedition to New Guinea was undertaken by d' Albertis and Beccara 
between 1 872 and 1 873 (Petocz and Raspado 1 989:60). 
The h istory of the legal status of th is area is complex. The Dutch colonial 
administration had originally declared a l 0,000 hectare reserve in the Arfak 
Mountains in 1 957 .  In 1 982, the reserve was included in the Consensus Forest 
Land Use Plan (TGHK), but the status of the reserve remained ambiguous. In 
1 992, the Minister of Forests declared it a Kawasan Konservasi ( 'Nature 
Conservation Area' ) under the 1 990 Conservation Act. 
In 1 986, the WWF began a joint project with the PHP A subsection office in 
Manokwari -or KSDA - to develop a management system for the proposed 
reserve. After about e ighteen months of fieldwork, Ian Craven and Yance de 
Fretes completed work on a management plan in 1 987 (Craven and de Fretes 
1 987) . Implementation of the plan began the next year, and by January 1 996 it 
had arguably become the most successful conservation project in Irian Jaya. 
The Arfak Mountains, l ike the Cyclops, are increasingly an island in a sea 
of settlements and cocoa or rubber plantations. In 1 987, Craven and de Fretes 
( 1 987:30- 1 )  reported that the five subdistricts immediately adjacent to the 
reserve contained a population of some 74,8 1 6 . The population of Manokwari 
District as a whole reached 1 3 5 ,643 in 1 99 1 ,  and was growing at an annual rate 
of 4.3 7 percent (PIJ 1 993 :23) .  In addition, there are three indigenous tribes who 
traditional ly l ived with in, or in close proximity to, the conservation area, both in 
the mountains themselves and on the coastal slopes. These are the Hatam, 
Meyah, and Soub. Apart from two Soub clans, however, only the Hatam are 
reported as trad itional ly control l ing land in the reserve (Craven and de Fretes 
1 987 :33-34). In 1 988,  there were about 1 4,708 Hatam who l ived in settlements 
near the reserve boundaries. 
JO This account is based on descriptions contained in the management plans, and also personal 
communications ( 1 996) from Yopie Muskita and Jenny Foster-Smith. 
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Hatam settlement patterns in the mountains have changed dramatical ly 
since the early 1 960s. Traditionally, Hatam l ived in small isolated hamlets on 
the spurs and ridges of the range. Some thirty years ago, American missionaries 
from TEAM (The Evangel ical Al l iance Mission) establ ished a small m ission 
station in an upland val ley known as Minyambou. S ince that time, Hatam have 
moved down from the hamlets in the mountains into the surrounding valley, 
where there is now also an airstrip. In 1 987, World Vision International 
completed a six-year development project in the val ley which resulted in the 
construction of a smal l hydroelectric dam, a water supply system, a Bible school, 
and a modern health centre. The current settlement of Minyambou, with its 
ordered rows of houses c lustered around an airstrip, bears more resemblance to a 
country town in the United States than it does to a pre-colonial Hatam 
settlement. Whi le it is not representative of all settlements in the Hatam area, 
missionary and government influence have nonetheless resulted in the 
amalgamation of settlements throughout the mountains .  
Over the past three decades, the flora and fauna of the Arfak Mountains 
have been threatened by three patterns of activity: the expansion of 
transmigration settlements and agricultural plantations in the coastal lowlands; 
the extensification of shifting cultivation in the highland val leys; and the 
collection of birds and butterflies for the i l legal wildlife trade. While the 
expansion of shifting cultivation was not considered to be a major threat in 1 987, 
Craven and de Fretes ( 1 987 :46) sti l l  thought that it could become so if it 
continued without regulation . In 1 99 1 ,  Craven observed ( 1 99 1 : 1 2) that 
vegetable gardens established on recently cleared plots were the principal source 
of cash income for people in the western area of the reserve,3 1 and were 
therefore consuming an ever- increasing area of land. The people of Minyambou 
and Makwam, for example, were expanding the area under cultivation to grow 
vegetables for sale to shops, restaurants, and markets in Manokwari . By the 
beginning of the 1 990s, shifting cultivation, alongside the i l legal trade of birds 
of paradise, parrots, and butterflies, constituted the greatest threat to the 
conservation area. 
The objective of the Arfak management strategy was to establish a 
boundary 'chosen, recognised, and respected by indigenous peoples and the 
government' (ibid :3) .  The first step involved organising committees composed 
of local, indigenous leaders in al l of the Hatam communities located within, or 
adjacent to, the conservation area. These committees, which were organised for 
the most part by indigenous church leaders, were made up of influential people 
who could exercise some authority over the community of customary 
landowners . The WWF/KSDA team organised a total of fifteen committees in 
the conservation area, each of which represented the physical and social 
boundaries of a group of traditional landowners who were will ing to work 
together. In such a way, the WWF/KSDA team was able to divide the 
conservation area into fifteen territorial units, which Craven named 'nature 
3 I The produce is sold to markets and restaurants in Manokwari. 
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reserve management areas' (NRMAs). The aim of organising the committees 
was for them 'to use the traditional tribal system to defend the conservation area 
as they would the ir own tribal land' (Craven 1 990:2). In a publ ication intended 
for a Canadian audience, Craven and Nash claimed that ' the Hatam word for 
conservation area translates as "the place we guard"' ( 1 989:43). 
Between 1 988  and 1 992, these committees worked with the WWF /KSDA 
team to define a boundary between land for gardening and land for conservation 
(Craven 1 989 :5) .  This process was a protracted one, and involved some 
compromises between the boundary proposed by the WWF/KSDA on 
attitudinal, habitat, and species considerations, and the committee's own 
assessments of the present and future needs of their communities. The 
negotiation and marking of the western boundary was largely complete by 1 99 1 .  
Meanwhi le, the official government department charged with del ineating 
boundaries on the ground, BIPHUT (the Department of Forest Inventory and 
Mapping), proceeded to erect posts along the eastern boundary, as it had been 
defined by Petocz ( 1 983 ), without any community input. According to Craven 
( 1 99 1  ), the del ineation of this boundary al ienated local Hatam communities and 
has contributed to their lack of support for the conservation area. They have 
largely ignored the boundary and have even removed the boundary markers. By 
1 992, however, the WWF/KSDA had renegotiated the location of boundaries in 
the eastern segment of the reserve. In early 1 996, the WWF /KSDA were 
claiming that the location of the conservation area boundaries had been final ised 
by using this participatory method (personal communication, Yopie Muskita, 
1 996). 
The next step in the management strategy cal led for the WWF /KSDA team 
to negotiate a set of land and resource use restrictions with the Hatam through 
the Nature Reserve Management Committees. The original management plan 
had prescribed a system of five zones in the conservation area, each representing 
a different level of restriction on access and use : ' sanctuary zones' ,  where no 
d isturbance or appropriation of wildl ife would be permitted; ' traditional use 
zones' ,  where the Hatam could continue to hunt using 'traditional ' methods; 
'rehabi l itation zones ' ,  which had already been degraded but were now included 
in the conservation area; ' rights of way' ,  which comprised the paths traditional ly 
used by indigenous people to travel from the mountains to the coast; and finally 
'community development zones' ,  located on the boundaries of the reserve and to 
be used for the establ ishment of smal l-scale sustainable industries and 
agroforestry. However, shortly after the implementation of the management 
p lan had begun, the WWF /KSDA team was compel led to acknowledge that the 
zoning system was too complex, and even impol itic, because the whole area of 
the reserve consisted ' in real ity and in practice ' of traditional Hatam hunting 
lands. Thus, the entire conservation area has come to be viewed as a 'traditional 
use zone ' where hunting by Hatam people using bows and arrows is not 
restricted. The WWF /PHP A secured agreements with the nature reserve 
management committees to recognise and enforce other restrictions in the 
traditional use zone, but the only ones which are actively enforced are those 
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which deal with the tcl.king of resources from another vi l lage ' s  land, with the 
building of houses and establishment of gardens, and with collecting birds of 
paradise and butterflies (Craven 1 99 1  : 5). 
Another problem which developed during the implementation of the 
management plan was the lack of legal authority which the nature reserve 
management committees exercised over outsiders . While members of their own 
communities might respect the rules which the committees established for their 
areas, outsiders had little reason for doing so. In order to address this problem, 
the WWF /KSDA team worked to secure local government support for the 
committees and the management system. To a certain extent they have 
succeeded. Under present arrangements, the committees can report 
infringements of reserve regulations by outsiders to the KSDA office in 
Manokwari, or to the District Head (Bupati), and expect that they will receive 
assistance in stopping and prosecuting trespassers. 
The Arfak Mountains management strategy also advocated the development 
of alternative sources of cash income for the Hatam who customarily owned land 
in the conservation area. The most important initiative has been the promotion 
of 'butterfly ranching'32 in the 'community development zones' adjacent to the 
conservation area.33 The WWF/KSDA team bel ieved that butterfly ranching 
could provide the Hatam with an important financial incentive to support the 
conservation area: ' by ranching forest dependent species the economy becomes 
dependent on the presence of the forest' (Craven and Nash 1 989). 
The WWF initiated the butterfly ranching scheme in the western areas of 
the reserve in 1 989, and later, in December 1 992, helped to establish a local non­
governmental organisation, Yayasan Bina Lestari Bumi Cenderawasih 
(YBLBC), to manage the farming and marketing of the birdwing butterflies. In 
early 1 993 , YBLBC began to purchase pupae from Hatam ranchers and sell them 
to international col lectors through a semi-state owned forestry company. 
However, YBLBC hopes to manage marketing and exports on its own 
eventually. 
Several problems have afflicted the butterfly project. First of al l ,  YBLBC 
has faced problems of over-production. In its first two years of operation, the 
business sustained a large loss when it felt compel led to purchase large numbers 
of pupae from enthusiastic ranchers. A second problem is that YBLBC has 
faced long delays in obtaining the necessary CITES34 permits to export the 
32 Butterfly ranching involves cultivating the v ines on which the caterpi l lars feed and pupate. 
When the pupae are close to maturity, they are removed and transported to town, where they 
emerge under control led conditions. The butterflies are then promptly ki l led and mounted for sale. 
33 This industry was already well-established in the Manokwari area. Chinese and Indonesian 
merchants in Manokwari have paid Hatam to collect butterflies for domestic and international 
markets since 1 97 1 .  
34 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species. It takes many months to obtain 
export clearance under the conditions of the convention. 
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butterflies overseas. This has added to the cash flow problem, since YBLBC 
purchases pupae wel l  before it is  able to export them. In April 1 995 ,  however, 
the Arfak butterfly project received a three-year grant of US$ 1 79,000 from the 
B iodiversity Support Program35 to establ ish the trading agency on a firm basis .  
S ince the project started, 1 ,  1 85 famil ies have earned about US$48,000 from 
sales of pupae to the agency. 
The WWF/KSDA Arfak project has also faci l itated the establ ishment of a 
wholesale cooperative in Manokwari to supply smal l trade stores in the Hatam 
area. The trade stores developed out of community organisation and information 
centres which were establ ished by the leaders of the nature reserve management 
committees .  The cooperative was named ACEMO, which is an acronym of the 
names of al l the Hatam subtribes. It sel ls such items as rice, cooking oil ,  
kerosene, salt, soap, and soft drinks to its members for resale. By January 1 996, 
there were a total of 3 70 trade stores registered with the cooperative . The 
YBLBC reports that about 70 percent of the income from the sale of pupae has 
been reinvested in the purchase of trade store goods from the cooperative. The 
profit that is being earned by the cooperative is being saved in the bank, and wil l  
be used as a source of funds for Hatam chi ldren who gain entry to h igh school .  
Individual trade store owners keep their own profits (personal communication, 
Jenny Foster-Smith and Yopie Muskita, 1 996). 
On the whole, the management strategy for the Arfak conservation area has 
ach ieved some tangible results over the past decade . A reserve boundary was 
delimited in consultation with the local committees, regulations were drawn up 
and agreed upon, and the committees have some juridical authority to enforce 
the regulations. In addition, the butterfly ranching scheme has succeeded in 
generating modest levels of income for local fami l ies, wh ile the cooperative has 
so far been a major success. 
Jrian Jaya 's First National Park36 
Wasur National Park is located in the southeast corner of Irian Jaya and borders 
the Tonda Wildl ife Management Area in neighbouring PNG. It encompasses 
over 400,000 hectares37 of extremely flat terrain and includes large areas of 
eucalypt-clad savannahs which are unique to this part of New Guinea. There are 
also s ignificant stretches of lowland forest, swamps and tidal mud flats. Over 
400 species of b irds can be found in the park, including important populations of 
migratory waders and waterfowl .  The park also shelters s ign ificant numbers of 
wallabies and rusa deer. 
35 The B iodiversity Support Program is a consortium of the Worldwide Fund for Nature, the 
Nature Conservancy, and the World Resources Institute, with funding from the United States 
Agency of International Development. 
36 This description is  drawn from PHPA/WWF ( 1 992); Barber, Affif and Purnomo ( 1 995 :38-45); 
and Zulfira Warta (personal communication, 1 996). 
37 The WWF remeasured the official boundary maps for the park with an electric p lanimeter and 
calculated the area to be 4 1 3 ,8 1 0  hectares. 
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The forests of the W asur and Maro River areas were first declared as a 
Game Reserve by the Ministry of Agriculture in 1 978 .  The permanent lake in 
the centre, Rawa Biru, which is the major source of water for the town of 
Merauke, was declared as a Nature Reserve at the same time. In 1 982, the 
Minister of Agriculture increased the s ize of the reserve by about 98,000 
hectares, and in 1 990, the Minister of Forests reclassified the area as a National 
Park. 
The main source of threats to the ecological integrity of the park stem from 
the rapid expans ion of the town of Merauke and the chain of transmigration 
settlements along its western border. Merauke itself contains a population of 
some 44,000 people, whi le more than 1 9,000 people l ive in transmigration 
settlements across the Maro River. The growth of the town has also stimulated 
organised poaching of rusa deer and wal labies by outsiders who come equipped 
with jeeps, motorcycles, and guns. It has been estimated that deer meat sold in 
the Merauke markets (coming from adjacent areas as wel l  as Wasur itself) 
constitutes about 80 percent of urban meat consumption (PHPA/WWF 1 992). 
Until 1 990, moreover, the game reserve remained essentially unmanaged. 
There are also about 2,500 people who l ive with in the boundaries of the 
national park, approximately 1 ,  700 of whom are indigenous Marind, Kanum, 
Marori, and Yei .  The government has recognised that the Marind and Kanum 
peoples continue to have the right to l ive in the park. 
In January 1 99 1 ,  the WWF Irian Jaya programme, in conjunction with the 
subdistrict office (KSDA) of the PHPA, initiated a project to develop a 
management plan for the national park.38 Over the next two years, project staff 
carried out research in the park, including habitat and biological surveys, land 
tenure studies, a demographic and economic census, and feasibil ity studies of 
tourism and eucalypt o i l  as smal l-scale industries (PHPA/WWF 1 992 :65) .  This 
research formed the basis of the management plan, completed at the end of 1 992. 
A team of consultants funded by a World Bank loan were then commissioned to 
draft a twenty-five year management plan . The draft was completed in March 
1 994, and revisions are sti l l  being made by the KSDA/WWF staff. 
Like the management plans for other reserves in Irian Jaya, the Wasur 
prescription focussed on del ineating boundaries that wil l  be recognised and 
respected by the government, m igrant settlers, and indigenous people. However, 
Wasur is unique in having indigenous communities actual ly residing in the park 
- smal l v i llages on the frontier of a rapidly growing city. But rather than 
identifying the expansion of the town and its economy as the major source of 
threats to the park, the management plan identified the poverty of its residents as 
the single greatest threat. The plan stated that the motivation behind hunting and 
38 The current local management authority is the Subseksi Konservasi Sumber Daya Alam 
(KSDA) Merauke which comes under the authority of the KSDA Irian Jaya. Funding came from 
the Dutch government until 1 992, when the Dutch branch of the WWF stepped in and assumed 
financial responsibil ity for the project. 
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logging, the wildlife trade and land sales is ' the continual search for cash to buy 
food, clothes, education, housing and medication ' (ibid.) .  
The p lan proposed a four-part strategy to address both the need for 
conservation management and the need for improving the welfare of park 
residents . The initial move involved the establishment of institutional 
mechanisms for boundary control, through which park residents and local 
authorities could restrict access to the park by outsiders. The aim was to provide 
the customary landowners with a monopoly over the game (rusa deer and 
wal labies) in the park, thereby increasing their incomes and making the hunting 
more manageable. The second step involved the WWF/KSDA negotiating a 
multiple-use zoning system with park residents . Then, to administer the park, 
the p lan proposed a three-tiered structure of management authorities, comprising 
the local KSDA office, Vil lage Park Councils, and a Park Resident Advisory 
Body. Village park counci ls were to be composed of influential park residents 
who could act as intermediaries between their communities, the KSDA, and the 
local government. The councils would negotiate the location of zone 
boundaries, provide input into framing regulations, and keep the KSDA and 
local government authorities informed about any infringements. The fourth and 
final step involved the estab lishment of small-scale industries in 'uti l isation 
zones '  to provide park residents with an alternative and ecologically sustainable 
source of cash income. 
How, then, have these initiatives fared? 
Since 1 992, there has been some progress in implementing boundary 
control .  The WWF/KSDA establ ished a guard post on the Trans-Irian Highway, 
which cuts through the m iddle of the park. There has been a slight increase in 
the numbers of park staff (funded by the WWF). Experiments have been made 
in allowing park residents to use traditional methods for hunting deer and pigs . 
These have involved the issue of tickets to park residents at the guard posts in 
order to allow the transport of deer and pig meat to town . Park authorities have 
also been involved in organising local transport for this purpose . The plan noted 
that, in the first stage of implementation, this assertion of control over a key park 
resource for the exclusive use of residents was the single most important factor 
in increasing community support for the national park. 
Progress with regard to the establ ishment of a three-tiered structure of 
management authorities beyond the guard force has been slow. In 1 995, the 
WWF staff sti l l  thought that the concept was workable but might take a decade 
to ach ieve (Barber, Affif and Purnomo 1 995 :44). 
Evaluation of the success of the proposed zoning system would also be 
premature . The plan and subsequent documents (PHP A 1 994) mapped a system 
of five different zones, including a 'vi l lage zone ' ,  a 'uti l isation zone ' ,  a 
' traditional use zone' ,  a ' low-intensity use zone' ,  and a 'core zone' .  The 
establishment of the boundaries of these zones, and the restrictions on activities 
within them, were negotiated by the KSDA/WWF and park residents between 
1 992 and 1 994. The 'traditional use ' zone covers the entire park, and permits 
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the indigenous residents to continue their ' traditional activities ' within it .  The 
definition of ' traditional activities' was one focus of the research conducted in 
1 992, and came to include the establ ishment of small garden plots and hunting 
by pre-contact methods (such as fire), wh·ich is now seen as a key practice in 
maintaining biological d iversity. 
In conjunction with local partners, the WWF has also begun to implement 
the plans for two smal l-scale industries in several of the vi l lages in the park area. 
The WWF team has establ ished aromatic oi l  d isti l leries in a few vi l lages, as wel l  
as a marketing cooperative in Merauke which sel ls  oi l  to buyers in Java. This 
has succeeded in generating a modest amount of income for park residents. 
However, some trees have also been cut down and some areas over-harvested. 
Like the butterfly project in Arfak, the enterprise as a whole is running at a loss. 
Efforts have also been directed at promoting tourism in the park. Three 
guesthouses have been built in different v i l lage locations, and itineraries are 
being establ ished for travel lers . The project has also tried to establ ish 
safeguards to ensure that income goes directly to park residents rather than 
outside entrepreneurs. As tourists are required to hire transport and guides 
through the WWF office in Merauke, the trips are relatively expensive, but 
profits over costs are channel led back through the vi l lage management counci ls 
to pay for community needs.39 Although the number of park visitors since 1 992 
has been small (perhaps 600), WWF staff are actively seeking to expand the 
enterprise. 
Since the WWF Wasur programme began in 1 99 1 ,  it has accomplished a 
great deal in terms of establ ishing beneficial relationsh ips between park 
residents and park authorities. The project has strengthened the boundary 
protecting the park from encroachment by residents of the neighbouring town 
and transmigration settlements . It remains to be seen, however, if smal l-scale 
businesses wil l  succeed sufficiently to function as a substitute for more 
destructive efforts to generate cash income .  More troubl ing, however, are the 
effects of national development pol icies which continue to promote the Merauke 
area as a s ite for new transmigration settlements, forestry projects, and the 
expansion of rice cultivation . As the town of Merauke grows, the stress on the 
resources of the park must correspondingly increase. In th is setting, it would not 
be surprising if the indigenous communities continued to ally themselves with 
conservation practitioners in an effort to protect their land and resources in a 
region where they have already become marginal players. 
The Troubled History of the Proposed Lorentz National Park4° 
S ince the late 1 970s, a section of the southern escarpment of the Carstensz 
Mountains in the Central Dividing Range has been a h igh priority area for 
39 In January 1 996, the price for tours ranged from about US$72 to US$300 per person per day. 
Most of the income derived thus far has been spent on secondary school fees. 
40 This account is based on Jim Schweithelm (personal communication, 1 996). 
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conservationists. This  is because the region includes the highest peak in 
south east Asia, Mount Jaya ( 4,884 metres), the permanent snowfields below it, 
and a 'complete spectrum of alpine, subalpine, montane, lowland and swamp 
forests [extending down] to the coastal mangroves of the Arafura Sea' (Petocz 
and Raspado 1 989 : 5 8) .  In other words, the region comprised a complete 
altitudinal transect of al l  of the major habitats of the southern region, which are 
home to a substantial proportion of al l  the known species of Irian Jaya. In this 
area, b iologists have identified 1 23 of the 1 72 mammal species, and 4 1 1 of the 
643 bird species, within the proposed boundaries of the reserve. 
The Dutch are credited with making the first attempt to create a nature 
reserve in this area. In 1 9 1 9, they legal ly declared a 300,000 hectare area from 
the equatorial icefields to the southern coast, bracketed by the Noord West and 
Lorentz rivers . In 1 956, however, the Dutch colonial administration abolished 
the reserve because of the unresolved land rights of indigenous people who l ived 
within it (Petocz 1 989:44; Smith 1 993 : 1 7- 1 8). 
In 1 978, the Indonesian government re-establ ished the Lorentz Strict Nature 
Reserve following the recommendations of the F AO/UNDP report ( 1 977). The 
boundaries of the reserve encompassed some 2 . 1 5  mi l l ion hectares. They 
enclosed not only the entire Freeport mine and Timika township, but also some 
of the densely populated communities of the highlands. The tribal lands of five 
tribal groups were included in the reserve, as wel l  as a number of settlements 
with a population numbering wel l  over 1 0,000 people (Manembu 1 99 1  ) .  In 
1 980, a joint WWF /PHP A team recommended that the boundaries be changed to 
exclude the mine site and associated operations, as wel l  as most of the highland 
vi llages, thus reducing the s ize of the reserve to 1 .48 mi l l ion hectares (Petocz 
1 983) .  They also recommended that the status of the reserve be changed to that 
of a National Park to al low for a more flexible approach to conservation 
management. In 1 992, the Forestry Department and the Department of Mines 
submitted another proposal for boundary changes which repeated those that had 
been recommended in 1 980, along with a few modifications along the southwest 
boundary (Smith 1 993 : 1 8) .  However, the government has not yet officially 
recognised the proposed changes. The Lorentz legally remains a Nature Reserve 
with the same boundaries as those that were drawn in 1 978 .  
In the mid- l 980s, the Lorentz area was considered a high-priority reserve 
for development as a National Park (Petocz and Raspado 1 989 :58) .  The 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature even proposed that the 
Lorentz be included on its l ist of World Heritage sites .  But, despite the interest 
amongst the .. international conservation community in the fate of this large 
' pristine area' ,  the WWF Irian Jaya programme had difficulty raising funds to 
start an active project. 
The reasons for the lack of international donor interest in the Lorentz are 
unclear, but can probably be attributed to two major issues which affect the 
reserve. Firstly, the Indonesian government does not seem to be particularly 
committed to the reserve, because there are large prospects of subsurface 
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minerals in the central mountains and o i l  in the coastal lowlands. The Basic 
Mining Act of 1 968 clearly states that these natural resources are the property of 
the state, and that their exploitation takes precedence over all other forms of land 
use . When Freeport finished mining the Ertsberg cap in 1 989, the Indonesian 
government granted it a second concession of 2 .6  mi l l ion hectares, much of 
which falls within the boundaries of the reserve (see McBeth 1 994). 
Secondly, the central high lands have historical ly been the scene of a great 
deal of social unrest s ince the Indonesian takeover in 1 963 , and more recently, 
since the construction of the Freeport mine in the early 1 970s. The construction 
of the m ine displaced a number of indigenous communities, while the direct 
d isposal of tai l ings from the mine into the Ajkwe and Minanjeri rivers has 
greatly increased sedimentation rates and forced the rivers back into a network 
of shal low braided channels .4 1 Lowland vegetation in the vicinity of these 
channels has died back - in some places for 30 ki lometres from the source of the 
river (PHP A 1 995) .  Traditional landowners do not receive any direct royalty 
payments from Freeport, whi le compensation for the loss of land and resources 
over the past thirty years has been extremely l imited.42 It is therefore no 
surprise that the highland area around the m ine has been a major centre of OPM 
activity and of repeated mi l itary reprisals since the mid- 1 970s (see Osborne 
1 985) .  The prospects for the development of new mining and oil ventures in the 
region, and the threat of continuing social unrest and violence, have probably 
helped to dissuade international agencies from investing in the management of 
the nature reserve. 
In 1 990, however, the WWF secured funding to launch a pi lot project in the 
reserve which resulted in the production of two reports. The first report 
provided an ethnographic overview of four of the tribal groups whose traditional 
lands were included in the reserve, and offered a partial assessment of their 
attitudes towards the establ ishment of the national park (Manembu 1 99 1 ;  see 
also Cook 1 995) .  The second report explored the tourism potential of the 
Lorentz Reserve (Smith 1 993) .  It took the WWF another four years to secure 
additional funding for the next phase of the project. The Asian Development 
Bank deferred a request for funding, while there were repeated breakdowns in 
negotiations with the Freeport mine to establish a 'Friends of the Lorentz' 
committee which would have involved Freeport, the PHPA, the WWF and other 
NGOs, and which would have included joint financial support. In 1 995,  the 
WWF finally secured funding from the Dutch branch of the WWF, the German 
aid agency GTZ,43 and the B iodiversity Conservation Fund . The goal of the 
project was to develop a draft management plan by the end of a two-year period, 
and then to l ine up additional funding for its implementation . 
4 1 On average, the mine has discharged between 1 00,000 and 1 60,000 tonnes each day since the 
beginning of the decade (PHPA 1 995). 
42 See also the reports in The Ecologist, 25(6), 1 996; Tapo/ Bulletin, No. 1 32, December 1 995; 
and Indonesia Reports, No. 325, April 1 996. 
43 Gemeinschaft fiir Technische Zusammenarbeit ( 'Technical Cooperation Agency ') .  
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The project started in m id- 1 995 ,  with the aim of devising strategies to 
increase the interest of indigenous communities in the idea of a national park. 
As in the case of Cyclops and Arfak nature reserves, the core strategy to win 
such support was 'participatory mapping' . In the second half of 1 995,  
conservation practitioners were involved in locating customary land boundaries. 
They also began to consult with local communities, to col lect oral histories, and 
to make sketch maps. Again, the col laboration between conservation 
practitioners and indigenous groups in the participatory mapping process had a 
number of goals. These included the acceptance of reserve area boundaries, 
developing a mutually agreed zoning system, and raising awareness for nature 
conservation (Momberg 1 994). More significantly, however, 'participatory 
mapping' was also aimed at strengthening customary land rights. 
In January 1 996, two staff members of the WWF Lorentz project, along 
with members of a Cambridge University biological expedition to the reserve, 
were taken hostage by a faction of the OPM. The leader of the faction, Kel ly 
Kwalik, had long been organising acts of sabotage against the Freeport m ine.44 
Kwalik believed that, by taking Western hostages, the rebels would draw 
international attention both to the activities of Freeport and to the OPM's  quest 
for independence from Indonesia.45 The hostage crisis dragged on unti l  the 
middle of May, when an e lite Indonesian mi l itary unit under the command of 
Prabowo Subianto, Soeharto' s  son-in-law, freed the hostages in a mi l itary raid .  
Two of the Indonesian hostages were murdered, but the Western hostages 
escaped unharmed. 
The OPM action in this case did not succeed in raising sympathetic 
international attention to their cause . Instead, it was either condemned by 
governments or passed unnoticed in the world' s  major media. The Indonesian 
government responded by stepping up the presence of the mi l itary in the Timika 
area. The OPM action also dealt a severe, if not irreversible, setback to the 
WWF Lorentz project. 
Conclusion: Drawing and Enforcing Boundaries 
In this chapter, I have provided evidence that conservation initiatives have not 
been easier to ach ieve in Irian Jaya than in PNG, despite the differences in 
national systems of land tenure. I have pointed out that the Indonesian 
government has only partial ly acted on the recommendations of its consultants, 
and has only just begun to implement conservation management in a handful of 
44 Kwalik reportedly participated in the sabotaging of the pipeline that carried copper and gold 
sluice down to Timika in 1 977 (the incident is described in Osborne 1 985 :69). An Australian 
journalist who interviewed Kwalik in the interior of Irian Jaya in 1 995 reported that 'the issue of 
compensation and equity seems central to Kwal ik and the tribes he represents' (Bohane 1 996:34). 
45 It is ironic that the OPM took this particular group hostage. In November 1 995, nineteen 
environmental groups signed a petition which charged Freeport with 'massively altering the 
landscape, irreparably damaging the rich biodiversity of the area, and harming the health and 
sustenance of local indigenous communities ' (McBeth 1 996 :28). 
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high priority areas. Even in the areas where conservation management is being 
implemented, conservation practitioners are finding that they must first address 
the competition for land and resources which is taking place between the state, 
indigenous Irianese, and recent Indonesian- immigrants. 
From the perspective of conservation practitioners in PNG, the strategies 
that their couq.terparts in Irian Jaya have developed to manage conservation 
areas are l iable to present something of a paradox. From their perspective, the 
legal protection of customary land rights in PNG has created numerous, 
seemingly intractable obstacles to nature conservation. In Irian Jaya, on the 
other hand, conservation practitioners have viewed state recognition of 
customary land tenure as an essential precondition for successful nature 
conservation.46 
The paradox d isappears, however, when we recognise the obvious : that the 
status of ethnic Melanesians in the pol itical economy of these two nation-states 
is fundamentally different. 'Melanesians'  in Irian Jaya comprise a smal l ,  
marginal ethnic m inority in a nation of over 200 mil l ion people, where the state 
controls the al location of permits for, and the revenue from, the exploitation of 
timber, subsurface 111 inerals, and oi l .  The Irianese, in other words, are not in a 
position to negotiate a ' rent' for ' their' natural resources. Their material interest 
in land and resources is more l ikely to correspond with the conservationist 's 
interest in the protection of nature. In PNG, on the other hand, the 
'Melanesians' are an indigenous citizenry divided into numerous customary 
landholding groups which can negotiate rental incomes and demand 
compensation or royalty payments for the exploitation of natural resources. 
Their material interest in conservation or exploitation varies in accordance with 
their abi l ity to command local resources. We may therefore say that 
'Melanesians' in Irian Jaya constitute an ethnic 'c lass ' ,  while 'Melanesians' in 
PNG do not. 
Nevertheless, the differences in the 'c lass positions' of Melanesians in PNG 
and Irian Jaya, and the differences in national systems of forest tenure, have not 
led to predictable d ifferences in the outcomes of conservation projects. In Irian 
Jaya, putative state control of forests has facil itated proposals for the 
establishment of conservation areas. It has also, to some extent, facil itated their 
legal declaration . But it has not meant that either the state or indigenous 
communities have found it easier to recognise the boundaries of nature reserves 
on the ground . 
46 'The key to conservation area management in Irian Jaya is a boundary chosen, recognized and 
respected by the indigenous people and the Government' (Craven 1 99 1  :3) .  
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